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Case Number
Judges
  • Bhole, J.
Acts
  • Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Bhole, J.
Acts
  • Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, Union of India through the General Manager Central Railway, Bombay, filed a revision against a decree passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Akola. The trial Court had decreed the plaintiff's claim against the railway administration for recovery of a sum stated in the opinion as "Rs. 155,20,". On 17-12-1962 three ginger bags were booked at Ottappalam on the Southern Railway to be carried to and delivered to the consignee at Akola on the Central Railway. These bags never reached Akola and were not delivered. The consignee (plaintiff) filed suit against the Central Railway claiming compensation on 11-8-1964.

The defendant (railway) denied liability and pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, asserting that the suit was not filed within one year from 22-10-1962, the date when the consignment ought to have been delivered. The trial Court examined correspondence between the parties up to 12-8-1963, concluded that such correspondence showed inquiries and an implied hope of delivery, relied on the Allahabad Full Bench decision Mutsaddi Lal v. G.G in Council, AIR 1952 All 897 (FB), and decreed the plaintiff's suit. The Union of India challenged that decree in revision. The revisional Court (this opinion) set aside the trial Court's decree, allowed the revision application and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. No order as to costs was made.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree of the trial Court decreeing the plaintiff's claim is legal and proper.
  2. Whether the correspondence between the plaintiff and the railway administration extended or altered the starting point of limitation under Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act in respect of a suit against a carrier for non-delivery or delay in delivery of goods.
  3. How the jurisprudence on Article 31 (including the view of the Allahabad Full Bench and the Supreme Court in Boota Mal v. Union of India) applies to the facts of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant / Applicant (Union of India) — content as presented in the opinion

  • The defendant denied the plaintiff's claim on merits and contended that the suit was barred by limitation because it was not filed within one year from 22-10-1962 (the date on which the consignment ought to have been delivered).
  • On revision, the applicant challenged the trial Court's reliance on correspondence and on the Allahabad Full Bench decision to extend the period of limitation.

Plaintiff / Trial Court view — content as presented in the opinion

  • The plaintiff complained of non-delivery and relied on correspondence between the plaintiff and the railway administration extending to 12-8-1963. The trial Court treated that correspondence as evidence that inquiries were being made and as holding out a hope of delivery, and accordingly treated the date of the last letter (12-8-1963) as the starting point for limitation.
  • The trial Court relied upon the Full Bench decision in Mutsaddi Lal v. G.G in Council, AIR 1952 All 897 (FB) to support the conclusion that the starting point of limitation could be the date of the carrier's undertaking, communication of liability, or a reasonable later date fixed upon subsequent events.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mutsaddi Lal v. G.G in Council, AIR 1952 All 897 (FB) The Full Bench view that the phrase "when the goods ought to be delivered" in Article 31 may mean the time at which the carrier undertakes to deliver, or the date when the carrier informs the consignee it will be delivered, or when the carrier communicates its liability, or a reasonable date fixed by subsequent events, thereby potentially extending the starting point of limitation. The Court examined the facts and concluded the present correspondence did not show an undertaking, contract to deliver on a particular date, or a communication fixing a reasonable later date; therefore the Full Bench decision was not applicable to extend limitation in this case.
Boota Mal v. Union Of India, AIR 1962 SC 1716 The Supreme Court's clear proposition on Article 31: the period of limitation is one year from when the goods ought to be delivered; correspondence that merely shows tracing inquiries does not alter that starting point, though correspondence acknowledging carrier's liability or disclosing material relevant to reasonable time may give a fresh starting point. The revisional Court relied on this Supreme Court authority as laying down the correct test. Applying it, the Court found the correspondence in the instant case did not amount to an acknowledgment of liability nor did it disclose material relevant to determining reasonable time, and so it did not extend the limitation period.
Jugal Kishore v. G.I.P Rly. Co., AIR 1923 All 22 The observation (as relied upon by the Allahabad Court) that when the railway's conduct made the plaintiff await the result of inquiry, it was inconsistent for the railway to plead limitation. The Supreme Court considered this case in Boota Mal and took the view that correspondence showing only tracing inquiries does not determine the reasonable time for carriage; the revisional Court noted this analysis and thus did not accept that mere inquiry correspondence extends limitation.
B. and N.W Rly. Co. v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1933 Pat 45 Authority considered on whether correspondence showing inquiry affects the starting point of limitation. Referenced by the Supreme Court in Boota Mal; the revisional Court relied on the Supreme Court's conclusion that inquiry correspondence alone does not alter the starting point of limitation.
Governor General in Council v. S.G Ahmed, AIR 1952 Nag 77 Considered on whether correspondence showing hope of delivery and inquiries along the route affects limitation. The Supreme Court held that correspondence showing hope of delivery and inquiries along the route would not help the plaintiff; the revisional Court adopted that reasoning in concluding the present correspondence was insufficient to extend limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the correspondence between the plaintiff-consignee and the railway administration and found that it was "for the purpose of supporting the claim of the plaintiff-consignee" and that it did not contain an undertaking by the railway to deliver the goods on a particular date, nor a communication of inability to deliver, nor an acknowledgement of liability. The Court considered the Allahabad Full Bench decision (Mutsaddi Lal) which treats the phrase "when the goods ought to be delivered" in Article 31 as potentially the time when the carrier undertakes to deliver or communicates a date or liability; however, the Court held the facts before it did not satisfy that formulation (no undertaking, no communication fixing a date, no acknowledgement of liability).

The Court placed decisive reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Boota Mal v. Union of India, which construed Article 31 to mean the limitation period runs from when the goods ought to be delivered after a reasonable time for carriage; correspondence merely showing inquiries or attempts to trace goods does not alter that starting point. The Supreme Court further held that only correspondence amounting to an acknowledgement of liability or correspondence that materially bears on determining what is a reasonable time could reset the starting point; otherwise mere tracing inquiries are irrelevant.

Applying these principles, the revisional Court concluded that the correspondence in the present case did not fall into the limited categories that could extend limitation: it neither acknowledged liability nor disclosed material relevant to determining reasonable time for carriage. Consequently, the trial Court's reliance on the correspondence and the Allahabad Full Bench decision to treat 12-8-1963 as the starting point of limitation was incorrect. The Court therefore set aside the trial Court's decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision allowed; the decree of the trial Court is set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. The Court made no order as to costs.

Implications: The direct consequence is the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit and the setting aside of the trial Court's decree. The Court applied existing authority (notably Boota Mal) to confirm that correspondence which only shows tracing inquiries does not extend the limitation period under Article 31; only correspondence amounting to an acknowledgment of liability or materially relevant to fixing reasonable time will do so. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new principle beyond applying and following the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 31.

Show full summary ...

    Union Of India v. Vithalsa Kisansa And Co.

    1. The applicant Union of India through the General Manager Central Railway, Bombay, has come here in revision from the decree passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Akola, decreeing the claim of the plaintiff against the railway administration for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 155,20, On 17-12-1962, three ginger bags were booked at Ottappalam on the Southern Railway to be carried to and delivered to the consignee at Akola on the Central Railway. These bags never reached Akola and were not delivered. The consignee plaintiff therefore filed a suit against the Central Railway claiming a decree for compensation on 11-8-1964.

    2. The defendant denied the claim and contended that the suit was liable to be dismissed because it was barred by limitation. The suit was not filed within one year from 22-10-1962 when the consignment ought to have been delivered. The trial Court considered the plea and came to the conclusion that there was some correspondence between the plaintiff and the railway administration and that it continued upto 12-8-1963. By this correspondence full information had been called for. The correspondence showed that an enquiry was being made and the railway administration had not expressed its inability to make delivery of the consignment. According to the trial Court, the starting point of limitation cannot be the date on which the goods should have reached the destination, but the date of the last letter which is 12-8-1963. He has relied upon a Full Bench case, of the Allahabad High Court. Mutsaddi Lal v. G.G in Council, AIR 1952 All 897 (FB). Accordingly therefore, he decreed the plaintiffs suit This decree is challenged here. The point, therefore, that arises here for consideration is to see whether: this decree is legal and proper.

    3. I have seen the correspondence between the plaintiff consignee and the railway administration and that correspondence appears to be for the purpose of supporting the claim of the plaintiff-consignee. The correspondence is neither on the point of the goods reaching late to the place of destination, nor does it show that there was any acknowledgement later on, of the liability by the railways. We have, therefore, to see whether this correspondence would help the plaintiff by extending the period of limitation. In AIR 1952 All 897 (FB), the Allahabad High Court seems to have taken a view that if the goods do not geach the destination on the date when in the normal course of affairs they are expected to reach there and the railway administration on being approached for delivery holds out a hope to the plaintiff that the goods would be delivered and that the matter was being inquired into, then the starting point of limitation under Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act could not be said to be the date on which the goods should have reached the destination in the normal course. According to that High Court, the phrase “when the goods ought to be delivered” in Article 31 means, the point of time at which the carrier undertakes to deliver the goods or the date when the carrier informs the consignee that it would be delivered or when the carrier communicates to the consignee its liability to deliver the goods or a reasonable date that may be fixed on a consideration of events subsequent to the handing over of the consignment to the carrier for: carriage. So far as the instant case before me is concerned, there was neither an undertaking by the railway administration nor a contract between the parties to deliver the goods on a particular date. There is nothing on record also to show that the carrier informed the consignee that it would be delivered on a particular date. There Is nothing also on record to show that the Railways informed the consignee their inability to deliver the goods. Now, can our case be said to be a case wherein a reasonable date could be fixed on a consideration of events subsequent to the handing over of the consignment to the carrier for carriage. Except for the correspondence wherein the railways wanted to settle the claim of the plaintiff, there was no event to extend the date of limitation. It appears to me that even considering this Full Bench decision, the facts of our case are not such that the plaintiff could get an extension of the period of limitation.

    4. However, the Supreme Court In Boota Mal v. Union Of India ., AIR 1962 SC 1716 has laid down a very clear proposition in so far as Article 31 is concerned. Article 31 is regarding a suit against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery or delay in delivering goods. The period of limitation is one year from the time when the goods ought to be delivered. The word “when the goods ought to be delivered” were construed by the Supreme Court in this case. They considered several cases, They considered Jugal Kishore v. G.I.P Rly. Co., AIR 1923 All 22 (2) wherein it was observed that when the Railway Company, by its own conduct, made the plaintiff await the result of the inquiry, it is rather startling to find the plea of limitation raised in defence on its behalf. It was further observed that the correspondence between the parties showed that the matter was being inquired into and that there was no refusal to deliver, up to well within a year of the suit. Therefore, according to Allahabad High Court, the period of limitation was extended. The Supreme Court differed from this conclusion. Because the correspondence only showed that the railway was trying to trace the goods, the period that might be taken in tracing the goods could have no relevance, according to the Supreme Court, in determining the reasonable time that is required for the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. In a similar way after considering B. and N.W Rly. Co. v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1933 Pat 45 the Supreme Court was of the view that if there is some correspondence which showed that some inquiry was being made by the railways, that also would not alter the starting point of limitation. The Supreme Court was also of the view after considering Governor General in Council v. S.G Ahmed, AIR 1952 Nag 77 that if the correspondence showed that the railways were hoping to deliver the packages and were making Inquiries all along the route, that would not help the plaintiff. After considering a series of cases, the Supreme Court was of the view that the very fact that Article 31 deals with both cases of nondelivery of goods and delay in delivering the goods shows that in either case the starting point of limitation is after reasonable time has elapsed for the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination The fact that what Is reasonable time must depend upon the circumstances of each case; and the further fact that the carrier may have to show eventually what was the reasonable time for carriage of goods will make no difference to the interpretation of the words used in the third column of Article 31, But if the correspondence disclosed anything which may amount to an acknowledgement of the liability of the carrier, that would give a fresh starting point of limitation. If the subsequent correspondence is only about tracing the goods, that will not be material in considering the question as to when the goods ought to have been delivered. On the other hand, if the correspondence also discloses material which may throw light on the question of determining the reasonable time for carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination, then it may be open to the Court to take into account that correspondence. Further, if there was anything in the correspondence which has a bearing on the question of reasonable time and the carrier wants to go back on that, to that extent the carrier may be estopped from denying that.

    5. It is, therefore, clear that a correspondence of a particular nature alone would be taken into consideration to construe the language in the third column of Article 31 and not any correspondence.

    6. In so far as our case is concerned, the correspondence does not appear to come within the categories of the nature of correspondence that are mentioned by the Supreme Court. Even otherwise, it appears to me that the correspondence does not come within the nature observed by the Allahabad Full Bench ease. In this view of the matter, therefore, the decree passed by the trial Court is not proper. I, therefore, set aside the decree of the trial Court, allow this revision application and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff-opponent. No order as to costs.

    7. Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Union Of India v. Vithalsa Kisansa And Co.
    (Jan 22, 1970)