Lodha, J.:— These two cross-appeals arise out of the common award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jaipur in the case of Gyan Prakash Bhargava.
2. Briefly stated, facts giving rise to this claim are that on 19.11.1978 at about 11.45 a.m, accident to car No. RJZ 6970 owned by Mrs. S.R Srivastava, another claimant in Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal's Case No. 31 of 1979, who has not filed any appeal, took place. The claimant Gyan Prakash Bhargava was driving the said car which was dashed by the bus No. RSG 681, owned by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur, and driven rashly and negligently by the driver, namely, Baboolal. As a result of this accident, according to the claimant Gyan Prakash, his right hand got fractured. On account of the impact of the accident the said car which belonged to Mrs. S.R Srivastava was also damaged. As such, Mrs. S.R Srivastava also filed a claim petition for damage caused to the said car, in addition to the claim petition filed by Gyan Prakash Bhargava claiming compensation of Rs. 1,18,000/- from the owner and driver of the aforesaid bus.
3. Both the claim petitions, i.e No. 30 of 1979 of Gyan Prakash and No. 31 of 1979 of Mrs. S.R Srivastava were consolidated and were disposed of by a common judgment dated the 8th July, 1981, whereby the claim petition No. 31 of 1979 was disallowed for the reason of claimant having received the amount of damages from the insurance company.
4. The Tribunal though has held in the impugned award that the accident which took place on 19.11.1978, occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the bus RSG 681, but while dealing with the quantum of compensation, under issue No. 4, awarded a sum of Rs. 30,000/- in favour of the claimant Gyan Prakash allowing interest @ 12% per annum if the award sum is not paid by 8th October, 1981 and costs in a sum of Rs. 500/- were also awarded to the claimant.
5. Mr. N.L Jain, the learned Advocate General, appearing for the Corporation, has challenged the finding of the Tribunal on the ground that the claimant Gyan Prakash, in spite of the injuries sustained in the accident, of his right hand-elbow, is continuing and functioning as the Manager of the Bank and there has been no loss in his income on account of the accident, Mr. Jain further contended that the Tribunal was not justified in taking into consideration the possibility and probability of Mr. G.P Bhargava's inability to play badminton or, to drive the car or, to lift the weight on account of impact of this accident because these are all irrelevant and immaterial factors in the case of compensation claims.
6. Mr. S.C Srivastava, the learned counsel for the claimant Gyan Prakash, on the contrary, has submitted that the compensation amount is grossly inadequate. According to him, the Tribunal should have allowed compensation of Rs. 15,000/- for the treatment which lasted for 2½ years.
7. Mr. Jain also submitted that there was no negligence or rashness of the driver of the vehicle of the Corporation and, in any case, it was a case of contributory negligence because Gyan Prakash while driving the car, was keeping and projecting his elbow outside the window of the car and taking risk himself in case of accident.
8. I have carefully gone through the statements of the witnesses read over before me, by the parties and the record of the case as also the relevant portions of the judgment/award asserted by the learned counsel on either side. Hari Kishan (AW 1), Gyan Prakash (AW 2), Ram Pratap (AW 3), Mrs. Srivastava (AW 4), Dr. Chandra Shekhar (AW 5), S.D Kalra (AW 6), Surajmal (AW 7), Girendra Bhartiya (AW 8), S.C Srivastava (AW 9), Dr. Kasliwal (AW 10), and Dr. Dinesh Mathur (AW 11) have been examined by the claimant and about 17 documents have been produced. The non-applicants have examined Chittarmal (NW 1) and Baboolal (NW 2), the conductor and driver, respectively.
9. The Tribunal has found that Hari Kishan (AW 1) is an independent witness and he has seen the accident. A complaint was filed by him in the police. According to him, the bus in question tried to overtake the car at a fast speed from the wrong side. He is corroborated by Gyan Prakash (AW 2), in this respect, in addition to Girendra Bhartiya (AW 8) and others.
10. In my opinion, the Tribunal has rightly believed them. The statements of Chittarmal, conductor, and Baboolal, the driver, failed to inspire confidence as rightly observed by the Tribunal. Baboolal has not filed even a written statement.
11. The contention of Mr. Jain that it was a case of contributory negligence as Gyan Prakash was projecting his elbow outside the window and taking risk, now deserves to be examined. On this point, Mr. Jain wants to rely upon the statement of Gyan Prakash, himself. I do not find any such admission of Gyan Prakash that the hand was being projected outside the car. All that he stated is that his hand was on the steering and resting on the window. The exact words translated in english are as under:
“I was holding the steering wheel with both hands. My elbow was not projecting outside the window.”
12. From the above, no inference can be drawn that there is any admission that the hand of Gyan Prakash was projecting outside the window, though undoubtedly, it was resting on the window while driving.
13. In view of the above I am not prepared to accept the factual version submitted by Mr. Jain.
14. Even otherwise, in Suraj Narain v. Sneh Lata, 1985 ACJ 580 (Rajasthan), I have held that when the vehicles cross each other or somebody, it is the duty of the driver to keep the vehicle at such distance that there cannot be any such accident to the persons travelling in the vehicle. That was also a case where injuries were caused to the hand which was resting on the window of the bus. In the instant case, the bus of the Corporation tried to overtake the car and therefore, it was the duty of the driver of the vehicle to keep it at a safe distance. It would be dangerous to accept that when two vehicles cross each other either way, they can be allowed to drive at such a proximity and nearness that one can have the impact on the passengers of the other vehicle and cause injuries to the persons travelling inside. It would be disastrous and would endanger security of the passengers.
15. The above view is supported by the following decisions:
(1) Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Krishnawanti, 1972 ACJ 423 (Delhi)
(2) Sushma Mitra v. M.P State Road Transport Corporation, 1974 ACJ 87 (MP).
16. Now coming to the quantum of compensation it has been held in S.K Devi v. Uttam Bhoi, 1974 ACJ 291 (Orissa) that in cases of injuries to living persons, usual loss is to be compensated by the award of damages, the amount of which is bound to be more than death because a person suffers for the whole of life physically, economically, emotionally and socially.
17. I have adopted the above view in Manak Chand Kothari v. Ram Prakash (S.B Civil Misc. Appeal No. 142/79; decided on 31.8.1984).
18. In the instant case, an amount of Rs. 3,000/- has been claimed by Gyan Prakash for the expenses incurred on the visitors who came during treatment and the period of ailment. I am not inclined to accept this contention because, it is too remote in nature of the compensation and, unless it is specifically proved, they should not be allowed normally. The Tribunal has disallowed and I reject the contention of Mr. Srivastava to enhance the compensation on this count.
19. However, the Tribunal has not allowed a single paisa for the expenses incurred for the treatment. It has come in evidence that Gyan Prakash, the injured, had to undergo treatment for about 214 years. He was operated, steel nail was put in the hand and on account of this accident, the hand has not only been re-shaped but it is obvious, the strength has been reduced by 40%, permanently. The relevant evidence shows that when the injured was examined on 10th March, 1981 which means after about more than two years and four months of the accident, it was found that there has been permanent impairment for the functioning of right hand below the elbow. The loss of strength is 40% of the joint with the result that the patient cannot perform many activities e.g lifting of weight, combing hair, etc. It has come in evidence of Dr. Kasliwal that injured permanently cannot play badminton and cannot drive car or cannot lift any weight. It is true that Gyan Prakash is the Manager of the Bank and knows how to keep the accounts but he has not produced the bills of expenses incurred on treatment. It is equally true that for these two and halt years, he was greatly under mental pain, distress, agony and sufferings as throughout he was facing ordeal and, that too, of his right hand. I have repeatedly held in a number of cases that in the accident claims cases, compensation computation, standards of civil suits and the principles of evidence ruling out possibility of doubt cannot be applied. The uhrebutted evidence of Dr. Kasliwal and Dr. Bhargava, cannot be scrapped on the theoretical requirements of accounts and vouchers. There is no rule of law which requires that the vouchers must be kept for every expense incurred and the regular accounts should be maintained. The Tribunals are expected to apply common sense standards and not to insist on strict proof.
20. The very fact that for about 2½ years, Gyan Prakash had to undergo treatment at the hospital located at Chandigarh where life was very expensive, shows that this cannot be done without heavy expenditure. Undoubtedly, apart from the application of medicines, X-rays were required to be taken a number of times and the operations and treatment, and going and coming to the hospital either for medical advice, check up, or exercise, heavy expenses were incurred during those days. It would have been better if Gyan Prakash would have maintained bills or produce some statement of expenses incurred but, in the absence of it, I cannot keep him ‘high and dry’ on this count because it would be doing violation to the concept of social justice where the social justice is to be done to those who suffer. Rejecting compensation on technical grounds, is negation of social justice as it adds insult to injury and I cannot be a party to it. I would, therefore, allow an amount of Rs. 10,000/- for the expenses incurred on treatment which would include all expenses of medicines, diet, conveyances.
21. So far as the amount of Rs. 30,500/- allowed by the Tribunal is concerned, I do not find it excessive. I cannot accept the contention of Mr. Jain that if a person on account of impairment of hand and permanent disability to elbow is deprived for whole of life to play badminton, to drive car, to lilt weight, to do his other physical work, he should not be compensated at all because the Bank management has not thrown him on the road so far. It is impossible for me to reject the compensation for all these deprivations and handicap created by the accident by permanent impairment of the elbow functioning.
22. The result of the above discussion is that the appeal of the Corporation is dismissed and that of Gyan Prakash Bhargava is partly allowed. The compensation awarded is increased by an amount of Rs. 10,000/- making it Rs. 40,500/- in all. The claimant Gyan Prakash would get interest @ 12% from the date of application till the date of realisation on this amount of Rs. 40,500/-. I also assess the costs of this appeal at Rs. 1,000/- in favour of Gyan Prakash.
23. The Corporation is expected to pay the said compensation without dragging the claimants to the Accidents Claims Tribunal as it is a public sector undertaking in a social welfare State where the preamble to the Constitution proclaims social justice. It is unfortunate that the Corporation not only refuses to pay compensation but drags the claimants to the Tribunal and compels them to face another ordeal of litigation, then even after the adjudication by the Tribunal by indiscriminately filing the appeals before this Court. Only yesterday I noticed an appeal filed by the Corporation against the award of the Tribunal awarding Rs. 2,000/- and probably, the entire amount spent must have been much more, apart from apathy shown to this social welfare legislation by the Corporation. The Corporation should, therefore, consider that the exemption granted from the insurance was never meant to drag the claimants and the unfortunate victims of the accidents to the Tribunals and increase the litigation instead of making payment from the funds kept for this purpose. The funds of the Corporation kept for payment to the unfortunate accident victims is unfortunately being used for unwarranted expenditure on litigation. It is high time that the Chairman of the Corporation should take up this issue at a high level and lay down certain norms of entering into litigation. It must be known by now that even for no fault accidents, the legislation has provided an amount of Rs. 15,000/- keeping in view that sufferers of the accidents should have some social security in a Constitution which is wedded to socialism and the directive principles of which ensures social justice. Apart from this, even where when the vehicle committing accident is not known, solatium amounts are provided by the Government and the public sector undertaking, like the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation who part-take character of the State in this social welfare legislation and, act accordingly, otherwise, it would be paying a poor homage to the principles of ‘social justice’ by entering into unwarranted litigation. Let a photostat copy of this judgment be sent to the Chairman of the Corporation, forthwith.
24. Appeal partly allowed.