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Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Burdwan dated 10 December 1918. The underlying suit, instituted by the Respondent (or his predecessors-in-interest) against the Appellants (or their predecessors), concerned recovery of a lease-hold colliery known as the Chattapathar Colliery. On 18 May 1914 the Privy Council reversed the decree of the High Court (dated 4 June 1912) and restored the trial Court's decree of 8 September (reference made to Raghunath Das v. Sunder Das Khetri). The remaining issue on this appeal related solely to the amount of indemnity payable by the unsuccessful party: the Respondent sought (1) mesne profits and (2) damages for alleged malicious or negligent injury to the colliery.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What amount of indemnity (mesne profits and/or damages) should the unsuccessful party (Appellants) pay to the successful party (Respondent) following the Privy Council's restoration of the trial Court decree?
  2. Whether the Respondent is entitled to mesne profits for periods after the Appellants ceased working the mine (in particular after 31 May 1914) and for which specific periods mesne profits should be awarded.
  3. Whether the Respondent proved, on the evidence, that the Appellants maliciously or negligently caused injury to the colliery (specifically: (a) cutting/robbing pillars causing subsidences and (b) creating or enlarging a channel allowing ingress of river Noonia water).
  4. Whether evidence recorded by a Commissioner (and accepted by the parties and the Subordinate Judge) was admissible for deciding the claims, and whether any jurisdictional objection to the Commissioner's proceedings could be sustained.
  5. What adjustments, if any, (including allowances for dewatering and deductions for royalties) should be made to the calculation of mesne profits and damages, given the facts of possession and bona fide claim of title by the Appellants.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Respondent claimed mesne profits and damages for malicious or negligent injury to the colliery arising from the Appellants' period of possession under the High Court decree.
  • He asserted entitlement to damages for cutting pillars, for the creation of a junction between the Noonia river and the mine, for damage to machinery, and for removal of stacked coal; an estimate of damages (in a January 1916 petition) amounted to Rs. 57,577 across specified items.
  • The Respondent contended that, despite the Appellants' having ceased workings on 31 May 1914, their possession should be treated as continuing until the Court formally delivered possession on 23 May 1915 (affecting mesne profits entitlement).

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Appellants admitted possession for earlier periods but asserted that they relinquished possession by closing workings on 31 May 1914.
  • They took the position that certain claims for damages (including for machinery and for sinking a new pit) should be disallowed; some counterclaims were also advanced and were disallowed by the courts below.
  • The Appellants raised objections to the Commissioner examining witnesses at the colliery (jurisdiction/regularity challenge), and they argued that they had acted with at least a bonâ fide claim of title when in possession.
  • The Appellants relied on evidence that they had not been raising coal during certain subperiods (e.g., none after 31 May 1914) and sought appropriate deductions and allowances (including dewatering compensation and deduction of royalties).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghunath Das v. Sunder Das Khetri (Privy Council) Historical outcome: Privy Council reversed the High Court and restored the trial Court's decree. Used to establish the procedural posture — that the Privy Council restored the trial Court's decree, leaving only the question of indemnity to be determined.
Girish v. Soshi Statement about the nature of mesne profits — that they are in the nature of damages which the Court may mould according to the justice of the case. The Court relied on this principle in assessing entitlement to mesne profits and in concluding that the statutory definition must be applied with regard to justice and the particular circumstances (e.g., whether the defendant "might with ordinary diligence have received" such profits).
Shadhoo v. Ramanugraha Principles concerning the effect of evidence recorded by a Commissioner and general rules on jurisdiction/regularity. The Court accepted the principles laid down in this case and treated the evidence recorded by the Commissioner as properly received, because the parties and the Subordinate Judge had accepted it in the proceedings below.
Raja Ram Narain v. Odindra Same general principles as Shadhoo v. Ramanugraha on the reception of commissioner's evidence and jurisdictional limits. The Court accepted the precedential principles but found the present facts distinguishable; it concluded no material jurisdictional irregularity arose that would invalidate the Commissioner's evidence.
Mac Swinney on Mines (4th Ed.) Collection of authorities on allowances and measure of damages in mining contexts. The Court cited this text to support its view that in India the measure of damages for mining matters need not follow English distinctions rigidly and to justify allowances given to the Appellants (e.g., for dewatering and deductions related to bona fide possession).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of factual findings and legal analyses strictly tied to the record presented:

  1. Preliminary posture and limited issue: The Court observed that, because the Privy Council had restored the trial Court decree, the only remaining question was the quantum of indemnity (mesne profits and damages) to be paid by the unsuccessful party.
  2. Procedural history and evidence reception: The Commissioner had been appointed by the Subordinate Judge to make a local investigation; he recorded oral evidence at length and prepared a report. Although the Appellants initially objected to evidence being taken in this manner, both parties and the Subordinate Judge subsequently accepted the Commissioner's evidence. The appellate Court accepted the legal principles in Shadhoo v. Ramanugraha and Raja Ram Narain v. Odindra, and concluded that no jurisdictional or material irregularity now vitiated that evidence.
  3. Possession and timing issues: The Appellants had been in possession under a bonâ fide claim of title for two periods (2 Sep 1908 to 25 Sep 1909; and 28 Jul 1912 to 22 May 1915 as claimed), but the Appellants closed workings on 31 May 1914. The Respondent delayed taking physical possession until 23 May 1915. The Court held that no coal was extracted after 31 May 1914, and therefore the Respondent was not entitled to mesne profits for the post-31 May 1914 period because mesne profits are intended to replace profits that the defendant "might with ordinary diligence have received," and here no extraction took place.
  4. Effect of delay on damage claims: The Court reasoned that the delay by the Respondent in taking possession prejudiced his ability to prove that the condition of the mine on taking possession was caused by the Appellants' improper or malicious working. The relinquishment/stop of work with notice was not itself an improper act; subsequent deterioration could have resulted from natural causes or from the mine having been left unattended during the long interval.
  5. Inspection and expert evidence limitations: The later local inspection and the Commissioner's report showed subsidences and that the workings were full of water when taken over in May 1915. However, there had been no adequate underground examination by experts before trial; the Commissioner's report and the Subordinate Judge's inspection notes therefore did not establish causation to the standard required to fix liability for negligent or malicious acts.
  6. Specific challenge to river ingress damages: The Court found the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the Appellants had maliciously or negligently created or enlarged a channel connecting the Noonia river to the mine. The Commissioner's report and the Judge's inspection only proved the existence of a channel (e.g., a bamboo could be pushed through), not that it was artificially created by the Appellants or that the Appellants had failed to take necessary precautions up to the time they ceased working.
  7. Specific challenge to pillar robbing/subsidence damages: The evidence for damages said to arise from robbing pillars was stronger than for the river ingress claim but nonetheless insufficient. The Court emphasized that the underground workings had not been properly examined and that subsidences could have been due to prior workings, natural causes, or the period when the colliery was left unattended after the Appellants ceased working.
  8. Mesne profits computation and adjustments: The Court accepted the Subordinate Judge's findings as to the price of coal at pit's mouth, cost of severing and bringing coal to surface, and accepted an average extraction rate of 600 tons per month for the periods in question as a reasonable figure supported by evidence. However, the Court disallowed mesne profits for the specific period from 28 July to 31 December 1912 (because that period was spent dewatering/getting into working order) and disallowed mesne profits for the period after 31 May 1914 (no coal was extracted). The Court nevertheless allowed a compensation for dewatering for the period between 28 July 1912 and the end of that year, assessed at Rs. 4,000.
  9. Allowances and deductions: Because the Appellants were in possession under a bonâ fide claim of title (and not wholly unauthorised), the Court considered them entitled to appropriate allowances (including an allowance for dewatering) and to the deduction of royalties due under the lease in respect of the two periods for which mesne profits were claimed.
  10. Other claims and counterclaims: Claims for damage to machinery and counterclaims for compensation for new machinery and sinking a new pit were disallowed by the Court below and were not further disturbed on appeal. No claim for trade profits had been made below and could not be allowed on appeal.
  11. Costs: The Court concluded that the parties should pay their own costs of the appeal and of the Court below.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is ALLOWED IN PART. The decree of the Subordinate Judge is modified in the respects indicated by the appellate Court's analysis.

Direct consequences on the parties:

  • The awards made below for damages alleged to result from the ingress of river water are disallowed for lack of evidential support that the Appellants were responsible by malice or negligence.
  • Damages awarded for alleged improper working by robbing pillars (leading to subsidences) are also disallowed for want of sufficient proof and because the underground workings could not be adequately examined; responsibility for the subsidences was not established against the Appellants.
  • The award of mesne profits is sustained in part but is modified: mesne profits are disallowed for the period from 28 July 1912 to 31 December 1912 and for any period after 31 May 1914 (no coal was extracted after that date). The Appellants are granted Rs. 4,000 as compensation for dewatering efforts relating to the latter part of 1912, and are entitled to deduction of royalties owing under the lease for the relevant periods.
  • Claims to damages for machinery and counterclaims for replacement/new works remain disallowed as below.
  • Each party is to bear its own costs of the appeal and of the Court below.

Broader legal implications: The opinion modifies the lower court's awards without establishing a new general precedent. The Court applied existing principles (including those concerning mesne profits and the admissibility/effect of commissioner's evidence) and cited established authorities and a mining treatise for guidance. The judgment emphasises that lack of timely possession, absence of adequate underground expert examination, and insufficient proof of causation will preclude awards for alleged subterranean or hydrological injuries to a mine.

Outcome stated in the opinion: Appeal allowed in part. Parties to pay their own costs.

Judgment delivered by: J.N.R. (as recorded in the opinion)

    Shambhu Nath Khettri v. Satish Chandra Mitra

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Burdwan, dated 10th December 1918. The proceedings were in continuation of a suit brought by the Respondent or his predecessors-in-interest as Plaintiffs against the Appellants or their predecessors as Defendants for the recovery of a lease-hold colliery known as the Chattapathar Colliery. In the result, on the 18th May 1914, the Privy Council reversed the decree of the High Court, dated 4th June 1912, in favour of the Appellants and restored the decree of trial Court, dated 8th September ??? favour, in favour of the Respondent [Raghunath Das v. Sunder Das Khetri (1)]. The question which now arises relates merely to the amount of the indemnity which the unsuccessful party in the contest should pay to the successful party.

    The Respondent as decree-holder claims damages from the Appellants as judgment-debtors, first, in the nature of mesne profits, and secondly, in the nature of damages for malicious or negligent injury to the colliery.

    The application for assessment of these damages was made by the Respondent on the 15th June 1915. It appears that the Appellants asked for details; and in a petition filed on 19th January 1916, the Respondent gave “details of the amount of damages and wasilat damage to the colliery by cutting pillars, etc., etc.” The damage as then estimated amounted to Rs. 57,577 including four items: (1) Damage to the machineries, plants, tools, etc., estimated at Rs. 14,888, (2) mesne profits with interest estimated at Rs. 29,000, (3) an item of Rs. 12,000 said to be detailed in Bankim Babu's report which we have not seen; and (4) a small item of Rs. 1,089 for stacked coal removed by the Defendant.

    The decree of the trial Court in the suit provided for the ascertainment of wasilat or mesne profits. The application of 15th June refers to sec. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, no doubt on the footing that the injurious damages claimed were consequential on the working of the mine by the Appellants during their period of possession under the decree of the High Court. No objection was raised on the Appellants' behalf in this connection.

    The learned Subordinate Judge has awarded the Respondent a sum of Rs. 14,000 on the ground of damage done by cutting or robbing pillars, and a further sum of Rs. 31,400 on the ground that the Appellants maliciously brought about what is called a junction between the river Noonia and the mine. He has further awarded the Respondent a sum of Rs. 76,285 on the footing of mesne profits, the calculation being as follows: Rs. 1,21,720 for the price of the coal extracted at the pit's mouth less a sum of Rs. 31,255 being the cost of getting the coal and raising it to the surface and less a further sum of Rs. 14,180 representing the royalties payable under the lease in respect of the period for which the Appellants were in possession. The total amount awarded to the Respondent comes to Rs. 1,21,685 made up of Rs. 76,285 for mesne profits and Rs. 45,400 as additional damages.

    A further claim by the Respondent on the ground of damage to machinery and Counter claims by the Appellants for compensation for the purchase of new machinery and for sinking a new pit have in our opinion been rightly disallowed and call for no further mention. As will appear we shall allow the Appellants some compensation for dewatering.

    Mesne profits are claimed in respect of two periods, firstly, from the 2nd September 1908 to the 25th September 1909 inclusive, and secondly, from the 28th July 1912 to the 22nd May 1915 inclusive. The Appellants were not in possession when the Respondents' suit was instituted in July 1908. Apparently, however, they had previously been in possession as purchasers of the lease-hold interest in execution of a decree which they had obtained for their royalties and they recovered possession on the 2nd September 1908 under a decree which they obtained in a possessory suit, and held it till they were ousted under the decree of the trial Court. The Appellants therefore admit possession during the first of the two periods. As regards the second period there is no dispute as to the date on which they regained possession under the decree of the High Court but they assert that after the Privy Council delivered judgment they relinquished possession on the 31st May 1914. As a matter of fact they closed their workings on that date but the Respondent argues that their possession must be regarded as having continued until the Court formally delivered possession to him on the 23rd May 1915. The question is of some little importance.

    It appears that on the 4th June 1914, the Respondent filed a petition in the Court below praying that until a certified copy of the decree in the Privy Council appeal was brought and possession was taken on the basis thereof a temporary injunction might be issued on the Appellants and others restraining them from doing anything detrimental to the disputed pits and disposing of the machineries, pumps, pipes, fittings, etc. On 6th June 1914, the Appellants replied by a petition denying the allegations made in the Respondent's petition and disputing his right to an injunction. The order-sheet shows that on the same day, the 6th June, the Appellants undertook not to remove any moveables. Then, on the 11th June, an order was made stating that the undertaking had been accepted by the Respondent and that the prayer for an injunction was, therefore, disallowed.

    Meanwhile the Appellants had been in communication with the Inspector of Mines. On 6th June 1914, the Inspector addressed a letter to the Respondent's attorney enclosing a report by the junior Inspector Mr. Turnbull, dated 5th June, which report stated that the mine in question had been closed on 1st June 1914, in consequence of a decree given against the Appellants by the Privy Council. We Were not told that any reply was sent to the Inspector's letter by the Respondent. On 17th June 1914, Dwarka Nath Khetry, as agent of the Appellants, sent to the Chief Inspector of Mines a notice that the workings of the Chattapathar Colliery had been closed from the first instant, asking him to send the necessary forms to be filled up and further stating that the plan would be submitted in due time.

    On 7th July 1914, the Appellants' Solicitor wrote to the Respondent's Attorney offering to deliver possession and requesting the Respondent to take steps to obtain possession as early as possible. Notice was given by this letter that in case of neglect the colliery with its machinery and accessories would remain at the Respondent's risk. The Respondent, however, took no steps to obtain possession till the following year. He waited apparently till the decree of the Privy Council or the records or both reached the Court below.

    Nearly a year, therefore, elapsed between the date on which the Appellants ceased to work the mine and the date on which the Respondent took possession. The Respondent urges that he is not responsible for the delay because the Appellants did not give notice of relinquishment, through the Court under Or. XX, r. 12(1)(???)(ii), C.P.C It is not, however, disputed that the notice given directly by the Appellants to the Respondent reached him. He did not say that he would not accept notice of relinquishment unless it was sent to him through the Court. He remained inactive and did nothing. It may be strange that the Appellants said nothing about relinquishment in their reply to the application for an injunction but the facts are too clear to make that of much significance.

    As no coal was extracted from the mine after the 31st May 1914, we are of opinion that the Respondent is not entitled in respect of the subsequent period to damages in the nature of mesne profits. The definition of mesne profits in sec. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, includes profits which the Defendant “might with ordinary diligence have received.” But “mesne profits are in the nature of damages which the Court may mould according to the justice of the case.” [Girish v. Soshi ]. Mining differs from agricultural operations on the surface. The coal which the Appellant might have got is still there and now belongs to the Respondent under the lease. The question, therefore, whether, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, the omission to give notice through the Court left the Appellant liable for mesne profits does not arise.

    As regards the effect of the delay in taking possession, on the other damages claimed, it cannot be contended with success that the delay has not prejudiced the Respondent. The relinquishment or stoppage of work with notice to the Respondent was not in itself an improper or negligent act and the delay has made it impossible or difficult for him to say that the condition of the mine when he took it over was due to any impropriety in the mode in which it had been worked by the Appellants or to any act of intentional malice on their part.

    The report of the Sheristadar who gave the Respondent possession on behalf of the Court has appended to it a note signed by Sudhir Mohan Chatterjee, a first class colliery manager, to the following effect:—

    “There are two subsidences perhaps due to pillar robbing and the whole of the mines are now full of water.” This note seems to be attested by certain persons who were present on behalf of the Appellant. But however that may be, though Sudhir Mohan was not called as a witness, because, we are told, he was in England at the time, it may be accepted that when the colliery was taken over on the 23rd May 1915, these two subsidences had already occurred and the working parts underground were full of water.

    It is obvious, however, that a coal mine in this country which is left to look after itself for nearly a year may sadly deteriorate. The further comment must be made that as the pits were full of water no attempt seems to have been made to have them examined in detail by an expert. Such examination was probably impossible.

    Now, let us turn back for a moment to January 1914. In that month the mine was visited by Mr. David, a mining Inspector, and we have his report, dated the 17th January, to which both sides referred. He says: “This colliery is at last working again, raising having started just about a year ago ….. “The coal,” he goes on, “is being raised from Nos. 2 and 5 pits and men enter by No. 1 incline. The old workings consist of pillars now not much more than 12-15 feet square with roads of like size. No fresh work has been done yet, as the water has not been got out entirely and so work has been confined to dressing pillars.” Then he says about the work, “it has been carried on with practically no regard to safety.” He adds that he is addressing the owners very strongly on this subject. Further on, again, he says: “The old pillars are being dressed and practically no timber is being used to support the roof either in the working places or in the travelling roads. This work is probably just as dangerous as pillar extraction and is likely to bring about a much more dangerous state of affairs and if carried too far it will be bound to bring on ‘creep.’ All things considered, the roof has stood remarkably well, but the travelling roads and working places should be tempered.” We do not know whether the word “tempered” is a technical term or whether it is a misprint for “timbered.”

    Passing to another subject, the Inspector continues:— “Another danger which must be carefully watched is the workings under the Nooniajore which are close to the outcrop. A plan and section showing levels should be made to see what cover there is and no work should be done in dressing these pillars. Water is making in small quantities from the coal at this point.”

    The Inspector concludes is follows:—

    “The manager H.H Banerjee was absent, he lives at Dobalia Colliery and was said to have gone to his house at Kalikapur in the morning. He holds a first class certificate and wherever he has been manager I have always had to complain of the very bad state of affairs.” The gentleman so unfavourably mentioned is Harihar Banerjee who appears to have been the manager up to January 1914. He was not called as a witness by the Appellants but they called his successor Nidarsan Banerjee who was manager till the Appellants ceased working at the end of May 1914.

    There are two observations which it occurs to us to make on this report. The first is that there is no mention in it of any subsidences. The Respondent's application of June 1914, for an injunction, is equally silent on this subject. It is probable therefore that the two subsidences noticed in May 1915, occurred during or after the rainy season of 1914.

    The second observation is that the Appellants seem to have taken the Inspector's report to heart. They got rid of Harihar Banerjee of whom the Inspector; had complained, and there is also the evidence of Harihar's successor that he did a certain amount of timbering as the Inspector had recommended.

    The Subordinate Judge who dealt with the present claims appointed a commissioner to make a local investigation. He prepared a useful plan of the surface land of the colliery. It shows that in addition to the larger subsidences noticed in May 1915, other subsidences of a slighter character had subsequently occurred. The Commissioner's report dated 6th November 1918, is of very little value except so far as it shows that the pits were not even then in a condition in which they could be examined to any purpose. The Subordinate Judge himself made a local inspection of the colliery on the 9th December 1918. His note of his inspection, however, is principally concerned with the incursion of river water into the mine.

    It is clear, therefore, that up to the date of the trial no proper examination of the pits had been made. The only underground plan we have is apparently the plan submitted by the Appellants or their agent in pursuance of the latter's letter of the 17th June 1914, to the Chief Inspector.

    Some attempt was made to raise a question of jurisdiction in connection with the Commissioner's proceedings. The terms of his commission were not placed before us but as his report is confined to some observations about the subsidences, the junction with the river and the underground conditions so far as they could be observed, we can only conclude that he was instructed to investigate the actual condition of the colliery with reference to the allegations of malice and negligence brought against the Appellants. He seems, however, to have taken it upon himself to examine witnesses at length on the whole case. The whole of the oral evidence printed in the paper-book was recorded by him, very much as if he had been appointed an arbitrator. It is unsatisfactory that these charges of improper working should have been decided on evidence taken in this way. But what happened was this. The Appellants made some initial objection to the witnesses being examined by the Commissioner at the colliery and they may have subsequently repeated the objection. But when the case came before the learned Subordinate Judge he appears to have been willing to take the evidence over again himself. He states in his judgment that “at the request of the pleaders of both parties,” he “agreed to determine the amount to which the decree-holder might be entitled on the evidence recorded by the Commissioner as also on the report relating to the local inspection.” The report referred to seems to be the learned Subordinate Judge's note of his own inspection. The parties having thus accepted the evidence recorded by the Commissioner as evidence duly taken in the cause, it is idle now for the Appellants to take exception to that evidence. The evidence must be treated as evidence recorded by a Commissioner appointed for the purpose of examining witnesses. It is open to parties to agree as to the materials to be placed before the Judge for his decision and if the Judge acts on such agreement, he does not thereby delegate his functions as a Judge. We accept in their entirety the principles laid down in the cases of Shadhoo v. Ramanugraha and Raja Ram Narain v. Odindra , but the present case is distinguishable on the facts from those cases. No question of jurisdiction or material irregularity arises here and we declined to allow the learned Vakil for the Appellants to raise any objection to the proceedings of the Commissioner which were not urged in the Court below.

    We come then to the specific awards made by the Subordinate Judge. As to the amount awarded for the ingress of river water into the mine, we are of opinion that the evidence entirely fails to support the charge of malice or the charge of negligence on which the learned Vakil for the Respondent preferred to rely before us. The existence of any channel between the river and the mine was apparently not suspected by the Respondent himself till February 1918. We know nothing of the state of the mine at the spot where the water enters subsequent to January 1914, when the Inspector of Mines noticed some percolation of water. It is surprising that it never seems to have occurred to the learned Subordinate Judge that the formation or enlargement of the channel may have been due to natural causes. The Subordinate Judge seems to attribute great importance to the Commissioner's report and his own inspection note. But the fact that a bamboo can be pushed through only proves the existence of the channel. It does not prove that the channel was artificially made or that up to the time when the Appellants closed their working they had not taken such precautions as were necessary. The result is that we disallow the damages awarded in this connection. As to the damages awarded for improper working by robbing pillars which is said to have led to the subsidences of the surface, the evidence may be somewhat stronger, but is still in our opinion insufficient to justify the award. The question was not argued with reference to any terms of the lease. The Appellants were dealing with their own property and the only clause of the lease to which reference was made was cl. 13 which provides that “If there be inconvenience to your business, or if you so wish, or if the coal be exhausted, you will be able to relinquish these properties at the proper time and according to law.” That clause was referred to in reply to the argument that it was not to the interest of the Appellants as grantors of the lease, to do anything likely to injure the colliery. It was suggested for the Respondent that they might have intended to force the Respondent to surrender the lease. We can see no sufficient reason for attributing to them any such sinister motive and we are not satisfied that the responsibility of the Appellants for the subsidences has been made out. The underground workings have not been examined, at any rate they have not been properly examined. It is not clear that the principal subsidences are above the areas worked by the Appellants. They may be due to old workings … or again they may be due to the fact that the colliery was left unattended after the Appellants relinquished possession. In January 1914, it was at any rate possible to explore the interior of the pits. Up to that time or till they ceased working, it is not in our opinion established that the Appellants were guilty of any improprieties of working entitling the Respondent to damages. From the Respondent's evidence it would appear that no pumping was done after he regained possession till May 1917. The award of damages under this head must also be disallowed.

    As regards the mesne profits we find in reference to the second period of possession that the Appellants raised no coal before January 1913 or after the 31st May 1914. The evidence of Srikanta Banerjee as to the period before January 1913, is corroborated by Mr. David's report. In regard to the amount of coal raised, we agree with the Subordinate Judge that the average should be taken to be 600 tons a month. We are not impressed with the Appellants' raising book or accounts. The coal raised during the first period of possession may not have been as much but the Appellants have not given us materials on which we can say that definitely. We accept the Subordinate Judge's findings as to the price of coal at the pit's mouth and as to the cost of severing and bringing to the surface. The award on this head must be modified by the disallowance of mesne profits for the period from 28th July to the end of December 1912 and for the period after the 31st May 1914. But inasmuch as the time between 28th July 1912 and the end of the year was spent in dewatering the mine and getting it into working order, the Appellants are entitled to some compensation on that account. We assess that compensation at Rs. 4,000. The Appellants' are entitled to the deduction of the royalties due under the lease in respect of the whole of the two periods in respect of which the Respondent claims.

    As the Appellants were in possession under a bonâ fide claim of title and not “without any colour of title” or “in a manner wholly unauthorised and unlawful,” we are of opinion with the Subordinate Judge that they are entitled to the allowances which we have mentioned. The authorities are conveniently collected in Mac Swinney on Mines (4th Ed. pp. 537-540). In India there is no reason why the measure of damages should depend, as it appears to do in England to some extent, on the nature of the remedy sought, or why any distinction should be made in this respect between a suit for damages for trespass and a suit, for instance, for accounts.

    No claim to an allowance for trade profits was made in the Court below and we cannot allow any such claim.

    The decree of the Court below will be modified in the manner indicated. The parties, we think, should pay their own costs of this appeal and of the Court below.

    J.N.R
    Appeal allowed in part.

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    Shambhu Nath Khettri v. Satish Chandra Mitra
    (Mar 19, 1920)