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  • Article 142 or 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 44 of the Limitation Act.4.
  • Article 44 of the Limitation Act,
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • Article 142 or 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 44 of the Limitation Act.4.
  • Article 44 of the Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Pal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was brought by two sons (the Plaintiffs) claiming declaration of title to an eight annas share each in disputed land, joint possession to that extent and mesne profits. The lands admittedly belonged to their father Hari Charan Hazra who died in 1915 leaving a widow, a daughter and four sons (the Plaintiffs and their two brothers Fakir and Khanda). The Plaintiffs were infants at their father's death: Plaintiff No. 1 was born on 13th Baisack, 1319 B.S. (about April 1912) and Plaintiff No. 2 on 7th Falgoon, 1321 B.S. (about February 1915). The Plaintiffs allege that Fakir and Khanda sold the disputed lands during the Plaintiffs' minority by two sale deeds (Exhibit A dated 24 September 1926 and Exhibit A(1) dated 21 October 1927), that neither Fakir nor Khanda was guardian of the Plaintiffs, that the Plaintiffs were brought up by their sister, and that the sales were without legal necessity.

Procedurally: the Subordinate Judge found Fakir to be karta of a joint family and natural guardian, but dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit on grounds that the transactions were binding until set aside and because there was no prayer for cancellation; also held Plaintiff No. 1's claim barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act. On appeal the Additional District Judge reversed, holding Fakir was not guardian (de facto or de jure), the minors were brought up by their sister, the sale deeds were executed by Fakir and Khanda in their personal capacities, and there was no legal necessity for sale; the Additional District Judge set aside the Subordinate Judge's decree and decreed the Plaintiffs' suit. The Defendant (appellant) appealed to the present court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Fakir was the guardian (natural, de facto or de jure) of the minor Plaintiffs such that transfers he made would bind the minors.
  2. Whether the two sale deeds (Ex. A and A(1)) were executed by Fakir in his capacity as guardian (or as karta) on behalf of the minors, or whether they were executed in his personal capacity only.
  3. Whether the sales were made out of legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate (i.e., whether the qualified power to dispose of minors' property was validly exercised).
  4. Whether Article 44 of the Limitation Act applies (and would bar the Plaintiffs' claim) if the transfers were by a guardian and required being set aside; alternatively, whether Articles 142 or 144 (or the 12-year rule) apply if the transfers are treated differently (e.g., as karta's acts).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Account / Contentions

  • The lands belonged to their father who died in 1915; the Plaintiffs were minors at that time (Plaintiff No. 1 born 13 Baisack, 1319 B.S.; Plaintiff No. 2 born 7 Falgoon, 1321 B.S.).
  • During their minority Fakir and Khanda sold the disputed land by two sale deeds (Ex. A dated 24-9-1926 and Ex. A(1) dated 21-10-1927).
  • Neither Fakir nor Khanda was the guardian (de jure or de facto) of the Plaintiffs; the Plaintiffs were brought up by their sister.
  • The sales were made without legal necessity and therefore were not binding on the Plaintiffs.

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The Court of Appeal erred in concluding the sales were not made by Fakir as guardian; a proper construction of the sale deeds would show the sales were made (a) by Fakir as guardian of the minors or (b) by the minors represented by Fakir as their guardian.
  • Fakir was the natural guardian of the minors under Hindu law and so could make a binding transfer of the minors' shares.
  • If Fakir acted as guardian the Plaintiffs' present claim would be governed by Article 44 of the Limitation Act and would be barred because the suit was instituted more than three years after their attaining majority.
  • On the Plaintiffs' own pleading both Plaintiffs attained majority more than three years before institution of the suit (suit instituted 2 October 1936; Plaintiff No. 1 attained majority in 1930; Plaintiff No. 2 in February 1933).
  • The finding by the Subordinate Judge that the four brothers formed a joint Hindu family with Fakir as karta was not reversed; thus the sales should have been treated as by Fakir as karta and binding on the Plaintiffs.
  • The evidence was sufficient to establish legal necessity for the sales.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Budhkaran Chowkhani v. Thakur Prosad Saha Supports proposition that guardianship under Hindu law vests in the sovereign (parens patrix) and that original texts illustrate delegation of guardianship to relatives. Cited to show the background authorities for the statement that guardianship is by delegation and relatives (other than parents) must derive authority from the Court; used to support the conclusion that Fakir was not a natural guardian merely by relation.
Kristo Kissore Neogy v. Kadermoyee Dossee Holds that in absence of parents or guardian appointed by father, selection of guardian is to be made by the Court (the Court represents ruling power); authority applicable to guardianship of property as well as person. Relied upon to explain that relations (other than parents) must derive guardianship authority from the Court and to support holding that Fakir was not guardian of the minors.
Mt. Bhikuo Koer v. Mt. Chamala Koer Authority establishing that relations other than parents must obtain guardianship authority from the Court (i.e., relations do not automatically possess guardianship). Used with other authorities to justify the conclusion that Fakir was not the minors' guardian and therefore transfers by him did not bind the minors.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of factual and legal determinations that track the relief sought and the limitation question:

  1. Factual findings below: The Subordinate Judge found Fakir was karta and natural guardian and held transactions binding unless set aside; but the Additional District Judge found Fakir was not guardian (de facto or de jure), the minors were raised by their sister, the sale documents were executed by Fakir and Khanda in their personal capacities, and there was no legal necessity for the sales. The present Court accepted the Additional District Judge's factual findings in material respects.
  2. Legal necessity: Both lower courts scrutinized the recitals of necessity in the sale deeds and concluded there was no legal necessity. The present Court treated this as a concurrent finding of fact and found no reason to interfere.
  3. Scope of guardian/karta power: The Court noted Fakir's power to make disposals binding on minors is limited and qualified — such power can be exercised only for need or the benefit of the estate. No benefit-of-estate case was made; only a need was alleged and found absent.
  4. If the sales had been made by Fakir as karta, the Court observed Article 142 or 144 of the Limitation Act (or the 12-year rule) would apply and Article 44 would not. However, that scenario depends on a finding that Fakir acted as karta; the Court found (following the Additional District Judge) that Fakir was not guardian or acting on behalf of the minors.
  5. Guardianship analysis: The Court examined the concept of de facto guardianship, observed that it is a fact question, and accepted the Additional District Judge's factual finding that Fakir was not a de facto guardian — the minors were looked after by their sister and Fakir had no concern with them. Authorities (including Kristo Kissore Neogy and Budhkaran Chowkhani) were cited to show that relations other than parents must derive guardianship authority from the Court. The Court concluded Fakir was neither natural, de facto nor de jure guardian.
  6. Effect of unauthorized transfer: Because Fakir was not guardian and the sale documents bore execution by Fakir and Khanda in their individual capacities (the minors did not in fact join in the execution), the transfers were by an unauthorized person and did not affect the minors' interest. Therefore the minors need not set aside the transactions to recover their shares; they could recover possession treating the purchaser (Defendant) as a trespasser as regards the minors' shares.
  7. Limitation consequence: Since the Plaintiffs sued within 12 years from the dates of the transactions, no limitation bar (as would arise under Article 44 if the transfers were by a guardian requiring setting aside) arose. Article 44 was held inapplicable to transfers by wholly unauthorized persons.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Additional District Judge's findings that Fakir was not the minors' guardian (neither natural, de facto nor de jure), that the sale deeds were executed by Fakir and Khanda in their personal capacities, and that there was no legal necessity for the sales are accepted and upheld.
  • Because Fakir acted without authority in respect of the minors' shares, those transfers did not divest the minors of their rights and the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of their shares from the Defendant, who must be treated as a trespasser in respect of those shares.
  • Article 44 of the Limitation Act does not apply to transfers by wholly unauthorized persons; consequently the Plaintiffs' suit is not barred by Article 44 where the transferor lacked guardian authority and where the suit was brought within the relevant 12-year period.
  • No broader or novel legal principle is proclaimed beyond application of existing authority on guardianship, requirement of legal necessity for disposals by guardians/karta, and the limitation consequences; the decision resolves the parties' rights on the facts and applies established principles rather than creating new precedent.

Disposition recorded by Pal, J.; Akram, J. concurred (P.C.).

    Banku Behari Mandol v. Banku Behari Hazra

    Pal, J.:— This is an appeal by the Defendant in a suit for declaration of the Plaintiff's title to an eight annas share in the disputed land and for joint possession to the extent of that share, as also for mesne profits.

    2. Admittedly the lands in suit belonged to the Plaintiff's father Hari Charan Hazra, who died in 1915, leaving behind him his widow, a daughter and four sons, namely, the Plaintiffs and their two brothers — Fakir and Khanda. The Plaintiffs were mere infants at the date of their father's death. Their case is that the Plaintiff No. 1 was aged about three years, having been born on the 13th Baisack, 1319 B.S, and that the Plaintiff No. 2 was between one and two years, having been born on the 7th Falgoon, 1321 B.S Their mother also died shortly after their father. The Plaintiffs' case is that during their minority, Fakir and Khanda sold the disputed lands to the Defendant by two sale deeds, namely, Exhibit A, dated the 24th September, 1926, and Exhibit A(1), dated the 21st October, 1927; that neither Fakir nor Khanda was their guardian — either de jure or de facto; that they were brought up by their sister; and that these sales were for no legal necessity.

    3. The case of the Defendant is that Fakir was the de facto guardian of the Plaintiffs during their minority and was also their natural guardian; and that he as such guardian sold the shares of the Plaintiffs also by the two sale deeds; that the sales were for legal-necessity, and were thus binding on the Plaintiffs unless and until these were set aside; that as the Plaintiffs did not seek to set aside the kowalas in this suit, their claim for recovery of possession was not maintainable; and that the Plaintiffs having attained majority more than three years before the institution of the present suit, their claim-for setting aside the transactions would be barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act.

    4. The Court of first Instance found that the four brothers constituted a joint family of which Fakir was the karta and that Fakir as such karta and as natural guardian of the minors after their parents' death brought them up; that he purported to sell the shares of the Plaintiffs also as their guardian, but that there was no legal necessity for the sale. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, dismissed the suit on the ground (1) that the transactions were binding on the Plaintiffs till these were set aside by a properly framed suit, and (2) that the present suit was not maintainable as there was no prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds; further, so far as the Plaintiff No. 1 was concerned, it was barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act, he having attained majority in 1930, — more than three years before the institution of the present suit on 2nd October, 1936.

    5. On appeal by the Plaintiffs, the learned Additional District Judge held (1) that Fakir was not the de facto guardian of the Plaintiffs, and also was not their natural guardian; (2) that the Plaintiffs were brought up by their sister as alleged by them; (3) that the kowalas were executed by Fakir only in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the Plaintiffs; and (4) that, in any case, there was no legal necessity for selling the property, and, therefore,-the sale was not binding on the Plaintiffs. On these findings, he set aside the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, and decreed the Plaintiffs' suit.

    6. The learned Advocate appearing in support of the present appeal before us contends as follows:

    (1) that the Court of Appeal below went wrong in saying that the sales were not made by Fakir as guardian of the minors and on behalf of them; that on a proper construction of the two sale deeds (Ex. A and Al) the learned Additional District Judge should have held that the sales were (a) by Fakir as guardian of the minors or (b) by the minors represented by Fakir as their guardian;

    (2) that Fakir was the natural guardian of the minors under the Hindu law, and as such was entitled to make a binding transfer of the minors' shares;

    (3) that consequently, the present claim of the Plaintiffs would be governed by Article 44 of the Limitation Act, and the suit having been instituted more than three years after the Plaintiffs attained majority, it would be barred by limitation;

    (4) that on their own case as made in the plaint, both the Plaintiffs attained majority more than three years before the date of the institution of the pre sent suit;

    (5) that in any case, the finding arrived at by the Court of first instance that the four brothers constituted a joint Hindu family of which Fakir was the karta, not having been reversed by the Court of appeal below, the latter Court should have held that the sales were by Fakir as karta of the joint family and consequently binding on the Plaintiffs;

    (6) that the evidence on the record was sufficient to establish legal necessity for these sales.

    7. The last point urged by the learned Advocate for the Appellant does not raise any question of law at all. The entire evidence on the point was considered in minute details by the Courts below and both the Courts arrived at the conclusion that there was no legal necessity for the sales. The necessities recited in the sale deeds were minutely scrutinised and both the Courts found that these never existed. This is a concurernt finding of fact based on a consideration of the evidence on the record. Nothing could be placed before us which would entitle us to interfere with this finding.

    8. It cannot be, and it is not, disputed that the power of Fakir to make a binding disposal of the property, — binding on the minors, — was a limited and qualified one, and could be exercised only in the case of need, or for the benefit of the estate, whether he acted as guardian of the minors or as karta of the joint family. No case of benefit of the estate was made here. The case made was one of need only, and it was found that there was none. In view of the finding that there was no legal necessity, the transactions failed validly to take away the minors' right, title and interest in the property. The question is what relief these minors are entitled to, and whether their remedy is barred.

    9. If the sales be taken as having been made by Fakir as karta of the joint family then the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of their share of the property from the alleged purchaser on establishing the defect due to want of legal necessity. Article 44 of the Limitation Act would have no application to such a case. It would be either Article 142 or 144 of the Limitation Act that would apply. In this case the Plaintiffs were within 12 years from the dates of the transactions. Consequently the question when they attained majority would be immaterial for this purpose. There is thus no substance in the fifth ground urged by the learned Advocate for the Appellant.

    10. Coming now to the first four points raised in this appeal, it cannot be disputed that if Article 44 of the Limitation Act apply to this case then the Plaintiffs must fail, as according to the case made in the plaint both of them attained majority more than three years before the date of the suit. The suit was instituted on 2nd October, 1936. The Plaintiff No. 1 was born on 13th Baisakh, 1319, i.e, in April, 1912. He therefore attained majority in 1930. The other Plaintiff was born on 7th Falgoon, 1321 B.S, i.e, in February, 1915. He thus attained majority in February, 1933.

    11. The question whether or not Article 44 of the Limitation Act shall apply depends upon whether the transactions were by the guardian of the minors and whether these require setting aside.

    12. The learned Additional District Judge found that the transactions were not by the guardian of the minors at all because

    (1) Fakir was not their guardian either de facto or de jure;

    (2) Fakir executed the documents in his personal capacity and not in his capacity as guardian of the minors, nor as representing the minors as their guardian.

    13. The juristic principle underlying the conception of de facto guardianship is not easily discernible. Ex facto jus oritur. It may be easy to trace the basis of obligation of such an inter-meddler. But perhaps it is not equally easy to find out the basis of any right available against the minor derived from such intermeddler by a third person.

    14. We are however not troubled with this question here. It has been found by the learned Additional District-Judge that Fakir was not a de facto guardian of the minors. The minors were looked after not by Fakir, but by their sister. Fakir had no concern with his minor brothers. The question whether Fakir was the defacto guardian of the minors is one of fact, and the finding of the final Court of fact is that he was not. No error of law or procedure vitiating this finding could be pointed out to us. The learned Advocate for the Appellant contended that Fakir was the natural guardian of the minors under the Hindu law. The Hindu law vests the guardianship of the minor in the sovereign as parens patrix. Some of the original texts in support of this proposition were cited in Budhkaran Chowkhani v. Thakur, Prosad Saha(1). Necessarily, this duty is delegated to the minor's relations. According to Narada, of such relations the father is the fittest for such guardianship. Next to him comes the mother. Narada names the elder brothers after her. But it has uniformly been held that relations other than the parents of the minors must derive their authority from the Courts: Krsito Kissor Neoghy v. Kadermoyee Dossee(2), Mt. Bhikuo Koer v. Mt. Chamala Koer(3) and Budhkaran Chowkani v. Thakur Prosad Saha.

    15. In Kristo Kissore Neogy v. Kadermoyee Dossee, Garth, C.J, on the authorities cited at page 586 of 2 C.L.R and specially on the authority of a passage in Jagannath's Digest cited there, summarized the law on the point thus: “The passages …. support the view that in the absence of the father, or mother, or the guardian appointed by the father, the selection of the guardian is to be made by the Court, which, of course, represents the ruling power.” No doubt the case of Kristo Kissore Neogy v. Kadermoyee Dossee related to the guardianship of the person of a minor. But so far as Hindu law is concerned, the authorities relied on by the learned Chief Justice equally apply to the guardianship of property. The texts really relate to the guardianship of property.

    16. Admittedly in this case Fakir was not appointed by the father of the minors to better guardian. Nor was he appointed by the Court. In our opinion he was not the guardian of the minors, either natural, or de facto or de jure.

    17. In this particular case it has been found by the Court of Appeal below that the minors were brought up by their sister, and their brother Fakir had nothing to do with them after the death of their parents. In my opinion, therefore, the learned Additional District Judge was correct in saying that Fakir was neither the natural guardian of the minors, nor was he their de facto guardian.

    18. This being so, any transfer by him of the minors' property would be a transfer by an unauthorized person, and would not affect the minors' interest in the property at all. As the minors have come to Court within 12 years from the dates of the transactions, no question of limitation would arise. Article 44 of the Limitation Act has no application to cases of transfer by wholly unauthorized persons.

    19. The document by which the sale was transacted has also been placed before us. According to the recitals in them, the minors themselves, represented by their guardian, purported to join in the conveyance; but these minors never joined in the execution of the deed. The document was executed only by Fakir and Khanda, — to all appearance, in their individual capacities. It was not signed by Fakir, either in his capacity as guardian of the minors, nor by the minors represented by this guardian. In my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge was correct in saying that these documents were executed only by Fakir and Khanda in their personal capacities, and not as guardians of the minors nor on behalf of the minors. In this view again, the transfer did not at all affect the interests of the minors in the property and it is not at all necessary for them to set aside the transactions. They are entitled to recover possession of their share from the Defendant, treating him as a mere trespasser so far as their shares are concerned.

    20. In my opinion, therefore, all the grounds urged by the Appellant fail and there is no substance in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

    Akram, J.:— I agree.

    P.C

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    Banku Behari Mandol v. Banku Behari Hazra
    (Jan 8, 1943)