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  • S. 12 of the Indian Contract Act,
  • Ss. 13 and 14 of the Lunacy Act
  • S. 65 of the Contract Act.
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  • S. 12 of the Indian Contract Act,
  • Ss. 13 and 14 of the Lunacy Act
  • S. 65 of the Contract Act.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Appeal No. 119 of 1933 (Varadachariar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit instituted to obtain a declaration that certain transactions entered into by the first plaintiff were void and for incidental reliefs. In the court below the plaintiffs attacked three transactions evidenced by documents marked Exs. H, J and I; the lower court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The first plaintiff (the father) died during the proceedings; plaintiffs 2 and 3 (his sons) prosecuted this appeal. In the appeal the attack was confined to Exs. H and I. During the appeal the second plaintiff died and his legal representatives were transposed as appellants to continue the appeal with the third plaintiff.

Background facts given in the opinion: the first plaintiff had started with little or no means, worked for many years in Rangoon and acquired immovable properties in Rangoon and Chingleput District. About mid-1927, at about age 58, he developed symptoms described as unsoundness of mind, later characterized by medical witnesses as senile dementia. Among the transactions challenged were sale deeds (Exs. H and J dated 19 December 1927 and 5 May 1928 respectively) and a settlement deed (Ex. I dated 26 April 1928) executed in favour of the 4th defendant (the daughter).

The plaint alleged that from about mid-1927 the first plaintiff suffered senile dementia and was incapable of managing his affairs; that defendants 1 and 2 had taken money from him and purported to sell properties to him in repayment and by way of consideration a promissory note was executed by him. It was alleged that Ex. I had been procured to benefit the 4th defendant (and her husband, the 3rd defendant) and that the settled property was joint family property.

Defendants denied incapacity and denied that the properties were joint family properties. The first defendant instituted a connected suit for recovery under the promissory note executed by the first plaintiff. The two matters were tried together: the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the plaintiffs' suit to set aside the transactions and made a decree in the promissory-note suit in favour of the plaintiff in that suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the first plaintiff was of unsound mind (senile dementia) at the time of the transactions evidenced by Ex. H and Ex. I, such that those transactions are voidable or void for want of capacity.
  2. Whether, given the Lunacy Act proceedings and a medical certificate (Ex. A), there is a presumption that the lunacy (or incapacity) continued and, if so, whether the onus shifts to persons who uphold subsequent transactions to prove capacity.
  3. Whether the sale under Ex. H was one-sided or the price so extravagant as to establish that it was brought about by taking advantage of the first plaintiff's mental condition.
  4. Whether the settlement deed Ex. I can be upheld either on the basis that the settled property was self-acquired or because the incapacity did not affect the particular transaction (i.e., whether the incapacity was such as to prevent a rational judgment under S.12 of the Indian Contract Act).
  5. Remedial question: if transactions are set aside, what restitutionary relief and consequential orders (refund, possession, interest, mesne profits, costs) should follow, including applicability of S.65 of the Contract Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The first plaintiff suffered from senile dementia from about mid-1927 and was incapable of managing his affairs; transactions after that date (including Exs. H and I) were vitiated by his incapacity.
  • Defendants 1 and 2 took advantage of the first plaintiff's condition to obtain money and execute sale deeds in their favour; the promissory note given as balance consideration should be declared void.
  • The settlement deed (Ex. I) was procured by the 4th defendant (with the assistance of others) for their benefit and the settled property was joint family property, providing further grounds to impeach Ex. I.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • They denied that the first plaintiff was ever of unsound mind; therefore the transactions are valid.
  • As to Ex. I, the lower court found that the properties were self-acquired; defendants 3 and 4 argued that, except on the ground of mental incapacity, Ex. I could not be impeached and that the medical evidence was insufficient to invalidate Ex. I with respect to that particular transaction.
  • It was argued (relying on Jenkin v. Morris) that unless the incapacity was shown to have affected the particular transaction the deed should be upheld; the respondents relied on evidence (lay witnesses D.Ws 3–5) to support the validity.
  • Regarding the price paid under Ex. H, the first defendant resisted the claim that the price was so disproportionate as to show advantage taken of the plaintiff's condition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Seshamma v. Padmanabha Rao Presumption regarding continuance of lunacy where lunacy is found (discussed in relation to whether lunacy should be presumed to continue). The court considered the decision and observed that it might be distinguishable on the facts (it involved lunacy found by inquisition). Nevertheless, the court thought it reasonable, given the nature of senile dementia proved here, to presume continuance of the incapacity and to place the onus on those upholding subsequent transactions to prove they were not vitiated by incapacity.
Jenkin v. Morris Authority addressing whether a person must be so insane as to be incompetent to manage his affairs and whether particular transactions are affected by insanity. The court held that Jenkin v. Morris does not lay down a universal rule and was mainly about whether a jury direction was correct; it did not displace S.12 of the Indian Contract Act as the applicable test. The court therefore did not treat Jenkin v. Morris as decisive against invalidating Ex. I on incapacity grounds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps grounded in the factual record and medical evidence:

  1. Assessment of the lower court's approach to presumption of continuity of lunacy:
    • The learned Subordinate Judge had stated that even assuming unsoundness in July–August 1927 "there could be no presumption that the lunacy continued." The appellate court questioned that proposition.
    • Although Seshamma v. Padmanabha Rao was discussed and recognized as possibly distinguishable (that case involved lunacy found by inquisition), the appellate court considered the nature of the mental infirmity here (senile dementia of an old man) and regarded it as more reasonable to presume continuance than discontinuance.
    • Consequently, the onus lies on those who wish the court to uphold transactions entered into after the medical finding to prove that the transactions were not vitiated by incapacity.
  2. Reliance on documentary and medical evidence:
    • Ex. A: certificate dated 4 August 1927 by P.W.1 (District Medical Officer) concluding that the first plaintiff was a lunatic and a proper person to be taken charge of and detained under care, though he could be cared for by relatives; the certificate records that the patient was "not inclined to be violent or boisterous," was "quite rational in his talk" but had delusions about possessing thousands of acres of land.
    • Ex. B: report (prepared by P.W.2, the Sub Inspector) contains statements suggesting violence, but P.W.2 admitted that statements about violence were not from his personal knowledge; the court therefore did not accept the oral evidence about violent acts as reliable on that basis.
    • Another medical witness examined on commission in Burma also gave evidence that in his opinion the first plaintiff suffered from senile dementia, though his evidence was not detailed; nonetheless the court found the combined medical evidence persuasive that the first plaintiff's mental condition in or about July–August 1927 was one of senile dementia.
  3. Examination of subsequent transactions and whether they rebut the medical evidence:
    • Several transactions took place after the medical certificate, but the court analyzed the surrounding facts and found they did not displace the medical evidence. Examples included:
      • A sale for Rs.4,000 executed in favour of the first plaintiff's wife (not the first plaintiff) — the family retained it because it was a good bargain.
      • A promissory note taken in July 1927 in favour of the wife (not the first plaintiff).
      • A hypothecation bond executed in Rangoon which involved plaintiffs 2 and 3 in its execution, reducing its probative value as evidence of independent capacity of the father.
      • The first plaintiff's habit of keeping a business note-book and taking signatures was noted, but the court regarded that habit as consistent with the type of incapacity (senile dementia) proven and not inconsistent with incapacity.
    • The court also observed that defendants did not contend that the first plaintiff had recovered; rather they denied any incapacity at any time. The court found it unlikely the son-in-law (3rd defendant) would have been unaware of the Lunacy Act proceedings and believed that the first defendant likely initiated the report that led to the medical examination.
  4. On the specific question of Ex. H (sale) and price fairness:
    • The Subordinate Judge had considered the price somewhat high but not so disproportionate as to prove advantage taken of the first plaintiff's condition. The appellate court noted the facts (first defendant earlier bought the lands for Rs.1,500, retained 10 cents, sold the rest under Ex. H for Rs.2,375) but chose to rest its decision primarily on the incapacity issue rather than further pursue the price question.
    • Additional proof of the first defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's condition included a notice (Ex. F) warning the first defendant against entering into transactions with the first plaintiff and the first defendant's subsequent sale after denying the charge in Ex. F-1; this knowledge supported setting aside Ex. H.
  5. On the specific question of Ex. I (settlement) and application of the legal test:
    • The court identified S.12 of the Indian Contract Act as the relevant statutory test: the person whose act is challenged must be capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect on his interests.
    • Ex. A recorded the delusion that the first plaintiff believed himself to possess thousands of acres when he in fact had about 100 acres in Rangoon and 15–20 acres in India. The court found that such delusion made it difficult to conclude that the first plaintiff could form a rational judgment about the effect of the gift deed (Ex. I) upon his interests.
    • The evidence of lay defence witnesses (D.Ws 3, 4 and 5) was of little assistance because the nature of the malady might not be detectable in ordinary conversation; thus their testimony did not rebut the medical evidence.
    • The court acknowledged it would have been disposed to uphold Ex. I if the question were solely one of reasonableness; but because the legal test required mental capacity to form a rational judgment, Ex. I could not be upheld despite being arguably reasonable.
  6. Relief, restitution and consequential orders:
    • Having set aside Ex. H and Ex. I as void and inoperative, the court ordered restitution of Rs.850 (part of the sale price under Ex. H) that had been paid to the first defendant, invoking S.65 of the Contract Act as the principle for refund.
    • Recovery of the Rs.850 was conditional on the appellants delivering up possession of the land conveyed under Ex. H; because the appellants had been in possession, they were not entitled to claim interest on the refund from the date of payment. From the time the appellants notify the first defendant of abandonment of possession, they will be entitled to interest on the Rs.850 at 6% per annum until payment.
    • As to Ex. I, the court ordered a decree for possession in plaintiffs' favour. It was stated that during earlier proceedings plaintiffs had been appointed receivers and in possession, but the 4th defendant had subsequently taken back possession; accordingly the court directed restoration and awarded mesne profits against the 4th defendant at Rs.75 per annum from 1 July 1936 until delivery of possession.
    • Costs of the appeal: in the peculiar circumstances the court ordered that parties shall bear their respective costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal allowed. The appellate court set aside the lower court's dismissal and declared both the sale deed Ex. H and the settlement deed Ex. I void and inoperative.

Immediate consequences and relief ordered:

  • Rs. 850 (part of the sale price paid under Ex. H) found to have been paid to the first defendant must be returned to the appellants; there will be a decree against the first defendant for Rs. 850. Recovery is subject to the appellants delivering up possession of the land conveyed under Ex. H.
  • The refund was ordered on the principle of S.65 of the Contract Act; appellants will not be entitled to interest on the Rs.850 for the period they remained in possession, but from the date they notify abandonment of possession they are entitled to interest at 6% per annum until payment.
  • As regards Ex. I, there will be a decree for possession in plaintiffs' favour and a decree for mesne profits against the 4th defendant at Rs.75 per annum from 1 July 1936 until the date of delivery of possession.
  • Costs: each party to bear their own costs of the appeal.
  • The memorandum of objections filed by respondents 2 and 3 in the appeal failed and was dismissed.

Wider legal implications: The court clarified that, in the circumstances of senile dementia proved by medical certificate and evidence, it is reasonable to presume continuance of the incapacity and to place the onus on those who seek to uphold transactions made thereafter to prove capacity. The court applied S.12 of the Indian Contract Act as the functional test for capacity to make the challenged transaction and applied restitutionary principles under S.65 of the Contract Act for refund. The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond those applications to the facts.

    Govindaswamy Naicker (Deceased) And Others v. K.N Srinivasa Rao And Others S

    JUDGMENT

    (Delivered by Varadachariar, J.)

    Appeal No. 119 of 1933.

    This appeal arises out of a suit instituted for obtaining a declaration that certain transactions entered into by the first plaintiff were void and for incidental reliefs. In the Court below, plaintiffs attacked three transactions evidenced by Exs. H, J and I. The lower Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The first plaintiff died pending the suit and the other two plaintiffs filed this appeal against the decree of dismissal. In the appeal the attack had been confined to Exs. H and I. The second plaintiff died during the pendency of the appeal and his legal representatives who were in the first instance added as respondents have since been transposed as appellants to continue the appeal along with the third plaintiff.

    The first plaintiff was the father and plaintiffs 2 and 3 were his sons. Starting with little or no means the first plaintiff seems to have earned substantial sums by working for a number of years in Rangoon and he acquired some immovable properties both in Rangoon and in the Chingleput District here. About the middle of 1927 when he was about 58 years old the first plaintiff is said to have developed symptoms of unsoundness of mind. The exact nature of his malady will be discussed presently; but, notwithstanding his state of health and mind he does seem to have taken part in some transactions in the later part of 1927 and in the first part of 1928. Amongst them are Exs. H and J, two sale deeds dated 19th December 1927 and 5th May 1928 executed by defendants 1 and 2 respectively in favour of the first plaintiff. On 26th April 1928 the first plaintiff executed a deed of settlement (Ex. I) in favour of the 4th defendant who is his daughter. This suit was instituted in March 1929 by the first plaintiff represented by the second plaintiff as his next friend and by the two sons as plaintiffs 2 and 3. The father died a few months after the institution of the suit. The case made in the plaint was that from about the middle of 1927 the first plaintiff who was an old man was suffering from senile dementia and was as such incapable of managing his affairs, that taking advantage of that condition defendants 1 and 2 who took moneys from the first plaintiff purported to sell their properties to him partly in re-payment of the moneys thus taken and also in consideration of a promissory note executed by the first plaintiff for the balance of the purchase money. As regards Ex. H, the plaint prayed that the first defendant should be directed to re-pay the sums of money which he had received from the first plaintiff and that the promissory note executed for the balance of the consideration should be declared void. As regards the settlement deed (Ex. I) it was alleged in paragraph 14 of the plaint that the 4th defendant and her husband the 3rd defendant, had managed with the help of certain other persons to benefit themselves at the expense of the plaintiffs' family and got the settlement deed executed by the demented first plaintiff. It was also contended that the property thus settled was joint family property and that the first plaintiff was on this ground also incompetent to make the settlement.

    The defendants denied the alleged incapacity of the first plaintiff. They also denied that the properties settled by Ex. I on the daughter were joint family properties. The first defendant in his turn instituted a suit (out of which the connected appeal arises) for recovery of the amount due under the promissory note which had been executed by the first plaintiff for the balance of the consideration. The two suits were tried together and the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit to set aside the transactions and passed a decree in plaintiff's favour in the promissory note suit. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that though the first plaintiff's mental condition was probably not quite alright in or about July 1927, there could be no presumption that the lunacy continued, and in view of the evidence furnished by other transactions alleged to have been entered into by the first plaintiff after this date, he held that the evidence was not sufficient to hold that Exs. H and I were brought into existence at a time when the first plaintiff was actually of unsound mind.

    It was also alleged in the plaint that the price fixed for the sale under Ex. H was extravagant and this was itself evidence of the advantage taken by the first defendant of the first plaintiff's condition. On this part of the case, the learned Judge was inclined to think that perhaps the price was a bit high but he was not prepared to say that it was so disproportionately high as to lead one to think that the first defendant took advantage of the mental condition of the first plaintiff and brought about the sale on very advantageous terms to the first defendant. The evidence bearing on the question of price is to the effect that about three years before sale, the first defendant purchased the lands for Rs. 1500 and retaining 10 cents of the lands for himself, he sold the remainder under Ex. H for Rs. 2375. As we propose to rest our decision in this appeal on the evidence as to the first plaintiff's mental capacity we do not propose to pursue further the question of the fairness or otherwise of the price fixed in Ex. H.

    Dealing with the question of the first plaintiff's mental capacity, we would observe at the outset that one remark of the learned Judge in paragraph 31 of his judgment is open to question, i.e, that statement that assuming that the first plaintiff was of unsound mind in July-August 1927 “there could be no presumption that the lunacy continued.” It was contended on behalf of the appellants that this was opposed to the decision in Seshamma v. Padmanabha Rao(1). That case is perhaps capable of being distinguished, on the facts, on the ground that it was a case of a person found lunatic by inquisition, whereas here all that happened was that certain proceedings were taken under Ss. 13 and 14 of the Lunacy Act with a view to avoid danger from the lunatic to himself and to others. Whether the presumption laid down in Seshamma v. Padmanabha Rao should be limited to cases of lunacy found by inquisition need not be dealt with as an abstract question. Having regard to the nature of the mental incapacity proved in this case, namely, senile dementia in the case of an old man, we think it more reasonable to presume its continuance than its discontinuance and the onus will be upon persons who wish the Court to uphold transactions entered into by the patient subsequent to this date to prove that the transactions were not vitiated on the ground of his incapacity.

    There is some evidence in the case consisting not merely of oral testimony but of at least one document (Ex. B) suggesting that the first plaintiff was even violent and dangerous; but as P.W 2, the Sub Inspector who made the report Ex. B admits that the statements in Ex. B relating to acts of violence committed by the first plaintiff cannot be vouched by him on his own personal knowledge, but were merely inserted on the strength of statements made before him by others, we are not prepared to accept the oral evidence relating to such acts as reliable, particularly in view of what is contained in the certificate (Ex. A) given by P.W 1. P.W 1 was the District Medical Officer in Chingleput in August 1927. On receipt of the report (Ex. B) he was asked by the Joint Magistrate to examine the first plaintiff and report on his mental condition and Ex. A is a certificate given by him on 4th August 1927. It says that after keeping the first plaintiff under observation for some days P.W 1 came to the conclusion that the first plaintiff was a lunatic and a proper person to be taken charge of and detained under care; but it was added that he could be taken care of by his relatives. It is stated in the certificate itself that the patient was “not inclined to be violent or boisterous”, that he is quite rational in his talk but when one talks to him about his wealth, he goes off at a tangent and “says that he has thousands of acres of lands and hundreds of houses.” On this certificate orders were passed by the Joint Magistrate (Ex. T) directing the first plaintiff to be entrusted to the care of his son, the 2nd plaintiff, who executed a bond Ex. D.

    A suggestion has been made by the learned Counsel for the respondent that these proceedings under the Lunacy Act must in all probability have been put through with some ulterior purpose, namely, to avoid criminal proceedings against the first plaintiff for some criminal acts committed by him. We see no warrant either direct or indirect for this suggestion. P.W 2 says that he himself saw the first plaintiff and examined him and that he made the report Ex. B on receipt of a report from the Village Munsif who is himself the first defendant in this case and has been examined as D.W 1. Though D.W 1 denies having made any report and suggests that P.W 2 is ill-disposed towards himself we prefer to accept the testimony of P.W 2. No suggestion of ill-will was put to him during his cross-examination and it was not elicited either from P.W 2 or from D.W 1 that there was any danger of criminal proceedings being taken against the first plaintiff and it was with a view to avoid the same that this device of proceedings under the Lunacy Act was adopted. The medical officer who gave the certificate Ex. A has been examined as P.W 1 in the case and nothing has been elicited in his cross-examination to suggest that Ex. A is not reliable or that he was a party to any conspiracy to hush up a criminal case. Another medical witness who was examined on commission in Burma speaks also to the fact that in his opinion the first plaintiff was suffering from senile dementia. It is true that his evidence is not very full and he has not been asked to state the grounds of his opinion or the symptoms which he saw. The defendants did not appear before the commissioner to cross-examine him and this is perhaps the reason why his evidence is so short. In view however of the medical certificate Ex. A and the evidence of P.W 1 we are not left in much doubt about the mental condition of the first plaintiff in or about July-August 1927.

    It is true that even after this period the first plaintiff was a party to certain transactions; but on close examination it will be found that his part in them is not such as to displace the effect of the medical evidence. For instance, another sale deed similar to Exs. H and J was executed about the same time for a sum of Rs. 4,000. But it is significant that this was executed in favour of the first plaintiff's wife and not in favour of the first plaintiff, like Exs. H and J. The contract had no doubt been entered into by the first plaintiff but it is explained that the other members of the family did not think fit to repudiate it because the bargain was a good one and they preferred to retain it. Again, it is significant, that a promissory note which was taken in July 1927 was taken not in the first plaintiff's name but in favour of his wife. This cannot be a bogus transaction or device because it is attested by the 3rd defendant who is now contesting the suit on behalf of his wife, the 4th defendant. When he was questioned in the witness-box about it, he did not seek to explain it away but merely fought shy of it and avoided any questions relating to it. The other transaction of this period on which the learned Subordinate Judge has strongly relied is a hypothecation bond executed in Rangoon in favour of a Chettiar, but its value in support of the defendants' case is very much diminished by the fact that it was not merely brought about by the sons, plaintiffs 2 and 3, but that they also joined in its execution. It is nothing strange if to satisfy the creditor they also got their father to join in executing it. Some point has been made of the fact that the first plaintiff was a careful businessman and kept a note-book in which his money transactions were entered and he even had the good sense to take the signatures in the book of persons to whom he lent moneys. This no doubt proves that in spite of his mental incapacity he continued a habit which he presumably must have formed in his better days: but having regard to the nature of the incapacity spoken to by the medical witnesses, this conduct is not inconsistent with the continuance of that kind of incapacity.

    We may also point out in this connection that it is not the case of the contesting defendants that the first plaintiff was at one stage of unsound mind but that he subsequently recovered his mental capacity. They and their witnesses totally deny that the first plaintiff was at any time of unsound mind. We are unable to believe that the 3rd defendant who is the son-in-law of the first plaintiff would have been ignorant of the proceedings under the Lunacy Act. As regards the first defendant, we have no hesitation in believing that he was not only aware of the proceedings but that it was his report which initiated the proceedings. We may at this stage also refer to an attempt made by the plaintiffs to have the first defendant's report placed on the record. The lower Court denied them an opportunity to do so and a petition has been filed before us in that connection. In the circumstances disclosed in the affidavit, we think that the learned Subordinate Judge would have done better to have given the opportunity to the plaintiffs. We do not however think it necessary to admit the documents in evidence at this stage because its admission would necessitate a further examination of the first defendant. We are prepared to proceed on the footing that Ex. B substantially represents the contents of the report made by the Village Munsif and this is sufficient for the purpose of this case. There being on record no evidence of the proved incapacity having terminated, we are unable to agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that it was for the plaintiffs to prove that on the dates of Exs. H and I, the first plaintiff was not of sound mind. We may however add that there is some evidence on record even to that effect. If it merely depended upon the evidence of the 2nd plaintiff we should have hesitated to act upon it. But both the medical witnesses state that having regard to the nature of the infirmity, it would in all probability have continued during the rest of the patient's lifetime.

    We have not had the benefit of any argument before us on behalf of the first defendant. His Counsel has reported no instruction. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for defendants 3 and 4 that on the medical evidence, there is not enough to invalidate Ex. I. In view of the finding of the lower Court that the properties settled under Ex. I were the self-acquired properties of the first plaintiff it was contended that except on the ground of mental incapacity, the transaction could not be impeached; it was also argued that unless it is shown that the mental incapacity was such as to affect the particular transaction, Ex. I should be upheld. Reliance was in this connection placed upon the observations in Jenkin v. Morris. That judgment does not seem upon careful examination to lay down any general rule applicable to all cases. The Court of appeal was more concerned with the question whether there had been a misdirection and they merely affirmed the correctness of the direction which had been given at the trial by Lindley, L.J, who had referred the question to the jury as a practical question “whether the party was so insane as to be incompetent to manage his own affairs in the sense of disposing of his property and even of property believed by him to be full of sulphur.” The test applicable to a case like the present is, in our opinion, sufficiently indicated in S. 12 of the Indian Contract Act, which requires that the person whose act is challenged should be capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interests. If, as Ex. A states, the first plaintiff was under a delusion in the sense that he possessed thousands of acres of lands when in fact he had about 100 acres of lands at Rangoon and about 15 or 20 acres in India, we find it difficult to say that he could have formed a rational judgment as to the effect of the gift deed Ex. I upon his interests. The evidence of D.Ws 3, 4 and 5 is not of much help to the 4th defendant because, as explained by P.W 1, the first plaintiff's malady was not such as could have been detected by laymen in the course of an ordinary conversation. We are free to confess that we would have gladly upheld Ex. I as a reasonable transaction, reasonable even if the property dealt with had been the ancestral property of the family; but dealing with the question not as one of reasonableness but of the mental capacity of the settlor, we regret we are unable to uphold it in spite of our view that it is not an unreasonable transaction.

    As regards the first defendant, we may add that his knowledge of the first plaintiff's condition is proved not merely by the report which he is said to have signed but by Ex. F, a notice sent by him about the end of August 1927, wherein he was specifically warned against entering into any transaction with the first plaintiff. In the reply Ex. F-1 he preferred to deny the charge and it is after Ex. F-1 that he entered into the sale deed Ex. H. The learned Subordinate Judge has laid some stress upon the fact that the plaintiffs are in possession of the property conveyed under Ex. H. The transfer of pattah is more or less a matter of course once a sale deed is registered, and, as the first defendant was the Village Munsif, it is not unlikely that the other village records were so prepared as to be in conformity with Ex. H. Even assuming that the taking of possession by the first plaintiff was a voluntary act, it cannot improve the validity of the transaction having regard to the grounds on which we have set aside the transaction.

    The result is that Appeal No. 119 of 1935 must be allowed and the sale deed Ex. H and the settlement deed Ex. I, declared void and inoperative. Out of the sale price under Ex. H, Rs. 850 has admittedly been paid to the first defendant. This money is liable to be returned to the appellants and there will be a decree against the first defendant for the same. It was brought to our notice that a Small Cause Suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 450 out of this Rs. 850 had been dismissed for default. If the subsequent sale had not come about, that dismissal would no doubt bar any further suit on the original promissory note. But the dismissal is explained by the execution of the sale deed and after that date the amount was no longer claimable as a debt due under the promissory note. The refund now ordered is only on the principle of S. 65 of the Contract Act. Before the plaintiffs can recover this sum of Rs. 850 they must deliver up possession of the land conveyed to them under Ex. H. As they have been in possession, they will not be entitled to claim any interest. From the time that they notify the first defendant of their abandonment of possession of the land they will be entitled to interest on this sum of Rs. 850 at 6 per cent per annum till date of payment. As regards the properties covered by Ex. I, we were informed that during the pendency of the suit in the lower Court the plaintiffs themselves had been appointed receivers and had taken possession of the land. But we are also told that at a subsequent date the 4th defendant has taken back possession of these lands. There will accordingly be a decree for possession in plaintiffs' favour. The appellants will be entitled to a decree for mesne profits against the 4th defendant at Rs. 75 per annum from the 1st July 1936 till date of delivery of possession.

    As regards the costs of the appeal, we think that in the peculiar circumstances of the case the parties will bear their respective costs. The memorandum of objections filed by respondents 2 and 3 in Appeal No. 119 of 1933 necessarily fails and is dismissed.

    Appeal allowed.

    N.R.R

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    Govindaswamy Naicker (Deceased) And Others v. K.N Srinivasa Rao And Others S
    (Sep 27, 1938)