Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit to restrain two arbitration proceedings pending before the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. By a contract, dated 1st December 1917, made on the ordinary form of the Indian Jute Manufacturers Association, the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant three lacs of yards of Hessian cloth. The terms which require consideration in this appeal were three:
“Delivery of the said goods to be given and taken as follows: December 1917.
Each month's delivery to be treated as a distinct and separate contract.
Any dispute whatsoever arising on or out of this contract shall be referred to arbitration under the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, applicable for the time being, for decision and such decision shall be accepted as final and binding on both parties to this contract. The award may, at the instance of either party and without any notice to the other of them, be made a rule of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William.”
2. These three terms are all part of the printed form with the exception of the words “December, 1917” at the end of the first.
3. Of the three lacs of yards contracted for, one-half lac was duly delivered and may now be ignored. No delivery was in fact made of any part of the remainder, which divides itself into three separate lots. As regards the first lot of 50,000 yards which was not delivered, on 28th February 1918 the defendant demanded arbitration by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and proceedings were confined to this particular claim. On 25th July 1918 on this portion of the claim an award was made by the Board in favour of the plaintiff with costs and interest. Subsequently, on 9th April 1918 and 21st June 1918, two other arbitration proceedings were started by the buyer and the object of the present suit is to stay these proceedings before the Chamber of Commeree. Rankin, J., has held that there is no foundation for the claim. In our opinion this conclusion is so manifestly right, on the terms of the contract itself, that it is not necessary to elaborate the matter.
4. The clause which opens with the words “any dispute whatsoever arising on or out of this contract shall be referred to arbitration,” obviously means that each and every dispute as it arises, on or out of this contract, shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. As each month's delivery was to be treated as a distinct and separate contract, the defendant properly obtained an award as regards the first portion of his claim; this clearly does not prevent him from proceeding with arbitration in respect of matters arising out of subsequent breaches of contract. We agree with Rankin, J., that as in the present case there were several and separate contracts, there is no foundation for the contention that the right conferred by the arbitration clause was fully exhausted as soon as a complete award was made upon the first reference. We may add that the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Chandanmull v. Donald Campbell and Co. (1) shows that there may be successive awards even in the same matter. There, a dispute arose as to the effect of the award on the first arbitration; for the settlement of this dispute a second reference to arbitration was made; it was ruled that such second arbitration was valid.
5. There is thus no substance in the appeal, which must be dismissed with costs.
Fletcher, J.:— I agree.
6. Appeal dismissed.