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  • Section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908),
  • section, Section 114 of the Code (Act V of 1908),
  • Section 540 of the Code (Act XIV of 188)2
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • Section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908),
  • section, Section 114 of the Code (Act V of 1908),
  • Section 540 of the Code (Act XIV of 188)2
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses a preliminary objection concerning the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain a Review in appeals preferred under Section 15 of the Letters Patent. The matter involves interpretation of statutory provisions and established practice regarding review proceedings in appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court can entertain a Review in appeals preferred under Section 15 of the Letters Patent.
  2. Whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Sections 114 and 117, apply to Reviews in appeals under the Letters Patent.
  3. Whether longstanding judicial practice permitting such Reviews should influence the Court's decision despite strict statutory interpretation.

Arguments of the Parties

Mr. Subrahmanya Ayyar's Arguments

  • The High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Review applications in appeals under Section 15 of the Letters Patent.
  • The decision in Hafiz Muhammad Moshin v. Sheo Prasad was followed but gave no reasoned basis for this conclusion.
  • The Letters Patent’s Clause 44 does not empower Courts to supplement the Letters Patent by importing acts passed by the Governor-General in Council except to fill omissions.
  • Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which governs Review, applies only to decrees or orders passed under the Code and thus cannot apply to appeals under the Letters Patent.
  • Relied on Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti to argue Section 15 of the Letters Patent is not controlled by the Code of Civil Procedure.

Court's Counter-Arguments

  • Clause 44 empowers the Governor-General in Council to legislate to supplement omissions in the Letters Patent, including incorporation of Review provisions via Section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 114 does not restrict Review to orders passed under the Code alone; the word "order" includes judgments as held in Krishen Doyal v. Irshad Ali.
  • The decision in Sabhapathi Chetti did not deny the competence of the Governor-General in Council to supplement appeal remedies with Review.
  • Decisions cited by Mr. Subrahmanya Ayyar regarding self-contained Acts do not affect the applicability of Review provisions here.
  • Longstanding practice of allowing Reviews in appeals under the Letters Patent supports entertaining such applications.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hafiz Muhammad Moshin v. Sheo Prasad (1904) 1 A.L.J. 509 High Court's jurisdiction on Review under Letters Patent appeals Noted as res integra; decision gave no reason for conclusion; court disagreed with the objection based on this precedent.
Krishen Doyal v. Irshad Ali (1915) 22 C.L.J. 525 Interpretation that "decree or order" includes a judgment Supported the applicability of Section 114 Review provisions to appeals under Letters Patent.
Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti (1902) I.L.R. 26 Mad. 555 Section 15 of Letters Patent not controlled by Code of Civil Procedure Clarified that unlimited appeal power under Section 15 is not taken away by implication; did not preclude supplementary remedies like Review.
Babaji bin Patloji v. Babaji bin Mahadu (1891) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 650;
Lala Pryag Lal v. Jai Narayan Singh (1895) I.L.R. 22 Calc. 419;
Nana bin Aba v. Sheku bin Andu (1908) I.L.R. 82 Bom. 337
Self-contained Acts should not be supplemented by Code of Civil Procedure provisions Held not applicable to the present question of Review under Letters Patent appeals.
Ravi Veeraraghavulu v. Venkata Narasimha Naidu Bahadur (1914) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 443 (P.C.) Longstanding judicial practice should not be lightly departed from Supported upholding the practice of allowing Reviews in appeals under Letters Patent despite strict statutory construction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the preliminary objection that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Reviews in appeals under Section 15 of the Letters Patent. It found the objection unpersuasive, noting that Clause 44 of the Letters Patent permits the Governor-General in Council to legislate to supplement omissions. Through Section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Review provisions were incorporated into the Letters Patent. The Court rejected the argument that Section 114 of the Code applies only to orders passed under the Code, explaining that appeals under the Letters Patent result in decrees passed under the Code, and the definition of "order" includes judgments. The Court also distinguished earlier decisions that restrict supplementing self-contained Acts, holding they do not affect the present issue. Furthermore, the Court placed weight on the longstanding practice of allowing Reviews in such appeals, citing the principle that such practice should not be lightly disturbed. Ultimately, the Court stated that it would only interfere in Review by upsetting factual conclusions of the appellate Judges, which it was unwilling to do in this case.

Holding and Implications

The petitions for Review are dismissed with costs.

The Court overruled the preliminary objection and affirmed that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain Reviews in appeals under Section 15 of the Letters Patent. The decision reinforces the incorporation of Review provisions via legislative supplementation and upholds the longstanding judicial practice permitting such Reviews. No new precedent was set beyond confirming the existing jurisdiction and practice, and the Court declined to interfere with the factual conclusions reached by the appellate Judges.

    Atyam Venkatasubbarayadu And Two Others (S In Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 26 And 28 Of 1912) v. Sri Rajah Velugoti Govinda Krishna Yachendrulu Varu Bahadur, Zamindar Garu ( In The Letters Patent Appeals) .

    1. Mr. Subrahmanya Ayyar has taken the preliminary objection that the High Court cannot entertain a Review in appeals preferred under Section 15 of the Letters Patent. The question is practically res integra as the decision in Hafiz Muhammad Moshin v. Sheo Prasad (1904) 1 A.L.J. 509 in which the point was directly raised, gives no reason for the conclusion arrived at.

    2. After hearing the matter fully argued by the learned vakils on either side, we are of opinion that there is no force in the objection. Clause 44 of the Letters Patent says that the provisions are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council. As at present advised, we are in agreement with Mr. Subrahmanya Ayyar that this provision would not enable Courts, by implication, to supplement the Letters Patent by importing into it all acts ejusdem generis passed by the Governor-General in Council and that the provision is only intended to empower the Governor-General in Council to legislate with a view to supplement omissions in the Letters Patent. Even in this view, we think that by Section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), the Governor-General in Council did incorporate into the Letters Patent the provisions relating to Review. It was then argued that the Review section, Section 114 of the Code (Act V of 1908), cannot apply as it provides only for the review of decrees or orders passed under the Code of Civil Procedure. We are not impressed by this argument. In the first place, decrees are passed in appeals heard under the Letters Patent only under the Code of Civil Procedure. In the second place, Clause (b) of Section 114 does not require that orders and decrees should have been passed under the Code. Further the word decree or order includes a judgment: Krishen Doyal v. Irshad Ali (1915) 22 C.L.J. 525. Mr. Subrahmanya Ayyar relies on Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti (1902) I.L.R. 26 Mad. 555 for the proposition that Section 15 of the Letters Patent is not controlled by the Code of Civil Procedure. All that was decided in that case was that as Section 15 had given an unlimited power of appeal against every judgment of a single Judge, the Governor-General in Council should not be understood to have taken away by implication that power of the litigant by making Section 540 of the Code (Act XIV of 188)2 applicable to Chartered High Courts. This does not contravene the principle that it is competent to the Governor-General in Council to supplement the remedy of appeal by giving an additional remedy by way of review to the litigant.

    3. The decisions in Babaji bin Patloji v. Babaji bin Mahadu (1891) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 650, Lala Pryag Lal v. Jai Narayan Singh (1895) I.L.R. 22 Calc. 419 and Nana bin Aba v. Sheku bin Andu (1908) I.L.R. 82 Bom. 337, only lay down that a self-contained Act should not be added to by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. This does not affect the present question.

    4. Mr. Ramachandra Ayyar has referred us to two reported cases and to an unreported decision in which reviews under similar circumstances were entertained. Apparently the practice of this High Court has been in favour of allowing reviews to be filed in appeals under the Letters Patent.

    5. It was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Ravi Veeraraghavulu v. Venkata Narasimha Naidu Bahadur (1914) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 443 (P.C.) that even though a strict construction of the law may not permit of the entertainment of appeals, a longstanding practice of the Court should not be lightly departed from in that respect. What relates to appeals, applies mutatis mutandis to reviews also. We must therefore overrule the preliminary objections.

    6. If we are to interfere in review in these cases, it can only be by upsetting conclusions of fact at which the learned Judges who heard the appeal arrived. We are not prepared to adopt this procedure.

    7. The petitions are dismissed with costs.

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