AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • clause (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act
  • cl. (2), Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Article 182 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act
  • cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • Article 182, cl. (2) of the Limitation Act
  • Article 182 (2) of the Limitation Act
  • Rule 79 (M) of 1940
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • clause (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act
  • cl. (2), Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Article 182 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act
  • cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • Article 182, cl. (2) of the Limitation Act
  • Article 182 (2) of the Limitation Act
  • Rule 79 (M) of 1940
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by the judgment-debtor (Defendant No. 5) against an order dated 13 May 1944 of the Subordinate Judge, 4th Court, Mymensingh, which dismissed his objections to the execution of a decree under section 47, Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.).

The decree sought to be executed arose from a partition suit in which the preliminary decree was dated 3 April 1938 and made final on 13 August (the following year). The final decree purported to rest on a compromise. On the day the compromise petition was filed and the decree passed, Defendant No. 5 (the present appellant) was absent though his pleader signed the compromise petition on his behalf. On 11 November 1935 Defendant No. 5 applied to set aside the compromise decree under Order IX, Rule 13 and section 151, C.P.C., contending his vakalat-nama was not signed by him and that the decree was, as to him, ex parte.

The trial court dismissed that application on 6 October 1939 as time-barred. The defendant appealed (F.M.A. No. 53 of 1940) and also filed an alternative application under section 115, C.P.C., upon which Rule 79 (M) of 1940 was issued; both the appeal and the Rule were dismissed by this Court on 23 July 1943.

Meanwhile, in December 1939 the decree-holders earlier filed an execution application limited to costs, which was struck off for non-prosecution on 4 July 1940. After this Court disposed of the appeal against the order rejecting the application to set aside the decree, the decree-holders filed a fresh execution petition on 20 December 1943 (registered as O.C. Execution Case No. 58 of 1943) praying for delivery of possession in terms of the final decree.

In the execution petition it was stated under column 11 that the execution proceedings were stayed pending the hearing of the appeal in this Court — a statement that the opinion records as "admittedly false." The executing Court nevertheless held the application to be within time and directed delivery of possession through a Commissioner with police assistance. The present appellant then filed objections under section 47, C.P.C., asserting the execution petition was barred by limitation under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Subordinate Judge overruled the limitation objection (holding time ran from 23 July 1943 under Article 182(2)) and also held the judgment-debtor was estopped from raising limitation because he had received notice under Order XXI, rule 22, C.P.C. The appellant challenged both points on this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of Article 182(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation for executing a decree runs from the date of the final decree or from the date of an appellate order dismissing an appeal that was taken against an order rejecting an application to set aside an ex parte decree (i.e., whether an appeal under those circumstances extends the period of limitation).
  2. Whether the judgment-debtor is estopped from raising the defence of limitation to execution because he received notice under Order XXI, rule 22, C.P.C., and did not object prior to the making of the order for delivery of possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Relying on previous decisions of this Court (notably Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan and Profulla Kumar Basu v. Sorojbala Basu), the appellant contended that an application to set aside an ex parte decree does not keep the decree open for the purposes of Article 182(2) — i.e., an appeal from an order rejecting such an application does not extend the period of limitation for execution.
  • The appellant further attacked the finding of service of notice under Order XXI, rule 22, C.P.C., on factual grounds: the peon's return and the evidence of witnesses were defective, one witness named was not examined, the peon's enquiries and efforts were not shown, and it was unclear whether the person who refused to accept service was a family member authorized for substituted service under Order V, rule 15, C.P.C. Thus the subordinate court's finding on service was unsatisfactory and required re-consideration.

Respondents' Arguments (Decree-holders)

  • Dr. Sen Gupta for the respondents argued that the Privy Council decision in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey impliedly overruled earlier High Court authorities and that Article 182(2) should be given its plain meaning: "where there has been an appeal" — without qualification as to who were parties or whether the appeal was directed against the decree sought to be executed. On this view the period should run from the Appellate Court's final order (23 July 1943).
  • He relied on subsequent decisions of other High Courts (Patna, Madras, Bombay) which accepted the broader interpretation that appeals against orders in separate proceedings (e.g., applications under Order IX, rule 13 or review orders) may bring the case within Article 182(2).
  • On the service point, by virtue of the peon's report and the fact that notice under Order XXI, rule 22 had been returned, the respondents argued the judgment-debtor had notice of the execution proceedings and therefore could not raise limitation later (i.e., was estopped by his silence after service).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck Held that an application by a defendant to revive a suit which was decreed ex parte keeps the decree open until the Appellate Court passes an order on the application. The Court notes this was an early pronouncement but was expressly dissented from in later decisions of this Court; it did not follow Lutful Huq's principle for the present case.
Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Held that an application to set aside a decree does not keep the decree open; the expression "decree on appeal" means the decree on appeal from the decree sought to be executed. The Court treated this and similar decisions as authoritative in favour of the appellant's position and relied on them to conclude Article 182(2) does not apply to appeals from orders rejecting applications under Order IX, rule 13.
Profulla Kumar Basu v. Sorojbala Basu Affirmed the view that the words in Article 182(2) mean an appeal from the decree sought to be executed and that an application to set aside a decree does not keep the decree open. The Court cited this as one of the later decisions of this Court that support the appellant's position and relied on it in interpreting Article 182(2).
Jivaji v. Ramchandra; Balkanta Nath Mitra v. Aughore Nath Bose; Rai Brij Raj v. Naurattam Lal These decisions were referenced by Page, J. in support of the restrictive interpretation of "decree on appeal". The Court records that these cases were referred to in earlier High Court reasoning and uses their citation as background support for the restrictive interpretation upheld by this Court.
Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (Privy Council) Privy Council held that the phrase "where there has been an appeal" in Article 182(2) must be taken in its plain grammatical meaning: any appeal to an Appellate Court suffices and time runs from the Appellate Court's decree; qualifications as to character of appeal or parties are unwarranted. The Court carefully examined and distinguished this decision: it observed the Privy Council's case involved an appeal against the decree itself. The Court held that Nagendra Nath Dey does not authorise extending Article 182(2) to appeals from orders in separate proceedings (such as orders rejecting applications under Order IX, rule 13) and therefore does not displace the earlier decisions of this Court.
Christiana Sens Law… v. Benarashi Proshad Chowdhury… Used by Mr. Justice Suhrawardy to support the view that "appeal" in Article 182(2) means an appeal directed against the decree sought to be executed. The Court records this authority as having been relied on in High Court reasoning that an appeal must be one which is likely to affect the decree sought to be executed.
Firm Dedhraj v. Bhagwan Das (Patna High Court) Held that "where there has been an appeal" in Article 182(2) does not require the appeal to be against the decree itself and may include appeals against orders (e.g., re-hearing) in the suit. The Court noted this decision as supporting the broader view urged by respondents but explicitly rejected that reasoning in favour of the line of authority of this Court.
Nandury Sriram Chandra v. Chintamani Bhatta (Madras High Court) Held that an appeal against the order dismissing an application to set aside an ex parte decree extended the time for execution to run from the Appellate Court's final order. The Court acknowledged this decision but declined to accept its reasoning, finding it inconsistent with the Privy Council decision as properly construed and with the existing authorities of this Court.
Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa (Bombay High Court) Dealt with an appeal against an order granting review where the decree was subsequently amended; held the time for execution of the amended decree would run from the appellate decision on the review order. The Court treated this as factually distinct and held it did not support the broad proposition that every appeal in the suit (even if not against the decree to be executed) extends limitation under Article 182(2).
Lalit Mohan Roy v. Sarat Chandra Saha Authority for the proposition that where notice under Order XXI, rule 22, C.P.C. is duly served and the judgment-debtor remains silent, he cannot later raise the point of limitation and is deemed to have acquiesced. The Court invoked this precedent to explain that if it is finally found that notice was duly served on Defendant No. 5, he would be precluded from raising limitation at a later stage.
Brijraj v. Naurattan (Patna High Court) (referred to) Earlier Patna High Court decision running counter to the later Patna view; mentioned as a decision that was held to have been impliedly overruled by the Patna Letters Patent Bench in Firm Dedhraj v. Bhagwan Das. Referenced as part of the jurisprudential landscape; the Court noted conflicting High Court authorities but adhered to its own earlier line of decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed two distinct questions sequentially: (1) the interpretation of Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act in the context of an appeal taken from an order rejecting an application under Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C.; and (2) whether the judgment-debtor was estopped from raising limitation because of service of notice under Order XXI, rule 22, C.P.C.

On the first question the Court:

  1. Reviewed the material facts showing that the present execution application had been presented beyond three years from the date of the final decree and also beyond three years from the earlier execution proceeding.
  2. Identified the respondents' contention that clause (2) of Article 182 operates to make time run from the date of the final order of this Court (23 July 1943) because there had been an appeal related to the decree.
  3. Examined earlier decisions of this Court (including Fakir Chand Mandal and Profulla Kumar Basu) which held that an application to set aside a decree does not keep the decree open and that "decree on appeal" in Article 182(2) means an appeal from the decree sought to be executed.
  4. Considered the Privy Council decision in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, which took a literal approach to the words "where there has been an appeal" and held that any appeal to an Appellate Court brings the case within Article 182(2), and noted that in Nagendra Nath Dey the appeal was in fact against the decree itself.
  5. Distinguished Nagendra Nath Dey: the Court held that the Privy Council's decision does not authorise the proposition that an appeal need not be directed against the decree sought to be executed, and that it is not authority for treating appeals from orders in separate proceedings (such as an order refusing an application to set aside an ex parte decree) as extending the limitation period under Article 182(2).
  6. Reviewed decisions of other High Courts (Patna, Madras, Bombay) that supported the broader interpretation urged by respondents, but concluded those decisions were not persuasive and that accepting them would effectively reintroduce the doctrine of "imperilling the decree" — a doctrine which the Privy Council had expressly repudiated when construing Article 182(2) literally.
  7. Concluded that the consistent line of authority of this Court (restrictive interpretation) should be maintained: an appeal from an order rejecting an application under Order IX, rule 13 does not extend the period for execution under Article 182(2).

On the second question (estoppel by notice), the Court:

  1. Examined the record relating to service: the peon's return, the peon's report stating Defendant No. 5 was absent and that notice had been hung on the fence after Defendant No. 4 refused to accept it, and the assertion that service was effected in the presence of two witnesses, though only one witness actually signed the return.
  2. Observed evidentiary defects: neither the peon nor the two witnesses were examined; the subordinate judge appeared to be under a misapprehension about signatures; it was not shown whether Defendant No. 4 was a member of Defendant No. 5's family as required for substituted service under Order V, rule 15; and it was not shown whether the peon made reasonable enquiries or waited for the defendant's return.
  3. Found the subordinate judge's finding on service to be unsatisfactory on the record and held the matter required re-consideration on the evidence already recorded and on such further evidence as the parties might adduce.
  4. Directed that if the Court below finds on full evidence that notice was duly served under Order XXI, rule 22, the judgment-debtor would be precluded from raising limitation; if it finds that notice was not duly served, the execution application would be dismissed on the ground of limitation (the Court having already held the application was barred).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED; the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and the matter remitted for further enquiry.

The Court expressly held that the first point raised by the appellant is sound: the execution application was barred by limitation if Article 182(2) does not apply to the appeal taken from the order rejecting the application under Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C. The Court reaffirmed the view of this Court's earlier decisions that an appeal from an order rejecting an application to set aside an ex parte decree does not extend the period of limitation under Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act.

Consequences and implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellate Court set aside the Subordinate Judge's order and remitted the case to the Court below to determine, on the evidence already recorded and on further evidence if necessary, whether notice under Order XXI, rule 22, C.P.C. was duly served on Defendant No. 5.
  • If the Court below finds that notice was duly served, Defendant No. 5 will be precluded from raising limitation and the execution may proceed; if the Court below finds that notice was not duly served, the execution application will be dismissed as barred by limitation.
  • The Court did not make an order as to costs in the appeal; future costs are left to the discretion of the Court below.
  • On the legal issue, the Court reaffirmed existing High Court authority: it did not accept decisions from other High Courts that would extend Article 182(2) to appeals not directed against the decree sought to be executed. Thus, while the opinion analyses and distinguishes the Privy Council decision in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, it does not adopt a broad new rule that would import the "imperilling the decree" doctrine into Article 182(2) in the context of appeals from orders under Order IX, rule 13.

No separate order as to costs in this appeal; future costs left to Court below.

    Habis Chandra Chowdhury Judgment-Debtor, v. Dines Chandra Chowdhury & Anr. Decreeholders,

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

    Mukherjea, J.:— This appeal is on behalf of the judgment-debtor and is directed against an order dated May 13th, 1944, made by the Subordinate Judge, 4th Court, Mymensingh, dismissing the Appellant's objections to the execution of a decree under sec. 47, C.P.C The facts material for our present purposes may be shortly stated as follows: The decree which is sought to be executed was passed in a suit for partition brought by the decree-holders Respondents against the Appellant and other Defendants in the Court of the 4th Subordinate Judge at Mymensingh. The preliminary decree is dated the 3rd April, 1938, and it was made final on the 13th August following. The final decree purports to have been made on the basis of a compromise. On the day that the petition of compromise was filed and the decree was passed, the Appellant before us, who is Defendant No. 5 in the suit was admittedly absent from Court, though his pleader signed the compromise petition on his behalf. On the 11th November, 1935, the Defendant No. 5 presented an application for setting aside the compromise decree under Or. 9, r. 13, as well as under sec. 151, C.P.G and his contention was that the vakalat-nama which purported to give authority to his pleader to act on his behalf was not signed by him at all and that the decree made was an ex parte decree so far as he was concerned. The trial Court dismissed the application on the 6th October, 1939, primarily on the “ground that it was time-barred. Against this order an appeal was taken to this Court being F.M.A No. 53 of 1940, and there was also an application in the alternative filed under sec. 115, C.P.C, upon which Rule 79 (M) of 1940 was issued. Both the appeal and the Rule were dismissed by this Court on the 23rd July, 1943. Pending these proceedings the decree-holders filed an application for execution of the decree only for the purpose of realising the costs awarded by it, sometime in December, 1939, and this proceeding was struck off for non-prosecution on the 4th July, 1940. After the appeal against the order rejecting the application for setting aside the decree under Or. 9, r. 13, C.P.C, was disposed of by this Court, the decree-holders commenced the present proceeding on the 20th December, 1943, praying for delivery of possession of the properties in terms of the final decree made in the suit, and it was registered as O.C Execution Case No. 58 of 1943. It was stated under column 11 of the execution petition that the proceedings in execution were stayed pending the hearing of this appeal in this Court and on this statement, which is admittedly false, the executing Court, it seems, held the application for execution to be within time and directed it to be registered. The Court ordered that delivery of possession of the properties might be given in terms of the final decree through a Commissioner appointed by the Court and arrangements were also made for police help as there was apprehension of a breach of peace. The present Appellant thereupon filed his objections under sec. 47, C.P.C, objecting to the execution of the decree on the ground that the application for execution was barred by limitation under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Court below overruled this objection being of opinion that under Article 182, cl. (2) of the Limitation Act time would run from the 23rd July, 1943, when the final order in appeal was made by this Court. It was further held that as the judgment-debtor did not put forward his objection before the order for delivery of possession was made although he received notice under Or. 21, r. 22, C.P.C, he was estopped from raising this point at a subsequent stage. The propriety of the decision of the Subordinate Judge on both these points has been challenged before us in this appeal.

    2. Now, so far as the first point is concerned, it would be clear from what has teen stated above that the application for execution of the decree was presented in this case beyond three years from the date of the decree. It was also beyond three years from the date of the final order made in the previous execution proceeding. To get round the plea of limitation the decree-holders relied upon cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act under which period of limitation for executing the decree runs, when there is an appeal, from the date of the final decree or order made by the Appellate Court. In the case before us there was admittedly no appeal by any party from the final decree. There was an application as stated above made by Defendant No. 5 for setting aside the ex parte final decree under Or. 9, r. 13, C.P.C, and sec. 151, C.P.C, and there was an appeal against the order rejecting that application. The final order made by this Court dismissing this appeal is dated the 23rd July, 1943, and the whole controversy centres round the point as to whether under cl. (2), Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act the period for execution of the final decree would be three years from the date when the appeal against the order rejecting the judgment debtors' application for setting aside the decree was finally disposed of. In an early pronouncement of this Court which is to be found reported in Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck(1), it was held that when there was an application by a Defendant to revive a suit, which was decreed ex parte against him the application would keep the decree open and the decree would not become final till the order of the Appellate Court was passed on the application for reviving the suit. This view, however, was expressly dissented from in later decisions and amongst these we may refer particularly to the cases of Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan(2) and Profulla Kumar Basu v. Sorojbala Basu(3). In the first of these cases Page and Graham, JJ., held that the expression “decree on appeal” can only mean the decree on appeal from the decree to obtain execution of which the application is; made, and an application to set aside a decree does not keep the decree open. Page, J., in course of his judgment referred to several decisions of this as well as other High Courts in India, [to wit Jivaji v. Ramchandra(4), Balkanta Nath Mitra v. Aughore Nath Bose(5) and Rai Brij Raj v. Naurattam Lal(6)], in support of the view taken by him. In the other case Rankin, C.J and C.C Ghose, expressly dissented from the view taken in Lutful Huq v. Sambhudin and held that the words “the final decree or order of the Appellate Court” in Article 182 (2) of the Limitation Act mean the final decree or order passed on appeal from the decree which is sought to be executed and do not include the final decree or order that may be passed on appeal from an order made in a proceeding under Or. 9, r, 13 C.P.C, to have the decree which is sought to be executed, set aside. The authorities of this Court therefore are decidedly in favour of the Appellant. The argument of Dr. Sen Gupta who appears for the Respondents decree-holders is that the law laid down in the above cases is no longer sound and has been impliedly overruled by the Privy Council in the case of Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey(7). This contention apparently receives support from certain decisions of the other High Courts in India which have accepted the interpretation which Dr. Sen Gupta wants to put on the decision of the Judicial Committee mentioned above. The question has not been considered till now by this Court and certainly requires careful examination.

    3. Stripped of details the facts of the Privy Council case were as follows: Madan Mohan who was the Plaintiff in a mortgage suit, in his application for final decree, claimed that certain co-mortgagees who were Defendants Nos. 11 and 12 in the suit had assigned their interests in his favour and consequently he was entitled to add to his own claim the shares of the mortgage money allowed to Defendants Nos. 11 and 12. This claim was rejected and a final decree was made in the usual way in favour of all the mortgagees on the 24th June, 1920. On August 27th, 1920, Madan Mohan appealed to this Court and in this appeal only the decree-holders mortgagees were made parties. Not only were the judgment-debtors not made parties to the appeal but the appeal itself which purported to be an appeal from an order embodied in the final decree and not the decree itself was insufficiently stamped. The complaint of the Appellant was limited to the question of assignment only which was decided against him by the trial Judge. This appeal was dismissed by this Court on the ground of irregularity as well as on its merits on August 24th, 1922. On October 3rd, 1923, the Defendants Nos. 11 and 12 who were comortgagees of the Plaintiff presented an application to the Subordinate Judge for execution of the final mortgage decree, by sale of the mortgaged properties. It was opposed by the mortgagors judgment-debtors on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Subordinate Judge overruled this contention and allowed the execution to proceed. On appeal, the decision of the Subordinate Judge was reversed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Suhra-wardy and Graham, JJ. Mr. Justice Suhrawardy held on the basis of the decision in Christiana Sens Law… v. Benarashi Proshad Chowdhury….(8) that the word “appeal” in cl. (2) of Article 182, means and can only mean an appeal which is directed against the decree sought to be executed, and is of such a nature that the result of it is likely to affect the decree. Mr. Justice Graham concurring in this view observed “as follows:—

    “The decisive factor in cases of this nature appears to be whether the appeal imperils or not the whole decree for the execution of which the application was made. Applying this test it is clear that the decree as a, whole was never imperilled and consequently it remained final and limitation must run from the date of the final decree and not from the date of the decision of the appeal.”

    4. There was an appeal taken against this decision by the Defendants Nos. 11 and 12 to the Privy Council, and their Lordships of the Judicial Committee reversed the decision of the High Court and held that there was an appeal within the meaning of Article 182 (2) of the Limitation Act and time would run from the order made by the High Court. On behalf of the judgment-debtors the decision of the High Court was sought to be supported on three grounds, namely, (1) that the appeal preferred by Madan Mohan on the 27th August, 1920, was by reason of its irregularity not an appeal at all but an abortive attempt to appeal; (2) that an appeal in order to save limitation under cl. (2) of the Article must be one in which the persons affected by it, namely, the judgment-debtors were parties and (3) that it must be also one in which the whole decree was imperilled. In their Lordships' opinion none of these contentions was of any avail to the judgment-debtors.

    “The question” thus runs the judgment, “must be decided upon the plain words of the Article: where there has been an appeal time is to run from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court. There is, in their Lordships' opinion, no warrant for reading into the words” quoted any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it; the words mean just what they say. The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hard-ship. “But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them may lead to no advantage. Nor in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced……………………… But whether there be or be not a theoretical justification for the provision in question, their Lordships think that the words of the Article are plain, and that there having been in the present case an appeal from the mortgage decree of June 24, 1920, time only ran against the Appellants from August 24, 1923, the date of the Appellate Court's decree.”

    5. It is not disputed that their Lordships of the judicial Committee were not called upon to decide a case like the present where the appeal was not from the decree sought to be executed or a portion of it but from an order made on an application to set aside the decree which was passed ex parte. Their Lordships laid particular stress on the fact that in the case before them the appeal was against the mortgage decree dated the 24th June, 1920. In their opinion the character of the appeal was altogether immaterial; it was also immaterial as to who were trade parties to “it and whether or not it imperilled or affected the entire decree. It was enough that there was an appeal in the sense that the Appellate tribunal was invited to set aside a decision of a Subordinate Court and therefore it attracted the operation of cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. In our opinion, this decision is no authority for the proposition that the appeal contemplated by Article 182 (2) of the Limitation Act need not be directed against the decree which is the subject-matter of execution or a portion of it and it is enough if there was an appeal from an order passed in a separate or independent proceeding the result of which might affect the decree in any event. The doctrine of imperilling the decree upon which the decision of the Judges of this Court rested was expressly reversed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee.

    6. Dr. Sen Gupta is undoubtedly supported in his contention by certain recent decisions of some of the other High Courts in India. In the case of Firm Dedhraj v. Bhagwan Das(9), it was held by a Letters Patent Bench of the Patna High Court that the words “where there has been an appeal” in cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act do not mean that the appeal must be against the decree in the suit. They include an appeal against an order made on an application for re-hearing of an appeal under Or. 41, r. 21, C.P.C The learned Judges were of opinion that the contrary view taken in the previous decision of the Patna High Court in Brijraj v. Naurattan has been impliedly overruled by the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey. In Nandury Sriram Chandra v. Chintamani Bhatta(10) decided by the Madras High Court, the facts were almost identical with those of the cases before us. There was also an application to set aside an ex parte decree and an appeal taken against the order of dismissal passed in that proceeding and it was held that time for execution of the original decree would run from the date when the final order of the Appellate Court was passed in the proceeding under Or. 9, r. 13, C.P.C The learned Judges proceeded upon the basis of the observation of the Judicial Committee which we have set out above; and although their Lordships of the Judicial Committee were not dealing with an appeal against an order refusing to set as de an ex parte decree the principles contained in the passages in the judgment quoted above were according to the learned Judges wide enough to cover the present case. In their opinion it does not necessarily follow that because a decree or order is mentioned in column 1 of Article 182 the appeal mentioned in column 3 must be against the decree or order. It would be equally logical to say that it must be something which affects the decree or order. With all deference to these learned Judges, we are unable to subscribe to the new taken by them. In the case before the Judicial Committee the appeal preferred by the Plaintiff was against the final decree in the mortgage suit. It was not against the entire decree but purported to be directed against that portion of it which negatived the claims of the Plaintiff which he put forward on the basis of assignment from some of his co-mortgagees. The appeal, as stated above, was defective in form and was not properly stamped. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that they must go by the language of the Article and equitable considerations were quite irrelevant to the construction of a statute of limitation. The Article speaks of an appeal. Here there was an appeal directed against the decree though it was limited in its character and defective in its form. But these were immaterial if there was in fact an appeal from the decree sought to be executed. The decree-holders were entitled to the extended period of limitation provided there by Article 182 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act and the question whether the appeal imperilled the entire decree or not was altogether irrelevant. In our opinion, if the view taken by the Madras and Patna High Courts be accepted as sound the expression “appeal” in clause (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act would mean an appeal which may not be directed against the decree or order sought to be executed but has the effect of affecting or imperilling the said decree. This would be introducing, for all practical purposes, the doctrine of imperilling the decree which was expressly repudiated by their Lordships. Their Lordships definitely held that whether or not the appeal imperilled the decree was it relevant to the enquiry and the only thing material was whether there was in fact an appeal, no matter whether it was defective in form and of a partial or fragmentary character.

    7. Dr. Sen Gupta also drew our attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court which is to be found reported in Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa(11). The facts of that case were different from those of the present one. There a decree for money was reduced on an application for review presented by the Defendants. The decree-holders preferred an appeal against the order granting the review but not against the amended decree made after review. It was held that the time for execution of the new amended decree would run from the date on which the appeal against the order granting review was dismissed. If the appeal was preferred against the amended decree undoubtedly the decree-holders could invoke the provisions of cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, as a “decree” would include an amended decree as well but if there was no appeal from the amended decree it is difficult to say how the period of limitation would be enlarged by an appeal from any order passed in the course of the suit. If that is the position, limitation could also be extended by an appeal taken against a subsequent decree which might be passed in a suit to set aside the original decree which is sought to be executed. In our opinion a broad proposition like this cannot be inferred either from the actual decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Nagendra v. Suresh or from the observations made by their Lordships in the course of the judgment which we have set out in extenso above. Dr. Sen Gupta argues that the Legislature in Article 182 (2) of the Limitation Act uses the word “appeal” generally without any qualification, and it cannot be limited to an appeal against a decree which is sought to be executed. He cites two classes of cases where this interpretation would lead to anomalous results. The first is where a decree is amended subsequently on an application by a party to the suit and on an appeal being taken against the amended decree the appeal is allowed and the original decree is restored. He says that time in such cases must run from the date of the appellate judgment and not from the date of the original decree which was eventually restored by the Appellate Court. This would undoubtedly be the position; but as has been said already the word “appeal” in cl. (2) is wide enough to include an appeal from an amended decree. The decree that can be executed is the final decree made on appeal from the amended decree and it is quite immaterial that the Appellate Court exercising its appellate powers varied the amended decree and restored the original decree of the Court. This class of cases therefore does not militate against the view taken all along in our Courts that the appeal in cl. (2) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act means the appeal from the decree sought to be executed. The other class mentioned by Dr. Sen Gupta covers cases where an appeal is preferred against a preliminary decree and a final decree is passed subsequently which is not appealed against. If the appeal against the preliminary decree is dismissed, time for execution of the final decree would run not from the date when the final decree was passed but from the date when the appellate judgment was pronounced in the appeal taken against the preliminary decree. We think that this admits of an explanation, for the appeal against the preliminary decree is in substance, though not in form, an appeal against the final decree also and the final decree has got no existence apart from the preliminary decree. But it is not necessary for us to examine all sorts of hypothetical cases that might arise for consideration. The whole question that requires decision in this appeal is “whether the view taken by this Court in a series of cases, to the effect that an appeal from an order rejecting an application to set aside an ex parte decree under Or. 9, r. 13, C.P.C, does not extend the period of limitation for execution of the decree under Article 182 (2) of the Limitation Act, has or has not been superseded by the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in the case of Nagendra v. Suresh. For the reasons given above we are decidedly of the opinion that the answer to this question must be in the negative.

    8. The result is that the first point raised by the Appellant is quite sound and in our opinion, the application for execution is barred by limitation.

    9. The next question then arises whether the judgment-debtor is estopped from raising the question of limitation at all in the present proceeding. It appears from the records “that on the 20th December, 1943, when the application for execution was registered the Court directed issue of notice under Or. 21, r. 22, C.P.C” The peon's report shows that on the 31st December, 1943, notice under Or. 21, r. 22, C.P.C, was served upon the judgment-debtors including the present Appellant. The orders for delivery of possession were made by the Court on the 30th March and 3rd April, 1944. The judgment-debtor No. 5 presented his objection under sec. 47, C.P.C, only on the 22nd April, 1944. It cannot be disputed that if the notice under Or. 21, r. 22 was actually served upon the judgment-debtors and he was apprised of the fact that the decree-holders had started proceedings for execution of the decree by delivery of possession of the properties and if in spite of the notice he remained silent, he cannot at a subsequent stage of the proceeding raise the question of limitation which must be deemed to have been decided against him when the Court made the order for execution. [Vide the case of Lalit Mohan Roy v. Sarat Chandra Saha(12)]. The controversy thus centres round the point as to whether the notice was really served upon the Appellant and he had the opportunity of putting forward his contention against the decision of the Court, directing delivery of possession to be made against him. The peon's report show's that the Defendant No. 5 was absent from his house at the time when the peon went there to serve the notices. He had on that day gone to Netrokona in connection with a criminal case. The Defendant No. 4 who is a brother of Defendant No. 5 was present on the spot and he having refused to accept notice it was hung up on the fencing of the katchari bari. The peon says in his report that this service was effected in the presence of two witnesses, namely, Hriday Chandra Dey and Kumud Chandra Bhattacharjee. Neither the peon nor the above two witnesses were examined in this case and the Subordinate Judge was apparently labouring under a misapprehension when he observed in his judgment that both the two had put their signatures on the return of the serving peon. As a matter of fact only one of the witnesses named Hriday signed the paper and not the other. Dr. Sen Gupta relies upon Or. 5, r. 15, C.P.C, which empowers the serving peon to serve notices on any adult male member of the family of the Defendant in case the Defendant cannot be found and has no agent empowered to accept the service. It does not appear from the evidence adduced in the case as to whether the peon made any enquiries about Defendant No. 5 or satisfied himself that he was not likely to return very soon. Apparently, he did not wait and made no effort to serve the notice upon him personally. It is also not clear from the evidence as to whether Defendant No. 4 was a member of his family. The finding of the Subordinate Judge on this point is certainly unsatisfactory and the whole matter requires re-consideration.

    10. We would accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge and the case would go back and the Court below will on the evidence already recorded and on such further evidence as might be adduced by the parties come to a definite finding as to whether notice under Or. 21, r. 22, C.P.C, was duly served upon Defendant No. 5.

    11. If he finds that the notice was duly served the Defendant No. 5 would he deemed incompetent in law to question the order for execution that was made after the service of notice upon him under Or. 21, r. 22, C.P.C If the Court decided that the notice was not duly served the application for execution will stand dismissed on the ground of limitation.

    12. We make no order as to costs in this appeal. Future costs will be in the discretion of the Court below.

    Sharpe, J.:— I agree

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Habis Chandra Chowdhury Judgment-Debtor, v. Dines Chandra Chowdhury & Anr. Decreeholders,
    (Mar 1, 1946)