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  • Order I, rule 10, clause (2) of the Civil Procedure Code
  • section 2, clause 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • SECTION 42 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Order I, rule 10, clause (2),
  • Order I, rule 10,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Order I, rule 10, clause (2) of the Civil Procedure Code
  • section 2, clause 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • SECTION 42 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Order I, rule 10, clause (2),
  • Order I, rule 10,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order striking out the name of the first defendant (the Raja of Pittapur) on a petition under Order I, rule 10, for amendment of the plaint. The first defendant had brought a suit as the next reversioner of property enjoyed by the fourth defendant, the widow of a junior member of the Pittapur family, seeking a declaration that an adoption made by her was invalid. The widow contested the Raja's claim to be the next reversioner and denied his relationship to her deceased husband. The plaintiffs, who also denied the Raja's relationship and claimed themselves to be the next reversioners, unsuccessfully sought to be made parties to that suit. Having failed, they instituted the present suit against the Raja and the widow for declarations that the Raja was not the nearest reversioner or a reversioner at all, and that the adoption was invalid.

The second and fourth defendants did not challenge the plaintiffs' claim to be the next reversioners and contended that the plaintiffs, not the Raja, were entitled to that character. The Subordinate Judge struck out the Raja's name from the suit on the ground that the plaint disclosed no cause of action against him and dismissed the suit against him. The plaintiffs appealed against this order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order striking out the name of a defendant on the ground that the plaint discloses no cause of action against him constitutes a decree and is appealable.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to maintain a separate suit against the Raja for a declaration that they, and not the Raja, are the next reversioners of the deceased.
  3. Whether a reversioner has a legal character or right to sue individually under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act for a declaratory decree as to status.
  4. Whether the plaintiffs' suit seeking a declaration of reversionership is maintainable as per settled legal principles and precedents.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs argued that they are persons entitled to the lawful character of next reversioners within the meaning of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • They contended that under section 42, they are entitled to bring a declaratory suit against the Raja, who questions their status.
  • The appellants relied on the fact that the Raja had brought a suit in the character of next reversioner, which they argued made a difference to their entitlement to sue.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Raja and others contended that the plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain a separate suit against the Raja for declaration of reversionership.
  • It was argued that a reversioner has no individual legal character or personal right of action under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • The respondents relied on settled practice and precedent that a declaration under section 42 is discretionary and generally not granted when the question is which of two persons is entitled to the status of next reversioner.
  • They emphasized that the plaintiffs had failed to be made parties to the Raja's suit and should not be allowed to maintain the present suit against him.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Saudagar Singh v. Pardip Narayan Singh Practice regarding declaratory relief under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, particularly on whether a declaration as to status of next reversioner ought to be made. The court relied on this precedent to affirm that such declarations are generally not granted when the only question is entitlement to the character of next reversioner, as it may serve no useful purpose.
Bobba Padmanabhudu v. Bobba Buchamma Suit by a reversioner for declaration relating to adoption authority. The court distinguished this case, holding it did not support maintainability of the present suit as it involved different facts.
Naganna v. Sivanappa History and scope of actions under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The court found this precedent did not assist the appellants, as the suit in that case was by a successor after widow's death, not a reversioner before succession opens.
Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer Whether a reversioner has a legal right to sue individually under section 42 for protection of estate and declarations of status. The court treated this decision as conclusive that a reversioner does not have an individual legal character to maintain such a suit; thus, the present suit was not maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first considered the nature of the order striking out the first defendant's name and concluded that, despite being made under Order I, rule 10, it amounted to a decree because it conclusively adjudicated the rights of the parties by dismissing the suit against the first defendant. Thus, the appeal was maintainable.

On the merits, the court analyzed the legal position of a reversioner under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. It held that a reversioner does not possess any individual legal character or personal right of action before succession opens. The right to sue arises only as a representative of the entire body of reversioners, not individually.

The court examined several precedents, including Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer, which established that a reversioner cannot maintain a suit solely for a declaration of status. It found that the plaintiffs' suit was essentially a request for such a declaration against the Raja, which is not maintainable. The court also noted settled practice discouraging declaratory relief when the question is which claimant is entitled to a status that may change over time.

The court rejected the argument that the Raja's prior suit as next reversioner justified the plaintiffs' separate suit, especially since the plaintiffs had failed to be made parties in that suit and did not seek injunctive relief to restrain it.

Accordingly, the court agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the suit against the Raja could not be sustained and the order striking out his name was correct.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The court's decision directly results in the dismissal of the suit against the first defendant (the Raja) on the ground that the plaintiffs cannot maintain a separate declaratory suit as next reversioners under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. No broader precedent is established beyond the affirmation of settled legal principles regarding the rights of reversioners and the nature of appeals against orders under Order I, rule 10.

    Rama Rao v. Raja Of Pittapur

    Wallis, C.J:— This is an appeal from an order striking out the name of the first defendant on a petition under Order I, rule 10, for the amendment of the plaint. No separate appeal is provided under the Code from orders passed under this rule, but in this case the Subordinate Judge decided to strike out the first defendant's name on the ground that the plaint disclosed no cause of action against him and ordered the suit to be dismissed as against him. In these circumstances I think the order comes within the definition of a ‘decree’ and is appealable as such. The facts are these. The fourth defendant is the widow of a junior member of the Pittapur family and the Raja of Pittapur, the first defendant, has recently brought a suit as next reversioner of the property in her enjoyment for a declaration that an adoption made by her is invalid. The widow as one of her defences, contested the Raja's claim to be the next reversioner and denied that he was related to her deceased husband. The present plaintiffs, who also deny the Raja's relationship and claim to be themselves the next reversioners to the estate in the hands of the widow, sought unsuccessfully to be made parties to that suit for the purpose of establishing as against the Raja that they are the next reversioners. Having failed in that attempt they then instituted the present suit against the Raja and the widow for a declaration that the Raja, the first defendant, is not the nearest reversioner or a reversioner at all of the husband of the fourth defendant and for a further declaration that the adoption of the second defendant by the fourth defendant was invalid. The second and fourth defendants in their written statement have not challenged the plaintiffs' claim to be the next reversioners, and indeed it is their case in the suit brought against them by the Raja that the plaintiffs and not the Raja are entitled to that character. In these circumstances it is clear that the Raja is not a necessary party to the suit as between the plaintiffs and the widow and the adopted boy, and that the suit against him cannot be supported, unless it be held, as argued, that the plaintiffs are entitled to maintain a separate suit against the Raja for a declaration that the plaintiffs and not the Raja are the next reversioners of the deceased and that the latter is not entitled to usurp the character of next reversioner. Mr. C.P Ramaswami Ayyar argued that the plaintiffs are persons entitled to the lawful character of next reversioners within the meaning of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and that they are entitled under that section to bring a declaratory suit against the first defendant who questions it. The granting of the relief under that section is discretionary with the Court, and it appears tome that there is a settled rule of practice against the grant of such relief when the only question for decision is which of two persons is entitled to the character of next reversioner at the date of the institution of the suit, a decision which may serve no useful purpose as both the claimants may be dead and a different person entitled to succeed when the succession actually opens. In the most recent case, Saudagar Singh v. Pardip Narayan Singh, Lord Pakker of Waddington delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee stated that the point was simply whether under the practice prevalent in India such a declaration, that is, a declaration under section 42, ought to have been made. In the present case, I think the Subordinate Judge was right in holding that it ought not. Mr. Ramaswami Ayyar argued that the fact that the Raja had brought a suit in the character of next reversioner made a difference, but his client has refrained no doubt advisedly from praying by way of consequential relief for an injunction restraining the Raja from prosecuting the other suit. Whatever grounds the plaintiffs may have had for asking to be made parties defendants in the other suit, a matter not now before us, they ought not, in my opinion, to be allowed either by reason of that failure or on any other grounds be maintain the present suit against the Raja and the Subordinate Judge was right in dismissing it. The Appeal fails, and must be dismissed with costs.

    Seshagiri Ayyar, J.:— I am of the same opinion. This appeal raises some interesting questions. The plaintiffs who are the appellants sued for a declaration that the first defendant is not the nearest reversioner to the estate of one Raja Venkata Rao and that he is not entitled to conduct any proceedings in respect of the said estate and for a further declaration that the adoption of second defendant made by the fourth defendant to her husband, the said Venkata Rao is not valid. The late Raja of Pittapur had a brother named Raja Venkata Rao. The latter, before his death, it is alleged, gave his wife, the fourth defendant, authority to adopt a son. She adopted the brother of the plaintiffs. The first defendant is the present owner of the Pittapur zamindari. On the death of the last zamindar his status as Aurasa son of the zamindar was challenged. The High Court and the Judicial Committee, without expressing any opinion on this question, held that under the will of the previous zamindar the first defendant was entitled to the estate as persona designata. This was in 1899. In O.S No. 55 of 1915 the present first defendant brought a suit for a declaration that the present fourth defendant was not entitled to adopt a boy to her husband. The present plaintiffs intervened and wanted to be made parties to that suit. Their application was dismissed. In revision the High Court refused to interfere. That suit is now being tried. In substance the present plaintiffs' contention is that as the first defendant is not the Aurasa son of the late zamindar, he is not the nearest reversioner to the estate of Raja Venkata Rao and that consequently he has no right to bring a suit to declare that the adoption by Raja Venkata Rao's widow is invalid. The Subordinate Judge in a carefully written judgment came to the conclusion that the first defendant's name should be struck out and that the prayer against him should be deleted. Against that order this appeal has been preferred.

    A preliminary objection was taken by the learned Advocate-General against the maintainability of the appeal. His contention is that the order of the Subordinate Judge comes under Order I, rule 10, clause (2) of the Civil Procedure Code and that no appeal is provided against it under Order XLIII. In a way the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge may be Said to come within Order I, rule 10. But what we have to see is the substance of the order and not the form of it. In his order the Subordinate Judge examines the right of the plaintiffs to bring a suit like the present one and concludes, having regard to certain authorities which he has quoted, that such a suit would not lie. In my opinion this is an adjudication determining the rights of the plaintiffs to bring a suit of this nature; and his order is a ‘decree’ defined in section 2, clause 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is one other answer to this preliminary objection. I am disposed to agree with Mr. C.P Ramaswami Ayyar who appeared for the appellants that unless the removal of the plaintiff or defendants leaves the suit intact Order I, rule 10, clause (2), cannot apply. In this clause the words are:

    “The Court may order that the name of any party improperly joined whether as plaintiff or defendant be struck out.”

    That is to say, the impropriety is in introducing a party who has no connection with the reliefs claimed in the plaint. Moreover Order I, rule 10, clause (2), does not relate to the deletion of reliefs but only to the striking out of parties. Consequently where a substantial right has been adjudicated upon and where the party's name has been struck out not on the ground that a suit against him would not lie and where a substantial relief claimed in the suit has been ordered to be deleted, I am of opinion that the Court has “conclusively adjudicated the rights of the parties with regard to a matter in controversy” and that therefore the order of the Subordinate Judge is a decree. The preliminary objection must therefore be overruled.

    On the merits, very elaborate arguments were addressed to us on both sides. It is now settled that a reversioner has no personal right of action. If he happens to be the next reversioner or if he is able to prove, that the next reversioner has neglected his rights, he is given a right of action as representing the entire body of the reversioners. In other words, he has no individual rights or, in the language of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, “is not entitled to any legal character in his own right.” Therefore the first of the ingredients necessary to enable him to sue under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is wanting.

    Mr. Ramaswami Ayyar referred to some decisions of this Court as supporting his contention. In Bobba Padmanabhudu v. Bobba Buchamma I pointed out that a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that his divided brother did not give authority to adopt as alleged by his widow is maintainable. My conclusion was in accordance with the judgment of the Judicial Committee which I quoted. I do not think that any observation of mine in that judgment lends support to the maintainability of the present suit. Reference was also made to Naganna v. Sivanappa wherein I traced the history of actions under section 42. Mr. Ramaswami Ayyar referred to the headnote which makes it appear as if the suit was brought by a reversioner and contended that if a reversioner was allowed to sue for a declaration that a decree obtained by: a third party against property in the hands of the widow is not binding on him, the present suit is equally maintainable. In my judgment I pointed out that the suit was not really one by a reversioner but by a person who had succeeded to the property on the death of the widow. In my judgment the expression ‘reversioner’ appears in one or two places. But the expression has not been employed as referring to the rights of persons before succession opens to them but only as describing what their status was before the widow died. That decision therefore does not help the appellants. On the other hand there is the decision of the Judicial Committee in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer which seems to be conclusive on the question now in dispute. In that case the suit was brought by a reversioner for a declaration that the widow was wrongfully wasting and alienating the property. In the first Court the allegations of waste and alienations were found against. But as there was an issue whether the plaintiff was a reversioner, the first Court gave a decree embodying such a declaration. On appeal to the High Court this Court agreed with the lower Court that no acts of waste were proved and held that the declaration should remain. Before the Judicial Committee it was contended for the respondents that “as next reverisoner he was the proper person to sue for the protection of the estate and therefore be had a ‘legal right as to property’ within the meaning of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.” It is with reference to this contention that their Lordships say in page 639:

    “And in their Lordships' opinion the case must accordingly be treated as if the suit had been directed simpliciter to a declaration of the plaintiff's individual right. In the view of the Board it is not legitimate to give a plaintiff under cover of a request for ‘further relief’ after all the substantial heads of a claim have failed greater right to obtain a declaration than he would have had if such a declaration had been asked directly and unaccompanied by other and unfounded claims.”

    These observations are exactly in point. If the suit against the first defendant is to be regarded simply as one for a declaration that the plaintiffs are the reversioners and not the first defendant, the observations of the Judicial Committee leave no room for doubt that such a suit would not be maintainable. Mr. Ramaswami Ayyar sought to distinguish this case by arguing that this was not a case in which there were rival claimants to the nearest reversionership. I do not think that this matters. In Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer there was an issue whether the plaintiff was the nearest reversioner. The fact that the nearest reversionership was denied by the widow and not by another reversioner is not a ground for distinction. I have already pointed out each reversioner has not an individual legal character. Mr. Ramaswami Ayyar referred to the decision in Saudagar Singh v. Pardip Narayan Singh where a declaration as to the status of the nearest reversioner was embodied in the decree. Lord Parker distinguishes the case in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyer on the ground that the declaration in the case before the Board was only incidental to the main relief given in the case. It is stated in the judgment:

    “It is quite true that it involves a finding that the plaintiffs in this case are reversionary heirs but that must always he the case where a declaration is made following the illustration (e) of the section, because it is only in virtue of the persons claiming the declaration being reversionary heirs, and therefore presumptively entitled that the declaration is made.”

    In that case the substantial declaration was as to the validity of the document, and the declaration as to reversionership was really a part of the main relief given in the case. I do not think this decision is any authority for the proposition that a bare declaration of the status as a reversioner lies under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. I do not think it necessary to examine the other cases quoted at the bar, I think the decision of the Subordinate Judge is right and this Appeal should be dismissed with costs.

    N.R

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    Rama Rao v. Raja Of Pittapur
    (Oct 2, 1918)