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  • SECTION 26 INDIAN STAMP ACT
  • article 62, clause (c) of schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act).
  • (article 57, clause (b), of schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act).
  • provisions of section 26 of the Indian Stamp
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citation codes
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  • SECTION 26 INDIAN STAMP ACT
  • article 62, clause (c) of schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act).
  • (article 57, clause (b), of schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act).
  • provisions of section 26 of the Indian Stamp
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a suit by McDowell and Company Limited against Raghava Chetty (the first defendant) and his three minor sons for recovery of Rs. 8,558-7-4 under two mortgages executed by Raghava Chetty on 4 November 1895 and 19 October 1899. The trial Judge (Mr. Justice Bodham) decreed the full amount against the first defendant personally but, as to the mortgaged property, allowed only Rs. 2,000 on the ground that section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act II of 1899 precluded recovery of a larger sum. The Company appealed. The contesting respondents (the minors) raised three principal questions in the appeal concerning applicability of section 26, alleged illegality of the 19 October 1899 mortgage, and the minors' liability under Hindu Law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgage of 19 October 1899 is an instrument falling within the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act.
  2. Whether the mortgage was illegal because it was executed in consideration of the Company forbearing to prosecute the first defendant for embezzlement.
  3. Whether Rs. 5,372-1-10 (the plaintiff's claim less Rs. 3,186-5-6 admitted under the 1895 mortgage) is a debt not binding on the minor defendants under Hindu Law, and therefore not chargeable upon their shares of the mortgaged property.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (McDowell & Company Limited) Arguments

  • The instrument of 9 October 1899 comprises two parts: (a) transfer to McDowell & Co., Ltd. by the firm of the 4 November 1895 mortgage (a transfer of mortgage) and (b) provisions constituting a mortgage deed securing the cashier's accountability up to Rs. 6,000.
  • Both parts attract fixed stamp duties (article 62, clause (c) for transfer; article 57, clause (b) for the security), so section 26 (which applies only to instruments liable to ad valorem duty) does not apply.
  • The promise in the instrument to pay the 1895 mortgage debt is merely an admission of an existing debt and not a fresh contract requiring ad valorem duty; it does not affect the company's right to recover under the assignment or under the security provisions.

Respondents' (Contestants — the Minor Defendants) Arguments

  • The mortgage is within section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act (i.e., liable to ad valorem duty), affecting recoverability beyond the sum allowed by the trial Judge.
  • The mortgage was tainted with illegality because it was executed in consideration of the Company forbearing to prosecute the first defendant for embezzlement.
  • The sum claimed (less the admitted 1895 mortgage amount) is a debt not binding on the minors under Hindu Law (sons' pious-duty liability), and therefore not chargeable on their shares of the mortgaged property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton That sums misappropriated by a father in circumstances constituting a criminal offence do not render the sons liable under the Hindu Law rule of pious duty. The court followed this decision to hold that defendants Nos. 2–4 (the minors) cannot be held liable for sums misappropriated by the father.
Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh Same principle as above regarding sons' liability where the father's conduct amounted to criminal misappropriation. The court followed this decision alongside Pareman Dass to conclude the minors are not liable for the misappropriated sums.
Natasayya v. Ponusami Illustrates a case where a father's dishonest dealings in entering a contract and withholding funds constituted a civil breach (distinguished from criminal misappropriation). The court distinguished that case from the present facts, holding it inapplicable because there the withholding was a civil breach, unlike the criminal misappropriations here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court divided the 9 October 1899 instrument into two distinct heads: (1) transfer by the firm of the 4 November 1895 mortgage (a transfer of mortgage) and (2) provisions constituting a mortgage deed securing the first defendant's accountability as cashier up to Rs. 6,000. Each head attracted a fixed stamp duty (article 62(c) for the transfer; article 57(b) for the security). Because section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act applies only to instruments liable to ad valorem duty, it was held inapplicable.

The court treated the instrument's promise by the first defendant to pay the 1895 mortgage debt as an admission of an existing debt, not a new contract for consideration; thus it did not affect the company's rights under the assignment or the security provisions and could not bring the instrument within section 26 even if treated otherwise.

On illegality, the court found no evidence that the Company ever entertained or took steps to prosecute the first defendant after opening the cash chest and discovering deficits; the mere fact that the instrument followed discovery of defalcations did not prove an arrangement to compound an offence.

Regarding the minors' liability, the court placed the onus on the respondents but noted no evidence was called by them; the evidence presented showed the items related to company moneys misappropriated by the father in circumstances constituting criminal offences. Following Pareman Dass and Mahabir Prasad, the court held the minors cannot be held liable under the Hindu Law rule of pious duty. Natasayya v. Ponusami was distinguished as involving civil breach rather than criminal misappropriation.

Holding and Implications

MODIFIED DECREE:

The court modified the trial Judge's decree as follows:

  • The whole amount decreed against the first defendant, including costs, is realizable on his share of the mortgaged property.
  • The shares of defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (the minors) are liable only for Rs. 3,186-5-6 (the amount admittedly due under the 4 November 1895 mortgage) and interest on that sum.
  • The plaintiff Company must pay its own costs as between it and defendants Nos. 2–4.
  • The taxed costs of the appeal and the money advanced by the plaintiff to defendants Nos. 2–4 for purposes of the suit below are recoverable by the plaintiff and will be charged on the shares of defendants Nos. 2–4.
  • Time allowed for payment: four months.

Implications: The decision adjusts the parties' financial liabilities as specified above and follows existing precedents concerning sons' non-liability for a father's criminal misappropriations. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying the cited authorities to the facts.

    Mcdowell And Company Limited v. Ragava Chetty

    JUDGMENT

    This is a suit by McDowell and Company Limited, against Raghawa Chetty. The defendant, lately the Cashier of the Company, and his sons, who are minors, for the recovery of Rs. 8,558-7-4 being the amount stated to be due under two mortgages executed by Raghava Chetty for himself and on behalf of his minor sons, on the 4th November 1895 and the 19th October 1899, respectively. Mr. Justice Bodham granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the amount sued for against the firs defendant personally; but as against the mortgaged property the learned Judge allowed the claim only to the extent of Rs. 2,000, on the ground that under the later of the mortgages mentioned above. The Company was, by the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act II of 1899, precluded from recovering a larger sum.

    In this appeal, preferred by the Company. The contesting respondents are the minor defendants and three questions were raised in the arguments:—

    First.— Whether the said mortgage is an instrument falling within the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act.

    Secondly.— Whether the mortgage was illegal on the ground that it was executed in consideration of the Company forbearing to prosecute the first defendant for embezzlement of funds bald by him as their Cashier.

    Thirdly:— Whether the sum of Rs. 5,372-1-10, being the amount of the plaintiff's claim less the sum of Rs. 3-186-5-6 admittedly due under the mortgage of the 4th November 1895, was a debt not binding on the minor defendants under the Hindu Law, and, therefore, not chargeable upon their snares of the mortgaged property.

    As to the first question. The instrument of the 9th October 1899 was executed between the members, of the firm of McDowel and Company of the first part. The first defendant for himself and on behalf of his sons of the second part and Messrs McDowell and Company, Limited, of the third part. Its provisions fall under two heads. Those under the first relate to the transfer to McDowell and Company, Limited, by the firm of Messrs MoDowell and Company of the mortgage of the 4th November 1895, executed by the first defendant to one Emil Carl Ruppell, Assistant to the said firm, and by him formally assigned on the 5th December 1896 to the firm. This part of the instrument was of course, only. The transfer of a mortgage and as such liable to a fixed stamp duty (see article 62, clause (c) of schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act). The provisions of the instrument, under the other head, relate to the accountability to the Company of the first defendant in respect of the Company's funds coming to his hands as the Company's cashier, and constitutes a mortgage deed executed as security for the due fulfilment of his duties as cashier, and as security for the repayment of any sum he may he found liable for as cashier, to an extent not exceeding Rs. 6,000. The stamp duty payable as to this part was also a fixed duty (article 57, clause (b), of schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act). In these circumstances, section 26 of the Act, which extends only to cases of instruments liable to ad valorem duty, can have no application to the present case.

    No doubt, there is in the instrument a promise on the part of the first defendant to pay to McDowell and Company, Limited the amount payable by him under the mortgage of 1895. This, however, was, obviously no fresh contract, entered into for consideration, but must be understood to operate only as an admission that what the firm purported to transfer was a subsisting debt due by him. Even, if, in any way, it could possibly be viewed otherwise, it cannot touch either the right of the Company to recover the amount of the mortgage of 1895, by virtue of assignment by the firm to the company, unaffected as it is by anything contained in the instrument as a contract between the Company and the first defendant, or the right to recover from the defendant what the may be liable for by virtue of the provisions falling under the second head. The said promise having no reference whatever to the matter dealt with by those provisions.

    In other words, as the sustenance of no part of the claim of the Company here involves giving effect to the promise above referred to. The claim must be held to be unaffected thereby, even if the promise be treated as one requiring the payment of an ad valorem duty as urged on behalf of the respondents.

    As to the second question, we are clearly of opinion that the contention on behalf of the respondents, viz., that the mortgage of the 19th October 1899 is tainted with illegality, has no foundation. No doubt in exhibit II a letter of the 1st September 1899 addressed by the Assistant Manager of the Company to the first defendant with reference to the opening of the cash chest when suspicions came to he entertained about his defalcations, it was stated that the Police would be called in if necessary. But the first defendant having, as desired in the letter, sent in the key of the cash chest, it was opened, and the deficit found according to the accounts as they stood unverified was debited to him. There is absolutely no evidence to show that any intention to prosecute the first defendant was subsequently entertained, or any steps in the matter taken on behalf of the Company with or without the knowledge of the first defendant. It is scarcely necessary to say that the more fact that on the accounts being gone into defalcations to a large amount were discovered, and the execution of the instrument in question for the amount due followed some time after, would in no way warrant the inference that such execution was the result of an arrangement to compound any offence.

    Turning to the third and last question. The onus in respect of it is of course upon the contesting respondents and though they have called no evidence on the point yet upon the evidence adduced on behalf of the Company itself. The only conclusion that can be arrived at is that every one of the items making up the total of the claim under consideration relates to company's moneys taken by the first defendant and misappropriated under; circumstances which constituted the taking itself a criminal offence. Such being the case, it must be held, following the decisions in Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton (1) and Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh (2), that the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 cannot be held liable in respect of these sums under the Hindu Law rule as to the pious duty of a son to pay his father's debts. As to the case of Natasayya v. Ponusami it is clearly distinguishable. There the father of the defendants entered into a contract with one member of the plaintiffs' family and collected certain moneys due to the family. On the plaintiff repudiating the contract, he was not paid his share of the collections by the father of the defendants. Though, in entering into the contract purporting to bind the plaintiffs' family when it could not bind the family and in collecting the moneys due to it and withholding the plaintiffs' share. The father of the defendants had acted in circumstances which warranted the learned Judges in characterizing his conduct as dishonest, yet the withholding of the money accounted to nothing more than a breach of civil duty having no sort of resemblance to the present case. Our conclusion is therefore in no way inconsistent with the actual decision of the learned Judges in that case, which we think was right, though we do not wish to he understood as expressing entire concurrence with all the observations made by them with reference to the general question of the sons' liability under the Hindu Law.

    We must therefore modify the decree of the learned Judge and direct that the whole amount decreed against the first defendant inclusive of costs throughout, be realizable on his share of the mortgaged, property and that the shares of defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 be liable for the sum of Rs. 3,186-5-6 out of the amount decreed against the first defendant and interest on such sum of Rs. 3,186-5-6. As regards the costs between the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 the plaintiff Company must pay its own costs. The amount of the taxed costs of the appeal and the money advanced by the plaintiff to defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 for the purposes of the suit in the Court below will be recoverable by the plaintiff with the amount charged hereby on the shares of the defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The time allowed for payment is four months.

    King & Josselyn.— Attorneys for appellants.

    Mr. James Short.— Attorney for second to fourth respondents.

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    Comments

    Mcdowell And Company Limited v. Ragava Chetty
    (Mar 12, 1903)