Sabhahit, J.:— This is a claimants' appeal instituted against the Judgment and Award dated 30-9-1975 passed in M.V.C No. 53/1974 on the file of the Claims Tribunal, Bijapur.
2. The claimants are the widow and children of Gurusangappa Karabantanal, a conductor under the K.S.R.T.C, drawing according to claimants Rs. 300 per month and he was aged about 34 years at the time of his death. It is the case of the claimants that on 7-7-1974 at about 1 P.M, the deceased came by the road side of Kutakankeri cross on Guledagud-Badanii road to halt a K.S.R.T.C bus which was proceeding on the road, bearing No. MYF 4323. The driver of the bus who was driving the bus in a rash and negligent manner, knocked down Gurusangappa and ran over his head and killed him on the spot. On these averments, the petitioners claimed compensation of Rs. 1,21,400 from respondents. Respondent-1 is the Deputy General Manager, K.S.R.T.C and respondent-2 is the driver. They contested the claim by their statement of objections. They contended that the deceased suddenly tried to cross the road when the express bus was going on the road and thus he was run over, and there was no fault on the part of the driver of the bus. Hence they contended that they were not liable for compensation. During hearing, the claimants examined Vinobabai the widow of the deceased as PW-1. They examined PW-2 Irappa the conductor of the bus which caused the accident. As against that, the respondents examined the driver of the bus Hassansab as RW-1 and closed their case. The learned Member of the Tribunal, appreciating the evidence on record, held that the petitioners failed to establish that there was actionable negligence on the part of the driver of the bus in causing the accident. In that view, the Tribunal dismissed the petition for compensation. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the claimants have come up in appeal before this Court.
3. The learned counsel appearing for claimants-appellants vehemently contended that the Tribunal did not appreciate properly the evidence on record and that the evidence of the driver himself was sufficient to hold that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the bus and that further it was on record that the driver was convicted on his own plea of guilty before the criminal Court. Hence he submitted that the Tribunal ought to have held that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver RW-1 and further that the Tribunal ought to have awarded compensation to the claimants. As against that, the learned counsel for the respondents argued supporting the finding and the final award of the Tribunal. We were taken through the evidence and award of the Tribunal.
4. The points that arise for our consideration in this appeal are:
(1) Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the petitioners failed to establish that the accident was the result of rash, and negligent driving of the bus.
(2) If not, to what compensation are the claimants entitied and from whom?
It is true, the claimants did not examine any eye-witness to the occurrence. The only witness examined by them is PW-2 Irappa the conductor of the bus which caused the accident. He has stated that he was sitting in the bus calculating the way bill. He heard some sound. The bus was stopped and he got down along with other passengers and found that a man had fallen dead. Thus, apart from the fact that the accident had happened, he has not stated as to the manner of accident. The first claimant was admittedly not on the scene of occurrence. That being so, we have to necessarily read the evidence of RW-1 the driver of the bus to find out the manner of accident. The driver in his cross-examination has stated:
“There was nobody else at that cross.”
That being so, the claimants were not able to examine any witness on their behalf as eye-witness to the occurrence. It is not as if witnesses were available and they were not examined.
6. The driver, speaking about the manner of accident has stated thus:
“I had driven the bus upto Kutaganakeri cross. All of a sudden a man came right across the road from the left side. The bus was running at about 20 to 25 KMPH. I was keeping to the correct side. As the man came right across the bus, it dashed against him. He was thrown forward and the bus ran-over him. I stopped the bus.”
In the cross-examination he has stated thus:
“The bus had reached the junction of the 3 roads. That junction is visible from a distance of 1 1/2 to 2 furlongs. But there are small trees on either side of the road. I did not see him at all before he was actually run across. It is not correct to suggest that the deceased was standing by the side of the road and hand raised his hand to give the signal to stop. It is not correct to suggest that I negligently dashed against dim. There is a turning of the road at a distance of a furlong from the Kuttaganakere Cross towards Bagalkot side.”
Thus, in the cross-examination, the driver RW-1 belies his own version given in the examination-in-chief. In the examination-in-chief, he stated that a person came and tried to cross the road all of a sudden and thus the accident happened. But in the cross examination he stated that he could see persons coming on the road even from a distance of two furlongs, and he did not at all see the person, namely the deceased, till the bus ran over him. That shows he is not telling the truth. Even if a person came towards the left side of the road and started crossing the road, it was obvious he (the driver) could see him crossing the road. The driver, according to him, did not see him at all.
7. It is a principle well settled that oral evidence in an accident case has to be appreciated in the light of circumstantial evidence. It is in evidence that the left side headlight of the bus was broken. The driver has stated that he was going on the left side of the road. It is not his case that he swerved his bus towards right side. That being so, it is obvious that the bus was going on the left side of the road and the pedestrain has hit the left side head-light when the bus dashed against him. That only shows that the pedestrain the deceased in this case, was standing on the left side of the road. It belies the version of the driver that he (deceased) was crossing the road. If he was crossing the road and the bus hit him, it should have been the middle portion of the bus or the right side head-light of the bus which should have hit him. The fact that the left side head-light of the bus hit the deceased probabilises the suggestion put to the driver that the deceased was standing by the left side of the road and was showing his hand to the bus signalling to stop. But the driver, unmindful of the person giving signal has in a grossly negligent way, dashed against him and ran over the person. The Tribunal has not appreciated this aspect at all. As already pointed out above, even according to the driver RW-1, there was no other person at the cross to witness the accident and the Tribunal was required to closely scrutinise the evidence of driver himself to find out whether the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the bus. The Tribunal has not at all analysed his evidence. Moreover, it is in evidence that even after dashing the pedestrain and running over him, the bus was not able to halt at the spot, and it went nearly 98” ahead before it came to a halt as per the Mahazar Ex. P. 2. That shows the terrific speed with which the bus was going and it lends assurance to the inference that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the bus.
8. It is in the evidence of the driver that he was chargesheeted before the Magistrate at Bad ami for the offence committed in the very accident and that he was convicted and treated under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. The Tribunal has not appreciated this aspect at all. In the case of Nettleship v. Weston(1) Lord Denning M.R who delivered the Judgment for the Bench in the Court of appeal has observed at para-5 of the Judgment thus:
“So the criminal law is clear. No one would dream of throwing any doubt on it, Mrs. “Weston was convicted in accordance with it. The conviction is admissible in civil proceedings as prima facie evidence of negligence: See Stupple v. Royal Insurance Co., Ltd., (1970) 3 All E.R 230.”
Thus, the law is settled that when the driver is convicted in a regular trial before the Criminal Court, the fact that he is convicted becomes admissible in evidence in a civil proceeding and it becomes prima facie evidence that the driver was culpably negligent in causing the accident. The converse is not true; because that if driver is acquitted in a criminal case arising out of the accident, it is not established even prima facie that the driver is not negligent, as a higher degree of culpability is required to bring home an offence.
9. In the case of Govid Singh v. A.S Kailasam(2) the High Court of Madras held that the admission of the driver made before a criminal Court that the accident was committed by his rash and negligent driving certainly shifted the legal burden on the driver to show that such an admission, if at all was made by extraneous motive. In that case, the driver was convicted on his own plea of guilty. The High Court observed:
“After having admitted before the criminal court that the accident took place due to his rash and negligent driving of the car, there is hardly any force in the present contention of RW-1 that he did not drive the car rashly or negligently and that he was not to be blamed for the accident. It is nodoubt seen that RW-1 has attempted to reconcile the conflicting positions by projecting a story that his plea of guilt before the criminal court was not one of truth, but was one of truth, but was one of convenience, viz., to avoid making frequent visits to the Court to defend the case. This explanation is hardly convincing and, at any rate, cannot be allowed to be successfully projected by RW-1. An admission against his interest made by RW-1 either before the Tribuhal or elsewhere, has got to be taken into account in rendering a decision on the relative stands taken by the parties in the controversy. In the fact of his own admission in connected proceedings arising out of the same incident it is futile for RW-1 to contend that the accident was not due to his negligence.”’
In the instant case also, the driver comes forward with an explanation saying that he was told to admit his guilt as he would be let off after due admonition. It can hardly be believed that the Court would bargain with the accused to admit the guilt assuring him that he would be let off on admonition. It appears to us that the driver has woven this story taking advantage of the fact that he was let off on admonition by the Court. We are not persuaded to accept this explanation. Hence the fact that he admitted his guilt before the Criminal Court and that he was convicted by the Criminal Court would clearly establish prima facie that he was guilty of rash and negligent driving. The Tribunal has not considered this aspect at all. In the result, we are unable to agree with the finding of the Tribunal that the accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver RW-1. We are of the considered view that the accident was the result of actionable negligence on the part of the driver of the bus RW-1.
10. That leads us to consider the quantum of compensation to which the claimants are entitled. PW-1 the widow has stated that her husband was getting Rs. 280 per month as salary, working as Conductor under the K.S.R.T.C He was a permanent employee. This is not challenged, Hence we can take that at the time of his death, the deceased was drawing a salary of Rs. 280 per month. PW-1 in her evidence has stated that her husband was aged 30 years at the time of his death. In the claim petition his age is mentioned as 34 years. Hence it is safe to take the age of the deceased as 34 years at the time of his death by the accident.
11. Out of Rs. 280 he was getting per month, it is likely that he was spending half of it for his personal expenses including for food and raiment. He could have spared Rs. 140 per month to the members of his family for dependency. Thus multiplying 140 by 12, we get Rs. 1680 as annual loss of dependency. Having regard, to the age of the deceased at the time of his death and other circumstances, it is just and proper to multiply this by 12, which comes to Rs. 20,160. To this has to be added Rs. 5,000 for loss to the estate of the deceased as the deceased has lost the prospects of his future happy life as a result of his death due to accident. That gives us the figure Rs. 25,160 as total compensation to which the claimants are entitled. Out of this, Rs. 400 has to be deducted as K.S.R.T.C has made this payment earlier, which gives us Rs. 24,760 as compensation to which the claimants are entitled. Both the respondents are liable to pay this amount.
12. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The Award of the Tribunal is set aside and the claimants are awarded compensation of Rs. 24,760 along with costs throughout and interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of petition till payment from the respondents. The K.S.R.T.C shall pay the entire sum awarded with costs and interest from out of its special Insurance Fund.
The first claimant - widow on receipt of the amount of compensation shall deposit Rs. 18,000 in a schedule bank in the name of her minor children with herself as guardian and Rs. 6,000 can be withdrawn as and when each of the minor claimant attains the age of majority. In the meanwhile she can draw the interest on the fixed deposit and utilise the same for the welfare of the minor children. Respondents shall bear their own costs.