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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Indian and English Companies Acts. S. 92 of the Indian Companies Act (which corresponds with s. 67
  • provisions as art. 21 of the Articles of Association
  • Hutchinson. Section 29 of the Indian Companies Act,
  • s. [420] 26 of the English Companies Act, 1867,
  • s. 35 of the English Companies Act, 1862,
  • s. 55 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882,
  • s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act.
  • s. 58 of the Companies Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Indian and English Companies Acts. S. 92 of the Indian Companies Act (which corresponds with s. 67
  • provisions as art. 21 of the Articles of Association
  • Hutchinson. Section 29 of the Indian Companies Act,
  • s. [420] 26 of the English Companies Act, 1867,
  • s. 35 of the English Companies Act, 1862,
  • s. 55 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882,
  • s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act.
  • s. 58 of the Companies Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from six applications made under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act to compel the registration of certain applicants as members of the Muir Mills Company, Ltd. The applicants, who were employees of the Cawnpore Woollen Mills managed by Mr. McRobert, had purchased shares in the Muir Mills Company and sought registration of transfers in their names. The Company’s Directors refused to register these transfers, invoking article 21 of the Articles of Association, which permits refusal of registration to any person the Directors disapprove of. The applicants alleged that the refusals were arbitrary and wrongful. The case was tried at length in the lower Court with pleadings and evidence, and the issue framed was whether the Company had arbitrarily and without sufficient cause refused to register the transfers. The appeals challenge the refusals by the Directors to register the share transfers.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Directors of the Muir Mills Company exercised their discretionary power under article 21 of the Articles of Association legitimately and in good faith in refusing to register the transfers of shares to the applicants.
  2. Whether the reasons given by the Directors for refusal—namely, that the transferees were subordinates of Mr. McRobert and would support him in opposing the existing management—constituted legitimate grounds or were arbitrary and for a collateral purpose.
  3. Whether the applicants had locus standi to apply under section 58 of the Indian Companies Act without joining their vendors.
  4. The validity of the Board of Directors’ constitution at the time of refusal, including whether the acts of certain Directors who were appointed during absences were valid under the Articles of Association.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The Directors improperly and arbitrarily refused to register the transfers of shares.
  • The refusal was based on the applicants being subordinates of Mr. McRobert, which was not a legitimate ground for refusal under article 21.
  • The applicants contended that they were proper persons to become members and that the Directors’ objections were not personal to them.
  • They argued that it was not necessary for the transferors to join in the applications under section 58 of the Indian Companies Act.

Respondent Company’s Arguments

  • The Directors acted bona fide and in the interests of the Company in refusing registration under article 21.
  • The Directors were not bound to disclose the reasons for refusal but had, in any event, considered the fitness of the transferees at Board meetings.
  • The refusal was justified by the apprehension that the transferees, being subordinates of Mr. McRobert, would support him in opposing the management and would be litigious and cantankerous.
  • The constitution of the Board of Directors was valid by virtue of article 86, which validates acts done by persons acting as Directors despite defects in their appointment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Bell Brothers, Ltd., Ex parte Hodgson Established that the Directors’ discretionary power to refuse registration must be exercised in good faith, legitimately, and not arbitrarily or for collateral purposes; the Court will not interfere if reasons are legitimate. The Court applied these principles to find that the Directors’ refusal based on the transferees’ connection to McRobert was not a legitimate reason and thus an improper exercise of power.
Ex parte Penney Transferors need not join in applications under section 58 where the transfer is complete; the transferee has the right to apply for registration. The Court held that the applicants had locus standi to apply without joining their vendors, as the transfers were complete and valid between transferors and transferees.
Poole v. Middleton Absent provisions like article 21, Directors have no discretionary power to refuse registration. Used to contrast the present case where article 21 grants discretionary power to refuse registration subject to fiduciary limits.
Moffat v. Farquhar Directors cannot refuse transfers except on grounds personal to the transferee; refusal based on increasing voting power by splitting shares among nominees is improper. The Court found that refusal based on the transferees being McRobert’s employees (and thus likely to vote with him) was not a legitimate ground.
Howbeach Coal Co. v. Teague and Garden Gull Co. v. McLister Acts by persons purporting to be Directors without proper appointment may not be binding. The Court considered article 86, which validates acts by persons acting as Directors despite defects, and upheld the validity of the Board’s acts.
Skinner v. City of London Marine Insurance Co. Seller contracts to execute valid transfer but not to ensure registration by the Company. Supported the view that transferees have the duty to apply for registration, reinforcing the applicants’ locus standi.
London Founders Association v. Clarke Transferee has the duty to get himself registered. Supported the applicants’ right to apply for registration alone.
Paine v. Hutchinson Section 29 of the Indian Companies Act assumes transferee’s right to apply for registration and allows transferor to apply if transferee fails. Reinforced the procedural correctness of applicants applying without transferors.
Ex parte Shaw and Ex parte Gilbert Applications by transferees alone under relevant Companies Acts are valid where transfer is complete. Confirmed the procedural propriety of the applicants’ applications under section 58.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the pleadings, evidence, and Articles of Association, particularly article 21, which grants Directors discretionary power to refuse registration of share transfers to persons they disapprove of for any reason. The Court acknowledged that such discretion is fiduciary in nature and must be exercised in good faith, legitimately, and not arbitrarily or for collateral purposes.

The Court found that the Directors did consider the applications and acted bona fide, but the sole reason for refusal was that the transferees were subordinates of Mr. McRobert, a former Director and the largest shareholder who had a personal quarrel with the Managing Director Johnson. The Directors feared that the transferees would vote with McRobert and "harass the management." The Court held that this reason was not a legitimate objection personal to the transferees but a collateral purpose to protect the Directors’ personal interests against McRobert's influence.

The Court emphasized that the Directors’ power does not extend to excluding shareholders merely because they are expected to oppose the current management. It rejected the idea that increasing McRobert’s voting power by legitimate share purchases could harm the Company, especially since McRobert was a major shareholder and the transferees were proper persons.

Regarding procedural issues, the Court held that the applicants had locus standi to apply without joining their vendors, as the transfers were complete and the Articles did not require vendor participation. The Court also upheld the validity of the Board’s acts despite irregularities in appointment of some Directors, relying on article 86 which validates acts by persons acting as Directors despite defects.

Applying these legal principles and precedents, the Court concluded that the Directors’ refusal was an improper exercise of their fiduciary discretion and that the lower Court was correct in ordering registration.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are dismissed.

The Court affirmed the lower Court’s decision directing the Muir Mills Company to register the applicants as members. The refusal by the Directors to register the transfers was held to be an improper exercise of discretionary power, being arbitrary and motivated by a collateral purpose to protect the Directors’ personal interests rather than the Company’s interests. The decision directly affects the parties by compelling registration of the shares but does not establish any new precedent beyond the application of established principles regarding Directors’ fiduciary discretion under company articles.

    Muir Mills Company v. T.H. Condon And A. Butterworth

    Burkitt, J.:— In this case I have had an opportunity of perusing the judgment which is about to be delivered by my brother Henderson. I fully concur in it, and have but little to add.

    As to the preliminary points, in discussing which so much time was, I think unnecessarily, spent at the hearing of these [412] appeals, I fail to see way they should have been raised at all by the applicants in the Court below (respondents here), where most of them were incidentally raised during the hearing of the applications. Though the proceedings before the lower Court were in form applications under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act, they were tried most elaborately as regular suits. Regular pleadings were filed on both sides and issues joined on them. By their pleadings the Muir Mills Company admitted that the respondents had formally applied to have the shares registered in their names, and that the Company had refused to allow registration. The applicants in fact said that the Company had improperly refused to register the transfers. The Company, in reply, admitted the refusals and justified their action by relying on art. 21 of their Articles of Association. It is difficult to understand why on such pleadings the applicants should during the hearing below, have endeavoured to prove that in some of the cases, there had not been any refusal to register owing to a legal defect in the constitution of the Board by which the refusals in those cases purported to have been made. In those cases if the contention of the applicants had been sustained, they would have succeeded in showing that they had come into Court without any substantial cause of action. But anyhow as to all these preliminary matters, I think my learned brother has come to a right conclusion.

    On the merits it is abundantly clear that, though the appellant Company was not by law bound to disclose the reasons which actuated the Directors in declining to register the transfers which form the subject of these appeals, those reasons have been very fully disclosed. The question we have to consider is, whether those reasons are legitimate or are arbitrary and unjustifiable. Those reasons succinctly put are that the Directors of the Muir Mills Company knew the transferees, the applicants, to be employes of Mr. McRobert of the Woollen Mills; that Mr. McRobert had not long previously been a Director of the Muir Mills; that he quarrelled with Mr. Johnson, the Managing Director of the Muir Mills, saying he “distrusted the management;” that he had prosecuted one of the other Directors for a technical offence under the Companies Act, and refused to seek[413] re-election as a Director; and that the Directors of the Muir Mills Company therefore feared that these transferees being his employes would support him by their votes as shareholders at shareholders' meetings of the Muir Mills Company, that they would be “litigious and cantankerous”, and would “harass the management”, the meaning of which phrase no doubt is that they would support Mr. McRobert's views as to the advisability of making a change in the management. There was evidence given to show that the managing Director, Johnson, threatened to resign if McRobert had anything to do with the management, and that the Directors believed that the loss of Johnson's services would be injurious to the interests of the Company. Shortly put, the Directors were apprehensive that any increase in McRobert's voting power would assist him in enforcing his views as to the management, and as the transferees were McRobert's subordinates in another Mill, the Muir Mill Directors refused to register the transfers to them. It should be mentioned here (1) that McRobert was, at the time when these transfers were made, the largest shareholder in the Muir Mills Company; (2) that he did not, for the purpose of increasing his own voting power, transfer any of his own shares to his subordinates as his nominees, but on the contrary assisted them in purchasing the shares in open market; (3) that the Cawnpore Woollen Mills Company is in no way a rival in business to the Muir Mills Company which is a Cotton Mill; and (4) that admittedly there is no personal objection to any of the transferees; they are acknowledged to be perfectly proper persons to become members of the appellant Company, and to be unobjectionable in all respects except in that they are subordinates of McRobert at the Woollen Mills.

    The principles of law applicable to a case of this kind will be found most exhaustively laid down by Mr. Justice Chitty in the case of In re Bell Brothers, Ld., Ex parte Hodgson, where that learned Judge cites as his authority a large number of reporte 1 cases, most of which were referred to in the argument before us. In that case arts. 18 and 34 of the Articles of Association of Bell Brothers, Ld., somewhat resembled art. 21 of the Articles of Association in the present case, but conferred on the Directors the [414] power of disapproving and rejecting intending shareholders in stronger language than that used in art. 21 of the appellant Company here.

    The learned Judge held that the right of transfer conferred on every shareholder was subject to the discretionary power conferred on the Directors by arts. 18 and 34. So in the Present case a right to transfer is assumed by art. 19 to belong to every holder of shares in the Company, subject, to the discretionary power given to the Directors by art. 21 of declining to register any transfer of shares to any person of whom they may for any reason disapprove.

    As to the manner in which that discretionary power is to exercised, the learned Judge says that it is of “a fiduciary nature and must be exercised in good faith, i.e, legitimately, for the purpose for which it is conferred. It must not be exercised corruptly or fraudulently or arbitrarily or capriciously or wantonly. It may not be exercised for a collateral purpose. In exercising it the Directors must act in good faith in the interests of the Company, and they must fairly consider the question of the transferee's fitness at a Board Meeting.” Then as to the power of the Court to interfere with the Directors' decision, the judgment lays down that the Court will not review the Directors' decision when they have in good faith rejected a transfer on the ground that the transferee is not a fit person to become a member of the Company; that the Court will not draw unfavourable inferences against the Directors merely because the latter have declined to assign their reason for disallowing the transfers, but that if the Directors do disclose their reasons, the Court must consider the reisons assigned with a view to ascertain whether they are legitimate or not, or in other words, to ascertain whether the Directors have proceeded on a right or a wrong principle. The judgment then states that the Court will not overrule the Directors' decision merely because the Court itself would not have come to the same conclusion, and then follows this most important passage:—“But if they” (i.e, the reasons assigned by the Directors) are not legitimate, as for instance, if the Directors state that they rejected the transfer because the transferor's object was to in crease the voting power in respect of his shares by splitting them up among [415] his nominees, the Court would hold that the power had not been duly exercised. So also if the reason assigned is that the transferees' name is Smith and is not Beli.”

    Now in applying the above principles to these appeals, I find in the voluminous evidence adduced on both sides that the reason, and the only reason, which actuated the Directors in disallowing the respondents' transfers is because the latter were subordinates of McRobert, and the Directors believed that these transferees would at shareholders' meetings vote with McRobert in opposing the directorate, and especially the Managing Director Johnson; that they would “harass the management.” Can such a reason be considered to be a legitimate reason for refusing, to allow the respondents to become members of the Muir Mills Company. The Directors say their action was taken in good faith in the interests of the Company. They say that if McRobert was able to interfere in the management of the Mills the Managing Director Johnson would resign, and that, they say, would injure the Company. The Directors consider Johnson to be a good man of business, an opinion which Johnson also shares, but it is quite open to McRobert honestly to hold a different opinion, and from his saying that he “distrusted the management,” he apparently does not concur with the Directors. Even if McRobert's object in procuring shares for his subordinates was with their assistance to enforce his views on and so interfere with the management, and even if he transferred some of his own shares to his nominees for that purpose, it is not intelligible how such action on his part should be considered to be injurious to the interests of the Muir Mills Company, though no doubt it would be unpleasant to the existing Board of Directors. I can see no pretence for supposing that the acquisition by McRobert of an increased voting power could be injurious to the Company, in which he is the largest shareholder, but in which under art. 55 of the Articles of Association his voting power is not commensurate with his holding.

    It seems to me that all through these cases the interests of the Muir Mills Company have been too much mixed up with the personal interests of the Directors. The Directors may well think that unless they continue on the Board the Company will [416] suffer. Other shareholders may legitimately entertain a different opinion, and may, like McRobert, “distrust the management,” and desire to make a change in the Board of Directors. Can then that Board legitimately refuse to pass transfers made to persons who, the Board believe, will act in conjunction with a prominent shareholder who “distrusts the management.” On the authority of the passages from the judgment cited above, I am of opinion that such a reason is not legitimate. It practically amounts to this, that the Board will not admit any new shareholder who, they believe, will not support or will oppose their management. It is impossible, in my opinion, to regard such an exercise of the Directors fiduciary discretionary power as being other than one of the most arbitrary and unjustifiable nature, exercised for a collateral purpose, namely, to safeguard the Directors' personal interests against McRobert, and not in the interest of the Company as such. The transfers were refused, not in good faith in the interests of the Company, but to prevent McRobert having at his disposal an increased voting power which the Directors apprehended he might use to “harass” their management. For that reason the Directors' objections, though to that extent personal to the transferees, are not legitimate objections. The constitution of the Company is not such as would justify the Directors in excluding from membership all persons who, they feared, would oppose their management.

    For the above reasons I am of opinion that the District Judge was right in allowing the applications and in directing the registration of the shares purchased by the applicants respondents.

    Therefore, in concurrence with my learned brother, I direct that these appeals be dismissed.

    [As to costs, we allow to the respondents the fees certified to have been paid to their advocates or vakils in each of these appeals.]

    Henderson, J.:— These appeals have arisen out of six applications which were made under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act, to compel the registration of the applicants as members of the Muir Mills Company, Ld. There were five applicants claiming to be registered, but one of these, Butterworth, sought to have his name registered in respect of two sets of shares purchased by him at different times, and he made a separate application in respect of each set. In his first application his [417] vendor, Dr. Condon, joined. The other applicants were James Scott, the dyeing master; W. Yickers, the accountant; P. Scott, the weaving master; and H. Thomson, the engineer of the Cawnpore Woollen Mills, and none of them joined in their applications the persons from whom they had purchased the shares in respect of which they sought to be registered. Butterworth was the Mill Manager of the Cawnpore Woollen Mills. One Mr. McRobert was then, and now is, the Managing Director of those Mills.

    The following particulars with regard to the purchases of the various shares and the refusal to register may here be conveniently noted:—

    (1) Butterworth purchased three shares from Dr. Condon, the transfer deed was dated the 3rd April 1897, and application for registration was made on the 20th April 1897. On the 23rd April 1897, the application was refused by the Directors, the Directors being Newcomen, Smith, and Arindell.

    (2) James Scott purchased three shares from Mrs. Wilson; payment being made on the 17th June and the deed of trausfer, dated 23rd June, 1897. Application was made for registration of the transfer on the 16th July, 1897, and refused by the same Directors on the 11th August, 1897.

    (3) W. Vickers purchased five shares from one Gillespie, payment being made on the 31st August, 1897, and the transfer deed dated 14th September, 1897. Application was made for registration on the 14th September, 1897, and refused by the same Directors, on the 15th September, 1897.

    (4) P. Scott purchased three shares from Gillespie, payment being made on the 31st August, 1897, and the transfer deed dated the 1st November, 1897. Application was made for registration on the 2nd November, 1897, and refused by the Directors, Beer and Newcomen, on the 5th November, 1897.

    (5) H. Thompson purchased five shares from Gillespie, payment being made on the 31st August, 1897, and the deed of transfer dated 1st November, 1897. Application for registration was made on the 15th November, 1897, and refused by the Directors, Beer, Newcomen, and Johnson, on the 18th November, 1897.

    [418] (6) Butterworth purchased five shares from Gillespie, payment being made on the 31st August, 1897, and the transfer deed dated 1st November, 1897. Application for registration was made on the 15th November, 1897, and refused on the 18th November, 1897, by Beer, Newcomen, and Johnson.

    It should be mentioned that on the 5th January, 1898, Butterworth made a second application for registration of the two sets of shares purchased by him, and this application was refused by the Directors Beer, Newcomen, and Johnson on the 28th January, 1898.

    In refusing to register the various transfers the Directors acted under art. 21 of the Articles of Association of the Company. That article is as follows:—“The Directors may decline to register any transfer of shares to any person of whom they may for any reason disapprove, or of any share upon which the Company has a lien”; and in refusing to register the transfers, except in the case of Butterworth, they gave no reasons for their refusal except that they did so under art. 21 of the Articles of Association. In Butterworth's case certain correspondence took place on the subject. In that correspondence the reason first given was that the Directors acted under art. 21 of the Articles of Association. In a letter of the 27th May, 1897, to Butterworth it was alleged that the reason for the Directors' refusal to register was that they did not consider it would be in the interests of the Company to register Butterworth as a member; and in a letter of the 28th May, 1897, to Dr. Condon, in reply to a letter from him, they stated that they were “taking every precaution to avoid having any shareholders who are, in their opinion, likely to prove ill-disposed towards the management of the Company, or of a litigious or cantankerous disposition.”

    In the applications under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act, it was alleged, as the ground upon which such applications were based, that the Directors had acted arbitrarily and without sufficient cause, and in a wrongful exercise of their powers in refusing to register the different applications for registration. The Company in answer to the several applications filed written statements, in which it contended that it was not necessary for the Directors in refusing under art. 21 of the Articles of Association [419] to register transfers of shares, to give any reasons, and alleged that the refusals to register had been made bona fide in the interest of the Company, after due consideration and for reasons which were legitimate and sufficient. Upon this the following issue was framed, viz.—Whether the Company had arbitrarily and without sufficient cause refused to register the transfers.

    By consent all the applications were beard together:

    Before proceeding to deal with the main contentions raised in these appeals it will be well to dispose of certain questions which were raised during the argument. The first question was as to the competency of the applicants who had not joined their vendors in their applications to apply under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act. It was contended that they had no locus standi as they were not, and could not be, members of the Company until the transfers to them had been registered. Exparte Penney was relied upon as showing that the transferor, should make the application, or at all events join in it. In that case the application was made by both transferor and intended transferee, but a reference to the Articles of Association of the Company concerned makes it clear that there could be no transfer without the approval of the Directors. The articles provided that “no person not already a shareholder shall be entitled to become “the transferee of any share unless approved of by the Board.” In the cases before us art. 21 deals merely with the right of the Directors to decline to register any transfer of shares already made, if they disapprove for any reason of the transferee. The transfers were otherwise complete as between the transferors and the transferees, the purchase money had been paid, and the trausfer deeds in each case executed by both transferor and transferee. On a sale of shares the seller contracts to execute a valid transfer and to baud the same to the transferee. Skinner v. City of London Marine Insurance Co.. He does not contract that the Company will register the transfer. London Founders Association v. Clarke. It is the duty of the transferee to get himself registered. Paine v. Hutchinson. Section 29 of the Indian Companies Act, which corresponds verbatim with s. [420] 26 of the English Companies Act, 1867, assumes the right of the transferee to apply for registration and enables the transferor, where the transferee fails to do so, to apply to get the transfer registered. In ex parte Shaw an application by the transferee alone under s. 35 of the English Companies Act, 1862, was allowed on the ground that the transfer was complete. The reasoning in that case was accepted by Farran, J., in ex parte Gilbert. In my opinion ex parte Shaw is an authority for our holding that it is not necessary in the present cases for the transferors to join in the applications.

    No question was raised as to whether the summary procedure apparently intended by s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act was the proper procedure here. It is sufficient to say that these applications have not been tried summarily. They have practically in all respects been treated as if the parties had proceeded by suit.

    The second question, which it will be convenient to deal with before discussing the main grounds of appeal, turns upon the constitution of the Board of Directors which refused the applications for registration made by James Scott, Vickers and P. Scott.

    [His Lordship having pointed out in regard to the applications of James Scott and Vickers that the proper forms had not been complied with in the appointment of Arindell and Smith to act for Cooper and Beer, and that, if the appointments of the two former were to be held valid, there would have been six Directors instead of a maximum of four allowed by the Articles of Association, held that the defect was cured by art. 86 of the Articles of Association which ran as follows:—

    “All acts done by any meeting of Directors * * * or by any person acting as a Director, shall be valid and effectual notwithstanding that it be afterwards discovered that there was some defect in their appointment or qualifications respectively.”

    His Lordship then continued:—]

    [In the case of James Scott and Vickers the applications for registration were refused by a Board consisting of Newcomer, Smith and Arindell, and it was contended that Smith and Arindell were not in fact and could not, having regard to the Articles of Association, be Directors at the time. On the 27th March, 1897, the Directors of the Company were Cooper, Beer, Newcomen and Johnson, the last mentioned being styled the Managing Director. According to art. 66, “the number of Directors shall never be less than three nor more than four, including the Managing Director.” From the proceedings of the Directors of the 27th March, 1897, it appears that Cooper and Beer contemplated being absent for about 7 months, and applied for leave of absence. Under art. 73 leave of absence was sanctioned, and it was resolved that during their absence Arindell and Smith “should be asked to take a seat on the Board during the absence of Cooper and Beer respectively.” Arindell and Smith were accordingly asked, and they accepted seats on the Board, and during the absence of Cooper and Beer respectively they acted as if they had been duly appointed Directors, and it was during the absence of Cooper and Beer that they sat upon the Board and refused the applications for registration made by James Scott and Vickers.

    It may be mentioned that Johnson had previously, on the 2nd January, 1897, applied for leave for 7 months as from about the 1st April, 1897, and this leave was granted, no one being appointed to take this seat.

    It is clear from the Articles of Association that none of the Directors who thus obtained leave of absence ceased to be Directors. If therefore Arindell and Smith be treated as Directors, there were from the time of their taking their seats on the Board and at the time they refused the application for registration, six Directors instead of a maximum of four allowed by the Articles. Article 76 provided that any casual vacancy in the Board other than that of Managing Director might be filled up by the Board subject to the approval of the next Ordinary General Meeting; but any Director so chosen should retain office so long only as the vacating Director would have retained the same if no vacancy had occurred. This article clearly did not apply. It enables the Directors to fill up casual vacancies, but no vacancy, casual or other, had occurred on the Board. Article 71(k), amongst other powers and authorities, gave the Directors power and authority “to authorise or empower the Secretary of the Company, or such other person or persons as the Directors may think fit, to exercise and perform all or any of the powers, authorities or duties conferred upon the Directors by these Articles of Association,” and reliance was placed upon this article as showing that Arindell and Smith under this article might be treated as having been authorised or empowered to perform all the powers and duties of Directors. But the Board on the 27th March, 1897, did not purport to give them any power or authority under that article. It undoubtedly professed to appoint them as Directors. In my opinion that appointment was ultra vires of the Directors and therefore bad. Article 86, however, provides: “All acts done by any Meeting of Directors * * * or by any person acting as a Director, shall be valid and effectual notwithstanding that it be afterwards discovered that there was some defect in their appointment or qualifications respectively.”

    This article is based upon art. 71 of Table A, which is the same in both the Indian and English Companies Acts. S. 92 of the Indian Companies Act (which corresponds with s. 67 of the English) of 1862 provides that “until the contrary is proved every * * * meeting of Directors or Managers * * * * and all appointments of Directors * * * shall be deemed to be valid, and all acts done by such Directors * **shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may be discovered in their appointments or qualifications.” While, on the one hand, it was contended by counsel for the company that the effect of art. 85 was to validate the acts of the Board of which Arindell and Smith professed to act as members, it was argued, on the other hand, by the advocate for the applicants that article, could not validate the acts of individuals appoiuted to act as Directors by persons who had themselves no power to make the appointment, and we were referred to the cases of Howbeach Coal Co. v. Teague (5 H. and N. 151) and Garden Gull Co. v. McLister (L.R 1 Ap. Ca. 39) (referred to in Buckley's Companies Acts. 6th edition, 219). As pointed out by Mr. Buckley, those were) cases in which a Company was seeking to enforce against a member duties purporting to be imposed upon him by persons to whom he and his co-shareholders had never delegated the authority of imposing such duties. Here the applicants were not members of the Company, and their position is very different from the case of persons objecting, as in the cases quoted, to the making of calls or the forfeiture of shares by persons who were not in fact Directors. I see no reason therefore why the acts of the Board, consisting of Newcomen, Arindell, and Smith, should not, having regard to the terms of art. 86 of the Articles of Association, be treated as valid as if every one of such persons had been validly appointed.]

    In the case of P. Scott, the position is somewhat different. There the Board which rejected the application for registration consisted of Beer and Newcomen, who were both qualified [421] Directors, but they formed less than a quorum as required by art. 67 of the Articles of Association. Under that article “the number of Directors to form a quorum for the transaction of business shall be three, including the Managing Director, or such substitute as may be acting for him.” It seems to me that the action of a Board so constituted is not validated by art. 86, and that P. Scott is entitled now to say that their action was not binding upon him. What then is the result? His application is in all respects the same as the other applications under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act. He has treated their refusal as an improper refusal, and has alleged that it was made arbitrarily and without sufficient cause, and the answer to the application by the Company, as in the other cases, was that the Directors had bona fide after due consideration and for sufficient reason refused to register, and the matter has been tried out on that basis. Either there has been no refusal in law and his application, which is based solely and entirely on the allegation that there has been an improper refusal, is premature, or it may be taken that the defence set up on the application under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act is a, refusal, and the matter dealt with on its merits. I think it is open to us to adopt the latter course rather than dismiss the application as premature. This disposes of the questions which have been raised, other than the questions which go to the merits of the application.

    I have already referred to the issue raised by the lower Court. Evidence was adduced by both sides upon that issue. Of the applicants, Butterworth was the only one who was examined on their behalf in support of the applications under s. 58 of the Companies Act. They, however, called one Cave who had been in the service of the Muir Mills Company when the registrations had been refused, but who had since left, Beer, one of the Directors already mentioned of the Company, and Dr. Condon. Butterworth admitted that the first 3 shares purchased by him were offered to him by McRobert, the Manager of the Cawpore Woollon Mills, that he did not inquire if he had money to pay for shares; that his account with the Mills was at debit; that he asked McRobert for permission to further overdraw, and that permission was given; that McRobert directed [422] the accountant to make out a cheque for the shares on the Mussoorie Bank in favour of Dr. Condon, to pay for the shares; that he (Butterworth) eventually paid back the purchase-money by instalments, and that his debit was still from Rs. 2,000, to Rs. 3,000; that most probably McRobert wrote for the shares and sent them to him; that when the transfer deed came McRobert sent it back for alterations to Dr. Condon; that on receipt of the letter intimating that the Directors declined to register, he consulted McRobert, who advised him in his correspondence with regard to the refusal. As to the second lot of 5 shares he admitted that they had been paid for on the 31st August, 1897; that McRobert had caused his account to be debited with Rs. 1,300, the price; that he could not say why two months had elapsed between the date of his being so debited and the date of the transfer-deed; that he had nothing to do with the seller; that he was not sure whether McRobert or he himself had applied for registration; that it was possible that the scrip remained with McRobert up to the time of the application to the Court. He then went on to say that he could not swear that the Directors had not bona fide considered his application for registration. He also said that he knew that MoRobart's relations with the Company (The Muir Mills Co.) were not amicable.

    Cave, who had left the Company's service because he had been superseded by another employee, stated that the refusal to register the transfer to Butterworth was because he was employed in the Woollen Mills. The reasons be said were contained in the letter of the 28th May, 1897, to Dr. Condon, to which reference has been made. It was thought that a gentleman in the Cawnpore Woollen Mills might be influenced by McRobert to the detriment of the Company. Cave had been present at the meetings at which the different applications had been considered, and he referred to the minutes of such meetings which showed that all the applications had been considered, and in some instances remitted to subsequent meetings for further consideration. “I certainly swear,” he said, “that the Directors gave bona fide consideration to the question of registration,” and again “whether they acted in an arbitrary manner is a matter of opinion. I think they had some grounds for what they did. In my opinion they did not act in an [423] arbitrary manner.”. Cave was apparently called with a view to proving that the refusal to register the transfers was solely on account of Johnson, the Managing Director, and at his instance. This I think he failed to do. Examined on this point by the counsel for the applicants, he said: “I am not aware that Johnson had any voice in the refusal to register Butterworth's and the other shares.”

    Beer who was present at the meetings of Directors which refused to register the transfers to P. Scott, Thompson, and Butterworth, was examined as to the reasons which guided the Directors in their refusals. From his evidence it is clear that the reason was the fear that the transferees being employees of the Mills of which McRobert was Manager, would be under his influence, and would vote just as he wished them to. He stated that while McRobert had been a Director of the Muir Mills, there had been various stormy meetings, and he had evinced hostility on more occasions than one to Johnson, the Managing Director, who had threatened to resign, and start a mill of his own. He said that he believed that McRobert was at the bottom of the transfers; that he would use the transferees for his own ends, and that they would do what be told them; that he (Beer) had been a Director of the Cawnpore Woollen Mills, where there was always a preponderance of votes amongst the staff of that Mill, and he wanted to prevent a similar preponderance of votes on McRobert's part in the Muir Mills. “I considered,” he said, “if McRobert gained that preponderance, Johnson (the Managing Director) would sever his connection with the Muir Milis, and it was thus that I considered it was not to the interest of the Company that the shares should be registered. I considered that McRobert evidently wanted to gain that preponderance * * *. I don't think McRobert would hesitate to harass the management in order to gain his point. I considered harassment to the management would harm the Company.”

    The evidence of Dr. Condon, the only other witness called by the applicants, is not important. He speaks of a conversation with Johnson, which is denied by the latter.

    Now although Butterworth was the only one of the applicants who gave evidence in support of their case, the counsel for the [424] Company called the others apparently with a view to show that in purchasing their respective shares they were acting on the suggestion of and through McRobert. None of them had previously purchased shares in the Muir Mills Company, and with one exception all were at the time indebted to the Cawnpore Woollen Mills: but were allowed to further overdraw their accounts to meet the purchase money, and 7 per cent, was charged on the over-drafts. In each case the shares were offered to the purchaser by McRobert, were purchased by him, and paid for through him. Except in the case of Vicker's, application for registration was made by McRobert, who was advising them throughout. Each of them stated that he was not prepared to say that the Directors did not fairly and properly consider the matter of their fitness to become members of the Company, but Thompson went so far as to say that while he believed they had not fairly and properly considered his application, he was not prepared to swear it. In the case of Thompson his shares were purchased during his absence in England for him by McRobert, who without consulting him, had caused his account to be debited with the purchase money. Vickers in his evidence stated that he knew that there was great antagonism between Johnson and McRobert, and that before he bought his shares he was aware of their hatred.

    These matters which I have just mentioned, or most of them, only came to light in the course of this litigation, and therefore cannot be said to have influenced the Directors in their refusal to register the transfers. To my mind, however, they show almost conclusively that McRobert was taking much more than an impersonal interest in getting his employees to purchase shares in the Muir Mills Company. What his real object was there is nothing to show, though it may be that the view said to have been taken by the Directors as to his object was correct. It may be noted here that Beer was unable to specify, except in the vaguest terms, in what way McRobert was likely to be able to harass the management of the Company. It is admitted that at the time he was the largest shareholder in the Company, and it is to be presumed therefore that he would be the last person to do anything which would be likely to injure the interests of the shareholders. He had been a Director of the Company, but in February, 1897, he [425] ceased to be a Director, and though he was proposed and seconded for re-election as a Director at the Annual General Meeting of shareholders on the 27th February, 1897, he declined to submit himself for re-election. It is difficult to see how, as an ordinary shareholder, he could have interfered with or harassed the management, and he could not have submitted himself again for election as a Director until the next Annual General Meeting. Having regard to the constitution and views of the Board, and temporary Board, it was not likely that had a casual vacancy occurred on the Board, be would have been asked to join the Board in the meantime.

    In his cross-examination Beer referred to a prosecution which had been instituted against him as a Director of the Company under s. 55 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, this being done apparently with a view to show how in one respect McRobert had harassed the management. The prosecution was instituted under the following circumstances. After an Extraordinary General Meeting of the shareholders which took place in March 1897, it appears McRobert asked to see the register of shareholders, and was told by Beer, who was the Chairman of the Meeting, that be could not be allowed to see it then, as it was required at once at an adjourned meeting of the Directors, but that he could see it the next day. McRobert thereupon left the meeting, but in the course of half an hour was informed that the register was available for his inspection. Notwithstanding this information McRobert instituted the prosecution referred to, alleging that he had been refused inspection of the register. The Magistrate who tried the case acquitted Beer. McRobert thereupon first directly, and then through the Chamber of Commerce, of which he was President, moved the Local Government to appeal to the High Court against the acquittal, which it did. In the result Beer was fined 8 annas, the High Court being of opinion that technically an offence had been committed.

    The only other evidence which is material is that of Johnson, the Managing Director. He referred to various meetings which he described as stormy meetings at which there had been a difference of opinion between him and McRobert, when the latter was a Director, and especially to a particular meeting when McRobert [426] had expressed distrust of the management of the Company. He also referred to the prosecution of Beer. As to the reasons for the refusals to register the transfers he said there was a belief that the transferees would in all probability prove themselves cantankerous and litigious, just as their employer (McRobert) had proved himself to be. It was considered that as they were his employees, he could rely on them to do whatever he wished them to do; that they would therefore act in any manner he wished or directed because of the ill-will he bore against him (Johnson) personally; and that the Directors wished to guard against anything of this sort. He further said “after that (the criminal prosecution against Beer) all these applications came in. It appeared to me they could only mean one thing, namely, that McRobert was determined to follow up these different incidents by bringing in as shareholders his own nominees to work in whatever way circumstances might direct.”

    The evidence of Johnson leaves no doubt in my mind that the real objections to the various transferees were (1) their connection as employees of the Cawnpore Woollen Mills with McRobert, and the personal animosity existing between Johnson and McRobert, and (2) the desire of the Directors that McRobert should not add to his voting power at the meetings of the Company. It was very candidly admitted by Mr. Moti Lal Nehru who appeared for the applicants that they were under the influence of McRobert, but he denied that they would necessarily vote as he might direct them.

    The objections, it is to be observed, were not personal to the applicants themselves, and we have to see whether, under the circumstances, they were legitimate objections.

    In the absence of any such provisions as art. 21 of the Articles of Association in this case, Directors have no discretionary Dower of refusing to register a transfer of shares—See Poole v. Middleton, but where the power of rejecting proposed transferees is reserved to the Directors of the Company, they must exercise it reasonably and in good faith, and with due regard to the interests of the Company and to the right of a shareholder to transfer his shares, and the question of the fitness of the [427] transferees must be fairly considered at a meeting of the Board. The principles to be gathered from the cases in England are summed up in re Bell Bros.:. In that case Chitty, J., said:—“According to the constitution of this Company, every shareholder is entitled to transfer his shares to any person not being infant, lunatic, married woman or under any legal disability. This right, which is a right of property, is subject to the discretionary power conferred on the Directors by arts. 18 and 34, of approving; of the persons to whom the transfer is made, and of rejecting the transfer on the ground that they do not approve of the transferee. The discretionary power is of a fiduciary nature and must be exercised in good faith, that is, legitimately for the purpose for which it is conferred. It must not be exercised corruptly or fraudulently or arbitrarily or capriciously or wantonly. It may not be exercised for a collateral purpose. In exercising it the Directors must act in good faith in the interest of the Company and with due regard to the shareholder's right to transfer his shares, and they must fairly consider the question of the transferee's fitness at a Board meeting. When the Court once arrives at the conclusion that the Directors have in good faith rejected a transfer on the ground that the transferee is not a fit person to become a member of the Company, it will not review the Directors' decision. The Directors are not bound out of Court to assign their reasons for disapproving. If they decline to do so, or if their decision is challenged in Court and they refrain from giving evidence, upon which a cross-examination may take place as to their reasons, or if, giving such evidence, they refrain from stating their reasons, the Court will not merely on that account, draw an unfavourable inference against them. In these articles there is an express provision protecting the Directors against any liability to disclose their reasons. They are, however, at liberty, if they think fit, to disclose them, and if they do, the Court must consider the reasons assigned with a view to ascertain whether they are legitimate or not, or, in other words, to ascertain whether the Directors have proceeded on a right or a wrong principle. If the reasons assigned are legitimate, the Court will not overrule the Directors' decision merely because the Court itself would not have [428] come to the same conclusion. But if they are not legitimate, as, for instance, if the Directors state that they rejected the transfer because the transferor's object was to increase the voting power in respect of his share by splitting them among his nominees, the Court would hold that the power had not been duly exercised. So, also, if the reason assigned is that the transferee's name is Smith, or is not Bell. Where the Directors do not assign any reason it is still competent for those who seek to have the transfer registered to show affirmatively, if they can, by proper evidence, that the Directors have not duly exercised their power.” In the same judgment, Chatty, J., said:—“In my opinion, the power conferred on the Directors by the articles of this Company does not justify them in rejecting a transfer on the ground that the transferee, against whom they entertained no objection, is the nominee of some person whom they consider objectionable.”

    In Ex parte Penney, where the Articles of Association provided inter alia that “no person not already a shareholder shall be entitled to become the transferee of any share unless approved by the Board,” it was said that the Directors were not bound to disclose their reasons for rejecting a transferee, provided they had fairly considered the question at a meeting of the Board, and that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court would take it for granted that they had acted reasonably and bona fide. But if there was evidence to show that the Directors had exercised their power capriciously or unfairly, the Court would interfere; and Mellish, L.J, pointed out that it would be an abuse of their power to object to register a transfer on any ground not applying personally to the transferee.

    In Moffat v. Farquhar, the Articles of Association provided:— “No share in the Company shall be transferred by any proprietor to any person who has not been, first approved of by the Board of Directors or the Committee of Directors appointed as aforesaid; and if any transfer of any share or shares shall be made or attempted to be made to any person who has not been approved, the same shall be void.” There was a difference of opinion amongst the shareholders as to the mode in which the Company should be managed, and the plaintiff, who was a large [429] shareholder, transferred shares to his own nominees to strengthen his voting powers. The Directors refused to approve the transferees, not from any personal objection to them, but on the ground that the transfers were colourable and were intended to increase the plaintiffs voting power. It was held the Directors had no power to refuse to allow the transfers except upon objections personal to the transferees. That case was followed by Farrao, J., in Kaikhosro v. Koorla Spinning and Weaving Co..

    In the applications before us, the lower Court has found and in that finding I agree, that due consideration was given by the Directors to the matter of the various transfers, but I am prepared to hold further that in rejecting the applications for registration they acted bona fide and as they believed in what they considered to be the interest of the Company. On the authorities quoted they were not bound on rejecting the applications to give their reasons, and as I have said, except in one case, they did not give their reasons. Evidence, however, has been gone into, and it now appears that the reasons upon which he acted were not personal to the applicants. It was in fact ??? that there was no objection to them personally, apart from ??? connection with McRobert. The objection was to. McRobert, who, it was feared, would, from his position in the Cawnpore Woollen Mills Company, be likely to influence them to vote as he might wish. It should he here mentioned that the Muir Mills and the Cawnpore Woollen Mills were in no way rivals in trade, the one being a Cotton and the other a Woollen Mill. McRobert was not transferring his shares to his own nominees with a view to increasing his voting power in the Company, which, apparently on the authorites, he might have been justified in doing. He was merely influencing his subordinates to take shares which were being offered in the market. As the Directors have now disclosed their reasons, we are entitled to consider those reasons with a view to ascertain whether the Directors have proceeded on a right or wrong principle. The objections, as I have said, were not personal to the applicants, and applying the principles of the English cases, I think we must hold that the reasons now given for refusing to [430] register the transfers were not legitimate, of their reasons had been legitimate, we should not be justified in sitting “as a Court of appeal” to use the words of James, L.J, in Ex parte Penney “from the deliberate decision of the Board of Directors to whom by the “constitution of the Company the question of the determining the “eligibility or non-eligibility of new members is committed.”

    In In re Coal-port China Co. where the Court refused to interfere, there was no evidence to show that the Directors had exercised their power improperly or with want of bona fides.

    Although, as I have said, I consider that the Directors of the Muir Mills Company duly considered the applications before them and in rejecting the applications for registration acted bona fide, and as they believed in the interests of the Company, yet the reasons upon which they based their refusal not being legitimate reasons, the Court has power to interfere, and I therefore think that the Court below was right in directing the Company to register the names of the applicants.

    I would accordingly affirm the decrees of the Court below with costs in this Court in each case.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Muir Mills Company v. T.H. Condon And A. Butterworth
    (Jun 29, 1900)