AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision concerning refund to auction-purchaser)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was the auction-purchaser of a house sold in execution of a money decree. The original money decree was passed on 12 December 1929 by the Subordinate Judge at Monghyr in favour of the parties numbered 1–5 (decree-holders) against parties numbered 6–10 (judgment-debtors). The decree was transferred for execution to the Subordinate Judge at Bhagalpur where a house belonging to the judgment-debtors was attached.

A claim under Order 21, Rule 58, CPC was presented by Mt. Parbati and allowed on 12 January 1931. The decree-holders then filed Title Suit No. 108 of 1931; a compromise petition was filed and, pursuant to it, a compromise decree was passed on 14 December 1932 declaring the house to belong to the judgment-debtors. The decree-holders executed the decree (Execution No. 58 of 1933), and the house was sold on 3 July 1933 to the petitioner for Rs. 2,755. The decree-holders withdrew Rs. 2,425 (part of the purchase money) on 15 May 1934 after confirmation of the sale.

Meanwhile the claimant (opposite party No. 11), successor and heir of Mt. Parbati, brought Title Suit No. 84 of 1933 in the Munsif's Court seeking a declaration that the compromise decree had been fraudulently obtained (alleging misuse of the claimant's thumb impression). That suit was decreed on 22 December 1934 and the compromise decree was vacated. The auction-purchaser (petitioner) applied on 4 January 1935 for refund of the purchase money. The decree-holders' appeals in the title suit were unsuccessful (decision confirmed on 29 June 1935 in appeal and on 5 December 1935 in second appeal). The Subordinate Judge passed an order on 26 September 1935 directing the decree-holders to bring into Court Rs. 2,425 which they had withdrawn.

The decree-holders appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the Subordinate Judge's order. The petitioner lodged the present revision contesting (i) that no appeal lay from the Subordinate Judge's order and (ii) the correctness of the Subordinate Judge's order directing repayment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Subordinate Judge's order directing restitution (the decree-holders to bring into Court Rs. 2,425) was an appealable order (i.e., whether it was an order under Section 144 CPC or an exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC not appealable).
  2. Whether the Subordinate Judge's order directing the decree-holders to repay the purchase money was a proper exercise of the Court's powers (including whether relief should be given under inherent powers where the Code prescribes a specific procedure).
  3. Whether an auction-purchaser can obtain refund of purchase money without first getting the sale set aside by following the procedure under Order 21, Rules 91–93 CPC, and how alleged fraud by decree-holders affects available remedies and limitation periods (including relevance of Section 18 of the Limitation Act and Article 166 of the Limitation Act).
  4. Whether the petitioner should be denied interest or other relief because he has been enjoying the property.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • No appeal lay from the Subordinate Judge's order (it was not appealable).
  • The Subordinate Judge's order to require the decree-holders to repay Rs. 2,425 was correct and should be sustained.
  • The Court should act to prevent the decree-holders profiting from their own fraud; courts have a duty to ensure that judicial acts do not injure suitors (invoking the dictum reproduced from Cairns L.C.).
  • The decree in Title Suit No. 84 of 1933 (which vacated the compromise decree) operated to set aside the sale in law (relying on 2 Pat 829), so refund could follow; alternatively, because the decree-holders' fraud delayed knowledge of the defect, the petitioner could invoke Section 18 of the Limitation Act to count time from the decision in the title suit.

Opposite Party's Arguments

  • A court auction sale carries no warranty of title; until the sale is set aside the purchaser has no cause to claim refund merely because the judgment-debtor's title was defective.
  • Where the Code prescribes a particular remedy (application under Order 21, Rule 91), the Court should not go outside that procedure and grant relief under its inherent powers (Section 151 CPC).
  • The petitioner failed to apply within the 30-day period from the date of sale (Article 166, Limitation Act); therefore the remedy under the Code is barred by limitation.
  • In any event, the petitioner should not be allowed interest because he has been enjoying the property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1 Pat LJ 43 Held that an order for restitution made in exercise of inherent powers (S.151) is not appealable under S.144. The Court relied on this authority to conclude that the Subordinate Judge's order was not appealable and therefore the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to reverse it.
57 Cal 226 Approval by the Calcutta High Court of the decision in 1 Pat LJ 43 regarding non-appealability. Used to support the proposition that orders of restitution under inherent powers fall outside S.144 appealability.
11 PLT 156 Held that when an execution sale is set aside an order for restitution does not fall under S.144 but under S.151 and is not appealable. Reinforced the conclusion on non-appealability of the Subordinate Judge's order.
2 Pat LJ 361 Case where a sale was set aside by the first Court under its inherent powers; on appeal the order was reversed, and it was held that the first Court's order was under S.151 and not appealable. The Court cited this as another example supporting the non-appealability principle and applied it to the present case.
(1871) LR 3 PC 465 (dictum of Cairns L.C.) and 2 Pat 105 Expresses the principle that one of the primary duties of courts is to ensure their acts do not injure suitors (quoted by Lord Carson in 2 Pat 105). The Court invoked this dictum as a general principle supporting the petitioner's plea that courts should prevent parties from profiting by fraud and should provide relief where lawful.
2 Pat 829 Held (in its facts) that a decree in favour of a third party which declared an auction sale invalid had the effect of setting aside the sale without a formal execution-court order, and the decree-holder could proceed to recover the revived debt. The Court treated this decision as fact-specific; it acknowledged the authority but did not hold the present case governed by it. The petitioner relied on it to argue that the title suit's decree automatically set aside the sale.
3 Pat 947 : 6 PLT 769 A careful review concluding that under the present Code of Civil Procedure the auction-purchaser's remedy for lack of saleable interest is by application under Order 21, R.91 (and R.93 for repayment), and that a regular suit for refund is no longer maintainable as under the earlier Code. The Court regarded this as laying down the general principle that the Code prescribes an exclusive procedure (O.21 R.91–93) for setting aside sales and obtaining repayment; it followed this principle in limiting the petitioner's remedy to the specified procedure unless fraud permitted otherwise.
55 All 221 Restitution of purchase money ordered in exercise of inherent powers (S.151) in a case where the auction-purchaser was himself the decree-holder; decisions distinguished on their facts. The Court observed that 55 All 221 was fact-specific (purchaser was decree-holder) and should be confined to its special facts; it did not displace the general rule from 3 Pat 947 or 54 All 948.
54 All 948 Held that where the property purchased at a court sale is lost to the purchaser by a decree in favour of a third party, the purchaser's remedy for return of purchase money is under O.21 R.91 and R.93 CPC (no independent right to refund until sale set aside). The Court treated this as a controlling principle to the effect that refund arises only when the sale is set aside under the Code procedure.
46 Bom 833 and 53 Cal 758 Contain observations to the effect that suits to recover purchase money may be maintainable where fraud is alleged and can be proved. The Court cited these authorities to note that it was reserving opinion on whether fraud might permit relief outside the procedural route; they supported the view that fraud could affect available remedies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the matter in two sequential steps: first, whether the Subordinate Judge's order was appealable; and second, whether the Subordinate Judge's order directing repayment was proper on the merits.

1. Appealability. The Court examined authorities holding that an order for restitution falls under Section 144 CPC only when a trial Court's decree has been varied or reversed by a superior Court; otherwise such orders arise from the Court's inherent power under Section 151 and are not appealable. Relying on the cited precedents (including 1 Pat LJ 43, 57 Cal 226, 11 PLT 156, and 2 Pat LJ 361), the Court concluded that the Subordinate Judge's order was not appealable and that the District Judge therefore lacked jurisdiction to set it aside. The Court observed that the proper remedy for the decree-holders was to seek revision in this Court rather than appeal to the District Judge.

2. Merits — propriety of the Subordinate Judge's order and applicable procedure. The Court then considered whether it should, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, restore the Subordinate Judge's order. It noted the petitioner's contention — invoking the principle that courts must not allow judicial acts to injure suitors — and observed facts suggesting the decree-holders obtained a compromise decree by fraud which led to the sale: a claim by the owner had been allowed, then a later compromise decree (allegedly obtained by fraud) resulted in the sale and withdrawal of purchase money by the decree-holders.

The Court balanced this equitable consideration against the established procedural rule that court sale carries no warranty of title and that, under the present Code, the auction-purchaser's exclusive remedy (in ordinary cases) is the procedure in Order 21, Rules 91–93 CPC. The Court identified 3 Pat 947 and 54 All 948 as the controlling authorities for the proposition that the Code prescribes the exclusive remedy and that refund generally follows only after the sale is set aside by the procedure provided.

The Court acknowledged that some authorities (e.g., 2 Pat 829 and 55 All 221) were fact-specific and that there is a possible exception where fraud is pleaded and proved; it expressly reserved its opinion on the precise scope of that exception. The Court also considered the limitation contention: the opposite party argued that the 30-day limitation (Article 166) to apply under O.21 R.91 had expired; the petitioner countered that, because of the decree-holders' fraud, he might invoke Section 18 of the Limitation Act and count time from the date of the title suit's decision.

Given these competing considerations, the Court concluded that it should not restore the Subordinate Judge's order as it stood (both because of concerns about jurisdiction/irregularity and because the Subordinate Judge's statement of facts was incomplete). Rather than finally decide the merits on revision, the Court exercised its supervisory power to provide the petitioner an opportunity to seek appropriate relief under the procedural mechanism of the Code while allowing for amendment to meet the petitioner’s factual and limitation contentions.

Concretely, the Court set aside the District Judge's order (i.e., removed the appellate reversal) but did not simply restore the Subordinate Judge's order. Instead it directed that the petitioner be permitted to amend his application (filed 4 January 1935) to add a prayer for setting aside the sale and to add facts relied upon to avoid the limitation bar. If the petitioner amends within the time fixed by the Subordinate Judge, the opposite party is to be given an opportunity to answer and the Subordinate Judge will then proceed to decide the matter in accordance with law. The Court left other matters (e.g., whether interest should be disallowed because the petitioner enjoyed the property) to the Subordinate Judge's discretion when deciding the amended application.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court set aside the Appellate Court's (District Judge's) order which had reversed the Subordinate Judge, and directed that the petitioner be permitted to amend his application to add a prayer for setting aside the sale and to plead facts to avoid the limitation bar; the Subordinate Judge shall then permit the opposite party to answer and proceed to hear and decide the amended application in accordance with law.

Implications:

  • The direct operative effect is that the District Judge's reversal is vacated and the petitioner is granted an opportunity to amend and pursue relief by the procedure prescribed by the Code (O.21 R.91–93) while presenting facts to meet limitation and fraud contentions.
  • The Court reaffirmed the principle that orders for restitution made in exercise of inherent powers (S.151) are not generally appealable under Section 144 CPC; therefore the Appellate Court exceeded jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal.
  • The Court did not conclusively rule that the petitioner was entitled to repayment on the present record; instead it required the Subordinate Judge to decide the substantive claims after amendment and answer. The Court reserved its view on whether fraud permits relief outside the Code procedure but acknowledged authorities suggesting that fraud may affect available remedies.
  • No binding new precedent was laid down by this decision beyond (i) the conclusion on non-appealability in the circumstances and (ii) the procedural direction to permit amendment and fresh consideration; the Court applied and distinguished prior authorities rather than establishing a novel rule of law.

Costs: Parties to bear their own costs in this Court and before the District Judge; costs of the Subordinate Judge's Court to be in that Court's discretion.

D.S/R.K

Order accordingly.

    Rameshwar Lal Jhunjhunwala v. Ram Charan Parsad Sahu And Others Opposite Party.

    1. The petitioner was auction-purchaser of a property in execution of a money decree. A third party claimant having established title to the property, the auction-purchaser wanted to get back his money which had already been paid out to the decree-holders. The Subordinate Judge allowed the prayer of the petitioner and passed an order allowing him to recover a sum of Rs. 2425 which the decree-holders had withdrawn. From this decision an appeal was presented to the District Judge who reversed it.

    2. In revision it is contended first that no appeal lay and secondly that the Subordinate Judge's order on the decree-holders to repay to the petitioner the sum of Rs. 2425 paid to them out of the sale proceeds was a correct order. As the statement of facts in the order of the Subordinate Judge is incomplete and not quite accurate, I shall restate them. The money decree was passed on 12th December 1929, by the Subordinate Judge at Monghyr, opposite parties Nos. 1 to 5 being the plaintiffs and opposite parties Nos. 6 to 10 the defendants, and this decree is still in force; it has not been set aside as the Subordinate Judge thinks. The decree was transferred for execution to the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Bhagalpur who attached a certain house as being the property of the defendants judgment, debtors. A claim under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC, was presented by Mt. Parbati and was allowed on 12th January 1931. The decree-holders opposite parties Nos. 1 to 5 brought Title Suit No. 108 of 1931 under O. 21, R. 63 claiming a declaration that the property was the property of the judgment-debtors and was liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree. In this suit a compromise petition was filed and in pursuance of it a compromise decree was passed on 14th December 1932 declaring the house to belong to the judgment debtors and giving them time to pay up the decree. The money not being paid, the decree-holders took out execution (No. 58 of 1933) on which the house was put to sale and sold on 3rd July 1933 to the petitioner for Rs. 2755, of which sum the decree, holders withdrew Rs. 2425 on 15th May 1934, after the sale had been confirmed. In the meantime the claimant, opposite party No. 11, who is the successor and heir of Mt. Parbati, brought Title Suit No. 84 of 1933 in the Munsif's Court for a declaration that the compromise decree was fraudulently obtained. 16 was alleged that the decree-holders and judgment debtors had obtained the thumb impression of the claimant on a blank paper pretending that it was intended for an adjournment petition only and had fraudulently filled if in as a compromise petition. The suit was decreed on 22nd December 1934, and the compromise decree vacated. The application of the auction-purchaser to get back the purchase money was presented on 4th January 1935. The decree-holders appealed from the decree in Title Suit No. 84 of 1933, but the decision was confirmed in appeal on 29th June 1935, and in second appeal on 5th December 1935. The order of the Subordinate Judge directing the decree-holders to bring into Court the sum of Rs. 2425 which they had drawn was passed on 26th September 1935.

    3. The first point for consideration is whether this order of the Subordinate Judge was appealable. An appeal lies from an order for restitution passed under Section 144 of the CPC, as from a decree, but it is said that this was not an order passed under S. 144 but passed in exercise of the inherent powers of the Court under S. 151. S. 144 is intended to be confined to cases in which the decree of a trial Court has been varied or reversed by some superior Court or by reason of some order passed by a superior Court. In other cases the order for restitution coined under S. 151 of the Code and is not appealable. It was so held in 1 Pat LJ 43,1 and this decision was approved by the Calcutta High Court in 57 Cal 226.2 It has been also held in 11 PLT 1563 that when an execution sale is set aside an order for restitution would not come under S. 144, because in such a case the decree is not varied or reversed but would come under S. 151 and would not be appealable. In 2 Pat LJ 3614 a somewhat anomalous position had arisen. The decree-holder brought certain property to sale. The sale was set aside by the first Court at the instance of Ritu, the auction-purchaser, on the ground that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest in the property, but on appeal the order setting aside the sale was reversed and the sale was confirmed. In the meantime Ritu Singh had withdrawn the purchase money from the Court and so when the sale was confirmed on appeal he was called on to bring into Court the purchase money. It was held that the first Court's order must have been made under Section 151 of the CPC, in exercise of the Court's inherent powers and no appeal lay against it. In the light of these decisions, I am of opinion that the first point taken in revision before me succeeds. The order of the Subordinate Judge was not appealable and the District Judge had no jurisdiction to set it aside. Apparently the remedy of the decree-holder, if aggrieved, was to present an application to this Court in revision. It remains to consider the propriety of the Subordinate Judge's order, for this Court obviously ought not to interfere in revision so as to restore an order which itself is without jurisdiction or founded on irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Mr. Bose for the petitioner urges me to I hold that the relief is one which the Court ought to give in pursuance of the well-recognized principle that one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors.

    4. This observation was quoted by Lord Carson in 2 Pat 105 reproducing the dictum of Cairns L.C in (1871) LR 3 PC 465;6 and the circumstances of the present case are prima facie such as to entitle the auction-purchaser as against the decree-holders to the sympathy and assistance of the Court so far as it can lawfully be given. For on the face of judicial pronouncements to which the decree-holders as well as the auction purchaser were parties, it would appear that the decree-holders first put up to sale a house which was not the property of the judgment-debtors; then a claim presented by the owner was allowed; thereafter the decree-holders in a suit 1 brought to set aside that decision, fraudulently obtained a compromise decree in pursuance of which the house was put to sale and the petitioner purchased it on the faith of the compromise decree which has since been found to be tainted with fraud on the part of the decree-holders. If those are the facts, it hardly seems to accord with principles of natural justice that the decree-holders should retain the money which would never have come into their 1 hands but for their own fraud which has 1 been exposed.

    5. But the opposite party relied on the rule that in a court sale there is no warranty of title and contends that when property is sold, unless and until the sale is set aside, the purchaser has no cause to claim refund merely because the title of the judgment-debtor was defective. It is further said that the sale can only be set aside in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, on an application by the auction purchaser under O. 21, R. 91. It is said that where a party is entitled to relief and a particular procedure is provided by the Code laying down the manner in which he is to get such relief, the Court has no juris, diction to go outside that procedure and give relief purporting to act under its inherent power. The first contention, that before the purchaser can recover his money the sale must first be set aside, appears to be well founded. All that was sold in the auction sale was the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors in the property. It might be worth more than the auction price, it might be worth less, it might be worth nothing; but whatever it might be, it passed by the sale to the auction-purchaser who thereafter may be said to stand in the shoes of the judgment-debtor so far as title to the property is concerned; and until he quits or is removed from that position it can reasonably be argued that the occasion for refunding the money has not arisen. He must give back what was sold to him before he gets back what he paid for it.

    6. It is argued for the petitioner that as a result of the decree in T.S No. 84 of 1933 the sale should be considered in the eye of law to have been set aside. For this I am referred to the decision in 2 Pat 829.7 This was a case in which after property had been sold and the sale confirmed a third party sued for a declaration of his title and for possession over the property which had been sold to the decree-holder. The suit was decreed and the decree-holder then claimed to execute the decree a fresh against other property of the judgment-debtor as if the property in question had never been sold to him. He was allowed to do so. Mullick, J. after referring to cases in which it has been held that the auction-purchaser cannot bring a suit to recover from the decree-holder the auction-purchase money on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property and that the only remedy open to the auction-purchaser is to apply under. O. 21, R. 91 to have the sale set aside, said that these authorities had no bearing on the question before him. He observed:

    The effect of the decree, in favour of Firangi Lal, was to set aside the sale and no formal order to that effect was required. The decree-holder and the judgment-debtor were both parties to the suit and therefore they are bound by the order. The argument that under the present Code of Civil Procedure no sale can be set aside, except by a resort to the procedure of O. 21 is, in my opinion, not well founded; nor is it necessary that the execution Court should formally cancel the order of satisfaction which was recorded after the sale of lot No. 1, before the decree-holder can proceed to recover the debt which has been revived in consequence of the decree declaring the sale of lot No. 1 to be invalid.

    7. The decision just cited appears to have been given with reference to its own facts and the authority of the previous cases is not questioned. The position was more exhaustively examined in 3 Pat 947 : 6 PLT 7698 where the whole history of the legislation from Regn. 7 of 1825 down to the Code of 1908 was reviewed, Kulwant Sahay, J. with whom Jwala Prasad, J. agreed said:

    Under the present Code, an auction-purchaser may apply under R. 91 to set aside a sale on the ground that the person whose property was sold had no saleable interest therein; and, if the sale is set aside upon such application, he may apply under R. 93 for an order for repayment of his purchase money. If his application is disallowed, the Court has under R. 92 to make an order confirming the sale, whereupon the sale becomes absolute, and when an order confirming the sale is made, then under sub-r. (3) of R. 92 no suit can be maintained to set aside that order. To my mind the present Code of Civil Procedure makes a material alteration in the provisions of the Code of 1882, and it is, under the present Code, no longer open to an auction-purchaser of maintain a regular suit for a declaration that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property which amounts to a declaration that the order confirming the sale was had and for setting aside the same and for a refund of the purchase money. Whereas Under S. 315 of the Code of 1882 it was optional to enforce repayment of the purchase money upon setting aside of a sale by having recourse to the procedure provided for execution of a decree for money, and the auction-purchaser was not limited to that remedy which was not an exclusive remedy, but he could, if he so chose, bring a regular suit to enforce payment of the purchase money; under the present Code, no such option is left to the auction-purchaser and his only remedy is by way of an application under O. 21, R. 91 of the Code.

    8. For the petitioner I am referred to 55 All 2219 where restitution of the purchase money to the auction-purchaser was ordered to be made in exercise of the inherent powers of the Court under S. 151. But this like the decision in 2 Pat 829 was a casein which the auction-purchaser was the decree-holder himself and in fact the learned Judges found it necessary to distinguish cases in which the property purchased at an auction-sale is lost by the purchaser in consequence of a decree passed in a suit brought by a third party for a declaration that he and not the judgment-debtor was the owner of the same. In such a case it had been held by the same Court in 54 All 94810 that the only remedy of such a purchaser for the return of the purchase money is that provided for by O. 21, R. 91 and O. 21, R. 93 of the CPC. The Judges who decided 55 All 221 did not question the correctness of the decision in 54 All 948 which proceeded on the principle that there was no warranty of title at court sales. It was observed that the right to refund only arises when the sale has been set aside and without getting the sale set aside there is no independent right to obtain such a refund. I think that the decisions in 2 Pat 829 and 55 All 221 must be taken to have been given with reference to the special facts of those cases, and that without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of those decisions, I should follow the principle laid down in 3 Pat 947 and in 54 All 948. With regard to what is there said however as to there being no right of suit for the same relief, I reserve my opinion as to whether those remarks apply to cases where fraud is alleged and can be proved. There are observations in 46 Bom 83311 and 53 Cal 75812 to the effect that such suits may be maintainable. It is a well recognized principle that where the party has another remedy and will not adopt of negligently fails to pursue it, the Court will not, as a general rule, grant him relief under its inherent powers under S. 151.

    9. The opposite party relies on this principle and contends that the remedy provided by the Code being an application under O. 21, R. 91 and the period of 30 days from date of sale (Article 166, Limitation Act) having expired, the petitioner can have no relief. The petitioner's answer is that it was due to the fraudulent device of the decree-holders that he was brought into his present position as he could not be aware of the absence of title in the judgment-debtor, until the result of the Title Suit No. 84 of 1933 and that justice demands that the petitioner be given relief on the principle that it would be iniquitous to let the decree-holders profit by their own fraud. If the petitioner can establish all that, he may be in a position to claim the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, and count time from the date of the decision of that title suit; and on that view on the date of the application for refund presented by him on 4th January 1935 it was competent to him to apply for setting aside the sale with refund of the money as a necessary consequence.

    10. His application was not so framed, it is said, under the impression that the effect of the decree in Title Suit No. 84 of 1933 was automatically to set aside the sale, relying on 2 Pat 829; and though I cannot hold the present case to be governed by that principle, I do not consider that the petitioner can fairly be penalized for the mistake. It is a case for allowing such amendment to be made as will enable the matters in dispute between the parties to be properly heard and decided. Therefore although I am unable to support the order of the Subordinate Judge as it stands I think the petitioner ought to have an opportunity of getting any relief he may be entitled to. In the result, I set aside the Appellate Court's order, and in lieu of restoring the order of the Subordinate Judge, direct that the petitioner be permitted to amend his application of 4th January 1935 adding a prayer for the setting aside of the sale, and adding facts relied on by him to avoid the bar of limitation; and if he does so within a time to be fixed by the Subordinate Judge, the opposite party be given an opportunity to answer the amended application which the Subordinate Judge will then proceed to deal with in accordance with law. There was another point taken on behalf of the opposite party, that in any event the petitioner should not have been allowed any interest because he has been enjoying the property. It will be for the Subordinate Judge to deal with this. Parties are to bear their own costs here and before the District Judge. Costs of the first Court will be in the discretion of that Court.

    D.S/R.K

    11. Order accordingly.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Rameshwar Lal Jhunjhunwala v. Ram Charan Parsad Sahu And Others Opposite Party.
    (Aug 25, 1937)