Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The District Munsif made a multi-part declaratory decree concerning the village of Hasanapuram and the Badhu Sahib Darga and the adjacent mosque in the village of Pallavaram. The declarations included: (1) that the village had been dedicated for the upkeep of the Darga and mosque and for the support of the mujavars (mujavars/mavanjars); (2) that the plaintiff-defendants 1–8 and 25–29 and certain other persons were entitled to perform mujavar service and to share in the surplus proceeds of the income of the village and properties appertaining to the Darga and mosque and to two sevenths of Urus festival collections; (3) that the plaintiff and defendants 5, 6, 7 and 8 were each entitled to certain arithmetical shares of the income; (4) that none of the parties except defendant 1 was entitled to manage the Darga, mosque or property; and (5) that defendant 1 was entitled to continue management until a competent authority made other arrangements.

The District Munsif also granted an injunction restraining the plaintiff and other defendants from interfering with defendant 1's management and decreed that defendants 1 and 2 should make certain payments to the plaintiff and defendants 5–8 for their shares for faslis 1320–1322. Defendants 1–4 appealed; defendant 1 died and his representatives were substituted. On appeal the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. The plaintiff then filed this second appeal to the Court from the Subordinate Judge's dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second appeal has abated in whole or in part because certain respondents (defendant 6 and Nuruddin, a representative of defendant 7) died after the second appeal was filed and their representatives were not brought on record in time.
  2. Whether surviving respondents (in particular defendants 3 and 4) may raise or preserve an objection to the setting aside of any abatement when the order bringing representatives on record or setting aside abatement was made without notice to those surviving respondents.
  3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to share in the surplus income of the endowment (the Darga) notwithstanding that he did not personally perform the physical acts of service (lighting, sweeping, keeping clean), i.e., whether the grant/confirmation requires personal rendering of service as a condition of enjoyment.
  4. Procedural consequence: whether and to what extent the District Munsif's earlier decree in favour of certain defendants remains effective where those defendants did not appeal from the Subordinate Judge's dismissal.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants 3 and 4 (Mr. Jayarama Ayyar)

  • Raised a preliminary objection that the appeal has abated because defendant 6 and Nuruddin (a representative of defendant 7) died after the second appeal was filed and their representatives were not brought on record in time.
  • Maintained that if the appeal abated against those respondents it should be treated as abating against surviving respondents as well, and thus surviving respondents could claim the objection and be heard on it.
  • Eventually admitted, during the course of proceedings, that the plaintiff is a mujavar of the Darga in question (this admission bears on the merits concerning entitlement).

Plaintiff (Mr. Venkatachariar)

  • Responded that the objection cannot be sustained now because the representatives of defendant 6 and Nuruddin have been brought on record and any abatement caused by their absence was set aside in this Court (albeit the order was made without notice to defendants 3 and 4).
  • Argued implicitly that the appeal can proceed as the representatives have been put on record and that the plaintiff does not seek anything by the appeal that would be detrimental to defendant 6 or defendant 7 or their representatives.

Subordinate Judge's Reasoning (as presented in the record)

  • The Subordinate Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the endowment was only for the upkeep of the Darga and its mujavars who do actual service (interpreting "mujavar" to mean those who physically perform acts such as lighting, sweeping and keeping the Darga clean), and that the plaintiff had not done such personal service.
  • The Subordinate Judge relied on earlier recorded judgments (including a Wallajah Court decree of 1774 and the District Court of Chingleput's judgment in Suit No. 190 of 1817) which had been understood to limit entitlement to those who rendered service personally.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wallajah Court decree (1774) Declared, in a suit brought by a lady descended from the original grantee, that only those who do service to the Darga were entitled to the Darga income and that a woman (there, the plaintiff) could not do such service. The Court noted the Wallajah Court's view as part of the earlier line of authority but did not treat that decision as determinative of the meaning of the later Government confirmation (Ex. C). The Court regarded the confirmation as indicating a hereditary grant not strictly limited to those who personally rendered service.
District Court of Chingleput, Suit No. 190 of 1817 (quoted in Ex. A) Held, following arbitration and agreement among descendants, that plaintiffs were entitled to two out of four shares of the surplus income provided they did "the mujavar and all other services along with the defendants," and ordered payment where defendants had prevented plaintiffs from doing service. The Court recorded this decision and acknowledged its terms; but, interpreting the later government confirmation (Ex. C) and the registration of the inam, the Court concluded that the confirmation operated as a hereditary grant to named persons so long as the Darga was maintained and service rendered (not necessarily by each named person personally). Thus the Chingleput decision did not control outcome under the confirmed inam.
Munnavaru Begam Sahibu v. Mir Mahapalli Sahib Cited in relation to whether a mujavar who supervises (and is "much more important than a mere servant or sweeper") can be said to render service by mere supervision rather than by manual acts. The Court referenced this authority but expressly declined to decide the precise point of whether mere supervision constituted rendering service; it noted the issue but resolved the present case on the construction of the confirmed grant and evidence of hereditary enjoyment rather than by determining that doctrinal question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two broad analytical stages: first addressing the preliminary objection of abatement, and then addressing the substantive entitlement of the plaintiff to share in the surplus income.

1. Abatement / Preliminary Objection

The Court observed that although many authorities were quoted on whether an appeal abates where certain respondents die and their representatives are not brought on record in time, it was unnecessary to discuss them exhaustively in the present judgment. The Court articulated a general principle: if an appeal has, in the absence of representatives of deceased respondents, abated against all respondents, then surviving respondents who claim such abatement may properly be heard when the appeal is set down. If an order bringing representatives on record and setting aside abatement was made without notice to surviving respondents, those surviving respondents must be allowed to raise the objection at the hearing of the appeal.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the appeal against defendants 3 and 4 (and the other surviving appellants) had not abated by reason of the delay in bringing on record the representatives of defendant 6 and Nuruddin. The reasons given include: defendant 6 and the representatives of defendant 7 had supported the District Munsif's decree and the plaintiff in the appeal did not seek anything harmful to them; when defendants 1 to 4 appealed, defendant 6 and the plaintiff supported the District Munsif's decree and the representatives of defendant 7 did not appear; thus the appellant could obtain restoration of the District Munsif's decree in favour of the plaintiff without prejudice to defendant 6 or defendant 7. Consequently, the preliminary objection of defendants 3 and 4 was overruled. The Court emphasized that surviving respondents nevertheless retain the right to urge any objection to the setting aside of abatement when the appeal is heard.

2. Substantive Entitlement — Construction of the Grant / Confirmation

The Subordinate Judge had dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the view that the endowment was for the upkeep of the Darga and its mujavars who did actual, personal service (lighting, sweeping, keeping it clean), and that the plaintiff had not personally done such service. The earlier authorities (Wallajah Court 1774; Chingleput 1817) had been quoted to that effect.

The Court examined the material documentary evidence of the confirmed inam (Ex. C) and the Inam Statement (Ex. HH). Ex. C (the Government confirmation) recorded the inam in favour of 16 persons and described the grant as being for the support of the Darga and its mujavars/servants, and noted the inam was "free of tax so long as the service is rendered," which the Court treated as implying a hereditary grant to the persons named so long as the Darga was kept in good order and service was rendered. The Court observed that Ex. C included several women among the named sharers and that the Government had recognized purchased and transferred fractional interests (including those originally held by women) in subsequent revenue records and confirmations.

The Court considered the Deputy Collector's remark in Ex. C regarding Syed Karim (grantee No. 6), which on the face of it might suggest personal rendering of service was required; but the Court doubted that the Deputy Collector intended to convert the confirmation into a personal-service-only grant. The Court pointed to the presence of women among the recorded sharers and to the inam-statement signed by claimants (Ex. HH) to conclude that the signatories did not intend to maintain that only those who actually rendered physical service were entitled to share in the income.

The Court therefore interpreted the confirmation as a hereditary grant held by the named persons (and implicitly their descendants) subject to the condition that the Darga be maintained and service be rendered by someone, not necessarily by each named person in person. Because the actual service at the Darga was being performed satisfactorily by defendants 5 and 6 (who did not oppose the plaintiff's claim), and the Darga was maintained in good order, the conditions of the grant as confirmed were being complied with. The plaintiff's hereditary share was not to be defeated simply because he did not personally light or sweep the Darga.

Holding and Implications

The Court overruled the preliminary objection of abatement raised by defendants 3 and 4 and remanded the appeal as it concerns the plaintiff to the Subordinate Judge for disposal in the light of the Court's finding that the confirmed inam is a hereditary grant and that the plaintiff cannot be denied his share merely because he did not personally perform physical acts of service.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The preliminary objection that the appeal had abated (for defendants 3 and 4) was rejected; surviving respondents retain the right to raise objections to any order setting aside abatement when the appeal is heard, but on the facts here the appeal as to defendants 3 and 4 had not abated.
  • The appeal insofar as it concerns the plaintiff is remanded to the Subordinate Judge to be disposed of consistently with the Court's interpretation that the confirmed inam conferred hereditary shares so long as the Darga is maintained and service rendered (not necessarily by each sharer personally).
  • The Court noted that insofar as the District Munsif's decision had been in favour of any defendants who did not appeal from the Subordinate Judge's dismissal, the District Munsif's decree in their favour has gone (i.e., the Court will not decide inter se rights among defendants who did not appeal).
  • Costs of this appeal will abide and follow the result of the remand proceedings before the Subordinate Judge, and the Court-fee on this appeal will be refunded.

The opinion does not purport to resolve broader doctrinal questions (for example whether a mujavar's supervisory acts alone constitute rendering service); it expressly refrains from deciding that precise question and instead rests its decision on the construction of the confirmed grant and the recorded practice of hereditary enjoyment.

Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

    Mir Mahaboob Hussain Sahib v. Mir Surajuddin Sahib Bahadur

    Reilly, J.:— In this suit the District Munsif made declarations (1) that the village of Hasanapuram has been dedicated for the upkeep of the Badhu Sahib Darga and the mosque near it in the I village of Pallavaram and also for the support of the mujavars of the said Darga and mosque; (2) that the plaintiff-defendants 1-8 and 25-29 and certain other persons are entitled to do mujavar service in the said Darga and mosque and share in the surplus proceeds of the income of the said village and the other properties appertaining to the said Darga and mosque and also to share in two sevenths of the collections made in the Urus festival conducted at that Durga and mosque; (3) that the plaintiff and defendants 5, 6, 7 and 8 are each entitled to certain arithmetical shares in the income; (1) that none of the parties except defendant 1 was entitled to manage the Darga, mosque or property and (5) that defendant 1 was entitled to continue in management until some other arrangement was made by competent authority: and he made an injunction restraining the plaintiff and the other defendants from interfering with defendant 1's management; and he made a decree that defendants 1 and 2 should make certain payments to the plaintiff and defendants 5, 6, 7 and 8 for their shares of the income for faslis 1320-1322. Against that decree defendants 1 to 4 appealed and, as defendant 1 died, his representatives were added as appellants in his stead. On appeal the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has preferred this second appeal.

    2. Mr. Jayarama Ayyar, who appears for defendants 3 and 4, has raised a preliminary objection that the appeal has abated because defendant 6 and Nuruddin, one of defendant 7's representatives (who was brought on record in the Subordinate Judge's Court) died since the second appeal was filed and their representatives were not brought on record in time. To that Mr. Venkatachariar for the plaintiff has replied that Mr. Jayarama Ayyar's objection cannot be raised now as the representatives of defendant 6 and Nuruddin have been brought on record and any abatement caused by their absence set aside in this Court after notice to them, though not after notice to Mr. Jayarama Ayyar's clients. A good many authorities have been quoted before us on this question; but I do not; think it necessary to discuss them. If this appeal is one which in the absence of the representatives of defendant 6 and Nuruddin must altogether abate, then Mr. Jayarama Ayyar's clients can certainly claim to be heard if they wish to object that those representatives were not brought on record in time and that the abatement should not be set aside. As the order bringing on record the representatives of defendant 6 and Nuruddin and setting aside any abatement due to their absence was made in this case without notice to Mr. Jayarama Ayyar's clients, he can raise this objection for them at the hearing of the appeal and we are bound to hear it. It is obviously unreasonable to suggest that, when an appeal in which a number of respondents are concerned has abated against all the respondents because some of them have died and their representatives have not been brought on record in time, it is enough before setting the abatement aside to give notice to those representatives alone without giving any opportunity to the surviving respondents to defend the advantage which has accrued to them. If by some oversight the abatement is set aside formally without notice to the surviving respondents, their objections, if any must be heard when the appeal comes on for hearing. This is elementary, and not authority is needed to support it. There may be cases in which it is doubtful whether the abatement of an appeal against one or more respondents who have died involves its abatement against the surviving respondents. If, as in this case, surviving respondents maintain that by reason of the death of other respondents whose representatives have not been brought on record in time the appeal has abated against them also but the appellant denies that the appeal has abated against the surviving respondents, the surviving respondents must still be allowed an opportunity to raise their objection for what it is worth; and, if no such opportunity is allowed to them before the appeal comes on for hearing, it must be allowed to them then. We can-never deny to a surviving respondent altogether an opportunity to defend the decree in his favour by urging that it has become unassailable either by delay in appealing or abatement of the appeal.

    3. In this case we have not heard in detail Mr. Jayarama Ayyar's arguments why the delay in bringing on record the representatives of defendant 6 and Nuruddin should not have been excused because it appears clear that the appeal against Mr. Jayarama Ayyar's clients had not abated by reason of that delay, on which question we have heard him in full. Neither defendant 6 nor defendant 7 disputed the plaintiff's claiming in the suit, and the plaintiff in this appeal does not contest the District Munsif's decree in their favour. When defendants 1 to 4 appealed against the District Munsif's decree, defendant 6 as well as the plaintiff supported that decree, and the representatives of defendant 7, who died while that appeal was pending before the Subordinate Judge did not appear. The plain-stiff now ask's for the restoration of the District Munsifs' decree, which the Subordinate Judge set aside dismissing the plaintiff's suit. He neither asks for, nor can he get, by this appeal anything to the detriment of defendant 6 or defendant 7 or their representatives.

    4. As against defendants 1 to 4 he could have got that decree restored, had his appeal against them been successful, even without bringing on record the representatives of defendant 6 or defendant 7. It cannot therefore be contended successfully by defendants 3 and 4 that any abatement of the appeal in respect of defendant 6 or defendant 7 involves the abatement of the appeal as against them. In my opinion the preliminary objection raised by defendants 3 and 4 must be overruled. Whether the defendants who support the plaintiff but did not appeal against the dismissal of the suit by the Subordinate Judge, can get anything out of this appeal is another question.

    5. Mr. Jayarama Ayyar has eventually admitted that the plaintiff is a mujavar of the Darga in question. The learned Subordinate Judge has dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the endowment is only “for the upkeep of the Darga and its mujavars”—that is the mujavars who do actual service— that no one does service as a mujavar who does not take part in lighting the Darga and sweeping it and keeping it clean and that the plaintiff has not done service as mujavar in that sense. The original grant is not available. Ex. A is a copy of the judgment of the District Court of Chingleput in Suit No. 190 of 1817 on its file. That judgment quotes a decree of the Wallajah Court of 1774 in a suit brought by a lady descended from the original grantee declaring that only those who do service to the Darga were entitled to the Darga income and that the plaintiff, being a woman, could not do any service.

    6. The decision in Suit No. 190 of 1817 it self was that in consequence of an arbitration and an agreement among certain descendants of the original grantee the plaintiffs in Suit No. 190 of 1817, who were among the descendants of the original grantee were entitled to two out of four shares of the surplus income of the endowment, provided that they did “the mujavar and all other services along with the defendants,” and that, as the defendants had prevented the plaintiffs from doing service in the year in question, they must pay to the plaintiffs half the surplus income of that year. But it appears that in 1826 an ancestor of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 and some of the other defendants, Subadar Major Nuruddin Sahib, who was himself a descendant of the original grantee, bought from other descendants or heirs of the original grantee fractional shares amounting in a to nearly two out of the four shares mentioned and that his purchases were eventually recognized by the Board of Revenue and the Government. In 1865 the inam was confirmed by the Government, and it is held under the terms I shown in the Inam Register, Ex. C. That shows 16 persons as the owners of the inam holding it in various shares. The inam was confirmed in favour of those persons so long as the Darga is in good order and service therein is rendered.

    7. Column 8, Ex. C shows that the inam was originally granted for the support of the Darga situated in Pallavaram and for that of its Mavanjars (which is admitted to be a mistake for, or equivalent to, Mujavars) or servants;

    and colmun 10, in which the inam is shown as “free of tax so long as the service is rendered,” implies that it was hereditary. It is clear that the inam is now held under the grant as confirmed in 1835 by the Government. Ex. C shows that it was confirmed in favour of the persons named (and implicitly their descendants) along as the Darga is in good order and the service therein is rendered.

    8. It was not confirmed in favour of the 16 persons named so long as they themselves and their descendants rendered service, nor in favour of such of them as rendered service. Among the sharers named in Ex. C were five ladies, who it is admitted were gosha ladies; and it cannot be suggested that it was intended that they should render service personally. It has indeed been suggested that it may have been intended that their male descendants should enjoy their shares if those male descendants did service. But Ex. C does not indicate that the shares of these ladies are to be in abeyance but transmissible to their male descendants, nor that those of the sharers who do not do service are not to share in the income, nor what is to be done with their shares while they do not do service. Three of the persona from whom Subadar Major Nuruddin Sahib obtained shares, for purchase appear to have been women, who could not themselves render service; find yet the Government recognized that they had a transferable interest and that interest had passed by descent from the transferee to other women, who again could not render service personally. Whatever may have been the views of the original grant taken by the Wallaja Court in 1774 or by the District Court of Chingleput in 1817, the grant as confirmed by the Government in 1865 appears to have been a hereditary grant to the 16 persons named in Ex. C, to continue so long as the Darga was maintained in good order and the service was rendered by some one. By whom the service was actually rendered was naturally not a matter which interested the Government. That appears to me to be the proper way to interpret the confirmation of the grant as shown in Bx. C. There is only one thing in Ex. C which might be thought to throw doubt on that interpretation. In the column for the Deputy Collector's opinion and recommendation it is noted that Syed Karim, grantee No. 6, had not been in enjoyment of his share for 30 years, that “the service due to” that share had been rendered by the other Mavujars, who had been enjoying that share, and that the reason assigned for his “neglect” was his dissatisfaction with the disposal of his claim to a share mortgaged by his brother's widow. But the Deputy Collector adds that Syed Karim has now agreed to hold his share and perform the service attached to it and that he has entered Syed Karim's name as he sees no transaction by which Syed Karim has forfeited his share. The Deputy Collector goes on to say that if Sved Karim still persists in absence, his share will be enjoyed by the other Mavujars Nos. 9 to 16 (of whom five, it may be noticed were women) who will perform in addition his share of service which has been done hitherto for the last 35 years.

    9. Apart from the reference to the women among grantees Nos. 9 to 16 these remarks of the Deputy Collector appear at first sight to imply that the enjoyment of a share depended on rendering service in person. But, taking into consider ration his reference to the women, I doubt whether he meant anything more than that in his opinion a sharer who disclaimed all interest in and responsibility for the Darga was not entitled to enjoy his share. At any rate I do not think that the Deputy Collector's remarks and opinion about Syed Karim can be treated as embodied in the confirmation of the grant, which is in favour of the persons named so long the service is rendered, not so long as it is rendered by them personally. If we turn to the Inam Statement, Ex. HH (that is the statement of the claimants), which is signed among others by the father of defendants 3 and 4, though we find a similar difficulty in the reference to Syed Karim not having rendered service and therefore the other sharers having rendered service for his share and having enjoyed the income of his share, we find also that five ladies are shown in column I among the persons enjoying the income of the inam, though it is not suggested that any of them was rendering any service personally. It is quite clear, I think, that in spite of the reference to Syed Karim the signatories to Ex. HH had no intention of maintaining that only those who actually rendered service at the Darga were entitled to share in the income.

    10. I do not think it necessary to discuss whether a mujavar, who is sometimes something much more important than a mere servant or sweeper, see Munnavaru Begam Sahibu v. Mir Mahapalli Sahib(1), can be said to render his service by mere supervision, not whether the plaintiff at times actually rendered service in that way. It is not denied that the actual service at the Darga has been performed and performed satisfactorily by defendants 5 and 6, who do not oppose the plaintiff's claim, and that the Darga is maintained in good order. That being so, the conditions of the grant as confirmed are being performed and the sharers are entitled to the surplus income. That the plaintiff has inherited a share, if the shares are hereditary, is not disputed. The plaintiff therefore cannot be denied a share in the surplus income of the years in question merely because he did not personally light or sweep the Darga. In my opinion the appeal from the District Munsif's decision, so far as it concerns the plaintiff, should now be remanded to the Subordinate Judge for disposal in the light of the finding. So far as the District Munsif's decision was in favour of any of the defendants, as they have not appealed against the dis-missal of the suit by the Subordinate Judge, the District Munsif's decree in their favour has gone. The suit is not one for general partition and we decide nothing as between the defendants inter se. The costs of this appeal will abide and follow the result of this appeal before the Subordinate Judge. The Court-fee on this appeal will be refunded.

    11. Kumaraswami Sastri, J.:— I agree.

    P.R.S/S.N

    12. Case remanded.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mir Mahaboob Hussain Sahib v. Mir Surajuddin Sahib Bahadur
    (Apr 27, 1928)