Sudhir Narain, J.:— This Special Appeal is directed against the order of a learned Single judge dated 28th August, 1993 whereby he stayed the operation of the order dated 28th July, 1993 passed by Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P, Meerut Region, Meerut, renewing registration certificate in favour of the appellant.

2. The facts, in brief, are that there is a religious educational institution known as Madarasa Mazahir Uloom, Mubarak Shah, Saharanpur. The respondent, Muzaffar Hussain, claimed right to manage the institution as Mutawali of the Waqf property. The members of the Managing Committee moved an application for registration of the society known as Society Madarsa Mazahir Uloom, Mubarak Shah, Saharanpur in the year 1985 under section 3 of the Societies Registration Act, 1868 (in short the ‘Act’). The respondent filed objection before the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P, Meerut Region, Meerut alleging that the Waqf was created in the name of the Madarsa and registered with the U.P Sunni Central Board of Waqf, Lucknow and he was appointed as Nazim/Mutawallia of the said Waqf and it could not be managed by any society. This objection of the respondent was repelled and the society was directed to be registered by order dated 18th October, 1985. The respondent filed Writ Petition No. 16110 of 1985. Muzaffar Hussain v. Assistant Registrar, Firms Societies and Chits, U.P, Meerut Region, Meerut. The High Court quashed the order of the Assistant Registrar dated 18th October, 1985 and directed the Assistant Registrar to refer the question of registration of the society under section 3-8 of the Act to the State Government. The State Government rejected the objection of the respondent by order dated 2nd May, 1988 and held that the appellant was entitled for registration of the society. The petitioner again filed Writ Petition No. 13741 of 1988. In the said writ petition he also filed an application for interim injunction on which notice was issued but no interim stay order was granted. The writ petition is still pending and no interim order has yet been passed in the said writ petition. The appellant was, however, granted registration certificate in pursuance of the order dated 2nd May, 1988 for a period of five year. The appellant, on 31st Mach, 1993, submitted application for renewal of the registration certificate under section 3-A of the Act before the Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P, Meerut Region, Meerut. The Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Meerut Region, Meerut by order dated 2nd July, 1993 allowed the application for renewal of the certificate of registration and granted on the same day a certificate of renewal of registration for a period of five years.

3. The respondent filed writ petition against the aforesaid order of the Deputy Registrar mainly on the aground that he had filed objectioa before the Deputy Registrar concerned but without taking into consideration the said objection the certificate of renewal of registration was issued. Learned Single Judge stayed the operation of the said order.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent had raised only those objections which he had taken at the time of grant of registration cen ficate and the same matter having been decided by the State Government, it could not, be agitated again before the Resistrar concerned. The appellant was entitled to renewal of registration certificate as a matter of right under sub-section (2) of section 3-A of the Act. The appellant was managing the institution and by staying the operation of the order of renewal of certificate of registration the appellant shall be treated as unregistered society and that would cause irreparable loss and injury to the society.

5. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent that the appeal has been filed against an interim order and no Special Appeal is maintainable under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court.

6. It is not disputed that under Chapter VIII Rule 5 a Special Appeal is maintainable only against a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court. It reads as follows.:—

“5. Special Appeal—An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (.........), of one Judge.”

(Omission and emphasis supplied)

7. There is no difficulty when the case is finally disposed of by the Court on merits but where an interim order is passed in a pending proceeding in a writ petition whether such order should be treated as a judgment, has been subject matter of consideration by various Courts. The Court has to draw a line of demarcation on a certain basic principles as to when an appeal is maintainable against an interim order and when it is incompetent against such an order.

8. The word ‘judgment’ cannot be interpreted in a narrower sense as defined under section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure which means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. The Supreme Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaban, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786, observed:—

“The concept of judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word “judgment” as used in clause 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term ‘order’ or decree anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word ‘judgment’ should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word ‘judgment’ used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word ‘judgment’ has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense.”

The word ‘judgment’ was/categorised, in three kinds:—

(1) Final Judgment—A judgment which decides all the, questions op issues in controversy so fap as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves nothing else to be decided.

(2) Preliminary Judgment—This kind of a judgment may take two forms— (a) Where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary point, (b) where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g bar of jurisdiction, res judicata etc.

(3) Intermediary or Interlocutory Judgment—Under the Civil Procedure Code most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 but besides those orders such other ordeis which possess characteristic and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding.

9. The Supreme Court was considering the nature of intermediary or interlocutory orders as judgment with respect to an order which was being passed in the suit or in the proceedings arising out of original suit. The Supreme Court, however, laid down guiding line when an interim order may be treated as a judgment. The Supreme Court laid down:—

“(1) That the trial Judge being a senior court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment otherwise the appellant court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presuption that any discretionary order which he passes must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex-facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice.

(2) That the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and rappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings.”

10. It is, thus, clear that an interim order to be a ‘judgment’ must contain trappings of finality. This may be at two stages in a writ petition:—

(i) When the writ petition is entertained and interim order is passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the respondents or if time is given for submitting objections but before such objection could be filed the order is passed which has the trappings of finality the result the writ petition is practically decided ex facie. It is termed as “pre-hearing judgment”.

(ii) Whsn an interim matter is decided after taking into consideration the objections filed by the respondents or the affidavits submitted by the parties before the Court.

11. For an order to be treated as ‘judgment’, in both the stages, it is necessary that it should have the effect of finally disposing of a writ petition and affecting the valuable rights of the parties which might ultimately be given when the writ petition is finally disposed of by the Court.

12. In State of U.P v. Kumari Renu Tiwari, 1993 (2) UP LB EC 1325, a Division Bench of this Court held that where the petitioners filed writ petition for payment of salary which was admissible to the regularly appointed lecturers and the learned Single Judge issued interim mandamus directing the respondents in the writ petition to pay salary to them in the scale of pay prescribed by University Grants Commission as claimed by them, it was held that the Court had granted the main relief in the writ petition and the order amounted to ‘pre-hearing judgment’. The Court observed that the order was not in the nature of interim order. The principle on which an interim order should be passed was laid down as follows:—

“We may now pass on to consider the parameters of an interim order. An interim order is generally passed to preserve the state of affairs obtaining on the date of institution of the proceeding. It is seldom passed to alter that position. Thus an interim order may be passed to restrain the respondent from interfering in the possession of the petitioner over an immovable property, or to stay the operation of an order of termination of service which has not taken effect, or to stay the alteration in the scale of pay. The order under appeal instead of preserving the state of affairs obtaining on the date of the filing of the writ petition alters the same by accepting the claim of parity raised by the respondents. No Exceptional circumstances has been pointed out by the learned Single Judge warranting, departure from the normal rule. The order under appeal cannot, therefore, be sustained.”

13. In Committee of Management of S.S.W Post Graduate College, Hapur, District Ghaziabad v. Sushil Kumar Sharma, 1993 (2) UP LB EC 1263, the Special Appeal was directed against an order of a learned Single Judge whereby while disposing of the stay application, passed an order directing the Committee of Management, who was respondent in the writ petition, to appoint the petitioner on the post of lecturer and gave further direction for payment of salary to him from the date of appointment and to continue the payment till he continued to hold the post. The Court held that it was a ‘judgment’ as the petitioner was granted the main relief sought for by him in the writ petition.

14. In Nagar Palika Inter College, Jaunpur v. Dr. Hawaldar Singh 1993 ESC 528, the appeal was filed against an order of a learned Single Judge whereby primary relief claimed in the writ petition was granted. The petitioner had sought appointment to the post of Principal of Nagar Palika Inter College, Jaunpur. Learned Single Judge, on the interim application, directed the respondents to appoint the petitioner as principal of Nagar Palika Inter College, Jaunpur within a month of production of a certified copy of the order before the District Inspector of Schools and farther directed to pay him salary regularly. It was held that the order contained quality of finality and therefore it was a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Chapter VIII Rule 5.

15. These are the cases where there was trappings of finality in the orders. There are, however, orders which may though cause inconvenience to the opposite party in the writ, petition, but such orders cannot be tieated to have adjudicated upon the rights of the parties or decided the controverty involved in the case. In Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. The Home Insurance Code of New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:

“In finding out whether the order is a judgment within the meaning of. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent it has to be found out that the order affects the merits of the action between the parties by determining some right and liability. The right or liability is to be found out by the Court. The nature of the order will have to be examined in order to ascertain whether there has been a determination of any right or liability.”

16. The basic test is that the decision must involve the determination of some right or liability which affects the merits of the question between the parties. The mere grant of stay order or vacating stay order in a pending writ petition does not decide any controversy on which the parties are at issue.

17. In special Appeal No. 628 of 1966, Iftikar Husain v. Shri Sharafat Ullah, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:

“An application for an interim order of stay is not based on a right, evidently it cainot be based en a right which itself is urder investigation in the main case. It is further based on a ground of expediency, the object behind it being to preserve certain state of affairs in which the final order to be passed in the case may operate to the fullest advantage. No one can claim to have a right to a particular stay order. Therefore an order granting or refusing an interim order of stay does not decide any question of right and does not amount to a judgment.”

18. The above view was followed by this Court in University of Lucknow v. State of U.P, 1972 ALH 543 and Vishnu Nath Tripathi v. Board of Revenue, U.P 1972 ALJ 985.

19. The tests laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court in Shanti Kumar R. Canji (supra) were considered in Fazir Chand v. The Financial Commissioner, Punjab, Chandigarh, AIR 1978 Pun. 269. It was held that the grant, refusal on vacation of stay during the pendency of proceedings does not involve determination of any right or liability which may ultimately affect the merits of controversy involved in the case.

20. In Special Appeal No. 586 of 1992, Virendra Singh v. Committee of Management, Lal Bahadur Shastri Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Nasirpur, Jalaun, a Special Appeal, was filed against the order of a learned Single Judge whereby the learned Single Judge provided that the operation of the order for single operation for purpose of disbursement of salary which was continuing shall continue but the respondents in the writ petition shall not restrain the petitioner in carrying out other managerial functions of the Vidyalaya. It was contended that the valuable rights of the respondents were affected and the order amounted to a ‘judgment’. The contention of the appellant was repelled and it was held that there was a dispute about constitution of Committee of Management. In such a situation the Court was not powerless to pass any interim injunction. The case of State of U.P v. Kumari Renu Tiwari (supra) was distinguished.

21. In some cases where at the time of enterainment of the writ petition, respondent in the writ petition is directed to be dispossessed without giving him opportunity of hearing, it may affect valuable rights and may amount to pre-hearing judgment but if after giving an opportunity to the respondent the Court passes an order whereby some arrangement is made till the dispute is decided, such an order is to preserve a status till the matter is finally adjudicated upon and such an order will not have a quality of finality. In each case the nature of the order will have to be examined. In case while disposing of application for inierim relief, the effect of the order passed is that it determines the right or liability of the parties, it can be treated as ‘judgment’

22. In the present case the learned Single Judge has only stayed the operationvof the order of the Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P, Meerut Region, Meerut whereby he had granted the certificate of renewal of registration of the society. There was no order that the society shall not be entitled to function. The appellant had not been dispossessed by any exparte interim order. The effect of the interim stay order is that a privilege which was conferred upon the appellant by granting of certificate of renewal of registration has been withheld.

23. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was granted registration certificate by the order of the Assistant Registrar which was challenged in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 13741 of 1988 and this Court did not grant any interim stay order in that petition. The respondent had not raised any new issues before the Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits. It was not necessary for him to decide the same controversy again by a reasoned order nor it was necessary for him to refer the matter to State Government for decision. The Tenewal of registration certificate is for five years and in case the interim stay order granted by this Court remains operative between this period, the petitioner in substance gets the relief asked for by him in the writ petition.

24. It is not necessary to decide the issues which are involved in the wrif petition. The appellant has opportunity to submit counter affidavit in the writ petition and to move application to vacate the stay order. The learned Single Judge has by interim order only stayed the operation of the impugned order and has not adjudicate upon any rights of the parties. There is no reason if the petitioner submits an application to vacate stay order, the same shall not be decided expeditiously by the, learned Single Judge.

25. In view of the above, the Special Appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.

26. Appeal dismissed.