Adami, J.:— [After stating facts as set out above, his Lordship proceeded:—]
2. It is contended that the learned District Judge by the order of the 19th September, and also by his order of the 13th September, allowed an extension of the time and that he had power so to order an extension, and therefore, the depositing of the decretal amount on the 22nd September fulfilled all the requirements of the agreement and the sale should have been set aside. In the order sheet there is no order for extension of time; there are orders that an inquiry should be made whether the amount had been deposited or not, and, when the appellant brought the money into Court and asked leave to deposit it, the learned District Judge allowed the deposit, but he did not express that by that deposit the terms of the agreement would be held to have been fulfilled. The question is whether the learned District Judge would in any case have jurisdiction to allow an extension of time having in view the terms of the agreement reached between the parties and whether time was of the essence of the contract. Several cases have been put before us in which it has been held that, where there has been a consent between the parties, the Court has power to grant relief against forfeiture and to extend the time for this purpose.
3. But the present case is not a case of relief against forfeiture. In the case of Kandarpa Nag v. Banwari Lal Nag(1) Mookerjee, Acting C.J, laid down, after considering the case-law on the subject the principle which governs cases like the present one. From the cases he examined he laid down the principle that time is of the essence of the agreement, when, in the course of proceedings by the judgment-debtor to set aside an execution sale, a compromise is made among the decree-holder, judgment-debtor and execution purchaser that on payment of the judgment debt within a prescribed period, the sale shall stand cancelled, while upon failure to make such payment the sale shall stand confirmed. He said:
“in such cases as the parties intended in the first conception of the agreement to make time the essence of the contract, the Court would not be competent to extend the time except by consent of all the parties concerned.”
4. That principle must be applied in the present case, and I am of opinion that the District Judge had not the power to extend the time which had been settled and agreed upon by the petitioners. As I have said before, the cases relied on by the learned vakil for the appellants are cases where the question was one of relief against forfeiture, and in the present case that question does not arise. I thus find that the learned District Judge was correct in finding that the appellants had not observed the terms of their agreement and therefore could not claim to set aside the sale.
5. Therefore, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
6. Kulwant Sahay, J.:— I agree.
7. Appeal dismissed.