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  • Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(al) read with Section 2(1a)(a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 44(e) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules,
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
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  • Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(al) read with Section 2(1a)(a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 44(e) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules,
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was instituted by the State (represented by the Public Prosecutor) challenging the acquittal of the respondent (and A.1) by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sankari in C.C. No. 198 of 1985. The respondent and A.2 (R. Muthu) were prosecuted for offences under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(al) read with Section 2(1a)(a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 44(e) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The State did not appeal against the acquittal of A.2.

On 18.12.1984 at about 10:30 a.m., P.W.1 (the Food Inspector of Edapadi Municipality) visited a grocery shop at Door No. 108, Angalamman Koil Street, Edapadi, and found the respondent transacting business there. P.W.1 identified himself and informed the respondent of his intention to obtain a sample of coconut oil for analysis, served Form VI, and purchased 750 ml of coconut oil for Rs. 22.50. The sample sent to the Public Analyst, Guindy (Ex. P.4) failed to conform to coconut oil standards on multiple tests and was found to be approximately 10% coconut oil and 90% groundnut oil; it was therefore found to be adulterated.

After analysis, prosecution was initiated and intimation under Section 13(2) of the Act was served on the respondent and A.2 on 14.2.1985. The complaint was presented before the trial Magistrate on 13.2.1985 but, according to the trial record, it was returned and re-presented only on 19.2.1985. Before the trial court the respondent and A.2 denied the case against them. The trial Magistrate acquitted both accused on two grounds: (1) the prosecution had not established A.2's connection to the grocery shop from which the sample was taken; and (2) the mandate of Section 13(2) had been violated because intimation appeared to have been served before the prosecution was instituted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Magistrate's acquittal could be sustained on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the respondent's connection with the shop from which the coconut oil sample was taken.
  2. Whether intimation under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was served before the prosecution was "instituted" (i.e., whether service on 14.2.1985 was premature given the procedural facts surrounding the complaint filed on 13.2.1985 and returned until 19.2.1985), and the legal meaning of the word "instituted" under the Act for purposes of Section 13(2).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (State) Arguments — Mr. A.S. Chakravarthy

  • The two grounds on which the trial Magistrate acquitted the respondent cannot be sustained.
  • Regarding connection with the shop: the respondent admitted he was the owner of the grocery shop, which resolves any controversy over connection between the respondent and the shop from which the sample was seized.
  • Regarding the timing of intimation under Section 13(2): presentation of the complaint before the trial Magistrate constitutes the "institution" of prosecution, therefore service of intimation on 14.2.1985 (after presentation on 13.2.1985) complied with Section 13(2).

Respondent's Arguments — Mr. R. Danasekaran

  • Between 13.2.1985 and 19.2.1985 there was no complaint available before the trial Magistrate; therefore the respondent was prejudiced because he could not exercise his right under Section 13(2) to have another portion of the sample forwarded to the Central Food Laboratory.
  • The complaint was vague and inconsistent: P.W.1 alleged the sample was taken from one person available in the shop even though two accused were named; the complaint and documents (Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2) did not give the address of P.W.2; P.W.2 did not support the prosecution and stated his signatures on the documents were obtained at his house and that he had no knowledge of the sampling operation.
  • P.W.1 admitted in cross-examination he omitted to state in the complaint who was present during the sampling and who signed Form VI; Ex. P.2 did not indicate who witnessed the purchase. On these admissions and the baldness of the complaint, Mr. Danasekaran submitted the sampling procedure and related provisions (including Section 10(7) of the Act) were violated.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Majeed v. State, Food Inspector, 1986 (2) FAC 57 (Ratnavel Pandian, J.) Held that the institution of a prosecution under the Act takes place the moment the person authorised to launch the prosecution files the complaint before the Court; institution is distinct from the Court taking cognizance. The court cited and accepted this view as correct on the meaning of "institution" and relied on it in evaluating whether intimation under Section 13(2) was timely.
Abdul Azeez v. Food Inspector, Ulundurpet, 1987 (1) FAC 347 (David Annoussamy, J.) Held similarly that filing the complaint before the competent Court (after complying with Section 20(1)) constitutes institution of prosecution; taking cognizance by the Magistrate is different. Emphasised practical problems if "institution" were equated with the Magistrate's taking cognizance and noted reliance on statutory text. The court relied on and agreed with this reasoning (including observations about practical consequences) and used it to reject the argument that institution meant the date of court's taking cognizance.
R. Veerappan v. State, 1986 (2) FAC 54 (Singaravelu, J.) Held that the term "institution" should be taken to mean the date on which the Court takes cognizance of the alleged offence (analogous to the categories in Section 190 CrPC). The court noted this contrary view but declined to follow it. The court distinguished that approach (observing it had not considered certain Act provisions relied upon in the other decisions) and expressed agreement instead with the earlier decisions holding "institution" occurs on filing of the complaint.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages addressing the two principal grounds of the trial acquittal.

  1. Connection between the respondent and the shop: the court observed that the acquittal of A.2 was not appealed. Documentary evidence indicated the respondent was the person who sold the coconut oil to P.W.1. The court held that regardless of the shop's ownership, if the prosecution case were accepted the respondent would be liable. Thus the first ground of acquittal did not require sustaining the trial court's decision insofar as the respondent was concerned.
  2. Meaning of "institution" under Section 13(2): the court reviewed three prior decisions dealing with the meaning of "institute" or "institution" under the Act. Two judgments (Ratnavel Pandian, J. in Abdul Majeed and David Annoussamy, J. in Abdul Azeez) were cited for the proposition that institution occurs when the authorised person files the complaint before the Court, and that this is distinct from the Court taking cognizance. The court found these authorities persuasive, including the practical reasoning that treating institution as the date of Magistrate's cognizance would place Local Health Authorities in an impossible position in relation to serving intimation. A contrary view by Singaravelu, J. in R. Veerappan (that institution means the date on which the Court takes cognizance) was noted but the court rejected that approach, observing that certain statutory provisions had not been taken into account by Singaravelu, J.
  3. Prejudice under Section 13(2): the court addressed the respondent's contention that there was no complaint available on 14.2.1985 when intimation was served and that this caused prejudice. The court observed that the respondent had not taken any steps to exercise the statutory right under Section 13(2) to have another portion of the sample forwarded to the Central Food Laboratory; therefore the court concluded there was no actual prejudice from the timing of intimation.
  4. Sampling procedure and admissibility: notwithstanding the foregoing on institution and prejudice, the court found that the acquittal should be confirmed because of deficiencies in the sampling process and the related documentary record. The court emphasized the sanctity of sampling operations under Section 10(7) of the Act and reasoned that documents prepared at the time of sampling must contain the addresses of witnesses to allow courts to test the acceptability of the sampling process when challenged. In this case, P.W.1's evidence contained adverse admissions (omissions in the complaint about persons present and signatories), Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2 lacked the address of P.W.2, and P.W.2 did not support the prosecution (stating his signatures were obtained at home and he had no knowledge of sampling). Given the unsatisfactory oral and documentary evidence, the court concluded the sampling process could not be accepted without corroboration and interference in the acquittal was not justified.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Appeal dismissed; the acquittal of the respondent is confirmed.

Direct consequences:

  • The respondent's acquittal by the trial Magistrate is upheld and the State's appeal is dismissed.
  • Although the court agreed with prior decisions that "institution" of prosecution under the Act occurs when the authorised person files the complaint before the Court (and is different from the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance), the court declined to set aside the acquittal because of defects in the sampling documentation and the unsatisfactory oral evidence.

Broader implications: the court expressly aligned itself with earlier decisions (Abdul Majeed and Abdul Azeez) on the meaning of "institution" under the Act and rejected the contrary view in R. Veerappan; however, because the appeal was dismissed on the specific evidentiary and procedural deficiencies in the sampling operation, the immediate practical effect is the confirmation of the respondent's acquittal in this case.

    State By Food Inspector, Edapadi Municipality By Public Prosecutor v. R. Perumal .

    Arunachalam, J.:— The State represented by the learned Public Prosecutor has chosen to challenge the acquittal of the respondent herein and A. 1 before the trial Magistrate, of an offence punishable under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(al) read with Section 2(1a)(a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 44(e) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, recorded by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sankari in C.C No. 198 of 1985. The respondent was prosecuted in the same calender case along with R. Muthu, arrayed as A. 2 against whose acquittal, the State has not chosen to prefer an appeal.

    2. The prosecution case will have to be narrated, for the disposal of this appeal. P.W.I the Food Inspector, Edapadi Municipality visited the grocery shop of the respondent and A. 2 situated at Door No. 108, Angalamman Koil Street, Edapadi at or about 10.30 a.m on 18.12.1984 P.W.I found the respondent transacting business in the grocery shop. P.W.I revealed his identity to the respondent and expressed his intention of obtaining sample of coconut oil for the purpose of analysis. P.W.I learnt from the respondent that the second accused was the owner of the shop. P.W.I served Form VI on the respondent and later purchased 750 m.l of coconut oil from the respondent after paying the sale consideration of Rs. 22.50 One of the parts of the sample sent for analysis to the Public Analyst, Guindy, revealed that the sample did not conform to the standard for coconut oil, in respect of Bytyro-refractometer reading, Iodine value, saponification value and Polenske value. The Analyst also opined that the sample was found to be a mixture of about 10% of coconut oil and 90% groundnut oil. Therefore the sample was adulterated. Ex. P. 4 is the report of the Analyst. After initiating prosecution intimation under Section 13(2) of the Act was served on the respondent and second accused. The case of the respondent and A. 2 before the trial Court was one of denial. Ex. D. 1, the letter addressed to A. 2 and returned to P.W.I was marked, on behalf of the defence.

    3. The trial Magistrate chose to acquit the respondent and A. 2 on two grounds:—1) The prosecution had not established connection between A. 2 and the grocery shop from which sample of coconut oil had been taken. 2) The mandate of Section 13(2) of the Act had been violated for the complaint filed by P.W.I before the trial Magistrate on 13.2.1985 was returned and represented only on 19.2.1985, but in between, on 14.2.1985 itself, intimation under Section 13(2) of the Act had been served. Therefore it must be deemed that the intimation had been served before institution of this prosecution.

    4. Mr. A.S Chakravarthy, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended, that both the grounds of acquittal cannot be sustained. As far as the first ground is concerned, the learned Government Advocate contended, that the respondent had admitted that he was the owner of the grocery shop and that would put an end to the controversy of the connection of the respondent with the shop, from which sample had been seized. On the second ground, he submitted that presentation of complaint before the trial Magistrate would amount to institution of prosecution and therefore service of intimation on the respondent and A. 2 on 14.2.1985 after presentation of the complaint on 13.2.1985 was well within the mandate of Section 13(2) of the Act.

    5. Mr. R. Danasekaran, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended, that between 13.2.1985 and 19.2.1985 no complaint was available before the trial Magistrate and therefore the respondent must be deemed to have been prejudiced since he could not have exercised his right under Section 13(2) of the Act. He also submitted that the complaint was vague in that P.W.I had chosen to allege that sample was taken from one person who was available in the shop especially when two names have been given in the complaint as accused. He also pointed out that Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2, the address of P.W 2 had not been given and P.W 2 himself had not supported the prosecution and had chosen to categorically state in court, that his signatures were obtained in Ex. P. 1 and P. 2 when he was in the house. He also affirmed, that he did not have any knowledge of the sampling operation. He also pointed out that P.W.I had admitted in his cross-examination that he had not stated in the complaint regarding the persons available at the shop during sampling operation. Further he had deposed that he had not stated about the person who had signed in Form VI. His further admission was, that in Ex. P. 2 he had not indicated who the witness was, for the purchase of coconut oil from the seller. On these admissions, of P.W 1 taken along with the baldness of the complaint, the learned Counsel for the respondent would submit, that the object of Section 10(7) of the Act had been violated.

    6. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the opposing counsel. The first ground of acquittal need not have to detain us for long since the acquittal of A. 2 has not been challenged. The documentary evidence shows, that the respondent was the person who had sold the coconut oil to P.W.I and irrespective of ownership of the groceryshop, the respondent would be liable, if the prosecution case were to be accepted. On the second ground, it can be stated at once, that the verdict of the trial Magistrate cannot be upheld. The meaning that should be given for ‘institute’ has been the subject matter of decisions by this Court, atleast in three cases, which have been placed before me. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (as he then was) in Abdul majeed v. State, Food Inspector, 1986 (2) FAC 57 and David Annoussamy J. (as he then was) in Abdul Azeez… v. Food Inspector, Ulundurpet…., Ulundurpet, 1987 (1) FAC 347, have held that institution of a prosecution under this Act took place the moment, the person authorised to launch the prosecution filed the complaint before the Court. It was also held by both the learned Judges that institution; of a prosecution was different from taking cognizance of the case by Court. In other words, the mere filing of the complaint before the competent Court after complying with the pre-requisites of Section 20(1) either by the person authorised or by the person referred to in Section 12 would satisfy the meaning of the expression ‘institution of the prosecution’. David Annoussamy, J. further observed that it would be making violence to the text of the statute to say that only when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the complaint, the prosecution could be said to have been instituted. It was further observed by the learned Judge that the authority is not informed of the date of the Magistrate taking on file the complaint and therefore construing the date of institution to be the date on which the Magistrate takes on file the complaint, would put the Local Health Authority in an impossible situation of being unaware of the institution of the prosecution and still bound to forward a copy of the report to the person concerned immediately after the institution of the prosecution. A contrary view was taken by Singaravelu, J, in R. Veerappan v. State, 1986 (2) FAC 54. The learned Judge held as hereunder:

    “The term ‘institution’ has not been defined anywhere in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or anywhere else. The only analogous provision is found in S. 19D of the Criminal Procedure Code, under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. Thus, the institution of a case may be one of the three categories mentioned in S. 190 of the Crl. P.C and the term ‘institutipn’ would mean only the date on which the Court takes cognizance of the alleged offence.”

    7. The view of Singaravelu, J. had been taken note of by David Annoussamy, J. in the case of Abdul Azeez was distinguished on the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as well as the meaning that should be given to the word ‘instituted’ on the various provisions found in the Act itself. The view of Singaravelu, J. had not been brought to the notice of Ratnavel Pandian, J (as he then was). The various provisions of the Act which have been referred to by Ratnavel Pandian, J. and David Annoussamy, J., which had not been taken note of by Singaravelu, J. would certainly permit my expressing agreement with the law laid down by Ratnavel Pandian, J and David Annoussamy, J. without referring this matter to a Division Bench.

    8. The argument of Mr. Danasekaran that there was no complaint available in Court on 14.2.1985, when intimation was served on the respondent and therefore it must be deemed, that the respondent had been prejudiced cannot be acceded to. It is fairly conceded that no steps were taken by the respondent to exercise his right under Section 13(2) of the Act to have another portion of the sample forwarded to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. Therefore the question of prejudice does not at all arise. However, the acquittal of the respondent has to be confirmed in view of the carelessness of the food inspector, P.W.I The sanctity of the sampling operation has to be safeguarded as mandated under Section 10(7) of the Act. The documents prepared at the time of sampling must contain the addresses of the witnesses called during the operation so that in the event of a challenge of the whole process, it would be open to the Court to test the acceptability or otherwise of the process of sampling. Sufficient challenge had been made in this case about the sampling operation and this taken along with the carelessness of P.W.I in having stated in the complaint, that sample was obtained from one of the accused though prosecution was against two, would certainly justify non-interference in an appeal against acquittal. The further admission of P.W 1 extracted in the earlier part of this judgment, would show, that his version cannot be accepted without corroboration either by documentary or other oral evidence. The documents prepared during sampling do not even contain the address of P.W 2 who is stated to have been present during such operation. P.W 2 himself has not supported the, prosecution and had chosen to depose, that his signatures were taken at his residence. Due to the unsatisfactory oral and documentary evidence, I do not think that any ground has been made out to interfere with the acquittal of the respondent recorded by the trial Magistrate. This appeal shall stand dismissed.

    9. Appeal dismissed.

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    State By Food Inspector, Edapadi Municipality By Public Prosecutor v. R. Perumal .
    (Dec 19, 1990)