Chandavarkar, J.:— The document (exhibit 29) which embodies the terms of a compromise between the parties has been apparently treated by the learned District Judge as a sale, which under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act requires a delivery of possession in order to validate it. But the terms of the deed do not bring the transaction within the category of a sale, as defined in that Act. The document in question merely embodied a compromise between the parties, and, as held by the Privy Council in Rani Mewa Kuwar v. Rani Hulas Kuwar, the nature of a compromise is that it is an acknowledgment of the existing rights of the parties. No delivery of possession was necessary in this case in order to give effect to the compromise that being the only point argued here, we reverse the District Judges decree and restore that of the Subordinate Judge with costs both of the second appeal and the appeal in the lower Court on the respondent.
Decree reversed.
R.R