Abdur Rahman, J.:— The main question that falls to be determined in this appeal is one of competency of the civil Courts to entertain the suit. Gnanapiran Thirumalai Nambigal was the hereditary archaka and mirasi service-holder in a non-excepted temple to which the provisions of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act apply. He died childless in July 1917 but his widow adopted the present plaintiff to her husband. The plaintiff was then a minor and was to attain majority on 26th August, 1938. During the period of his minority his natural father, Srinivasa Ayyangar acted as his guardian and performed the duties in the temple as his deputy. Srinivasa Ayyangar was removed by defendant 1 who is the executive officer of the temple, on 18th January, 1938 and proceedings were started by him before the Deputy Collector, Melur, and the Sub-Collector, Dindigul, to resume the inam lands granted to the plaintiff's ancestors for the services in the temple during his minority. It may also be mentioned here that certain suits had been instituted by Srinivasa Ayyangar on behalf of the plaintiff in which the propriety of orders passed by the trustee (defendant 1) and the Board (defendant 2) was questioned. They were pending at the time when the plaintiff attained majority.
2. Three days after attaining his majority the plaintiff wrote, Ex. B, to the trustee (defendant 1) informing him that he (i.e, the plaintiff) would not be able to take charge of his duties for a period of two months on account of his illness. To this letter a medical certificate was attached. This was followed by another letter, Ex. C, dated 23rd October, 1938 in which the plaintiff, although anxious to take charge of his nirvahams expressed his inability so to do for a period of another three months on account of his ill-health. A medical certificate by the same practitioner who had certified to his illness before was also attached to this application. No reply was given by the trustee to these applications. But the fact remains that the plaintiff had not assumed the charge of his duties when he was served with a letter (Ex. D) on 15th January, 1939 calling upon him to comply with certain conditions and informing him that the resumption proceedings of the inam lands would be withdrawn if he undertook to abide by them within 24 hours. One of these conditions was that the plaintiff should discharge his duties personally and to appoint a temporary agent for the purpose if he had not recovered from his illness. He was also called upon “to follow, obey and respect the orders and directions of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board” in certain proceedings, a list of which was appended. To this the plaintiff sent his reply (Ex. E). Since the order of the plaintiff's dismissal (Ex. F) dated 19th January, 1939 is based on this letter which was read by defendant 1 as containing not only “a taunt and ridicule thrown at this administration, but an insult more poignant than the injury,” “an euphemistic denial to perform his legitimate and ordained and unquestionable duties, whose evasion, no well-ordered institution could afford to tolerate” and as leading to inference that he meant to be “a titular service-holder performing practically no service,” it would be better to read it in extenso. Exhibit E reads as follows:
Yadast submitted by Thiruvengadathan Tirumalai Nambigal, hereditary Stanika of the aforesaid devasthanam:
1. I received your R.O.C No. 4148, dated 15th January, 1939, to-day, through my natural brother.
2. I am ever ready to attend to the stanika miras kainkaryams in the Sri Kallalagar Devasthanam, according to mamool and in accordance with practice and custom? which I have now obtained under hereditary right and which belonged to my ancestors hereditarily and which were in their enjoyment.
3. But I am not responsible for the proceedings I taken against my natural father for a mistake alleged to have been committed by him when he was doing duty during my minority and for the orders passed in connexion therewith. Nor can they be binding on me.
4. Further, in respect of the Board orders referred in your aforesaid letter, cases are pending wherein I figure as plaintiff and the devasthanam as defendants. Without prejudice to my contentions in the aforesaid cases, I am now prepared to take charge of my kainkaryams.
5. I have no objection also to have the accounts between us mutually settled without prejudice to my cases as aforesaid and contentions thereto.
6. As I have still some inconveniences which do not permit me to attend personally to my temple kainkaryams, I have made arrangements with Sri Seshadri Ayyangar Avergal, the hereditary stanika of Perumal temple at Sri Venamamalai also known as Todadri and the husband of my natural sister, to do duty as agent on my behalf, for sometime and with the individuals who were employed by you for doing the work, to be attending to my kainkaryams on my behalf. I trust that you would agree to the aforesaid arrangement.
7. I trust that you would therefore cause the proceedings in the Court of the Divisional Officer, Melur, and the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dindigul, referred in your letter to be stayed and cause suitable orders to be passed as aforesaid.
17th January(Sd.) G. Thiruvengadathan
1939.Thirumalai Nambigal.
3. In answer to the order communicating his dismissal, the plaintiff made another representation (Ex. J) but as this elicited no response he appealed to the Board inter alia on the grounds that his letter, Ex. E had been either misread or a very uncharitable construction was being placed upon it, that he had been condemned unheard without framing a charge or giving him any opportunity to show cause against any specific breach and that his dismissal even before he had entered the service was without jurisdiction and clearly unjust. He denied that he had ever refused to abide by the order of the Board. The statement about the plaintiff's inability to assume his duties on the ground of his illness, although not questioned by the trustee and in fact to a certain extent admitted in Ex. D, was not accepted by the Board as correct and it was held that
the appellant ceased to render service to the temple from the date of his majority (26th August, 1938) without any just or lawful excuse and caused great inconvenience to the conduct of the service in the temple.
4. It was also held that:
On 15th January, 1939, the trustee gave him an opportunity to enter upon his duties and to give an undertaking to abide by the orders of the Board issued with regard to the appellant's duties. The appellant already failed to obey the orders of the trustee. Therefore he is guilty of disobedience of lawful orders of the trustee within the meaning of Section 43 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
5. After indulging in certain generalities with which apparently the appellant had no concern and holding that Section 43 of the Act did not require any “regular charges to be framed against the appellant” the order of the trustee dismissing him was confirmed and his appeal rejected (Ex. H). The plaintiff then instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arises. It was brought against trustee (defendant 1) and as against the Hindu Religious Endowments Board as defendant 2 and asked for declaration that the orders passed by them regarding the plaintiff's dismissal (Ex. P. and Ex. H) were ultra vires of them and “wholly illegal and unjust.” In reply it was contended on behalf of defendant 1 that a suit of this nature did not lie in a Court of civil jurisdiction and that the orders passed by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board were final and con-elusive. The order Ex. F was also attempted to be maintained on its merits. The attitude adopted by the Board was more or less the same. They had indeed adopted the written statement filed on behalf of defendant 1. The question as to the maintainability of the civil suit formed the subject-matter of issue 2 and the question whether the orders were passed by the defendants
without a proper hearing and without a proper opportunity to the plaintiff to put forward his case and in violation of the fundamental principles of procedure and justice
was put into issue 3. Whether there was no sufficient cause to dismiss the plaintiff was covered by the first one. Inasmuch as the plaintiff had been dismissed before the expiry of five months for which he had asked for leave immediately after the attainment of his majority and no other reason was assigned in Ex. F or Ex. H-1 at least so far as he was concerned except what was stated in his applications Ex. B, Ex. C or in his reply Ex. E, no oral evidence was led on behalf of the parties and the matter was left to be decided on the documents produced on their behalf. Of these the most important have been already referred to by us. The learned Subordinate Judge of Madura held that having regard to the facts that the plaintiff had not assumed the charge of his duties and had no opportunity to work in the temple, it was “meaningless to say that he disobeyed orders or that he failed to perform duties”…… “especially when the plaintiff expressed his readiness to do service as required by the trustee without prejudice to the suits.” In short, he found on issue 1 that the various grounds set out in Ex. P. were not valid and could not operate as against the plaintiff “however much they might be forcible against the deputy.” He pointed out in para 13 of his judgment:
If only charges had been framed against the plaintiff or even without the charges plaintiff had been called upon to explain any particular matters put to him, the circumstances show that plaintiff would have convinced the trustee and order like Ex. F would never have seen the light of day.
6. For the above reasons, Ex. F and for reasons which it is hardly necessary to re-state (couched in rather strong language — perhaps justifiable in the circumstances) Ex. H were to be found indefensible. As for the contention that these orders (Ex. F and Ex. H) were not open to scrutiny by civil Courts and that Ss. 43 and 73 barred the present suit, the learned Subordinate Judge was of the view that inasmuch as the order, Ex. F, was not “covered by any of the offences mentioned in S. 43(i)” and that there had been such a flagrant violation of principles of natural justice, either S. 43(i) did not apply or that if it did, the finality was taken away by a violation of the principles of natural justice in giving a decision before giving any opportunity to the plaintiff to explain the deeds of omission or commission which, it was thought, he had committed. On these findings, the suit was decreed. Defendant 1 appeals.
7. A perusal of the letter, Ex. E, leaves no doubt in our minds that the plaintiff was willing to abide by the conditions stated by defendant 1 in Ex. D and the comment made by him (i.e, the trustee) in regard to para 4 of the letter was wholly unjustifiable. The plaintiff had expressed his willingness in that paragraph to take charge of his duties and it is impossible to read that paragraph either by itself or along with the other paragraphs so as to spell his “utter unwillingness to discharge his duties.” The fact that the plaintiff had stated that he was prepared to take charge without prejudice to his contentions in the aforesaid cases cannot imply that he was not prepared to do so. The plaintiff appeared to be anxious to safeguard his rights in regard to certain matters which were pending in Courts and this he was fully entitled to do. The plaintiff did not take up the position that he would not perform his duties until the matter was finally determined by civil Courts. He only urged that the execution of his duties should not in any way prejudice his rights in Court. We cannot see what possible objection could be raised to such a reservation unless the idea was to place the plaintiff's consent to act in pursuance of the conditions imposed by defendant 1 before the Court and to try and obtain a decision from the Courts against the former on account of his conduct. A great deal of stress was laid by the trustee on his user of the words “according to mamool and in accordance with practice and custom.” But we see nothing in this statement even if it is taken to mean that the plaintiff was not prepared to be bound by an agreement (Ex. III) which his natural father had executed during his minority. Reading Ex. E as strictly against the plaintiff as it is possible for us to do, we are unable to find anything in it to which any exception could possibly have been taken by the defendants. His nomination of his brother-in-law, Seshadri Ayyangar, to act as his agent was in accordance with the third condition in Ex. B and his request to the trustee “to carry on the work during his illness with the individuals who were employed by you (defendant 1) for doing the work” instead of savouring of disobedience points to his co-operation. The plaintiff cannot thus be regarded to have been guilty of any disobedience of lawful orders. Nor can he be, in view of his illness, held to have committed any neglect of duty. The question then is whether Sections 43 and 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, preclude the civil Courts from going into the question after the matter was decided by the trustee and his decision was confirmed by the Board. The relevant provisions of S. 43 read as follows:
(1) All office-holders and servants attached to a temple or in receipt of any emolument or perquisite from the temples shall be under the orders and control of the trustee; and the trustee may fine, suspend, remove or dismiss any of them for breach of trust, incapacity, disobedience of lawful orders, neglect of duty, misconduct or other sufficient cause:
Provided that………
(2) Any office-holder or servant of a temple other than an excepted temple punished by a trustee under sub-s. (1) may, within such time as may be prescribed, appeal to the committee whose decision shall in the case of a non-hereditary office-holder or servant be final.
(3) A hereditary office-holder or servant of a temple, other than an excepted temple may, within such time as may be prescribed, prefer a further appeal to the Board against the order of a committee on an appeal under sub-s. (2) and the decision of the Board shall be final.
(4) ……………
8. Section 73 on which reliance was also placed by learned counsel for the appellant provides as follows:
(1) The Board or any person having interest and having obtained the consent of the Board may institute a suit in the Court to obtain a decree: (a) appointing or removing the trustee of a math or excepted temple (or of a specific endowment attached to a math or excepted temple); (b) vesting any property in a trustee; (c) declaring what proportion of the endowed property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the endowment; (d) directing accounts and inquiries, or (e) granting such further or other reliefs as the nature of the case may require.
(2) ………………………….
(3) Sections 92 and 93 and R. 8 of O. 1, of Sch. 1 of the CPC, 1908, shall have no application to any suit claiming any relief in respect of the administration or management of a religious endowment and no suit in respect of such administration or management shall be instituted except as provided by this Act.
9. Taking up S. 43 first, it might be mentioned here that no committee such as is referred to in sub-clause (2) of that section appears to have been constituted. It was therefore urged by learned counsel for the respondent that S. 60(a) which provides for the exercise of all or any of the powers and for the performance of all or any of the duties of the committee by the Board and its president in case the committee has not been constituted or is not in existence can only refer to a temporary absence of the committee and could not be held to apply when a committee contemplated by that sub-clause had never been constituted at all. This would, he contended, have the effect of depriving the party entitled to appeal from a right of appeal to that body and to a further appeal to the Board and its president. There is no force, in our opinion, in that contention. The words in Section 60(a) of the Act are quite general and provide for the exercise of the right by the Board and its president in all cases where a committee such as is referred to in sub-cl. (2) to S. 43 “has not been constituted or is not in existence.” There is nothing in that section which gives the slightest support to the contention that it was intended to apply only when the committee did not happen to be in existence only temporarily.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant placed a great deal of reliance on the decision in I.L.R (1939) Mad. 811 which was affirmed in the Letters Patent Appeal by a Division Bench of this Court in I.L.R (1940) Mad. 8252. It was held by our learned brother Wadsworth, J. that inasmuch as Section 43 of the Religious Endowments Act, had set up a special machinery for appeals and had conferred finality on their decision, the propriety of the order passed by the trustee under that section could not be questioned in civil Courts by an office-holder who had been dismissed by the trustee in the exercise of the powers of administration and management conferred upon him under the said Act. We will go into the question of the meaning of the expression “in respect of such administration and management of a religious endowment” used in sub-cl. (2) of Section 73 of the Act when we are dealing with that section. But there can be no room for doubt that if the trustee has really acted in the exercise of the powers conferred on him under S. 43(1) and has fined, suspended, removed or dismissed an office-holder or a servant attached to a non-excepted temple for (a) breach of trust, (b) incapacity, (c) disobedience of lawful orders, (d) dereliction of duty, (e) misconduct or (f) for other sufficient cause, the order of the trustee if confirmed both by the committee (provided the committee was in existence) and the board and if the committee did not happen to exist by the board alone, shall be final and cannot be subsequently challenged in a civil Court. It was so held by Wadsworth, J. and by the Division Bench in the Letters Patent appeal in the case to which we have referred.
11. We must, however, make it clear that it is only in cases where the trustee has actually acted for the reasons given in sub-cl. (1) of S. 43 and enumerated in that last paragraph that the provisions of sub-cls. (2) and (3) can be attracted. If the trustee is, on the other hand, found to have fined, suspended, removed or dismissed an office-holder or a servant attached to a temple either for reasons other than those mentioned in sub-cl. (1) or although he purported to act for one of the reasons mentioned in that sub-clause, those reasons were not in fact found by him to have existed, the order of the trustee would not fall within the purview of sub-cl. (1) of that section and the orders of the committee or of the board could not be consequently held to be final under the latter sub-clauses. In the decision of the Letters Patent appeal cited above, the archaka was, as stated by the Hon'ble Chief Justice in his judgment, suffering from leucoderma and was dismissed from his office by the trustee at least ostensibly on that ground. If that ground did exist, as held by Wadsworth, J. it may be regarded as sufficient “to clothe the trustee with the power to pass an order of dismissal under Section 48 of the Act” on the ground of incapacity. It is thus clear that the contention advanced in this case that the civil Courts could not go into the question even if the trustee had not acted for any of the reasons stated in sub-cl. (1) to S. 43 was not considered in the Letters Patent appeal: although Wadsworth, J. appears to have been inclined to the opinion (he does not say so very clearly), that the trustee might not have had the power to dismiss the archaka if the reasons for his dismissal were not to be found within the four corners of sub-cl. (1) of the section and conferred jurisdiction on the trustee to so act. In any case, whether Wadsworth, J. was or was not of that view, there is no manner of doubt in our minds that a trustee can exercise the powers mentioned in sub-cl. (1) of S. 43 only when the reasons given in that sub-clause are found by him to have existed, and not merely because he purports to seek shelter behind them on grounds which could not be brought within the ambit of sub-cl. (1). It is true that a civil Court is not a Court of appeal; but it is open to a civil Court to examine the grounds on which the trustee has acted and to ascertain whether they could or could not be brought under the section. In dealing with the jurisdiction of civil Courts although in regard to Sea Customs Act, the following observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in I.L.R (1940) Mad. 5993 are pertinent:
It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
12. The last portion of this observation would be relevant to another contention raised on behalf of respondent 1 and we would deal with that later; but, in so far as the present question is concerned, the power of the civil Courts “to examine into cases where the provisions have not been complied with” was expressly recognised in that decision. We would therefore hold that the civil Courts have the power to go into the question and to ascertain whether any of the reasons did in fact exist which would confer jurisdiction on the trustee to act under S. 43 and if it be found that they did not exist (as we had already found in this case) he must be held to have exceeded his powers conferred on him by Section 43 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, and the decision of the Board could not, therefore, be regarded as final and in the absence of the finality of that decision, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts could not be found to have been ousted. The next question to decide is whether the civil suit would be barred under Section 73 of the Act. In I.L.R (1939) Mad. 81, Wadsworth, J. expressed the view that a suit by an office-holder or servant of the temple to set aside his dismissal by a trustee must be regarded to be a suit in respect of the administration or management of the religious endowment within the meaning of Section 73 of the Act and would therefore be barred. The Division Bench did not, however, on appeal from his judgment consider this aspect of the case.
13. It is unnecessary in this case to go into the question whether the expression “except as provided by this Act” should be taken to convey the idea of being “contrary to the provisions of this Act” as held by Curgenven, J. in 61 M.L.J 8154, or to mean as “except under the provisions of this Act” as understood by Venkatasubba Rao, J. in 57 Mad. 3625. Nor is it necessary for the purposes of the present case to examine the question whether the words “administration or management” used in sub-cl. (3) of S. 73 were meant to be more comprehensive than what was contained in Section 73(1) of the Act as held by Venkatasubba Rao, J. in the above case or were meant to cover such acts of administration only as were enumerated in that sub-clause as appears to have been decided in 57 Mad. 3156 to both of which, it is interesting to observe, Ramesam, J. was a party. It is sufficient for our purposes however to ascertain whether the dismissal of the plaintiff archaka by the trustee can be regarded to be an act of “administration or management of a religious endowment.” It is only “in respect of such administration or management” that a suit can be held to be barred. The term “religious endowment” has been defined in S. 9, sub-cl. (ii) of the Act to mean,
all property belonging to, or given or endowed for the support of, maths, or temples or for the performance of any service of charity connected therewith and includes the premises of maths or temples but does not include gifts of property made as personal gifts or offerings to the head of a math or to the archaka or other employee of a temple.
14. If the words “administration or management” used in sub-cl. (3) of S. 73 have been employed with reference to the “religious endowment” as defined in the Act and this is what is stated in that sub-clause, it appears to be clear that they could not possibly be taken to cover or include the case of a dismissal of an archaka of a temple. The administration or management must be with reference to the “religious endowment,” i.e, with reference to the property mentioned in the definition and not with respect to the dismissal of an archaka. The suit to set aside his dismissal relates to a personal right and as long as there is no question relating to the administration or management of the endowed property, the suit cannot be held to have been barred under that section. Our learned brother Wadsworth, J. appears to have conceded this to a large extent in the first sentence of the penultimate paragraph of his judgment at p. 86. But it seems to us, and we say so with great deference to him, that he did not take the definition of the term religious endowment as given in the Act into consideration and thus came to the view in a general sense that “a suit to set aside a dismissal by a trustee in the exercise of his powers” was “a suit in respect of the administration or management of a religious endowment.” It was held in 61 M.L.J 815 that a suit by a temple trustee against the temple committee and others to establish his hereditary right to trusteeship related to a personal claim and was not one in respect of the administration or management of the endowment. This view was accepted by Venkatasubba Rao, J. in 57 Mad. 362 at page 367. If that were so, in the case of a trustee who is after all to administer and manage the endowment, it would apply a fortiori to the case of an archaka whose province it is merely to conduct a worship in the temple and not to administer or manage the religious endowment of the temple. We are, for the above reasons, of opinion that S. 73 cannot be held to bar the present suit.
15. This is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. But it is contended by learned counsel for the respondents that inasmuch as no charge was framed against the archaka and he was not asked to submit any explanation although he was a hereditary archaka and did not hold the office at the trustee's pleasure, the order of dismissal must be regarded to have been passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice and must also, for that reason, be declared not to be binding on the plaintiff. There is, in our opinion, considerable force in that contention. We have pointed out in our judgment that the plaintiff was a minor till 26th August, 1938 and had not assumed the charge of his duties as a hereditary archaka when he received Ex. D on 17th January, 1939 or when he was ordered to be dismissed on 19th January, 1939 under the order Ex. F. From a perusal of the various applications and orders on record, it is clear that the plaintiff was dismissed before he had been required to submit any explanation. It is also clear that he was dismissed not because of any disobedience of lawful orders or of any neglect or misconduct in the discharge of his duties. He appears to have been dealt with in that highhanded manner simply because he did not withdraw the suits which his natural father had instituted on his behalf as his next friend during his minority.
16. It was clearly stated by the plaintiff in his letters that he was willing to assume the charge of his duties without prejudice to the cases that were pending in Court and this, in our opinion, he was fully entitled to do.
17. The plaintiff's dismissal without giving him any opportunity to explain his conduct solely on account of the sins committed by his father (even if the framing of charges in a formal manner may not be regarded as essential) must be held to contravene the principles of natural justice as observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the last sentence of the passage that we have quoted from I.L.R (1940) Mad. 599. We must therefore hold the order of dismissal by the trustee to be unsustainable on that ground as well. For the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of respondent 1. The costs will be borne by the appellant personally.
C.R.K/R.K
18. Appeal dismissed.