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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 3, Clause (d) of the Estate Land Act,
  • Cl. (e), Section 3(ii) of the Estates Land Act,
  • Cl. 2(e), Section 8 of the Estates Land Act,
  • Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act.6.
  • Section 185 of the Estates Land Act,
  • Cl. 3(2)(d), Estates Land Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3, Clause (d) of the Estate Land Act,
  • Cl. (e), Section 3(ii) of the Estates Land Act,
  • Cl. 2(e), Section 8 of the Estates Land Act,
  • Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act.6.
  • Section 185 of the Estates Land Act,
  • Cl. 3(2)(d), Estates Land Act.
Smart Summary

Concise, Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The litigation concerns the character of an agraharam (village grant) called Dammennu and whether it falls within the definition of an "estate" under the Estates Land Act (questioning applicability of Cl. (e) of Section 3(2) and Cl. (d) of Section 3(2)). The case reached the High Court by way of a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 16 of 1910 and a Civil Revision Petition No. 576 of 1913; an A.A.C. (Appeal) No. 16 of 1910 is also referenced. Lower Courts had held that the agraharam fell under Cl. 2(e) (or S. 3(2)(e)), a view the High Court describes as erroneous. The High Court directed the Subordinate Judge to determine, as a question of fact, whether in pre-permanent-settlement inam grants to Brahmins the land revenue alone (melvaram) was granted or whether both warams (melvaram and kudivaram) were granted; the Subordinate Judge was to allow both sides to adduce further evidence and to submit findings within specified timeframes. The factual record includes documentary exhibits (e.g., Ex. M, Ex. 1, Ex. 37, Ex. 14) and oral testimony (several P.W.s and D.W.s). The plaintiffs are heirs asserting title as reversioners; defendants are tenants claimed to have occupancy rights. The High Court ultimately remanded the case for disposal on merits and reversed the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that the agraharam was an estate under Cl. 3(2)(d).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the agraharam (Dammennu) is an "estate" within the meaning of Section 3(2)(e) (Cl. (e)) of the Estates Land Act.
  2. If not covered by Cl. (e), whether the agraharam falls within Section 3(2)(d) (Cl. (d)) — i.e., whether the grant was of land revenue alone (melvaram) or of both warams (melvaram and kudivaram) in pre-permanent-settlement inam grants to Brahmins.
  3. On whom lies the burden of proof to show that, at the date of the grant, tenants had rights of occupancy (relevant to whether land revenue alone or both warams were granted) — and the practical effect of that burden at trial where both sides adduce evidence.
  4. Whether the civil court or the revenue court has jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment suits (i.e., effect of classification of the inam as an "estate" on civil jurisdiction).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Plaintiffs

  • Plaintiffs (appellants) contended they are reversioners and that the widow Tiruvengalamma had only a life (widow's) right; the cowles executed by her were not binding on plaintiffs after her death and do not prevent plaintiffs from recovering possession.
  • Appellant's counsel, Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar, relied heavily on Privy Council authority (Suryanarayana v. Patanna) to argue that grants of the character in question conferred rights in the land itself (not merely land revenue), suggesting the defendants had not proven occupancy rights at the date of grant.
  • The appellants pointed to documentary evidence (some mortgage-bonds, cowles and registers) and later conduct to support the claim of landlord/right in soil, though the Court treated much of the later documentary evidence (post-1891/1898) as of limited value for the question of original grant.

Respondent / Defendants

  • Defendants asserted that Dammennu Agraharam is an estate within Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act and thus that the civil Court lacked jurisdiction; they relied on evidence attempting to show that tenants had occupancy rights at the time of the grant (which would mean the original grantee acquired only land revenue/melvaram).
  • Defendants produced oral and documentary evidence (including registers and statements) to show long possession and dealings by tenants; they also relied on inam registers and other exhibits to support the contention that tenants had jeroit/occupancy rights.
  • In the Subordinate Court, affidavits alleged that plaintiffs were not allowed to adduce evidence; Mr. Prakasam (for defendants in one segment) did not deny these affidavit statements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bila Sanyasi Naidu v. Agnihotram Venkatacharyulu Cited to show that the lower Courts' view that the agraharam falls under Cl. 2(e), Section 8 of the Estates Land Act, is clearly erroneous. Used to support the statement that Cl. (e) does not properly cover the agraharam in the present case.
Jyoti Prasad Singh v. Lachipur Coal Company Noted that zamindar may have some rights in an agraharam (i.e., zamindar's limited rights may exist). Court observed that while zamindar may have some rights, it was unnecessary to decide their exact nature for present purposes.
Tadikonda Buchi Virabhadrayya v. Sonti Venkanna Cited in support of the view that Cl. (e) does not cover the present case. Referred to in concluding that the agraharam was not regarded as an under-tenure at time of settlement; hence Cl. (e) inapplicable.
Yeddamapudi Lakshmi Narasimha Row v. Repalli Sitaramaswami Held that when inam is granted to a person already in occupation, the grant may be only of the melvaram even though melvaram and kudivaram rights may become vested in the same person. Court cited to explain that an inam to an occupier does not necessarily confer kudivaram in addition to melvaram.
Srimath Kidambi Jagannatlia Charyulu v. Pidipiti Kutumbarayadu Authority bearing on effect of non-residence of the grantee in negating kudivaram right. Used with Upadrasta to support proposition that non-residence of grantee negates kudivaram right.
Upadrasta Venkata Sastrulu v. Devi Sitaramudu Discussed in relation to presumption about grants of inams and residence of grantees; court referred to conflict with later Judicial Committee decisions. Referenced in relation to earlier local authorities and contrasted with subsequent Judicial Committee decisions (noting reversal by later authority).
Rajya v. Balkrishna Gangadhar Observed that if antiquity prevents evidence of commencement of tenancy, tenancy may be presumed co-extensive with landlord's tenure. Cited to support presumption that tenants' occupancy may be ancient and co-extensive with zamindar's tenure where origin is unknown.
Narayanaswami v. Venkayya Used to interpret the description of holdings as "iseri"/"jerioti" or raiyati holdings. Applied to support reading of Ex. 37 (1858) as describing tenants' holdings and supporting presumption of tenant occupancy at grant date.
Zamindar of Chellupalli v. Rajalapati Somayya Also cited regarding characterization of holdings as "seri"/"jerioti". Used alongside Narayanaswami to support the presumption that tenants had occupancy rights from early times.
Kandada Narasimhacharyalu v. Ravicherla Ramabrahmam Observed that an agraharamdar who obtained inam from the Nuzvid Zamindar had only the melvaram right. Cited in support of the court's finding that Dammennu grant conveyed melvaram only to the original grantee.
Parvataneni Venkataramiah v. Parvataneni Narayudu Cited among authorities on grants and what rights are conveyed. Referenced in stating that pre-settlement grants to non-resident Brahmins would be deemed to be only of melvaram when tenants held kudivaram.
Suryanarayana v. Acchutta Potdnna Cited together with Parvataneni as supporting authorities on effect of pre-settlement grants. Used to buttress the finding about non-resident grantees obtaining only land revenue (melvaram).
Goppisetti Narayanaswami v. Nalam Subrahmanyam Cited to support that a grant described as of a village as a whole is a grant of a village as a whole. Applied to conclude the inam statement shows the grant was of the village as a whole (not partial portions).
Narayansami v. Kanniappa Explained that a srothriam grant gives no right over the lands; grantee entitled only to land revenue and cannot interfere with occupants while they pay established rent. Used to interpret the inam statement which described the grant as srothriam of 60 Pagodas, indicating melvaram-only grant.
Chinnan v. Kondam Cited with Narayansami for the proposition that srothriam grants confer only revenue rights. Applied to support conclusion that the inam was srothriam and therefore confers melvaram only.
Suryanarayana v. Patanna (Privy Council) Privy Council decision holding that grants of similar character conferred right to the land itself (not merely land revenue); relied upon by appellant's counsel. Court considered this decision and its applicability; after considering subsequent Judicial Committee authority (Venkata v. Seetharamudu) the High Court acknowledged that the Privy Council approach warranted careful consideration but ultimately examined local evidence under the governing principles.
Venkata v. Seetharamudu (Judicial Committee) Subsequent Judicial Committee decision which reverses this Court's earlier judgment in Upadrasta and follows the view in Suryanarayana v. Patanna, treating such grants as conveying land rights in some circumstances. Court acknowledged that this decision dispelled earlier doubts and influenced the interpretation of grants by Nuzvid zamindars; nonetheless the key issue became whether tenants had occupancy rights at the date of the grant.
From Appa Rau v. Ratnam Decision showing active controversy regarding occupancy rights in the Nuzvid Zamindari (historical context of disputes). Referred to when discussing the background of disputed tenurial relations in the region and why later documentary assertions (post-1891/1898) are of limited value.
Suri Venkata Subbarayya Sastri v. Darapparoddi Kristnaiya Held that certain covenants or conditions in cowles are not inconsistent with rights of occupancy. Cited in rejecting some plaintiff documentary arguments (pre-existing cowles/renewals) as inconsistent proof of denial of tenant occupancy rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct stages and by reference to factual records and authorities:

  • Preliminary classification: The Court first rejected the lower Courts' view that the agraharam fell under Cl. (e) (S. 3(2)(e)), noting authorities and reasoning that Cl. (e) covers portions of an estate held on permanent under-tenure and was not intended to encompass pre-settlement inams to Brahmins.
  • Directed factual inquiry: Given conflicting authority on burden of proof, the High Court remitted to the Subordinate Judge the specific factual issue: "Whether in the case of villages granted in inam by the zamindar to Brahmins before the permanent settlement, the land revenue alone had been so granted or both the warams." The Subordinate Judge was to allow both sides to adduce further evidence and return a finding.
  • Evidence appraisal (Dammennu): On the remitted issue, the subordinate court considered documentary exhibits (Inam Register Ex. M; Inam Statement Ex. 1; Inam B Register Ex. SS; mashath account Ex. 37; other documents and cowles) and oral testimony (P.W.s including P.W.6 and P.W.8, who stated the agraharamdars were non-resident and tenants cultivated the land). The court scrutinised residence of grantees, descriptions in registers (mounji, srothriam), recurring recognition of tenant occupancy and transfers by tenants, and the absence of pati/site ownership by agraharamdars.
  • Key factual findings driving legal conclusion: (a) The inam statement described the grant as a srothriam of 60 Pagodas (land revenue), which, under cited authorities, confers only land revenue rights and not rights over the soil. (b) Evidence showed original grantee and descendants were resident elsewhere (Vijayarai), and agraharamdars did not personally cultivate or possess site-holdings in Dammennu; tenants had long-standing cultivation and alienations indicating occupancy rights. (c) Ex. 37 and other documents described holdings as "seri"/"jeroiti", supporting tenant occupancy from early times.
  • Burden of proof: The Court acknowledged conflicting authority about the burden of proof but emphasised that here both sides were allowed to adduce evidence and thus the burden point became less critical. The Judicial Committee decisions place on defendants the burden to show tenants had occupancy rights at the grant date; the High Court observed that defendants had the onus to show such rights but, examining all evidence, concluded the facts led to finding tenants had occupancy rights and therefore original grant conveyed only melvaram.
  • Weight of later documents: The Court placed little weight on documents and actions post-1891 (and referenced Section 185 of the Estates Land Act regarding acts after 1898), observing that later assertions by landlords were of limited probative value as they may reflect litigation-driven creation of evidence.
  • Final analysis and synthesis: Combining documentary descriptions (srothriam/mounji), oral evidence of non-residence and tenant cultivation, and prior decisions (including Kandada Narasimhacharyalu v. Ravicherla Ramabrahmam), the Court held that in the Dammennu case the original grant conveyed only the land revenue (melvaram) and not kudivaram; accordingly the agraharam did not qualify as an "estate" under Cl. 3(2)(d).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court reversed the Subordinate Judge's decision that the Dammennu agraharam was an estate under Clause 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, and found that, as to the suit village of Dammennu, the original grant conveyed the land revenue (melvaram) alone and not both warams. The Court remanded the case for disposal on the merits by the civil Court.

Implications (direct effects on the parties):

  • The decision disposes of the remitted issue in favour of the defendants (respondents) and against the plaintiffs (appellants) on the question whether both warams were granted; for Dammennu, only melvaram was granted.
  • The Court reversed the order that had ousted civil jurisdiction and remanded for trial on merits in the civil Court so that similar cases are not split between Revenue and Civil Courts (noting potential prejudice if one set prosecuted in Revenue Court and another in Civil Court).
  • Costs hitherto incurred were to be provided for in the revised decree.
  • The Subordinate Court (court of first instance) was directed to inquire into genuineness and validity of razinama petitions alleged to have been executed by some tenants and to deal with them on remand.

The opinion does not proclaim the establishment of a new legal precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities to the facts of this case; the ruling's primary consequence is reversal and remand for civil trial on the merits in accordance with the Court's findings on the remitted issue.

    Nandigam Subbarayudu v. Kannam Saheb

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— The view of the lower Courts that the agraharam falls under Cl. 2(e), Section 8 of the Estates Land Act, is learly erroneous: see Bila Sanyasi Naidu v. Agnihotram Venkatacharyulu(1). It may fall under Cl. 2(d) if the land revenue alone had been granted as inam by the zamindar before the Permanent Settlement.

    2. On the question of the burden of proving whether the land revenue alone was so granted or both the warams were granted in the case of villages granted in inam to Brahmins before the permanent settlement, there is some conflict of opinion in the decisions of this Court. The Subordinate Judge is requested to submit a finding on this question as a question of fact, allowing both sides to adduce further evidence. When both sides have been given an opportunity to adduce evidence, the question of burden of proof should not ordinarily be made much of by Courts of fact in arriving at conclusions. The Subordinate Judge however, if he thinks the evidence to be so very evenly balanced on both sides that the question of the burden of proof becomes important, might express his opinion in the alternative on the two views of the burden of proof.

    3. The finding should be submitted within six weeks from the date of receipt of records, and ten days will be allowed for filing objections.

    4. (The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 16 of 1910 against order in Original Suit No. 36 of 1908 coming on for hearing on 9th August 1915, Seshagiri Aiyar and Napier, JJ. delivered the following judgment.)

    Seshagiri Aiyar, J.:— The first question for consideration is whether the agraharam is an estate as defined in S. 3, Cl. 2(e); I think the Subordinate Judge is wrong in his view that it is. It is admitted that when the sannad was granted the agraharam was in the possession of the plaintiffs' ancestors. It is also admitted that this property was not included in the sannad as being within the ambit of the zamindari which was granted by the Government. The zamindar was entitled to one kattubadi fixed. It may be that he had some rights in the agraharam: see Jyoti Prasad Singh v. Lachipur Coal Company(2). It is not necessary to decide the exact nature of those rights. I am satisfied that the agraharam was not regarded as an under-tenure at the time of settlement. I therefore think that Cl. (e) does not cover this case: see Tadikonda Buchi Virabhadrayya v. Sonti Venkanna(3).

    5. On the question whether Cl. (d) applies, we have the affidavits of the learned vakils who appeared in the Court below that the plaintiffs were not allowed to adduce evidence to prove their case. Mr. Prakasam frankly admits that he is not prepared to deny the statements in these affidavits. We must ask the Subordinate Judge, after hearing the evidence which the parties may adduce, to return a finding whether the agraharam is an estate falling under Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act.

    6. The finding should be submitted within three months and ten days will be allowed for filing objections.

    Napier, J.:— I agree and would only add that I should be slow to hold that any pre-settlement inam could be brought within S. 3(2)(e). The legislature was dealing with inams specifically in Cl. (d) and I cannot think it intended to provide for any other class of them in (e). Cl. (e) provides for portions of an estate held on permanent under-tenure and I cannot hold that the fact that kattubadi is paid to a zamindar in respect of a pre-settlement inam makes that inam either a “portion” or an under-tenure.

    FINDING

    C.R.P No. 576 of 1913

    7. The issue on which I am directed to submit my finding is:

    “Whether in the case of villages granted in inam by the zamindar to Brahmins before the permanent settlement, the land revenue alone had been so granted or both the warams.”

    8. With reference to the High Court's direction to try the above issue as a question of fact, both parties were given an opportunity to adduce evidence. Each party has accordingly adduced evidence tending respectively to prove and disprove the fact in issue and so the importance of the incidence of the burden of proof disappears almost entirely in this case. The plaintiff, who is the appellant, has produced no sanad relating to Dammennu village, but has filed a sanad relating to Karravari Savaram village, which is situated two miles away from Dammennu. According to the evidence of P.W 12, who owns 1/6th share in Karravari Savaram, the original grant, as evidenced by the sanad (Ex. A AAA), was made in Fasli 1159 (1749), i.e, the same year as the grant of the suit agraharam (Dammennu) by the then zamindar Apparayanam Garu. Ex. CCCC, read with the evidence of P.W 12, shows that the original grant was in respect of 30 puttis of waste land * * * (beedu bhoomi) out of the village of Chivatam. The grant was made to Karra Perayya Sastry, who was the ancestor (i.e paternal grandfather's grandfather) of P.W 12. It is clear from the evidence of P.W 12 that it was a waste land which was granted to his ancestor. It is further deposed to by P.W 12 that as the land was waste his ancestor went with his family and lived there; that he dug wells and raised gardens of arecanuts, coconuts and mango trees. Ex. BBBB is an extract from the Inam Register relating to Karravari Savaram Agraharam referred to above and Ex. CCCC is a certified copy of the dhimat issued to the village officers in pursuance of the sanad (Ex. AAAA). P.W 12 deposed that from the time of his ancestor down to the time of his father, Savaram Agraharam was under the cultivation of the agraharamdars themselves and that it was never in the cultivation of their tenants. P.W 12 further deposed that subsequent to the death of his father the agraharam devolved upon him (P.W 12) and his brothers and that they have been leasing out the same to tenants. P.W 12 also explained that his ancestor belonged to the Karra family and so he gave his family name to the agraharam which was accordingly called “Karravari Savaram.” and thus with reference to Karravari Savaram, the original grant being that of a waste land * * * (beedu bhoomi), it follows that the grant consisted of the entire right in the property. For the position of the zamindar before the permanent settlement was that he had the administration of the whole zamindari.

    9. The other grant relied on by plaintiff's pleader is that of Kanur Agraharam. Kanur Agraharam is situated about four or five miles from the village of Dammennu. No sanad or dhimat has been produced, but reliance is placed on the oral evidence of P.W 13, Vadali Annappa. According to P.W 13 the Brahmins to whom the grant was made lived by cultivation. The grant was made to 80 or 90 Brahmins under a joint sanad and they were the residents of the agraharam at the time of the grant. The Brahmins to whom the grant was made lived by cultivation and so they acquired both the warams under the grant. It has however been held that in the case of an inam granted to a person in occupation of the land the grant would still be only the melvaram right although in consequence of the grant the melvaram and the kudivaram rights became vested in the same person: vide Yeddamapudi Lakshmi Narasimha Row v. Repalli Sitaramaswami(4).

    10. Coining next to the suit agraharam of Dammennu the question for consideration is what was the nature ??? the right given to the agraharamdar at the time of the grant in Fasil 1159 (1749)? It is clear from the evidence of P.W 6, Kandalam Tirumalacharyulu, that Dammennu Agraharam was granted before the permanent settlement to his ancestor Prativathi Bhayamkaram Varadacharyulu, a resident of Vijiarayi which is situated at a distance of about 50 miles from Dammennu Agraharam. Dammennu is situated in Tauuku Taluk but Vijiarayi is situated in Ellore Taluk. Besides the oral evidence of P.W 6 which goes to show that the original grantee was a non-resident Brahmin of Vijiarayi, there is also the documentary evidence showing that the grantee's descendants also were residents of Vijiarayi, so far back as 1860 (vide Cols. 16 and 17 of Ex. M) and even up to the year 1882 (vide Exs. M, N, Q and II). It has been held that the non-residence of the grantee, if proved, will negative the kudivaram right: vide Srimath Kidambi Jagannatlia Charyulu v. Pidipiti Kutumbarayadu(5) and Upadrasta Venkata Sastrulu v. Devi Sitaramudu(6).

    11. The next point for consideration is whether the suit agraharam (Dammennu) was a waste land (* *beedu bhoomi) as in the case of “Karravari Savaram,” referred to in para. 2, or in the occupation of tenants as in the case of “Kanur Agraharam” referred to in para. 3 supra. In the absence of the original sanad, reliance is placed by both sides on Exs. M and SS as also on Ex. 1. Ex. M is an extract from the Register of Inams in the village of Dammennu. The original of Ex. M appears to have been prepared in 1860. Ex. SS is the Inam B Register of Dammennu Agraharam for Fasli 1298 (1888). and Ex. 1 is a certified copy of Inam Statement of Dammennu Agraharam.

    12. The three points for consideration regarding the village of Dammennu are: (a) Whether the village of Dammennu was a waste land at the time of the grant in 1749 as in the case of “Karravari Savaram.” (b) If not, whether the grant was to a Brahmin residing in the village and cultivating it as in the case of “Kanur Agraharam.” (c) Whether the grant was made to a Brahmin not residing in the village.

    13. The suit village of Dammennu is described under Col. 8 of Ex. M as “granted as Agraharam.” In Ex. 1 (Col. 14) reference is made to a dhimat addressed to village officials. It is argued for the respondent that the reference to village officials presupposes the existence of a village and that therefore the entire land in Dammennu could not have been a waste land (* * beedu bhoomi) at the time of the grant and it is not the case of the plaintiff that Dammennu was entirely a waste land at the time of its grant in 1749.

    14. Next as regards the points (b) and (c). if the village was not waste it must have been in the occupation of tenants. The question then is: Who were the tenants? Is it the original grantee? Or is it the ancestor of the present defendant? Certainly it cannot be the original grantee because according to P.W 6, the original grantee was a resident of Vijiarayi and it is impossible to believe that the original grantee residing at Vijiarayi (50 miles away from Dammennu) was the cultivating tenant prior to, and at the time of the grant. I say it is impossible to believe, because even after the grant, the evidence on record points to the inference that the tenants themselves have been cultivating the land and not the agraharamdars. P.W 8, who has been the Karnam of Dammennu for the past 30 or 40 years and who, according to his own admission, has been working on behalf of the agraharamdars in this litigation, supports the evidence of P.W 6 in stating that the suit agraharam lands have been all along cultivated by the tenants and not by the agrahramdars themselves and Ex. 1 contains a statement of the agraharamdar Srinivasacharyulu that from 1835 to 1852 he and his cosharers were looking after (managing) the village, which does not mean that they were cultivating the lands in the village. It is also stated in Ex. 1 that they (agraharamdars) were enjoying the “medhavi” i.e, produce or melvaram. This recital gives a lie direct to the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 11 that Pedda Purushothamacharyulu was himself cultivating the land four or five years before his death. For Pedda Purushothamacharyulu died in 1852 after he had relinquished his right in favour of his daughter's son so early as 1835.

    15. The evidence of P.W 8 further shows that to his knowledge no agraharamdar personally cultivated any portion of the agraharam lands in the village of Dammennu; that the agraharamdars resided permanently at Vijiarayi in Ellore Taluk; that the agraharamdars, when they visited Dammennu for collecting rents, etc., used to stay in a portion of the house belonging to P.W 8; that 40 years ago Kandalam Venkatacharyulu lived in the house within the compound of P.W 8 for four years with his wife and children, but he did not during that period cultivate any of the agraharam lands; and that, as a matter of fact, the agraharamdars owned no house-sites at all in the village, but they belonged to the tenants who cultivated the surrounding lands. This evidence of P.W 8 falsifies the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 17 who depose to a contrary state of facts. But the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 17 is purely interested and utterly unreliable, as it is not only opposed to that of P.W 6 and 8 but also quite contrary to the recital of Ex. CC itself, which makes no mention of any pati-sites belonging to the agraharamdars.

    16. If the agrahramdars themselves were not the cultivators, either at the time of the grant, or subsequently as shown above, it follows that the grant of the suit Dammennu village must have been made to non-resident Brahmins who were the inhabitants of Vijiarayi as deposed to by P.W 6, and hence the case of “Kanur Agraharam” has no application whatever to the present case relating to Dammennu village. This disposes of points (b) and (c) in favour of defendants (respondents) and against plaintiff (appellant).

    17. On the other hand, the evidence of P.W 11, who is aged 90 years, shows that the village of Dammennu has been in the occupation of the tenants for nearly a century. Hence the presumption is that their ancestors also must have been living there in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. In the case of Rajya v. Balkrishna Gangadhar(7) it was observed that, if owing to antiquity there was no evidence of the commencement of a tenancy, it might be presumed to be co-extensive with the duration of the tenure of the landlord. The presumption is that the zamindar did not deal with the rights of the occupants when the grant was made, the raiyats being tenants of an agraharam in a zamindari. In the present case, this presumption is strongly supported by Ex. 37 of 1858, which gives a description of the holdings of the several tenants as agraharam “iseri,” which means the same thing as “jeroiti” or “raiyati” holdings: vide Narayanaswami v. Venkayya(8) and also Zamindar of Chellupalli v. Rajalapati Somayya(9). The description of the holdings as “seri” in Ex. 37 lends support to the further presumption that the tenants had been in the Dammennu village at the time of its grant to the ancestor of the agraharamdars in 1749. This presumption, instead of being rebutted by any counter-evidence on plaintiff's behalf, is supported by the admissions elicited in the cross-examination of P.W 8 himself. For P.W 8 admitted that there are 40 or 50 families of tenants residing in the agraharam and that he cannot say when these families first came to reside in the agraharam. P.W 8 was not prepared to deny that the ancestors of these families were not the cultivating tenants at the time of the original grant.

    18. With reference to the evidence pro and con discussed in the foregoing paragraphs it is clear that the suit agraharam of Dammennu must have been in the occupation of cultivating tenants and not in the occupation of the original grantee, who according to the evidence of P.W 6, was a resident of Vijiarayi. I accordingly find with reference to the issue remitted for trial that, so far as the village of Dammennu is concerned the land revenue alone (melvaram) had been assigned to the Original grantee and not the kudivaram right also. This finding is also in accordance with the decision reported as Kandada Narasimhacharyalu v. Ravicherla Ramabrahmam(10), where it was observed that an agraharamdar who obtained his inam from the Nuzvid Zamindar had only the melvaram right.

    19. Before concluding, I may add that I have not considered it necessary to discuss the contents of the other documents filed on both sides, firstly because they do not throw any light upon the terms of the sanad showing the origin of the grant of the suit agraharam; secondly because those documents relate to a disputed period and as such they are not of much evidentiary value to prove or disprove the nature of the original grant; and thirdly, because the mere fact that some of the tenants (not defendants) had acknowledged that they had no occupancy right is not sufficient to rebut the inference of occupancy right arising in favour of the tenants when they have been in possession for a long time and the origin of their tenancy is unknown.

    20. In the result, my finding is that in the case of inams granted by the Zamindar to Brahmins before the permanent settlement, if the grantees of the inam were in possession of the inam lands as cultivating tenants, it would make such persons owners of both the warams. So also in the case of waste lands granted by the zamindar, the grantee would acquire both the warams. I further find that in the case of an agraharam village granted before the permanent settlement by the zamindar to a Brahmin, who is a resident of a different place, as in the present case the grant would be deemed to be only of the melvaram, because the kudivaram was with the tenants in actual possession of the land at the time of the grant: vide also Parvataneni Venkataramiah v. Parvataneni Narayudu(11) and Suryanarayana v. Acchutta Potdnna(12). This finding has reference to the suit village and disposes of the issue in favour of defendants (respondents) and against plaintiff (appellant).

    FINDING

    A.A.C No. 16 of 1910

    21. Plaintiffs are the sons of one Kandady Taradacharyulu. He had a divided brother Bulli Kristnamacharyulu. He died childless leaving his widow Tiruvengalamma as his sole heir. A divided fourth share in the Dammennu Agraharam, composed of the lands in the possession of the defendants, 73 in number, in all about 60 acres belonged to Bulli Kristnama Charyulu. Tiruvengalamma died on 23rd March 1908. In 1894, with regard to about 40 acres of land she had executed in favour of the raiyats registered cowles for a period of 60 years at a fixed rate of rent: vide Ex. 25a to 25k. With regard to remaining 20 acres they were let to the raiyats for a period of sight years from 1894, and in 1902 the cowles were again renewed for another period of ten years. Tiruvengalamma having died in March 1908, the plaintiffs instituted this suit on 16th September 1908 as the reversioners to the estate of Bulli Venkayya, to recover the lands from the defendants. The plaintiffs contend that Tiruvengalamma had only the right to enjoy the said property as long as she lived, and that she had no higher right, that accordingly the cowles which she had given in respect of her properties were not valid subsequent to her death and that they would not bind the plaintiffs: vide para. 6 of the plaint. The defendants plead, apart from any question as to the binding character of the cowles, that Dammennu Agraharam is an estate falling within the definition of Section 3, Clause (d) of the Estate Land Act, and that the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit in ejectment. The same question is under consideration in Civil Revision Petition No. 576 of 1913 on the file of the High Court. The parties in the present suit have agreed to the oral and documentary evidence in the said suit being treated as evidence in the present case. Over and above the said evidence the defendants examined an additional witness, D.W No. 6, in the case. The plaintiff recalled and further examined the plaintiff's 8th witness, the karnam, and filed certain additional documents JJJJ to SSSS. Thus the evidence is substantially the same in both the suits.

    22. The additional documents are merely intended to explain certain transactions in the light of the plaintiffs' case. The conditions necessary to bring an inam under the definition of an estate are four: (1) The original grant should be of a village as a whole. (2) The land revenue alone of the village should have been granted in inam. (3) That the person to whom the inam is granted should be one not owning the kudivaram of the village (4). The grant should have been made, confirmed or recognized by the British Government. The wording of the section shotos that for any inam being classed as an estate the aforesaid conditions should be fulfilled; and it would therefore lie upon any person who sets up the plea that an inam is an estate to establish, apart from any presumptions, that it fulfils all the aforesaid conditions. Further any person who wants to oust the jurisdiction of a civil Court must also substantiate his plea. The defendants were accordingly called upon to show that the plaint inam is an estate. The plaint inam has been confirmed by the British Government in 1860: vide Ex. M. The extract from the Inam Register shows that the inam was conferred in Fasli 1159 (1747) on Varadacharyulu by the Zamindar Rajah Apparayanam Garu. The sanad and 29 dumbalas, from Fasli 1159 to 1270, the takeed and the patta produced before the Inam Commissioner by the inamdars are not now forthcoming. They were said to have been lost in a fire in Sanivarappet, which burnt the house in which one of the inamdars Sadagopalacharyulu was put up. The evidence as to such loss is not of a convincing character, but there is nothing to show that plaintiffs had possession of those records, and I do not think that any presumption adverse to the plaintiffs could be drawn on that ground. The extent of the grant and the character of the inam should have therefore to be gathered from the available records. The inam statement filed by the inamdars at the time of the inam settlement in 1860, Ex. 1, shows that the grant was of the village of Dammennu as a whole and not of any specified portion thereof. It begins:

    “Statement prepared by the Agraharikulu of Mounji Dammennu Agraharam attached to Relangi Taluk.”

    23. All the extents of land within the four boundaries of the village are claimed as inam with the exception of porambokes 2 and odd putties and minor inams 8 and odd putties. As to whether the minor inams were in existence at the time of the grant it is not clear, but probably they did as the village undoubtedly existed at the time of the grant. The existence of such minor inams does not make the grant less the grant of a village as a whole. There is thus no doubt that the grant was of a village as a whole: vide Goppisetti Narayanaswami v. Nalam Subrahmanyam(13).

    24. Secondly, it has to be seen whether the grant was of the land revenue alone. In the first place the description of the village as mounji is significant. It is only when a village already under cultivation is granted, it is known as a mounji village: vide Upadrasta Venkata Sastrulu v. Devi Sitaramudu. Secondly, Col. 6 of the inam statement shows that the grant was in the nature of a srothriam of G. 60 Pagodas to be enjoyed by the grantee, Sreemat Prathivadi Bhayamkaram Varadacharyulu Garu and his heirs. Srothriam means literally an assignment of land revenue to a srothria or Brahmin learned in the Vedas, and here evidently the grantee, as his name indicates, is a Vishnavite Brahmin of that stamp. Admittedly the grantee and his descendants are Gurus for a number of people. Srothriam grant gives no right over the lands, and the grantee is only entitled to land revenue and cannot interfere with the occupants as long as they pay the established rent: Narayansami v. Kanniappa(14), Chinnan v. Kondam(15). Thus the inam statement shows conclusively that the grant was a srothriam inam of 60 Pagodas of land revenue. The unambiguous nature of the present grantee therefore obviates the decision of any question as to even where the grant had been made of the lands in the village or of melvaram in such lands the section would cover such grants as well.

    25. The third point for consideration is whether the land revenue of the village was granted to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof. All the other voluminous oral and documentary evidence in the case is of use only in considering this aspect of the case. Firstly, there is scarcely any doubt that the grantee and his descendants were permanent residents of Vijayarai in the Ellore Taluk. Dammennu is a village situate in the Tanuku Taluk at a distance of more than 50 miles from Vijayarai. Admittedly the agraharamdars do not own at present any site or house in the village. Nor is there any evidence worth the name that they did so at any other time. The dwelling sites owned by the tenants belong to them and the agraharamdars have no right to any of such sites. There is further no doubt whatever that they never lived in the village except camping temporarily in the karnam's house, when they went to collect cist or lease out the lands. The plaintiffs' attempt to establish to the contrary is a miserable failure and does not deserve any detailed examination. P.W 8 Kalluri Venkayya, who is aged about 60 years, has been the knrnam of the village for the last 40 years. In spite of the fact that he is hand and glove with the plaintiff's and is too much interested in the result of the suit, to speak the truth, he was nevertheless perforce obliged to admit the aforesaid facts. It is established beyond all reasonable doubt that till the year 1891, so long as the agraharam had not been partitioned into four shares by the agraharamdars, they never claimed any higher right in the lands than that of collecting the mamool cist, nor did they deny the right of the raiyats to permanent occupancy rights in the lands. It is only after the partition of the lands by the agraharamdars they made a determined effort to get at the lands. In the inamstatement, inamdars state as follows:

    “We have been paying the cist to the Government on the srothriam and maintaining ourselves with the income therefrom…”

    26. A reference to the Inam Register Exhibit M shows that the agraharamdars had then let the village for five years for an annual rent of Rs. 700. The mashath account prepared on 25th September 1858 gives in detail the holdings of individual raiyats in the village (38). In order to facilitate the collection of rent from the raiyats, the agraharamdars had been till 1891 in the habit of executing a cowle for the entire village to the names of four principal or representative raiyats of the village, with a stipulation therein that they should not collect from the other raiyats any amount more than the amount settled with such raiyats according to the tharamvar of the lands owned by them (vide Exs. 2, 3 & 4). In all most all the cowles prior to 1891 the enjoyment of the several tenants or their holdings for a long time vide Ex. 2) is expressly and unambiguously admitted, and their right to continue on the land is not also denied, as the said cowles do not contain any stipulation that the tenants should surrender the land at the end of the period. The evidence of the karnam also with regard to the tenant's rights in the land is important to show that the tenants were recognized by the landlords as possessed of permanent occupancy rights. He says:

    “If a tenant dies, his son or heir cultivates unless for any reason the landlord gives the land to strangers. If a tenant dies leaving a son, his son cultivates the land. This has been the practice ever since I became karnam. The agraharamdar collects rent from tenants' son or heir as described above,”

    27. Asked whether the agraharamdars had ever disallowed the heir to cultivate the lands he said:

    “I cannot give any instance when the agraharamdar did not allow the heir of the tenant to cultivate the land of the deceased tenant.”

    28. Then again:

    “There is no practice for the heirs of the deceased tenant to apply to the agraharamdar, to apply for permission to cultivate the land of the deceased tenant.”

    29. And he admitted that the names of semale heirs are so registered in the account. For example, after her husband's brother, Ramayya's death, Pullamma's name is entered in the accounts. He further admitted that till the year 1891 there has been not a single instance of a tenant having been ejected and that till then there was no change of holding effected the landlords. In addition to the aforesaid evidence there have been numerous alienations by the tenants of their lands by sale, mortgage, gift, &c. (vide Exs. 6 to 6c, 12, 18 to 22). All these documents have been written by the karnam himself, and the lands dealt with are described as lands in which the tenants had jeroit right. It was also admitted by the karnam that the agraharamdars raised no objection to such transfers and received the rent from the transferees, and that their names also were duly entered in the accounts. The proceeding in Summary Suit No. 117 of 1891 is significant as showing that the agraharamdars had till that date never disputed the occupancy right of the tenants. In the said suit Kanoori Venkatareddi sued for acceptance of a patta by a tenant with the mamool cist Rs. 23-5-7. (Ex. 29) The suit was compromised to the effect that a decree may be passed for the acceptance of a patta with the mamool cist Rs. 9-14-0. (Ex. 30).

    30. After the partition by the agraharamdars, the above tenant was sought to be ejected in 1892, and on his setting up a right of occupancy it was found in his favour, and the suit was dismissed, and the decree was confirmed both in the first appellate Court and in the High Court: vide Exs. 14 and 14a. As a matter of fact, as already observed, there was no attempt till the actual partition by the agraharamdars of the village in 1891 to dispute the occupancy rights of the tenants in any manner the agraharamdars were content to receive the mamool cist from the several raiyats. But after 1891 the agraharamdars put forward a claim to the absolute ownership of the lands, and the tenants resisted the claim for some years. But finally the tenants and the landlords came practically to an agreement by which most of the tenants had their occupancy rights in the lands confirmed or recognized by the agraharamdars on payment of some consideration. Thus Sadagopachari and Jagannathachari, who in all owned one-half of the agraharam or 120 acres, have confirmed the occupancy rights possessed on the lands by the tenants for some consideration. With regard to another agraharamdar, Venkata Reddi, who owns 60 acres, he has similarly recognized the occupancy rights of the tenants for 40 acres. Of course in all the above cases, the recognition had been effected either as sales or as permanent leases. In the case of Thiruvengalamma, as she had only a widow's estate, the above procedure could not be followrd, and with regard to 40 acres she executed leases for the long period of 60 years for some consideration and for the remaining 20 acres for 10 years to the tenants who had long been in occupation of the lands. The karnam, P.W 8, helped the agraharamdar materially in bringing round the tenants, and has also materially profited thereby. Of course, the reason of the tenants' agreeing to so repurchase the occupancy rights from the agraharamdars was of course due to their fear that they might be ejected out of their lands either forcibly or by being dragged into litigation for long periods, and thus be ruined. It must also be said that subsequent to 1891 the tenants as a whole recognized the landlords' right to the lands and have in many instances given up their lands which the landlords had rented to others. It may be safely asserted that while the evidence prior to 1891 is all in favour of the tenants, the evidence, subsequent to 1891, is all in favour of the agraharamdars' right to the entire land. They have subsequent thereto periodically increased the rents, changed tenancies, and have otherwise also exercised absolute ownership of the lands. No good purpose would be served by setting forth in detail the evidence on the above indisputable facts. But a village has to be determined whether it is an estate or not by the original grant and by ascertaining whether at the time of the grant the grantee also owned the kudivaram of the village. In the present case the evidence conclusively shows that at the time of the grant the grantee did not own the kudivaram. I accordingly answer the issue in the affirmative.

    JUDGMENT

    31. The civil miscellaneous appeal and the civil revision petition are against orders returning the plaint for presentation to the Revenue Court. The suit in the civil miscellaneous appeal was filed by the agraharamdars against about 60 tenants for ejectment. On the first occasion the then Subordinate Judge decided that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. On appeal against that order this Court pointed out that the village in question was not an estate under Cl. (e), Section 3(ii) of the Estates Land Act, and remanded the case for a finding, whether it came under (ii)(d). The present Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that it is an estate falling, under S. 3(ii)(d).

    32. Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar who appeared for the appellant addressed a very elaborate argument to us resting it mainly upon the recent Privy Council decision in Suryanarayana v. Patanna(16). In the course of the argument we expressed doubts whether that decision would cover this case, and whether the fact that the grant of the agraharam was made by one of the Nuzvid zamindars and certain other circumstances would not differentiate this case from the one before the Judicial Committee. Since the argument was concluded, we have had the advantage of hearing Mr. Ramesam on a similar question relating to Thottapalli estate and the learned vakil drew our attention to a subsequent decision of the Judicial Committee in Venkata v. Seetharamudu(17) which to a considerable extent has dispelled our doubts entertained at the hearing. That decision reverses the judgment of this Court in Upadrasta Venkata Sastrulu v. Devi Sitaramudu. In that case, as in the case before us, the grant in question was made by one of the Nuzvid zamindars, and was made to Brahmins. Yet the Judicial Committee, following their view enunciated in the case in Suryanarayana v. Patanna, have held that there is no presumption that the land revenue alone was granted. If the matter were resintegra, we would have had some hesitation in applying the principles enunciated in Suryanarayana v. Patanna to a grant by a Nuzvid zamindar. In Appeals Nos. 122 and 123 of 1900, and 32 and 41 of 1904, this Court took occasion to examine the origin of the Nuzvid and Nidadavole zamindaries. Quoting from Grant's Political Survey, Davies and Benson, JJ., held that the ancestors of the present Nuzvid zamindars were farmers of revenue under the Nizam.

    33. It is not necessary to pursue this matter further although it is open to argument that the same rule of construction cannot be applied to grants from these zamindars as would apply to grants made by the ancient kings of this country. But the Judicial Committee have, by referring to the preamble of Regn. 31 of 1802, construed a grant of a similar character in their subsequent decision as conferring a right to the land itself and not merely to the land revenue. S. 2 of that Regulation may be regarded, as suggested by Mr. Ramesam, as justifying this conclusion. The framers of that section were aware that not only Ruling Princes but persons who had a lesser right in the soil but who professed to possess royal rights and prerogatives were making grants in the same manner. The section says that grants by these limited owners would be equally valid. This may be construed as a release on the part of the East India Company, which succeeded to the sovereign rights in these territories, of their right to take exception to the grant made by such owners. Therefore the grant by one of the Nuzvid zamindars would convey the right in the property as well as the right in the soil, which by Regn. 31 of 1802 may be regarded as having been surrendered to the grantee by the Government. Even that would not deprive tenants of their rights, if they had any in the soil. Because neither the zamindar by such grant nor the Government by their release can convey rights over which they had no control. Therefore the question resolves itself into this. Had the defendants any right of occupancy at the time when the grant was made by the Nuzvid zamindar which in this case is said to have been made about the year 1747: or in other words in the language of the Judicial Committee in the case reported as Suryanarayana v. Patanna:

    “Is it proved, or is there evidence to suggest, that at the date of the grant there were any tenants in the village holding lands with any rights of occupancy by custom or otherwise?”

    34. There can be no question from the language of the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the two cases already referred to that the burden of proving this is on the defendants. Looking at it from another point of view also the burden is on the defendants. It is they that object to the jurisdiction of the civil Court, and it is for them to show that their rights in the property are of such a character as a civil Court cannot take cognizance of. The Subordinate Judge rightly held that the burden was on the tenants. He has however come to the conclusion that burden has been discharged. Although in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 16 of 1910 there is no special reference to the current of authorities in this Presidency to the effect that grants of this description should be presumed to have affected the land revenue only and not the land, still there can be no doubt that in appreciating the evidence, the Subordinate Judge has been led to the conclusion at which he has arrived by this well-known presumption of fact. Since his judgment was delivered the Judicial Committee, as we pointed out already, have taken a different view of the situation and therefore in dealing with the judgment of the lower Court we have to examine the evidence from a new standpoint—a point which did not naturally strike the Subordinate Judge.

    35. We shall now proceed to shortly discuss the evidence that has been let in Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar relied upon Exs. KK to NN, which were executed between the years 1864 and 1870, as showing that the agraharamdar regarded himself as the owner of the land. They were mortgage-bonds and contained statements that they were under cultivation by somebody and that in the event of the instalments not being paid the documents should be regarded as cowles enabling the mortgagee to take possession of the land. At best this is self-serving evidence. There is no evidence before us that the tenants were deprived of their possession. This clause about treating the document as a cowle is not sufficient to warrant us in holding that the zemindar was the owner of the soil. The learned vakil then referred to Ex. M, the Inam Register of 1860, and commented upon the statement therein that the agraharam was under lease for five years. If one remembers the fact that for a long time in the Northern Circars, zemindars and agraharamdars were in the habit of leasing out their right to receive rent from the tenants to middlemen, there is nothing in the statement relied on to show that it was the cultivation of the land that was leased for the period. Nor is Ex. Z, wherein directions were given to the agent to put a seal upon the crops, inconsistent with the conception of occupancy rights in the tenants. There are many cases in which as against occupancy rights the zemindar has claimed the right to insert in the patta a condition that the tenants should not carry away the crops without notice to the zemindar and that the agent of the zemindar should put a seal upon the harvested crops.

    36. There is nothing in Exs. 6 and 7, which refer to pre-existing cowles and renewals of cowles, to support the appellant's case. In Suri Venkata Subbarayya Sastri v. Darapparoddi Kristnaiya(18) it was held that such conditions were not inconsistent with rights of occupancy. There are some documents relating to the acquisition of land which have better evidentiary value for the plaintiff than the ones we have discussed. It seems apparent that in one instance at any rate the agraharamdar was given some land outside the Agraharam in lieu of the land taken by Government within the agraharam. The defendants have not shown that they had a similar exchange of property for their interests in the land acquired. But that is only a solitary instance and may be due to the fact that the land was poramboke in which there were no tenants or the tenants were not astute enough to assert their rights. There are documents subsequent to 1891 which undoubtedly show that the agraharamdar has been asserting a right in the soil. This is conceded by the lower Court. It does not attach any importance, and in our opinion rightly, to these later documents. In Section 185 of the Estates Land Act, it is clearly intended by the legislature that the evidence of acts and of assertions subsequent to 1898 should not be regarded as settling the rights of the landlord against the tenant. The reason of this rule is that in the year 1898 the first draft of the Act which subsequently became law in 1909 was prepared and published. The land-holders, anticipating that tenants would be given large rights in the property, took active steps to create evidence in their favour. It is for that reason that the legislature has inserted the provision referred to by us in S. 185. Although the year 1898 was mentioned in that section, there can be no doubt that at least in the part of the country from which the present litigation has come the contest between landlord and tenant has been acute and pronounced for a long time earlier. From Appa Rau v. Ratnam(19), which was a decision of 1889 and which related to the Nuzvid Zamindari, it is clear that there was active controversy regarding occupancy rights between the zamindar and the tenant. Other cases may also be quoted to the same effect. Therefore we agree with the Subordinate Judge that much importance should not be attached to the documents which have been brought into existence since the year 1891.

    37. Thus far we have dealt with the evidence relied on by the plaintiff for establishing that he had the kudivaram right in himself. It may be mentioned that the sanad itself has not been produced. Therefore if the burden of proof was upon the agraharamdar to show that at the time of the grant not only the melvaram rights but also the rights in the soil were granted to him, we would have agreed with the Subordinate Judge that he has failed to prove his case. But as we said before in the language of the Judicial Committee, it is for the defendants to show that at the date of the grant they or their ancestors had the right of occupancy in the land. An examination of the documents filed by them does not establish this position. We shall very briefly deal with them because we are anxious that we should not prejudice the parties in any way by a too elaborate discussion of them. There are documents on their side which contain statements by the agraharamdar that the defendants and their ancestors have been long on the soil, that rates of rent have been settled with them and that the middleman or the lessee should not increase the rates thus settled. Ex. 6(c), 22, 19, 6(a) and Ex. 2 are instances of this kind. It must be said that they are all subsequent to the year 1883. There are documents which go to show that these tenants had been alienating the property as if they were the owners thereof. Ex. 21 and 20 are instances of this kind. There is Ex. 38, a document of 1858, which shows that the agraharamdar had compiled a list of tenants in occupation. Exhibit 14 shows that a previous suit in ejectment against the tenant was unsuccessful. These documents undoubtedly show that there had been an assertion of the right in the soil on the part of the tenants. They do not either directly or inferentially suggest that at the time of the grant in 1747 they or their ancestors had any occupancy right.

    38. It may be and we must express this opinion very guardedly, that these documents show that since the grant the tenants have acquired an occupancy right. That is a matter for consideration at the trial on the merits. But for the purposes of deciding whether the agraharam is an estate these documents are not of much value. For these reasons we must hold that it has not been shown that the lands in the agraharam were in the occupation of the tenants at the time of the grant to the plaintiff's ancestors and that therefore it is not proved that it is an estate falling within Cl. 3(2)(d), Estates Land Act. We must therefore reverse the decision of the Subordinate Judge and remand the case to the Court of first instance for disposal on the merits. Costs hitherto incurred will be provided for in the revised decree. As regards the razinama petitions alleged to have been executed by some of the tenants, the Court of first instance will inquire into their genuineness and validity and deal with them. In the civil revision petition, although it is open to argument that there is no question of want of jurisdiction which would enable us to interfere with the decision of the Court below we think that having regard to our decision in the civil miscellaneous appeal it would be injurious to the rights of both parties to allow one set of cases to be heard by the Revenue Court and another set of cases by the civil Court. It may not inaptly be said that having regard to the presumption with which the judgment in the civil revision petition starts, namely, that in case of similar grants the land revenue alone must be taken to have been granted, there has been material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. We must reverse that decision as well and remand the case for disposal by the civil Court on the merits. Costs hitherto incurred will be provided for in the revised decree.

    S.N/R.K

    39. Case remanded.

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