Venkatachaliah, J.:— This appeal, in which the claimants seek enhancement of compensation granted to them by the award dated 30-12-1972 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dharwar (hereinafter called the Tribunal), in Misc C (MVC) 57 of 1971, inter alia, involves the question whether in assessing the compensation in a fatal accident action for the pecuniary loss caused to the dependants, the “family pension” awardable to the dependants and the benefits of the policy of life insurance on the life of the deceased should or should not be taken into account. The Tribunal has answered this question in the affirmative.

2. Appellant-1 is the wife; appellants 2 and 3 are the daughters and appellants 4, 5 and 6, the sons of Kotrabasappa, Tobacco Development Officer, Class-II, in the Dept. of Agriculture, Govt. of Karnataka. The said Kotrabasappa died as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident which occurred on 8-10-1971 at about 2 p.m on the Poona-Bangalore highway at Halageri in Ranebennur Taluk, in which the truck bearing No. MYW 5751 driven by the first respondent collided with the jeep in which Kotrabasappa was travelling. The Tribunal has, on issue 3, found that the collision was as a result of rash and negligent driving of the first respondent. This finding has become final and conclusive. Deceased Kotrabasappa, at the time of the unfortunate accident, was aged 46 years and of reasonably good health. His emoluments from service, were Rs. 642 p.m The evidence on record shows that the deceased had the immediate prospects of further promotions in service, and, as borne out by Ext. P2, there were also prospects of his services being placed at the disposal of the Mysore Tobacco Co. Ltd. on deputation and this deputation would have entailed some additional emoluments.

3. The Tribunal assessed the value of the dependency at Rs. 460 p.m but deducted therefrom a sum of Rs. 96 p.m in lieu of the benefit of family pension of Rs. 128 p.m for 7 years and Rs. 64/- per month thereafter to which the appellants were entitled, and assessed the net value of the dependency at Rs. 364 p.m or Rs. 4,368 a year. The Tribunal capitalised this sum of Rs. 4,368/- at 10 years' purchase-value and arrived at the figure of Rs. 43,680/- from which it deducted Rs. 5,000/- being one-third of the proceeds of insurance as the value of the benefit of the acceleration. The compensation finally awarded was Rs. 38,680/-. In this appeal, appellants seek an enhancement.

4. Mr. R.P Hiremath, learned Counsel for the appellants, has urged the following four contentions in support of his appeal:

(a) That the deduction of Rs. 5,000 on the proceeds of life insurance policy was not permissible as the same was a collateral benefit not accruing as benefit “out of death” or “arising as a result of death”;

(b) that the family pension was likewise a collateral benefit and should not go in the diminution of the liability of the tort-feasor and should have been ignored in computing the compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependants;

(c) that in awarding compensation, the Tribunal ignored altogether the claim for compensation awardable for the loss of expectation in life; and

(d) that in assessing the value of the dependency, the Tribunal has ignored the prospects of an immediate increase in the emoluments of the deceased consequent upon his imminent promotion as Asst. Director of Agriculture, or, of his deputation to the Mysore Tobacco Co. Ltd.

5. Points (a) & (b): Mr. R.P Hiremath contends that there is considerable judicial authority for the proposition that in assessing the compensation for the loss of pecuniary benefits, to the dependants, the benefits received by them on account of life insurance on the life of the deceased, the pension, gratuity, provident fund etc., payable to the deceased should not be taken into account, inasmuch as these benefits have their genesis either in contract or in the past services or good conduct of the deceased and these benefits which are the result of the thrift practised by the deceased should not go to the benefit of the tort-feasor. According to him, these benefits do not constitute benefits “arising out of death”, but are contractual benefits which are only payable on death. This view finds support in several recent decisions of different High Courts of which particular mention may be made of the decisions in Bhagwanti Devi v. Ish Kumar . 1975 A.C.J 56.; Rita Arora v. Salig Ram . 1975 A.C.J 420.; Visakhapatnam Ex-Servicemen Co-op. Motor Transport Society v. Subbavarapu Ramayarnma . A.I.R 1976 A.P 326.; LIC v. Kasturben Narambhai . 1973 A.C.J 226. and Sood & Co., Kulu v. Surjit Kaur . 1973 A.C.J 414..

6. The cases on the subject show a conflict of views, each side of which having been attractively presented. The view contended for by Mr. R.P Hiremath, in substance, is that an insurance or a pension is the product of a man's service or a man's thrift and that it could not be said that it was ever intended nor is it just that a wrongdoer should take over the benefit of it by getting credit for it in the amount of damages that he would otherwise be found liable to pay. The true sources of these benefits, according to the argument, are the thrift of the deceased or the benefit of a contract entered into by him, or, his past good services, as the case may be, and not the accident. The argument however, in favour of taking into account these benefits is that the compensation which the defendant is liable to pay does not contain a punitive element in it and that what can be recovered is the actual loss to the pocket of the dependants claiming it and since the accident at once caused both the loss and the benefit of a pension or an acceleration of the benefits of insurance, both must be taken into account in the matter and that “for good or ill, the smooth with rough, a defendant takes a plaintiff as he finds him”. Though the tortious act of the defendant is the genesis of the liability, the quantum of damages under its head, however, is neither conditioned by nor related to the genesis, but is entirely guided by the economic situation of the plaintiff. Consistently with this principle, the quantum of damages is mitigated or augmented as the case may be, according to the gains or losses that result from the death.

7. The damages awardable in a fatal accident action respecting the pecuniary loss caused by the negligence of the defendant is therefore a concomitant of and relatable to the injury caused and is measured—not in terms of the culpability or the mensurability of the conduct of the negligent-defendant—but on the basis of the actual pecuniary loss caused to the defendant which, as observed by the Supreme Court, is ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which, from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained. The negligent-defendant who knocks down an indigent defendant gets, in the matter of assessment of damages, the benefit of his poverty and as it has been said “if he knocks down a pensionable-plaintiff he gets the benefit of his pension”. Mere emotive appellation of ‘tort-feasor’ or ‘wrongdoer’ to the defendant will not advance the claimants' case as to quantum. This undoubted general rule finds its clearest and most authoritative expression in the speeches of their Lordships in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Collieries which the Supreme Court referred to with approval in the Gobald Motors case, Lord Macmillan put it thus:

Except where there is express statutory direction to the contrary, the damages to be awarded to a dependant of a deceased person under the Fatal Accidents Acts must take into account any pecuniary benefit accruing to that dependant in consequence of the death of the deceased. It is the net loss on balance which constitutes the measure of damages.

8. In Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. Veluswami the Supreme Court, referred to with approval, the following passage of Lord Russell of Killowen in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries.

“The general rule which has always prevailed in regard to the assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts is well settled, namely, that any benefit accruing to a dependant by reason of the relevant death must be taken into account. Under these Acts the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained, the position of each dependant being considered separately.”

9. The Supreme Court also referred to the following passage in the opinion of Lord Wright in the said case:

“The damages are to be based on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or benefit reducible to money value. In assessing the damages all circumstances which may be legitimately pleaded in diminution of damages must be considered………The actual pecuniary loss of each individual entitled to sue can only be ascertained by balancing, on the one hand, the loss to him of the future pecuniary benefit, and, on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death”.

10. The law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motors Service case referred to above requires that in assessing the pecuniary loss to the dependants arising on the death, a deduction must be made for benefits which would not have arisen at all but for the death.

11. In a number of cases, (his Court has taken the view favouring the (sic. respondents) taking into consideration, in the matter of assessing the compensation for pecuniary loss of the benefits of insurance, though, however, what was held deductible was not the entirety of the proceeds of insurance, but such part thereof as could reasonably be held to represent the value of the benefit of acceleration. The decisions of this Court, amongst others, are in Ramswaroop Agarwal v. MSRTC, Ratnamma v. P. Shanmugam and Vageesh v. Channaveerappe.

12. In M.F.As-202 and 414 of 1971 referred to above, this Court, while holding that the proceeds of an accident insurance policy should not be taken into account in assessing the compensation for pecuniary loss, however, affirmed the principle that the benefit of acceleration of a life insurance policy was required to be so taken into account. Chandrashekhar, J. observed:

“(37) But, the whole of the sum of Rs. 53,000 received by the claimants under the policy of insurance cannot be regarded as a gain to the estate by reason of the premature death of Surendra Kumar. Even if he had lived the normal span of life, he would have got the sum of Rs. 53,000 when he attained the age of 50 or 55 years What represents the gain to the estate by his premature death, is the acceleration of the receipt of the sura of Rs. 53,000. As such acceleration is for a long period of 27 to 32 years, a very large part of Rs. 53,000 can be regarded as the benefit of such acceleration. Out of Rs. 53,000 a sum of Rs. 50,000 can be attributed to the benefit of acceleration. After deducting this sum of Rs. 50,000 from the estimated loss of about Rs. 65,000, the net loss to the estimate of the deceased, can be taken as Rs. 15,000.”

13. Again in Vageesh's case Chandrashekhar, J. observed:

“(13) Whatever the position of law in England may be, so far as our country is concerned, we are bouud by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.K.M Veluswami. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the Bench, said thus on page 6:

‘Shortly stated, the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained.’

(14) If on account of the premature death of Rudriah, the appellants got under the insurance policies certain amounts much earlier than the time when he would have got them had he lived, then the benefit of such accelerated receipt of amounts, should also be taken into account in assessing the balance of loss and gain resulting from the premature death of Rudriah. Thus, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Shivaswamy that the entire amount received by the appellants under the insurance policies should be left out of account in assessing the compensation for loss to the dependency.”

14. Mr. R.P Hiremath, however, urged the acceptability of the principle laid down by the House of Lords in Parry v. Cleaver, where the majority opinion was that in the computation of loss for damages earning capacity, the ill-health award to which the appellant was entitled, although it would have to be brought into account in respect of his loss of retirement-pension, was not deductible in assessing damages for his loss of earnings. The reasoning in the said judgment was stated in the majority opinion thus: here:

“As regards money coming to the plaintiff under a contract of insurance, I think that the real and substantial reason for disregarding them is that the plaintiff has bought them and that it would be unjust and unresonable to hold that the money which he prudently spent on premiums and the benefit from it should enure, to the benefit of the tort-feasor. Here again I think that the explanation that this is too remote is artificial and unreal. Why should the plaintiff be left worse off than if he had never insured? In that case he would have got the benefit of the premium money; if he had not spent it he would have had it in his possession at the time of the accident grossed up at compound interest…”

15. …So, if insurance benefits are not deductible in assessing damages and remoteness is out of the way, why should his pension be deductible? The majority opinion in the said case, however, was largely influenced by one circumstance which the Court held to be of great importance in the matter. In England, the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act had been progressively altered by the legislation. In section 2(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act, it was provided:

“In assessing damages in respect of a person's death in any action under the Fatal Accidents Act; 1846, or under the Carriage by Air Act, 1932, there shall not be taken into account any insurance money, benefit, pension, or gratuity which has been or will or may be paid as a result of the death.”

16. Public policy in the matter, as interpreted by the Parliament requiring pension to be disregarded under the Fatal Accidents Act, was this important factor which the Court took into account. Indeed, it was stated by Lord Reid:

“There is, however, one other matter which I regard as of great importance here….

“In assessing damages in respect of a person's death in any action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, or under the Carriage by Air Act, 1932, there shall not be taken into account any insurance money, benefit, pension or gratuity which has been or will or may be paid as a result of the death.”

Sub-section (2) defines benefit as meaning benefit under the National Insurance Acts, and payment by a friendly society or trade union. If public policy, as now interpreted by Parliament, requires all pensions to be disregarded in actions under the Fatal Accidents Acts, I find it impossible to see how it can be proper to bring pensions into account in common law actions. Plaintiffs were formerly worse off under Lord Campbell's Act and I can think of no reason why the position should now be reversed so as to make them worse off at common law. In my judgment, a decision that pensions should not be brought into account in assessing damages at common law is consistent with general principles, with the preponderating weight of authority and with public policy as enacted by Parliament and I would therefore so decide.”

17. However, in India, the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, have not been amended to bring its provisions at par with its amended English counterpart. The fact that in India the said statute has not been amended is a circumstance which requires significance of the, want of corresponding amendment to be kept sharply differentiated. This was pointed out by Deshpande, J. of the Delhi High Court in the case of Amarjit Kaur v. Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd., as follows:

“……The Courts determine the liability for compensation as also the quantum of compensation according to the well established principles of the Law of Torts. It is well known that the English law of Torts has been applied by the Indian Courts on the ground that in the absence of any other rule of law, the Courts are to follow the principles of ‘justice, equity and good conscience,’ which have been ‘generally interpreted to mean the rules of English law, if found applicable to the Indian society and circumstances, Waghela v. Shaikh. The English law itself has been constantly developing both by judicial decisions and statutory changes. In India also the common law of England as applied to India has been modified by legislation. The English statutes modifying the law of Torts do not of course apply to India in terms. If however, they embody any principles of justice, equity and good conscience, such principles would apply to India, in preference to the common law repealed by legislation as being contrary to such principles. The problem before me is to decide whether the common law rule should be followed in this respect or whether the English law as amended by statutes should be followed in preference to the common law. As stated above in India we are to follow the common law or the English law as amended by the statutes only in so far as it embodies the principles of ‘justice, equity and good conscience.’ The long established rule is that dependants of the deceased are awarded only the balance of the loss and the benefit suffered by them by reason of the death of the deceased. This rule was apparently based on ‘justice, equity and good conscience’ and has been followed in India. In A.I.R 1962 SC 1 the Supreme Court has affirmed it. On the date of the decision of the Supreme Court, statutory changes in England had already engrafted an exception to this rule by excluding the insurance money from the benefits which are to be deducted from the loss caused by the death of the deceased. The Supreme Court, however did not indicate in any way that the English law as amended by the statute would be followed in India or that the rule affirmed by them was subject to this statutory exception obtaining in England. The trend of legislation in England is apparently to enhance the compensation payable on death. The legislation is leaning in favour of the dependants of the deceased and against the tort-feasors and the insurance company. In India, however, there is no such legislation. It cannot be said that the statutory changes made in England embody a fundamental rule of justice, equity and good conscience or that the unamended common law was, therefore, contrary to ‘justice, equity and good conscience.’ Unless and until therefore, the Supreme Court decides in favour of following English law as amended by the statutes in this respect, I feel bound to follow the unamended common law, which in my view was endorsed by the Supreme Court in A.I.R 1962 SC 1. The benefit of the acceleration of the receipts of the insurance monies has, therefore, to be deducted as stated above”

18. The above exposition, in our opinion, correctly sets-out the legal position that obtains.

19. The basis of the reasoning in favour of the view that the benefits of a policy of life insurance, pension etc. should not be taken into account in assessing compensation for pecuniary loss in the several decisions of the High Courts cited by Mr. R.P Hiremath is illustrated by the following passage in the judgment of D.B Lal, J. in Rita Arora v. Salig Ram, which is typical and illustrative of this view point:

“…Whatever was payable on account of death has to be accounted for. If any amount is payable at the time of death the same is not liable to be accounted for. Insurance money is paid because of premium payment and obviously under insurance contract. The said money is never payable on account of the death of the person injured. Death is no doubt a step in the insurance contract. That will not mean that insurance money is payable because of death but it is payable because premiums were paid and a contract was entered into for such payment after death. Similarly provident fund, gratuity and family pension are not dependent upon death, but they are payable because of the saving or thrift practiced by the deceased. Whatever was contributed towards provident fund became payable. That did not depend upon the death of the person. The gratuity and family pension, were paid because the deceased had served for a number of years. Therefore, the learned Tribunal committed an obvious error of accounting for these payments. The amount of compensation could not be decreased because of such payments made by the employer.

21….The former were considered benefits for which the deceased had paid. They are in the nature of quid pro quo and these were benefits payable on death and not benefits arising out of death. The real test is, if these benefits would have arisen independent of death or arose on account of death…”

20. This view of D.B Lal, J. is in acceptance of the earlier enunciation by Anand, J. in Bhagwanti Devi v. Ish Kumar in which the learned Judge observed:

“…These benefits are in the nature of quid pro quo and have relation to the savings effected by the deceased besides having their genesis either in the contract or in the past service and good conduct and these benefits could not be said to be benefits arising out of the death of a person in the sense in which the action for damages or inheritance could be related to such an event. There would be no justification, therefore, to give the benefit of these payments to the wrong-doer who, by his negligent act, has caused the death of a person. Such a conclusion would be justified even if the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Gobald Motor Service (supra) were to regulate the determination of compensation under the Act because even on the application of the aforesaid principles, it appears to me that there is a clear distinction between benefits received on account of death and those that are merely payable on the death of a person. The former arise out of death and would not have been available without it, while the latter are benefits which are available independently of death but are payable on death. The deduction made by the Tribunal on these counts must, therefore, be ignored in computing the compensation to which the dependant would be entitled.”

21. It is no doubt true that a contract of life insurance, unlike, say a contract for marine insurance, is not a contract of indemnity, though the idea of indemnity may constitute the motive behind the insurance. Life insurance contract is really in the form of investment where there is no necessity to prove pecuniary loss and the amount covered by the policy becomes payable on the happening of the event or events contractually contemplated. The view taken by Lal, J. in Arora's case and Anand, J., in Bhagawdnti Devi's case proceeds on the premise that the benefit of life insurance arises not as a ‘result of death’ but ‘independently of death’ and is only ‘payable on death.’ With respect, the exclusive. In our opinion, the true test is whether the benefits in question are basis of this distinction, which pre-supposes and proceeds on the premise that what ‘result from death’ and what is ‘payable on death’ must needs be mutually would or would not have arisen at all, but for the death (See Damages for Personal Injuries and Death, 3rd Edn. by John Munkman). It may be correct to say that the benefits of life insurance arise independently of the cause of death except, of course, where contractually otherwise provided; but it cannot be said that the benefit of its acceleration would have arisen at all but for the death.

22. In McGregor on Damages, 13th Edn. at para. 1241, it is stated:

“However, in dealing with these cases, it remains a difficult matter to lay down any test, which will embrace all of them, of whether a benefit following the death does or does not result from the death. The insidious maxim post hoc, propter hoc must here as everywhere be guarded against, but the limits of its operation remain difficult to define. Although the language causa causans and causa sine qua non has sometimes been relied on, it has been said by Pearce L.J in Jenner v. Allen West that this distinction does not help. Any analysis of the case law can therefore only form a general guide: the approach to each new case must remain empirical.”

23. The Tribunal, in our opinion, in so far as it took into account the benefit of acceleration and the benefit of the pension was right and its view in this behalf is consistent with the law on the matter.

24. The benefit of a family pension of the kind with which we are concerned in the present case, being in the nature of an entitlement, which the deceased had paid for in terms of his past services or surrender of a part of his emoluments or both, has to be taken into account in assessing the compensation for pecuniary loss, inasmuch as, the corresponding benefit of a pension which the deceased would be entitled to in the normal course would be a relevant consideration in determining the extent of the pecuniary loss.

25. The principle of valuation of the benefit of acceleration of insurance is stated thus in Grand Truck Rly. Co. of Canada v. Jenning.

“…The pecuniary benefit which accrued to the respondent from his premature death, consisted in the accelerated receipt of a sum of money, the consideration for which had already been paid by him, out of his earnings. In such a case, the extent of the benefit may fairly be taken to be represented by the use or interest of the money during the period of acceleration; and it was upon that footing that Lord Campbell, in Hicks v. Newport Railway Company, suggested to the jury that, in estimating the widow's loss, the benefit which she derived from acceleration might be compensated by deducting from their estimate of the future earnings of the deceased the amount of the premiums which, if he had lived, he would have had to pay out of his earnings for the maintenance of the policy.”

26. In the present case, however, the Tribunal, in the absence of any evidence as to the actual basis of computation of the benefit of acceleration of the insurance receipts, has proceeded to deduct one-third of the proceeds. This cannot be said to be either erroneous or excessive. Indeed, in MFA. 290 of 1970 a bench of this Court indicated that in the absence of such evidence, one-half of the amount received by the petitioner under the insurance policy may be treated as the accelerated benefit that has accrued to the estate of the deceased. We accordingly answer points (a) and (b) against the appellants.

27. Point (c): Mr. Hiremath next contended that the Tribunal had totally ignored the award of compensation required to be made towards the loss to the estate and loss of expectation of life. This contention is not without merit. Loss of expectation of life is an injury accruing before death and where such death is caused by the actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, it only goes to substantiate that such loss of life expectation has resulted from the defendant's wrong. This head of damages, recognised for a Jiving plaintiff, is held to apply also to an action which had survived for the benefit of the victim's estate and is acknowledged as a distinct head under which damages are awardable. The causes of action respecting loss to the estate and loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependants are different and prima facie as the two claims are to be based on different causes of action, claimants whether they be same or different, would be entitled to recover compensation separately under both the heads. If persons taking benefit under both the heads are the same, as here, the requirement of law is that they cannot be permitted to recover twice over for the same loss. In the present case, what is granted for pecuniary loss is quantified on the basis only of the value of the dependency and there would, thus, be no question of duplication in the award of damages. We think it reasonable to award a compensation of Rs. 5,000 to the appellants on this count.

28. Point (d): Mr. Hiremath contends that in valuing the dependency, the Tribunal ignored the financial benefits which were incidental to the prospects of immediate promotion of Kotrabasappa to the cadre of Assistant Director of Agriculture and to the imminent prospect of his deputation to the Mysore Tobacco Co. Ltd., as indicated by Ext. P. 2. The grievance of the appellants is that in fixing Rs. 364/- as the value of the dependency, the Tribunal wholly ignored this imminent and relevant prospect. So far as this contention, which relates to the quantum of the damages is concerned, the Tribunal has observed:

“26. At the time of his death however his salary per month inclusive of all allowances was only Rs. 642/-. That is spoken to by PW. 3, S. Prahlad. Ext. 5 is the pay bill (office copy) for September 1971, which shows that his total emoluments were Rs. 642/-. Hence while calculating loss of dependency it is necessary not only to bear in mind the actual salary that Mr. C. Kotrabasappa was getting but also the chances of his getting promotion and better salary. This would be a necessary factor that should go into calculation of loss of dependency”.

Though the Tribunal rightly recognised this element and its augmenting effect on the value of the dependency, this circumstance does not, however, appear to have informed the award. The value of the dependency has been determined purely on the basis that the total emolument of the deceased was Rs. 642/- p.m which was the actual salary. No benefit relatable to the prospects of immediate advancement in service and consequent enlargement of pecuniary gains was, in fact, taken into account in the assessment of the compensation. It is no doubt true that in calculating the pecuniary loss to the dependants, many imponderables enter into the calculation, and the actual extent of such pecuniary loss may depend upon data which do not admit of or are susceptible to accurate assessments. In the very nature of things, such assessments must necessarily partake of the character of a broad estimate or even partly of conjectures. However, it is a well recognised principle that the prospects of immediate advancements in service, which are capable and admit of being sounded in terms of money should also be taken into account. Ext. P2 justifies a reasonable probability that the income of the deceased would have substantially increased, by the promotion or deputation, both of which could not be considered too remote. We think that in the circumstances of this case, we will not be in error in adding and it would indeed be reasonable to add a further sum of Rs. 50 p.m or Rs. 600 a year to the value of the dependency. On the basis of 10 years' purchase value, this will result in an addition of Rs. 6,000 to the compensation.

29. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part and in modification of the Tribunal, we allow enhancement to the extent of Rs. 5,000 under the head ‘loss of expectation of life’ and a further sum Rs. 6,000 towards loss of pecuniary benefits to the claimants. The claimants will, in all, now be entitled to compensation of Rs. 49,680 with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the filing of the application till date of payment.

30. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal.