The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— This is an appeal against an order passed by the District Court of North Arcot in execution proceedings. The decree sought to be executed is a compromise decree, dated 25th March 1895. The execution petition, which was dismissed by the learned District Judge as barred by Section 48 of the CPC was filed on 10th December 1909, more, than. 12 years from the date of the ???. The decree-holder put forward ??? arguments in support of his contention ??? not bar his claim Those arguments might be formulated thus:
(1) Though the decree is dated in 1895 it became executable only in ??? and according to the true construction of Section 48, Clause 1(a) of the CPC, the 12 years beyond which execution should be refused commenced from 1898 when the decree became executable, and not from 1895 when the decree was passed.
(2) If however such is not the true construction of S. 48, Cl. 1(a), then it must be held that S. 48 does not cover all kinds of decrees and that its provisions do not apply at all to a decree which is not executable on the date of its passing, and that therefore the disability to execute after 12 years does not apply to such a decree.
(3) If contentions (1) and (2) above are both unsustainable, the decree in this case might be treated as one “directing the delivery” of a property “at a certain date,” thus to come under S. 48, Cl. 1(b), the 12 years having then to be counted from 1898.
(4) If all the above three contentions are unsustainable, it is lastly argued that the present execution petition of December 1909 might be treated as a mere application to continue the proceedings in the former Execution Petition No. 74 of 1899, which was granted but which has not yet been finally disposed of, in which case Section 48 of the CPC, which prohibits only a fresh application after 12 years does not call for consideration at all.
2. These four contentions put forward on behalf of the decree-holder (appellant) have been met by various counter-arguments advanced by Mr. S. Srinivasa Aiyangar who appeared for the judgment-debtor (respondent). Very numerous authorities were quoted and discussed on both sides. I think it necessary to refer only to the more important of them in this judgment, an exhaustive consideration of all the cases, being not likely to lead to greater celerity of expression on my part.
3. As regards the first contention, the case in Narhar Raghunath Naphad v. Krishnaji Govind(1) is direct authority in support of the appellant's arguments. That decision however was critically analyzed by Mr. S. Srinivasa Aiyangar who asked us not to follow it. It must be admitted that the construction placed by Chandavarkar and Batchelor, JJ., in that case on the words in S. 48, Cl. 1(a) is prima facie a little forced. While that clause provides that no fresh application ??? after the expiration of 12 years “from the date of the decree sought to be executed” shall be granted, the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court expand that clause as if it stood thus: (a1) “The date of the decree sought to be executed” where the decree is at once capable of execution, and (a2) where the decree becomes executable only on a subsequent date; the date when it so becomes executable. Whether Cl. 1(a) as it stands is logically capable of this rather wide extension, is not free from doubt—such an extension may carry out the real intentions of the legislature, or it may be that the legislature lost sight of the contingency of the date of the decree not being always the date when it becomes executable the learned Judges supplied the omission carrying out what would have been the provision made by the legislature if they had not forgotten that contingency. The legislature probably committed a similar oversight when enacting the provision contained in the present Article 182, Limtation Act (old Article 179). That article provides generally a period of three years for the limitation of execution proceedings; and para. 1, column 3 which relates to the commencing period of limitation mentions “the date of the decree” as the starting date. It seems to me clear that the legislature assumed without warrant that all the decrees without exception are capable of immediate execution.
4. However the Courts found in the Limitation Act, Sch. 2, itself a prior Article 181 (old Article 178), which relates to “applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere” and the time from which the period begins to run is mentioned in Col. 3 of that article as “when the right to apply accrues.” The Courts accordingly held that Article 182, Col. 3, Cl. (2), did not apply to the execution of a decree which is not executable on the date of its passing, but that Article 181 applied to the execution of such a decree though Col. 1, Article 182 refers generally to “a decree of any civil Court, that is in any and every decree or order of all civil Courts. The learned Judges who decided the case in Narhar Raghunath Naphad v. Krishnaji Govind fortified their rather forced interpretation of Section 48 of the CPC, by referring to the interpretation of Article 182, Lamination Act. (old Article 179) by the Allahabad High Court in Muhammad Suleman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Khan(2) Mr. S. Srinivasa Aiyanger contends that the harsh provisions of Article 182 (Sch. 2, Limitation Act) could be and were more easily got over by the Courts, because in that same Limitation Act another Article 181 could be made to cover those hard cases which would be affected if the provisions of Article 182 were applied literally, whereas there is no other section in the Code of Civil Procedure which could be resorted to save decrees which fall under S. 48, Cl. 1(a). This of course, assumes that just as the Limitation Act was intended to provide exhaustively periods of limitation for the execution of all kinds of decrees, the Code of Civil Procedure wished to bar all decrees after a period of 12 year calculated from some date or other. This question, whether S. 48 was intended to apply exhaustively to all decrees (except, of course, to decrees for injunctions expressly excluded from its provisions under the new Code of 1908), has also to be considered when discussing the second contention on behalf of the appellant. I need only say that the development of the law by judicial decisions does not always follow an entirely logical course, and as the decision in Narhar Raghunath Naphad v. Krishnaji Govind seems to be an equitable decision, whether it can be based upon a strict logical construction of S. 48, Cl. 1(a), or not I would feel inclined to follow it if it was necessary to do so in this case. I do not think however, having regard to my opinion about the fourth contention of the appellant (which opinion of mine is in his favour), that it is necessary that I should express a decided view in this case as to whether the decision in Narhar Raghunath Naphad v. Krishnaji Govind should he followed or not.
5. Before leaving this subject, I mights shortly notice the contention of Mr. S. Srinivasa Aiyangar, that according to the true construction of the decree in this ??? did not become executable even in ??? that it is still unexecutable and that the execution petition is therefore premature. The particular provisions of the very complicated decree (now sought to be executed) which are material to be stated for the decision of this appeal are to the following effect:
“That defendant 1 do execute a deed in favour of plaintiff 2 empowering plaintiff 2 to enjoy ¼th share in certain villages within a, month from the date of demand by plaintiff 2, that the right to make the demand shall accrue to plaintiff 2 as soon as the Original Suit No. 14 of 1894 on the file of the District Court of North Arcot, is disposed of and as soon as a sacred tank (named in the decree) is provided with steps on four sides to be constructed by defendant 1 and that the construction of the said steps should be completed by defendant 1 within three years from the date of the decree.”
6. Defendant 1's contention is that the steps of the tank have not yet been completed and that the execution petition is therefore premature. It may be that on a strict construction of the decree it is really unexecutable till defendant 1 chooses to complete the construction of the steps of the sacred tank. But in the order on a previoue Execution Petition No. 74 of 1899, between these same parties, it has been decided by the High Court (confirming the lower Court's decision) that defendant 1 cannot prevent the decree becoming executable by delaying to complete the construction of the steps of the tank and that on the true construction of the decree, (a) that decree became executable when the Suit No. 14 of 1894 was decided, if the decision in that suit took place after three years from the date of the passing of the decree, (b) that it became executable within those three years if both the decisions in Suit No. 14 of 1894 and the construction of the steps took place within three years, on the date when the later of the said two events took place; and (c) that if the decision of Original Suit No. 14 of 1894 took place within three years, but the construction of the steps did not take place within three years, the decree became executable on the expiry of the three years. At least that is how I understand the reasoning on which Execution Petition No. 74 of 1899 was decided by the High Court. If so that decision has adjudication the dispute between the parties on the question and that adjudication being res judicata, Mr. S. Srinivasa Aiyangar's contention on this point cannot therefore be accepted: see Subba Chariar v. Muthuveeram Pillai(3) on the question of res judicata in interpreting decrees.
7. The second contention is based on the argument that Section 48 of the CPC, which excludes from the effect of its provisions only decrees granting injunctions, should not be treated as intended to affect exhaustively all other kinds of decrees, and just as the words in the first column of Article 182, Sch. 2, Lim. Act, were held not to include decrees not capable of execution on the dates of their being passed, so Section 48 of the CPC, should also be held not to include such decrees. It seems to me however to be very difficult to hold that when decrees granting the relief of injunction are expressly excluded in Section 48 of the CPC, any other kinds of decrees not so expressly excluded were intended to be left out of consideration in enacting the twelve years' rule. It seems easier to hold that all other decrees were intended to be affected by the legislature, but the period for the commencement of twelve years was to be calculated in the case of a decree not immediately executable from the date when it became executable, as was held in Narhar Raghunath Naphad v. Krishnaji Govind, than to hold that no period of twelve years calculated from any date could bar fresh applications for execution of such a decree.
8. The third contention is that the direction in the decree ordering the first defendant to execute a transfer document for the ¼th share in the villages in plaintiff 2's favour might be treated as a decree directing the “delivery of property” (the property being the transfer deed) and that in that case Cl. 1(b), S. 48 might apply; that the “certain date” referred to in that clause is in this case the expiry of three years from the date of decree and that the date from which the twelve years' period runs is, therefore 1898.
9. I was at first inclined to the view that a decree directing execution of a conveyance might come under the expression “directs… the delivery of any property” found in S. 48, Cl. 1(b); and though, on a further consideration, I feel some doubts as to whether a decree for specific relief relating to execution of a document was intended by the legislature to be included in the phrase “directs… the delivery of any property,” I am not satisfied that my opinion first formed is erroneous. Assuming then that S. 48 Cl. 1(b), can be applied, was the delivery of property directed to be made “at a, certain date” in this case, that is, was the delivery of the conveyance directed to be made at a certain date” within the meaning of S. 48, Cl. 1(b)? I have already set out the relevant provisions of the decree according to the construction put upon those provisions in Execution Petn. No. 74 of 1899. Those provisions show that far from “a certain date” being mentioned in the decree, the execution of the transfer deed might have taken place within three years of the decree in certain contingencies, that it might take place on some date more than three years after the decree in certain other contingencies (that is, if Original Suit No. 14 of 1894 was decided more than three years after the date of the decree), and that on a third set of contingencies, the transfer-deed was to be executed just one month after the expiry of three years from the date of the decree. 1 do not think therefore that S. 48, Cl. 1(b), can be applied in this case.
10. The final contention on the appellant's side is that the present application, so far as it seeks to obtain a conveyance of the Dasabhandam income of share in the villages, is only an application to continue the proceedings in an old Application No. 74 of 1899. As I intimated already, my opinion is in favour of the appellant on this contention.
11. In Chalavadi Kotiah v. Paloori Alimelammah(4) it was decided that where an execution petition was dismissed by the Munsif (even though the District Judge had ordered the Munsif only to stay execution), and where such a dismissal order was passed without notice and in the absence of both parties, such an order of dismissal cannot be regarded as an order passed between the parties at all, that it amounted to no more than a direction to the officers of the Court to remove the proceedings from the pending list and that the order of dismissal had not got the effect of closing the proceedings, and they must be considered to have been still pending. On this view it was held that, not withing the dismissal of the prior execution petition in December 1891, an application made in 1905 might be treated as one to continue the proceedings in the prior application of 1899 so far as the application of 1905 contained the same prayer (namely, the sale of attached property) as was contained in the previous application of 1899. I think the case which we are now deciding is a stronger case for the decree-holder than that in Chalavadi Kotiah v. Poloori Alimelammah. In that case the former execution petition of 1899 had been wrongly dismissed and yet it was held to be pending because the dismissal was unauthorized by law. Here, so far as the records go, the prayers in the prior Execution Application No. 74 of 1699 were fully granted both by the District Court and the High Court. Then there is an entry on 21st September 1900 that defendant 1 was arrested at the instance of the decree-holder's representative (plaintiff 2's widow) for the recovery of moneys (about Rs. 6,000 odd) due to her under the decree; and that he was afterwards released. There is no order dismissing the petition. As regards the prayer for the execution of the transfer deed, the learned District Judge says in his order under appeal: “Apparently, a draft transfer deed on a stamped paper was filed by the petitioner in Court. It cannot be ascertained from the records in Execution Petition No. 74 of 1899 whether the petitioner abandoned her application for the execution of a transfer deed by respondent or why the transfer deed was not executed by the Court.” Apparently also there is nothing to show that the execution petition was dismissed, struck off or otherwise disposed of.
12. In Subba Chariar v. Muthuveeram Pillai it was held that an application “intended to revive and carry through a pending execution is not covered by Article 179, Lim. Act (15 of 1877), as it is not an application ??? initiate a new execution” and that “the right to apply to continue execution in such cases accrues from day to day and will not be barred until three years have elapsed after the proceedings have ceased to be pending”: see also Venkatappiah v. Jagannadha Row(5) where it was held that an application for execution is pending until it is validly disposed of. I am prepared to follow the dicta in these cases and I therefore hold that, so far as the present execution petition of 1909 relates to the carrying out of the order passed in Execution Petition No. 74 of 1899, directing the defendant 1 to execute a deed of transfer in respect of ¼th share of the Dasabhandam in certain villages in favour of plaintiff 2's widow, it is not a fresh application and the provisions of Section 48 of the CPC, do not therefore apply to it. So far however as the present execution prays for the recovery of the amount due as mesne profits for ten faslis (faslis 1309 to 1318) to plaintiff 2's widow on the said ¼th share I would dismiss it as the decree does not give any such relief to plaintiff 2. In this view it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the application for such relief is a fresh application in execution to which the provisions of Section 48 of the CPC, become attracted.
13. It was argued by Mr. S. Srinivasa Aiyangar that as the records in Execution Petition No. 74 of 1899 may not be now forthcoming, it may be difficult to find out what the terms of the draft transfer deed filed by the appellant in Execution Petition No. 74 of 1899 were and hence the Courts would find it impossible to continue these proceedings. I have held in Kamakshamma v. Emperor(6) that a Court has inherent power to construct records whish had disappeared from its custody. The stamp paper already filed by plaintiff 2's widow might be replaced by a new stamp paper and the terms of the draft transfer deed then filed by her might be reconstructed on the evidence and affidavits adduced and filed by the parties.
14. In the result, while confirming the lower Court's decision so far as it dismisses the prayer for the recovery of mesne profits, I would set it aside so far as it refuses the relief for the execution of a transfer deed by defendant 1 and I would direct the learned District Judge to hear and dispose of that prayer, treating it as a continuation the corresponding portion of the proceedings in Execution Petition No. 74 of 1890. The parties will bear their respective costs in this appeal.
Napier, J.:— I concur with my learned brother in the order proposed for the reason given in the latter part of his judgment. Speaking for myself I have still greater doubts than he has of the correctness of the construction of S. 48 in Narhar Raghunath Naphad v. Krishnaji Govind and of Article 182 (old Article 179) in Muhammad Suleman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Khan.
S.N/R.K
15. Appeal party allowed.