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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Abdur Rahim, J.; Napier, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application to revise an order of acquittal passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate in appeal in a case in which the accused were originally convicted by a Second-class Magistrate of offences under sections 147, 355 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code.

On appeal the Appellate Magistrate found that the charge of rioting (section 147) could not be sustained and acquitted the accused of that offence. The Appellate Magistrate also acquitted the accused of offences under sections 323 and 355 on the ground that there had been a valid composition of those offences within the meaning of section 345 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the complainant laid the charge in Court.

The present opinion addresses an application to revise that order of acquittal. Two principal legal questions were identified by the Court in the course of considering the application, and the Court examined the factual findings made by the Sub-divisional Magistrate concerning whether a completed composition had in fact taken place.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under section 345, Criminal Procedure Code, a composition once arrived at by the injured person can be resiled from by that person after the composition has been made, or whether the composition is final and the Court should, upon proof of a composition, acquit the accused.
  2. Whether a composition that takes place before any complaint has been laid in Court by the person injured is covered by the provisions of section 345, Criminal Procedure Code (i.e., whether an out-of-court composition prior to lodging a complaint can have the effect of an acquittal under section 345).

Arguments of the Parties

Complainant's Arguments

  • The complainant argued that he did not accept the alleged composition and had not even agreed to the arbitration that was said to have produced the composition.
  • It was argued on behalf of the complainant that the use of the words "offence" and "accused" in section 345 shows that the composition contemplated by the section is one arrived at after a complaint has been laid and there is an accused person before the Court.

Prosecution / Public Prosecutor

  • Learned public prosecutor pointed out that it may be difficult to say whether a composition was lawful or unlawful unless the facts had been considered by the Court; emphasized the problem arising from the words "offence" and "accused" in the section.
  • Both the learned public prosecutor and the learned counsel for the petitioner did not urge any arguments against the decision in Kanni Rowther v. Inayathalla Sahib (i.e., they did not oppose the principle laid down in that case).

Accused / Petitioner's Counsel

  • The counsel for the petitioner (the accused) did not press arguments against the earlier decision in Kanni Rowther v. Inayathalla Sahib, and the Court notes no substantive adverse argument from that side on the principle established by that decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kanni Rowther v. Inayathalla Sahib Held that it is not necessary, for section 345, CrPC to operate, that the complainant after the composition has been arrived at should still be of the same mind and join the accused in asking the Court that the case should be dismissed; once composition is made the matter is at an end and the person injured cannot thereafter effectively resile. Abdur Rahim, J. followed this decision and found no sufficient reason to take a different view; Napier, J. expressly agreed with it.
Murray v. The Queen Empress Ruling of the Calcutta High Court cited in support of the proposition that an out-of-court composition can operate so as to bar prosecution. Abdur Rahim, J. stated he followed this ruling in reaching the conclusion that a composition, once made, may be effective without the parties having to repeat it before the Court.
Kusam Bewa v. Bechu Bewa Another Calcutta High Court ruling proceeding upon the same principle as Murray v. The Queen Empress (i.e., supports the same proposition regarding composition). Reference used to show established authority supporting the view that composition may be valid when made out of Court.
Keir v. Leeman Lord Denman's proposition that the law will permit a compromise of all offences for which the injured party might sue and recover damages, though if the offence is of a public nature no agreement is valid if founded on stifling a prosecution. Abdur Rahim, J. cited this case to support the view adopted in the Criminal Procedure Code that a composition is not necessarily invalid because it took place before any complaint was laid.
The Queen v. Burgess Early authority cited to show that the offence of illegal compounding (e.g., "theft-bote") could be committed before any charge had been laid; demonstrates compounding can occur in relation to matters not before the Court. Napier, J. relied on this historical authority (via Lord Coke's language) to show that illegal compounding can be committed before any charge and thus lawful compounding under CrPC should similarly cover out-of-court agreements.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court divided its analysis into two interrelated legal questions and then examined the facts as found by the lower magistrate.

1. Whether a complainant can resile after a composition (interpretation of section 345)

Abdur Rahim, J. held that once there has been a composition of an offence compoundable under the Criminal Procedure Code the matter is at an end and the person injured cannot afterwards effectively resile from the agreement. If the injured person does attempt to resile, it is for the Court to inquire into the accused's allegation that the offence was compounded out of Court and, if the Court finds that it was so compounded, to acquit the accused under section 345. In reaching this conclusion the Court followed prior authority (including Kanni Rowther and the Calcutta rulings).

Napier, J. concurred, emphasizing that the sole question is whether there was a contract; once a valid contract (composition) is established, there is nothing in principle permitting a party to resile from it and then lay a charge which he had agreed for consideration not to lay.

2. Whether an out-of-court composition made before any complaint is laid falls within section 345

Abdur Rahim, J. rejected the argument based on the words "offence" and "accused" that section 345 requires the composition to be made only after a complaint is laid and an accused is before the Court. He reasoned that an "offence" is complete when the acts constituting it have been committed, irrespective of whether any complaint or charge has been laid. The reference to "the accused" in paragraph 6 of section 345 merely describes his character at the time of trial when the effect of a composition comes under consideration.

He noted that for certain classes of offences the legislature requires Court permission before composition will operate; in those cases the composition's operation is suspended until the Court sanctions it. But for other compoundable offences where no permission is required, there is no apparent reason to insist the composition be made only after the accused has been brought before the Court.

Abdur Rahim further observed that the exception in section 214 of the Penal Code — which exempts from the provisions against compounding those cases which may lawfully be compounded — would lead to an untenable position if compositions made before a charge was laid were not treated as compounding: under the prosecution's contention, compounding certain offences before a charge would not be an offence, a proposition the Court found unacceptable.

Napier, J. reinforced this line of reasoning by noting historical authorities showing that illegal compounding can be committed before any charge is laid, and by stressing the close connection between illegal and lawful compounding: the Penal Code exception contemplates lawful compounding under section 345, and the same principles applied to compounding before proceedings are initiated.

3. Application of the legal analysis to the facts of the present case

On the factual side Abdur Rahim, J. was not satisfied that the Sub-divisional Magistrate had clearly determined whether there was a completed agreement within the meaning of section 345. The record showed an arbitration in which the arbitrator decided that accused No. 1 was to pay Rs. 300 to the complainant, but:

  • The complainant asserted he did not accept the composition and had not agreed to arbitration;
  • The Sub-divisional Magistrate did not reach a clear conclusion on whether the Rs. 300 was actually paid before the complaint was lodged or whether the complainant was satisfied with a mere promise to pay;
  • The amount was not actually paid before the complaint was lodged, and unless the compounding was completed before the complaint an incomplete agreement would not amount to an acquittal within the meaning of the law.

Because there was no clear finding by the Appellate Magistrate on whether a complete and valid composition (within section 345) had occurred in respect of sections 323 and 355, Abdur Rahim, J. concluded the acquittal on those charges could not stand and the matter should be remanded for rehearing on those specific issues.

Napier, J. agreed, observing that the Sub-divisional Magistrate appeared to misunderstand the alleged composition (for example, treating an agreement by one prosecution witness to abide by arbitrators' decision as necessarily amounting to a contract not to prosecute). Napier recommended that the Sub-divisional Magistrate should examine whether the panchayatdars decided that the complainant accepted a promise of payment or that, if payment were made, no complaint should be laid.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The Appellate Magistrate's acquittal of the accused on the rioting charge (section 147) was upheld.
  • The order acquitting the accused on charges under sections 323 and 355 of the Indian Penal Code was set aside, and the appeal was remanded to be reheard and disposed of by the Appellate Magistrate on those charges in the light of the Court's observations regarding the requirements for a completed composition under section 345, CrPC.

Implications:

  • The direct practical consequence is that the accused remain acquitted on the rioting charge (section 147), but the acquittals on sections 323 and 355 have been vacated and those matters must be reconsidered by the Appellate Magistrate with specific attention to whether a valid and completed composition (within section 345) occurred before the complaint was lodged.
  • The Court's opinion adheres to and applies earlier authorities (including Kanni Rowther, Murray v. The Queen Empress, Kusam Bewa, and Keir v. Leeman) and does not purport to depart from those precedents; it clarifies that composition under section 345 may operate where made out of Court prior to the laying of a complaint, subject where necessary to court sanction for particular classes of offences.
This summary is prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond what appears in that text.

    Kumaraswami Chetty (Complainant) v. Kuppuswami Chetty (Accused) .

    Abdur Rahim, J.:— This is an application to revise an order of acquittal passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate in appeal in a case in which the accused were convicted by a Second-class Magistrate of offences under sections 147, 355 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The Appellate Magistrate found that the charge of rioting could not be sustained upon the evidence and thereupon acquitted the accused of that offence. That acquittal must in my opinion stand, as no sufficient reason has been made out for interference with that part of the order of the Appellate Magistrate. He has acquitted the accused of charges under sections 323 and 355 on the ground that there had been a valid composition of those offences within the meaning of section 345, Criminal Procedure Code, before the complainant laid the charge in Court. There are two questions of law which arise in connexion with this matter. First of all, a doubt has been expressed by Oldfield, J., who admitted this application with regard to a decision of mine in Kanni Rowther v. Inayathalla Sahib(1) in which it was laid down that it was not necessary, for section 345, Criminal Procedure Code, to operate, that the complainant, after the composition has been arrived at, should still be of the same mind and join the accused in asking the Court that the case should be dismissed as there has been a valid composition. Once there has been a composition of an offence compoundable under the Criminal Procedure Code, the matter is at an end and the person injured cannot afterwards effectively resile from the agreement. If he chooses to do so, it is for the Court to enquire into the allegation of the accused that the offence was compounded out of Court and if it finds that it was so compounded, to acquit the accused under the provisions of section 345. In holding this view, I followed a ruling of Calcutta High Court—Murray v. The Queen Empress(2), There is also another ruling of the same Court Kusam Bewa v. Bechu Bewa(3) which proceeds upon the same principle. Both learned public prosecutor and the learned counsel who appeared for the petitioner urged no arguments against the decision in Kanni Rowther v. Inayathalla Sahib and on giving the question my best consideration again, I do not find any sufficient reasons for taking a different view.

    The next point of law that has been discussed relates to the question whether a composition which takes place before any complaint has been laid in Court by the person injured is covered by the provisions of section 345. In its first part the section says that the offences described in the table attached may be compounded by the parsons mentioned in the third column of the table. Looking at the third column, we find that the persons who can compound these offences are, generally speaking, the persons injured and not a person who has already laid a charge in Court. When the person injured has entered into a composition, that composition is complete; and paragraph 6 of the section lays down whats the effect of such a composition is. It says that

    “the composition of these offences under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused.”

    It is argued that the use of the words “offence” and “accused” shows that the composition which is contemplated is one arrived at after a complaint has been laid and there is an accused person before the Court. I cannot accept this argument as at all sound. An offence is complete when the acts constituting it have been committed apart from whether any complaint or charge has been laid before the Court or not. The allusion to “the accused” in paragraph 6 of section 345 only describes his character at the time of the trial when the question of the effect of the composition is under consideration. As regards certain classes of offences which may be compounded, the legislature provides that they may be compounded only with the permission of the Court. In those cases, the operation of the composition is necessarily suspended until the Court sanctions it. But in the other cases, no such permission is needed and no reason is apparent to me or has been suggested why the legislature having permitted certain classes of offences to be compounded by the parties themselves, without any reference to Court, should insist that composition should be arrived at after the person alleged to have committed the offence has been brought before the Court. In the absence of clear language showing that was the intention of the Legislature, I should not be prepared to impute to it any such intention. I think it is quite clear upon the interpretation of section 345 that the contention on behalf of the complainant on this point cannot be sustained. It is unnecessary therefore to discuss the English law on the subject to which some reference has been made at the bar. But I may point out that so far as I have been able to go into the matter, Keir v. Leeman supports the view which I have indicated as the one adopted in the Criminal Procedure Code rather than otherwise. This was a judgment of Lord Denman, C.J, and he, after reviewing the cases at some length, laid down the following proposition on the subject of compromise of offences:—

    “We shall probably be safe in laying it down that the law will permit a compromise of all offences though made the subject of a criminal prosecution, for which offences the injured party might sue and recover damages in an action. It is often the only manner in which he can obtain redress. But, if the offence is of a public nature, no agreement can be valid that is founded on the consideration of stifling a prosecution for it.”

    The Exact point we have to consider here was not before the learned Judges in that case, but the proposition seems to imply that a composition of an offence of a particular description would be not the less valid because it took place before any complaint was laid in Court. Then the exception to section 214 of the Penal Code exempts from the provisions of sections 213 and 214 cases of compounding offences which may be lawfully compounded. If the contention submitted on behalf of the prosecution in this case were sound, the compounding of particular offences dealt with under sections 213 and 214, Indian Penal Code, would be no offence if the compounding took place before the charge was laid. It seems to me that this would be an untenable proposition.

    On the facts, however, of this case, I am not satisfied that the Sub-divisional Magistrate quite clearly realised whether there was a completed agreement or composition within the meaning of section 345, Criminal Procedure. Code. It appears that there was an arbitration and the arbitrator decided after some parley that accused No. 1 was to pay to the complainant Rs. 300. It is argued on behalf of the complainant that he did not accept this composition and had not even agreed to the arbitration. The Sub-divisional Magistrate does not seem to have arrived at a clear conclusion on these points. A further question arises as to whether the Rs. 300 was to be actually paid before there was any completed composition within the meaning of section 345, or whether the complainant was satisfied with the promise of the accused to pay that amount. The amount was not actually paid before the complaint was lodged in court. Unless it is found that the compounding was completed before the complaint was made any incomplete agreement would not amount to an acquittal within the meaning of the law. I may say, speaking for myself, that I should ordinarily be very reluctant to interfere in a case of this nature. But there is no finding of the Appellate Magistrate on the subject of the charges under sections 323 and 355 of the Penal Code, the acquittal of the accused of these charges being based merely on an alleged composition. The facts found are not enough to show that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had in this connexion quite clear before his mind's eye the element which would be necessary for a complete and valid composition. I would therefore set aside the order acquitting the accused of the charges under sections 323 and 355 of the Penal Code and remand the appeal to be reheard and disposed of by the Appellate Magistrate on these charges in the light of the above observations.

    Napier, J.:— I agree and wish to and only a few words. With regard to the decision in Kanni Rowther v. Inayathalla Sahib which has been referred to in the admission order, I desire to say that I am in entire accord with it. It lays down that the composition referred to in section 345, Criminal Procedure Code, is not limited to acts done in Court nor to cases in which the parties continue to be of the same mind until the cases come on for further hearing before the Court, that view seams to me to be entirely warranted by the language of the section. The sole question to be ascertained is whether there was a contract, and once that has been ascertained, there is nothing on principle which would allow a party to resile from his contract and lay a charge which he agreed for consideration not to lay. A further question has been argued whether such composition can be made before any complaint has been made to a Magistrate or any proceedings taken in Court. Considerable stress has been laid on the words “offence” and “accused” in the section, and the learned public prosecutor has pointed out that it may be difficult to say whether a composition was lawful or unlawful unless the facts had been considered by the Court. The difficulty will arise however in the actual offence of compounding. It is clear from the very earliest authorities that the offence of compounding a felony could be committed before any charge had been laid. With reference to compounding theft, the language of Lord Coke is quoted in The Queen v. Burgess which language is reproduced in Archbold on “Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases” in the section dealing with compounding offences. The offence known as theft-bote is committed,

    “where the owner not only knows of the felony but taketh of the thief his goods again or amends for the same to favor or maintain him, that is, not to prosecute him to the intent that he may escape.”

    It is reproduced in Blackstone in his Commentaries as follows:—

    “The offence of theft-bote which is where the party robbed not only knows the felon but also takes his goods again or other amends upon agreement not to prosecute.”

    This is the language of the earliest authorities and there cannot be the slightest doubt that the offence of illegal compounding is one that can be committed in relation to a matter which has not been brought before the Court, Now the connexion between illegal compounding and legal compounding is very close because in the Penal Code the exception to section 214 Bays that,

    “the provisions of sections 213 and 214 do not extend to any case in which the offence may lawfully be compounded.”

    Of course, lawful compounding is that which is dealt with under section 345, Criminal Procedure Code. So the principles which apply to the offence must necessarily apply to the exception. I am therefore satisfied that a composition made to prevent a case going into a Court is just as much a composition under section 345 as one made after the case has come into Court. As my learned brother has pointed out, it will have no effect as a plea in bar of conviction in cases covered by clause (2) unless the Court has given its sanction. But where a composition has been made out of Court and at a certain stage in the proceedings, the Court gives the sanction required by clause (5) then that is a good composition.

    On the facts of this case, it seems to me that the Sub-Divisional Magistrata has entirely misunderstood the alleged composition. He seems to have thought that because prosecution witness No. 2 representing prosecution witness No. 1 agreed to abide by the decision of the arbitrators and there was a decision of a certain sort, that amounted necessarily to a contract not to prosecute. Speaking for myself, I think that the evidence is perfectly clear on that point: but I do not wish to decide this case on a question of evidence because we are sitting in revision of an order of acquittal. What the Sub-Divisional Magistrate should have done was to examine the evidence and see whether the panchayatdars decided that the complainant was to accept the promise of the accused to pay or whether the decision of the panchayatdars was that if the accused did pay, no complaint should be laid. I agree with my learned brother that this is a matter to which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate must direct his attention. I agree with the order proposed.

    N.R

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    Kumaraswami Chetty (Complainant) v. Kuppuswami Chetty (Accused) .
    (Jan 22, 1913)