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  • provisions contained in sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under section 82,
  • SECTION 95 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
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  • provisions contained in sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under section 82,
  • SECTION 95 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Shearer, J. (Second Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is a Co-operative society which purchased, in execution of an award, a 2 annas 8 pies interest (a moiety interest of the equity of redemption) in a revenue-paying estate that originally formed part of a larger property belonging to the defendants and certain relations. At the time of the transaction that led to the award the persons were members of a joint family; subsequently there was a partition and the contesting defendants received the portion now in question.

The larger property had been mortgaged in 1914 with the mortgage money due on 18 June 1915. A suit based on the mortgage produced a preliminary decree on 24 September 1927, made final on 15 December 1928, but execution was delayed. A sale in execution of the mortgage decree occurred on 27 January 1936 by which time the plaintiff already owned a moiety of the equity of redemption. On 26 February 1936 the plaintiff paid into court the decretal amount plus statutory compensation and had that sale set aside.

Within three years (25 February 1939) the plaintiff instituted the present suit seeking recovery from the defendants of one-half of the amount he had paid into court together with interest from the date of payment, and claiming that under sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act the amount due to him was chargeable on the moiety of the originally mortgaged property now owned by the contesting defendants.

The courts below decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The contesting defendants appealed to this Court. The appeal challenges both the nature of the plaintiff's remedy (charge versus subrogation/assignee-in-equity remedy after the 1929 amendment of the Transfer of Property Act) and certain components of the decree (recovery of half of the statutory compensation and pre-suit interest).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after the 1929 amendment to the Transfer of Property Act, a co-mortgagor (or co-owner) who redeems by paying the mortgage-money still, by operation of law, obtains a charge on the portions of the property belonging to his co-owners (i.e., a right under sections 82 and 100), or whether his exclusive remedy was converted into a right of subrogation/assignee-in-equity (subject to limitation rules applicable to suits on the mortgage bond).
  2. If both remedies (charge and subrogation) can coexist, whether limitation bars the plaintiff's claimed remedy (including whether limitation runs from the date fixed in the original mortgage bond or from the date of payment by the plaintiff).
  3. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover one-half of the statutory compensation he paid and to interest from the date of payment (i.e., entitlement to pre-suit interest).

Arguments of the Parties

Contestant Defendants / Appellants

  • Contended that the plaintiff's asserted right to a statutory charge had been taken away by the 1929 amendment to the Transfer of Property Act and that the plaintiff's remedy was confined to rights of subrogation or an assignee-in-equity of the mortgage he had redeemed (i.e., sections 92 and 95 as amended).
  • Asserted that any suit by the plaintiff in such a subrogated/assignee capacity was barred by limitation — the 12-year period running from the date fixed in the mortgage bond for repayment (18 June 1915) — and relied on the decision of Das and Coutts, JJ. in Sibanand Misra v. Jagmohan Lall for this limitation proposition.
  • Invited the Court to regard Rankin, C.J.'s observations in Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali as supporting the contention that a subrogation-based remedy (with its limitation consequences) displaces a co-mortgagor's claim to a statutory charge.

Plaintiff / Respondent

  • Maintained that sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act grant a redeeming co-mortgagor a charge on his co-owners' portions for contribution when he pays more than his share; thus he was entitled to a decree and a charge on the defendants' property.
  • Asserted that limitation should run either from the date of his payment into court or from the date fixed for payment in the mortgage decree rather than from the original mortgage bond's due date; relied on decisions of Chatterji, J. in Dulhin Kamlapati Devi v. Jageshar Dayal and Babu Lal Ray v. Bindhyachal Rai to support that position.
  • Alleged in the plaint that he had been subrogated to the position of the mortgagee so far as one-half of the mortgage amount was concerned, and sought a decree for sale “subject to the charge”, although the primary claim advanced and relied upon by the Court was a monetary decree with a charge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali (Rankin, C.J.) Observation that amendment (Act XX of 1929) to section 95 made sections 92 and 95 indicate a co-mortgagor redeeming has the “same right as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems may have against the mortgagor.” The Court analysed Rankin, C.J.'s remark and treated it as an observation addressing section 95 as it stood pre-1929 and not as laying down a general rule that subrogation and a charge cannot co-exist; the Court rejected the view that Rankin's words displace the co-mortgagor's right to a charge under sections 82 and 100.
Rajkumari Devi v. Mukundalal Bandopadhyaya (1920) Decision concerning a co-mortgagor who paid off entire mortgage and brought suit after more than 12 years from due date. Noted as a case similar in facts; the Full Bench in Umar Ali had been constituted to consider its correctness. The Court referred to it in evaluating the effect of the 1929 amendments and limitation questions.
Sibanand Misra v. Jagmohan Lall (Das and Coutts, JJ.) Authority relied upon by appellants for the proposition that a suit on the mortgage may be barred by limitation while a suit for contribution may not be; and that a plaintiff might obtain a money decree rather than a mortgage decree. The Court referred to Das, J.'s reasoning approvingly to show that subrogation is an additional remedy and that a redeeming co-mortgagor could obtain a money decree even where a suit on the mortgage was barred; this supported the point that subrogation does not extinguish rights to contribution/charge in all instances.
Dulhin Kamlapati Devi v. Jageshar Dayal (Chatterji, J.) Decision relied on by the plaintiff for the proposition regarding the starting point of limitation (from payment or decree date rather than from original due date). The Court noted Chatterji, J.'s view that Rankin, C.J.'s observations were obiter and that limitation need not necessarily run from the original due date; the Court found it unnecessary to resolve any conflict between the earlier and later decisions for the present case.
Babu Lal Ray v. Bindhyachal Rai (Meredith, J.) Another decision cited by the plaintiff in support of his limitation argument. Referred to as one of the later decisions which might appear at variance with an earlier view; the Court observed that those later decisions were not directly in point for the facts before it and did not decide the broader conflict.
Amhad Wali Khan v. Musammat Shamsh-ul-Jahan Begum (Judicial Committee) Authority construing the words “and obtain possession” in section 95 distributively, thereby avoiding a construction that would deprive a redeeming co-mortgagor of contribution/charge under sections 82 and 100. The Court cited the case for the proposition that section 95 should not be read so as to nullify the charge rights given by sections 82 and 100; it supported the Court's interpretation that section 95 did not take away the co-mortgagor's charge in the simple mortgage context.
Hasan v. Brijbhukan Saran (Banerji, J.) Judicial observations supporting the view that section 95 should not be construed to deprive a redeeming co-mortgagor of a charge under sections 82 and 100. Used as supportive authority for the Court's construction that sections 82 and 100 suffice to give a redeeming co-mortgagor a charge and that the 1929 changes do not remove that right.
Bhagwan Das v. Karam Husain (Richards, C.J.) Observations cited for construing section 95 so as not to oust the charge rights under sections 82 and 100. Cited to reinforce the Court's view that section 95, properly construed, does not deprive a co-mortgagor of the right to contribution and a charge under sections 82 and 100.
Freeman on Co-tenancy and Partition (textbook) Equitable principle: "he who enjoys the benefit must also share in the burden" and the rationale for making a co-owner's excess payment a charge on co-owners' interests so they may surrender property instead of paying personal liability. Invoked by the Court to explain the equitable rationale behind sections 82 and 100 and why a charge on co-owners' interests is an appropriate remedy when one co-owner pays more than his share.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first analysing the nature of the plaintiff's payment and the legal consequences that follow when one of several co-owners pays the whole or more than his share of mortgage-money. The Court relied on equitable principles (expressed in the maxim and referenced in Freeman on Co-tenancy and Partition) and on the statutory scheme in the Transfer of Property Act, notably sections 82 and 100, to explain that when one co-owner pays the entire mortgage debt a charge arises by operation of law in his favour on the portions of the property belonging to co-owners who paid nothing but benefited thereby.

The Court acknowledged that prior to the 1929 amendment the plaintiff would have, at minimum, been \"in no worse a position\" than to obtain a decree for the excess paid and a charge on the co-owners' portions. The appellants' argument was that the 1929 amendments (inserting new sections 92 and 95) altered this position and limited the redeemer's remedy to subrogation/assignee-in-equity rights which attract the limitation rule applicable to suits on the mortgage bond.

Central to the appellants' case was Rankin, C.J.'s observation in Umar Ali that the amended provisions equated the co-mortgagor's rights with those of a mortgagee (implying limitation consequences), and reliance was placed on Sibanand Misra and related decisions. The Court examined these authorities and concluded:

  • Rankin, C.J.'s observations were directed to section 95 as it stood pre-1929 and constituted an obiter remark in relation to the limitation point; they should not be read as a general proposition that a right of subrogation and a statutory charge cannot co-exist.
  • Subrogation is in equity an additional remedy — an assignee in equity may treat the security as still subsisting and sue on it, but that does not necessarily oust other remedies such as contribution and a statutory charge arising under sections 82 and 100.
  • Section 95 (old form) had been enacted to give a charge to a co-mortgagor redeeming a usufructuary or conditional sale mortgage where possession passed — it was never properly construed so as to deprive a redeeming co-mortgagor of the contribution/charge rights otherwise conferred by sections 82 and 100 in the case of simple mortgages.
  • The 1929 insertion of sections 92 and 95 does not, in the Court's view, eliminate the co-mortgagor's right to a charge under sections 82 and 100 when he has paid the mortgage-money; if the co-mortgagor cannot rely on the mortgage (because suit on it is barred by limitation), he may lose priority as against subsequent encumbrances but he does not forfeit the right to have the property sold to satisfy his claim (i.e., he still may obtain a charge and a money decree enforced by sale).

The Court also addressed more particular points argued by the appellants: the interpretation of the words \"and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage\" in section 100 and the significance of the plaintiff's incidental plea of subrogation in the plaint. The Court held that the plaintiff did not sue primarily as a subrogee and that the limitation point, though argued at length, did not properly arise on the plaintiff's chosen cause of action (a money decree with a charge).

However, the Court found error in the courts below in granting certain heads of relief: the plaintiff was not entitled to recover one-half of the statutory compensation of Rs. 140 and was not entitled to interest prior to the date of institution of the suit. On these narrow matters the appeal succeeded.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal was partly allowed.

Direct consequences and disposition:

  • The plaintiff is entitled to a decree for money to be realized by sale of that portion of the mortgaged property in the possession of the defendants, and to have the amount charged on the defendants' portion of the property — i.e., the Court recognised the plaintiff's right to a monetary decree with a charge under the statutory provisions relied on (sections 82 and 100).
  • To the limited extent that the courts below awarded recovery of one-half of the statutory compensation (Rs. 140) and interest prior to the institution of the suit, those parts of the decree were in error; the appeal was allowed on those points and the decree varied accordingly.
  • Because the appellants substantially failed on the principal point, they were ordered to pay the respondents' costs in this Court.

Broader implications: The Court analysed and interpreted the relationship between subrogation (assignee-in-equity) remedies and the statutory charge rights conferred by sections 82 and 100 after the 1929 amendments. It declined to hold that the 1929 amendments eliminated the co-mortgagor's charge-rights in the factual context before it, and it did not pronounce that a general conflict among earlier and later decisions required resolution by a larger Bench. The Court expressly noted some doubt as to the soundness of reasoning in some later decisions but did not lay down a sweeping new precedent beyond its conclusions in the present case.

Disposition

Appeal partly allowed; decree of the courts below varied to exclude recovery of half the statutory compensation and pre-suit interest. Costs in this Court awarded against the appellants.

This summary is compiled strictly from the text of the provided opinion and contains no information beyond that text.

    Sheosaran Singh v. Amla Co-Operative Credit Society

    Shearer, J.:— This second appeal, which is, by certain of the defendants, arises out of a contribution suit. The plaintiff in the suit is a Co-operative society, and purchased, at a sale in execution of an award, a 2 annas 8 pies interest in a revenue-paying estate. This was part of a larger property, which belonged originally to the defendants and certain relations of theirs against whom the award had been obtained. All these persons were, at the time the award was made, or, at all events, at the time when the transaction, which led ultimately to the making of the award, took place, members of a joint family. Subsequently, there was a partition, and, at this, the property, with which we are now concerned, was allotted to the contesting defendants. The sale in execution of the award took place in 1931. The property sold and the rest of the property, of which it then formed, part, had, in 1914, been mortgaged, the due date for the payment of the mortgage money being the 18th of June, 1915. A suit was instituted on the basis of this mortgage and a preliminary decree obtained on the 24th of September, 1927. This decree was made final on the 15th of December, 1928 but, for some reason or other, there was delay in putting it into execution. It was not until 1936 that the mortgaged property was sold, by which time the plaintiff had, as I have already said, become the owner of a moiety of the equity of redemption. The sale took place on the 27th of January, 1936, and, on the 26th of February, 1936, the plaintiff paid into court the decretal amount together with the statutory compensation, and had the sale set aside. On the 25th of February, 1939, that is, within a period of three years, the plaintiff instituted the present suit and claimed to recover from the defendants one-half of the amount he had paid into court together with interest from the date of payment. The plaintiff further claimed that, by reason of the provisions contained in sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the amount due to him was liable to be charged on the moiety of the property originally mortgaged, of which the contesting defendants were now the sole owners. The suit was decreed by the courts below, and, as I have said, the contesting defendants have appealed.

    When the plaintiff made the payment, on which he based his cause of action, the defendants and himself were co-owners of a property which had been sold in execution of a mortgage decree. By making the payment which he did, the plaintiff recovered the property for the defendants as well as for himself. In England, in cases of this kind, the Courts of Equity have, for long, applied the principle embodied in the maxim “qui sentit commodnm, sentire debet et dnus”, or he who enjoys the benefit must also share in the burden. The co-owner, who had, by his action, preserved the property, was entitled to recover a proportion of the sum he had expended from his co-owners, and the amount due to him was made a charge on the interest of the co-owner in the property, the reason for this being that cases might occur in which the amount spent for the preservation of the property was more than it was worth, and in such an event, the co-owner ought to be at liberty to relinquish his interest and not to be made personally liable, for the excess. These broad equitable principles are embodied in sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under section 82, when property subject to a mortgage belongs to several co-owners, the several portions in possession of each must contribute proportionately to the mortgage debt. It follows that, when one of several co-owners lays off the entire mortgage debt, a charge arises by operation of law in his favour on the portions of the property belonging to his co-owners who have paid nothing but have been benefited by his payment. Such a charge cannot obviously arise unless and until one of a number of co-owners has paid the entire mortgage-money or more than his share of the mortgage-money. Only in such a contingency is it possible to say that any particular portion of the mortgaged property is liable for an ascertainable sum of money which is less than the amount secured by the mortgage. In other words, the period of limitation in a suit by one co-owner for contribution against his other co-owners is 12 years from the date on which he made the payment to the mortgagee. It is conceded that, prior to the amendment of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929, the plaintiff would have been at least in no worse a position than this, that is, he would at least have been entitled to a decree for the excess he had paid, the amount to be charged on the portion of the mortgaged property which now belongs to the defendants. It is, however, contended that, in consequence of the amendment then made in the Act, this remedy has been taken away from the plaintiff, and he now has no remedy except, perhaps, a right to sue the legal representatives of some of the original mortgagors who are and as against them to obtain an ordinary money decree. In order to understand how such an argument came to be advanced, it is necessary to explain that, although in the plaint it was alleged that the plaintiff had a charge under sections 82 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, and a decree for sale “subject to the charge” was asked for, it had also been alleged, more or less incidentally, in the plaint that the plaintiff “had been subrogated to the position of the mortgagee of the aforesaid mortgage bond, dated the 18th of June, 1914, so far as one-half of the said amount is concerned”. Possibly, in consequence of this, it was assumed in the courts below that the plaintiff was relying on sections 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act as it now stands, and was suing as an assignee in equity of the mortgage which he had redeemed. On behalf of the defendants it was contended that his right to sue in that capacity was barred by limitation, the period for such a suit being 12 years from the date fixed in the mortgage bond for the repayment of the mortgage-money, which, as I have said was the 18th of June, 1915. For this reliance was placed on the decision of Das and Coutts, JJ. in Sibanand Misra v. Jagmohan Lall. For the plaintiff, it was contended that limitation ran either from the date of the payment or from the date fixed for payment in the mortgage decree, and reliance was placed on decisions of Chatterji, J., in one case Dulhin Kamlapati Devi v. Jageshar Dayal sitting with Khaja Mohamad Noor, J. and in the other Babu Lal Ray v. Bindhyachal Rai* with Meredith, J. The learned advocate for the appellants invited us to say that the subsequent two decisions were at variance with the earlier decision and that the point now requires further consideration by a larger Bench. One of these cases was a case of conventional subrogation and the other two were cases in which a puisne mortgagee had paid off a prior mortgage and claimed that he was subrogated to the rights of this prior mortgagee, none of them was a case, in which one of several co-owners or co-mortgagors had recovered property which has been sold in execution of a decree passed in a suit on the mortgage. Nevertheless, the question of limitation and the correctness of these decisions would have arisen if the plaintiff had asserted any right of priority over the holder of a second mortgage created before he himself purchased an interest in the equity of redemption, or over a purchaser of a portion of the property for value and without notice of the charge he claims. This, however, is not the position, and it is apparently sufficient for the plaintiff if he is given a decree for money and a mere charge on the property. That being so, it is not necessary for us to consider whether there is a conflict between the earlier and the later decisions of this court. For my own part, however, if must say that, as at present advised, I entertain some doubt as to the soundness of some of the reasoning by which the two later decisions are supported.

    So far then as this second appeal is concerned, the question that arises is whether, as a result of the amendment made in the Transfer of Property Act in 1929, the plaintiff did not, when he made the payment into court which he did, obtain, by operation of law, a charge on the property of the defendants. Put in a nutshell, the argument is that the right, which, prior to 1929, he would have admittedly had to a charge, was taken away from him, and, instead, there was given to him a right to sue as a subrogee or as an assignee in equity of the mortgage which he had redeemed. This argument was based, in the main, on an observation of Rankin, C.J in Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali. At page 1175 of the report, Rankin, C.J said this: “It may here be observed that section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act has, by Act XX of 1929, been amended in such a way that sections 92 and 95, as they now stand, make it clear that the right of the co-mortgagor redeeming is the ‘same right as the mortgagee whose mortgage, he redeems may have against the mortgagor’. In effect, therefore, the decision in Rajkumari's case is now statute law”. The Full Bench, oyer which the learned Chief Justice was presiding, had, it should be explained, been constituted to consider the correctness of the decision in Rajkumari Devi v. Mukundalal Bandopadhyaya. In that case, which was decided in 1920, the facts were similar to those with which we hate to deal here, namely, a co-mortgagor, who, had paid off the entire mortgage-money, had sued the other co-mortgagors for contribution, and the suit had not been brought until the expiration of more than 12 years after the due date fixed in the mortgage bond for the payment of the mortgage-money. Chatterji, J., in the decisions, to which I have referred, took the view that these observations of Rankin, C.J must be regarded as obiter dicta, and it is, I think, probable that, in making them, Rankin, C.J was not considering at all the point of limitation with which Chatterji, J. had to deal. In any case, assuming that Rankin, C.J was endorsing the broad general proposition that a subrogee, being an assignee in equity of the mortgage, must sue within the period prescribed for a suit on the mortgage bond, it does not follow that a co-mortgagor, who has redeemed a mortgage, must stand on his rights, if any, as a subrogee, and has, apart from that, no other right whatever. It is clear that the object of the legislature in inserting section 92 in the Act was to give the redeeming co-mortgagor priority over mortgages created by any of his co-mortgagors on the property subsequent to the mortgage he had redeemed. Whether or not he had such a priority under the Act as it stood prior to 1929 was a point which was open to doubt and on which there had been conflicting decisions. Subrogation is as a rule an additional remedy, the subrogee being regarded as an assignee in equity of the security and being entitled to treat the security as still subsisting, although, in law, it has been extinguished, and to sue on it as one of the means open to him to recover the money which is due to him. This was clearly recognized by Das, J. in Sibanand Misra's case in which the plaintiff was given a money and not a mortgage decree, it being held that, while a suit on the mortgage was barred by limitation, a suit for contribution was not. It is true that, in that case, the sum decreed was not made a charge on the property of the defendants; but, although this was not stated, the reason would appear to have been that the defendants were personally liable. As I have already pointed out the reason why in cases in which property, subject to a mortgage, has passed into the hands of several different persons, and one of these pays off the mortgage, the sum which he has paid in excess of his own share, is made a charge on the interest in the property of his co-owners, is that the amount which the latter or some of the latter may Mus owe him may be greater than the value of their, interest, and, therefore, they ought, in fairness, to be allowed to part with their property instead of paying it. (see Freeman on Co-tenancy and Partition, paragraph 176). Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it stood prior to 1929, was enacted to meet the case of a co-mortgagor who, having redeemed a mortgage by conditional sale or a usufructuary mortgage, obtained possession of the mortgaged property. It enacted that he should have a charge on the share of each of the other co-mortgagors in the property for his proportion of the expenses properly incurred in so redeeming and obtaining possession. Attempts were made from time to time so to construe the section as to deprive a redeeming co-mortgagor of any right to a charge in cases where the mortgage was a simple one and possession did not pass on the execution of the mortgage and repass on redemption. But this view was ultimately negatived. No doubt, the reason given by the Judicial Committee in Amhad Wali Khan v. Musammat Shamsh-ul-Jahan Begum was that the words “and obtain possession” in section 95 had to be construed distributively. But it is clear that, unless the words were so construed, section 95, which was most inartistically drafted, purported, by implication, to take away from a co-mortgagor redeeming a simple mortgage a right to contribution and a charge on the property which was expressly conferred by sections 82 and 100 of the Act. In order to give such a co-mortgagor a charge, it is not necessary to go beyond these sections.

    Section 95 had to be inserted in order to give a co-mortgagor redeeming a usufructuary mortgage a charge on the property, not merely for the excess of the mortgage money which he had paid, but for the expenses which he had incurred in recovering possession of the property. The wording of the sections as they stood in the old Act is, I think, sufficient to leave no doubt on this point; but, if authority is needed for the view I take, I may refer to the observations of Banerji, J. in I on Hasan v. Brijbhukan Saran and to the observations of Richards, C.J in Bhagwan Das v. Karam Husain. Sections 82 and 100 of the Act, as they now stand, are not precisely the same as they were in the Act prior to 1929, but such alterations as have been made in them do not affect this particular matter. If sections 82 and 100, as they stood prior to 1923 and as they stand now, give to a redeeming co-mortgagor in the position of the plaintiff a right to a charge, what is the result of the removal from the Act of the old section 95 and the insertion of the new sections 92 and 95? Is it not that, under the Act as it now stands, a co-mortgagor redeeming a simple mortgage, and suing the other co-mortgagors for contribution, may either stand on the mortgage he has redeemed if he can, or, if he cannot, may rely on a, charge. If he cannot stand on his mortgage as a suit on it is barred by limitation, he may lose his priority as against some subsequent mortgage, but he does not lose his right to have the property sold. The learned advocate for the appellants endeavoured to meet this point in two ways. In the first place, he invited our attention to certain observations of Rankin, C.J in Umar All's case and suggested that these support his view that the existence of a right of subrogation side by side with a right to a charge was impossible. What the learned Chief Justice there said was this: “Here the difficulty is that the statute which by section 74 gave this right of subrogation to a puisne mortgagee gives to a co-mortgagor something deliberately different. He may be worthy of all possible protection; one may think that a charge is insufficient. But will it do as a matter of construction to say ‘Let the worthy man have both. And when the other mortgagor wants to redeem him he must not redeem the statutory charge but the original mortgage within the statutory period from the due date thereof’”. It is, I think, quite clear that the learned Judge was construing section 95 of the Act as it stood prior to 1929, and not laying down any broad general proposition that a right of subrogation, with its ancillary right to priority over subsequent encumbrances, and a right to a charge without any such right of priority, could not co-exist. As I have already said, a right of subrogation is as a rule, an additional right given by equity to a creditor to enable him the more effectively to realize his debt. Secondly, the learned advocate relied on the words “and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage” which occur in section 100. The plaintiff, he said, when he paid the amount due under the decree into Court and had the sale set aside, acquired the rights of the mortgagee. It is true that he became an assignee in equity of the mortgage bond, but if a suit on the mortgage bond was barred by limitation, the security was worthless and had become a mere scrap of paper. Apart from this, the words on which reliance is placed have to be read with the words “by act of the parties” and not with the words “by operation of law”, as pointed out by Rankin, C.J in Umar Ali's case. The plaintiff, as I have said, asked in his plaint for a decree for money to be realized by the sale of that portion of the mortgaged property in the possession of the defendants, and to such a decree he is, in my opinion, entitled. He did not sue primarily as a subrogee, and the point of limitation, that has been argued at such length, and, if I may say so with much ability, does not properly speaking, arise. On one small point, the courts below were in error. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover half of the sum of Rs. 140 which he paid as compensation, nor is he entitled to interest prior to the date of the institution of the suit. To this extent the appeal must be allowed, and the decree of the courts below varied, But, as the appellants have substantially failed, they must pay the respondents their costs in this Court.

    Varma, J.:— I agree.

    K.D
    Appeal partly allowed.

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    Sheosaran Singh v. Amla Co-Operative Credit Society
    (Oct 5, 1944)