AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 57 of chapter IV of this Act in section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, deleted, and section 104, dropped. These sections (83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 102
  • SECTION 104 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, and 235, Civil Procedure code.Under section 223, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 295 of the Civil Procedure Code.In recasting sections 86, 88, and 92 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • section 287 of the Civil Procedure Code.Sections 87, 89 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of chapter XIX of Civil Procedure Code, section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • provisions of chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Code Before the Transfer of Property Act
  • section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act extending section 310-A, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code and section 89, Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 291 or 311 of the Civil Procedure Code and the Transfer of Property Act
  • XIX, Civil Procedure Code; sections 223(c), 295(c), 320 and 322, Civil Procedure Code,
  • SECTION 89 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section inconsistent with sections 310-A and 311, Civil Procedure Code,
  • XIX Civil Procedure Code.Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Indian Councils Act (24 & 25 Vict., cap. 67). Section 9 of the Charter Act,
  • provisions of sections 310-A and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or of the Limitation Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Transfer of Property Act came into operation. Section 310-A
  • sections 86, 87, 92 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 310-A
  • provisions of section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code
  • sections 87, 89 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act).
  • sections 310-A and 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Civil Procedure Code and the Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of sections 16 and 17, Civil Procedure Code,
  • Civil Procedure Code as the Transfer of Property Act
  • Sections 260 and 267 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the rules
  • SECTION 2 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • sections 310-A and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • sections 86 and 87 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 87 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Sections 88 and 89 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • section 311 and after the Transfer of Property Act
  • Transfer of Property Act.The Civil Procedure Code
  • section 22 of the Indian Councils Act (24 & 25 Vict.,
  • Transfer of Property Act. Section 311 of the Code
  • section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and (2),
  • Sale; section 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 248 Civil Procedure Code
  • sections of chapter XIX, Civil Procedure Code,
  • SECTION 92 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 88 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 87 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 86 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 90 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 62 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 60 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 93 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 203 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • section 212 of the Code of Civil. Procedure
  • section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 540 and 534, Civil Procedure Code,
  • sections 235 and 248, Civil Procedure Code.
  • 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 of section 83 as provisions
  • section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code
  • provision of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • article 179 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Transfer of Property Act in sections 87
  • sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 17 and 43, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 311 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 396 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • Transfer of Property Bill, section 19
  • CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Transfer of Property Act. Both Acts
  • section 310-A, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 224(c), Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 244(c), Civil Procedure Code
  • (section 215-A, Civil Procedure Code).
  • article 179 of the Limitation Act
  • Indian High Courts Act (24 & 25 Vict.,
  • section 311, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 244, Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 649, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 644, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 291, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 647, Civil Procedure Code)
  • section 284, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 235, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 287, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 230, Civil Procedure Code)
  • section 208, Civil Procedure Code)
  • (section 213, Civil Procedure Code)
  • section 244 of the Code of Civil
  • SECTION 43 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • 764, order 55, rule 2, clause, 14).
  • 3 of section 87 as provisions
  • Act under Order No. 42. Rule 9
  • section 287, Civil Procedure
  • sections 86 and 87, 88 and 89,
  • Rule 9; Order iv, Rule 14;
  • section 311 of the Code
  • sections 86, 87, 88, 89
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 57 of chapter IV of this Act in section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, deleted, and section 104, dropped. These sections (83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 102
  • SECTION 104 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, and 235, Civil Procedure code.Under section 223, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 295 of the Civil Procedure Code.In recasting sections 86, 88, and 92 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • section 287 of the Civil Procedure Code.Sections 87, 89 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of chapter XIX of Civil Procedure Code, section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • provisions of chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Code Before the Transfer of Property Act
  • section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act extending section 310-A, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code and section 89, Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 291 or 311 of the Civil Procedure Code and the Transfer of Property Act
  • XIX, Civil Procedure Code; sections 223(c), 295(c), 320 and 322, Civil Procedure Code,
  • SECTION 89 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section inconsistent with sections 310-A and 311, Civil Procedure Code,
  • XIX Civil Procedure Code.Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Indian Councils Act (24 & 25 Vict., cap. 67). Section 9 of the Charter Act,
  • provisions of sections 310-A and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or of the Limitation Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Transfer of Property Act came into operation. Section 310-A
  • sections 86, 87, 92 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 310-A
  • provisions of section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code
  • sections 87, 89 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act).
  • sections 310-A and 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Civil Procedure Code and the Transfer of Property Act
  • provisions of sections 16 and 17, Civil Procedure Code,
  • Civil Procedure Code as the Transfer of Property Act
  • Sections 260 and 267 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the rules
  • SECTION 2 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • sections 310-A and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • sections 86 and 87 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 87 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Sections 88 and 89 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • section 311 and after the Transfer of Property Act
  • Transfer of Property Act.The Civil Procedure Code
  • section 22 of the Indian Councils Act (24 & 25 Vict.,
  • Transfer of Property Act. Section 311 of the Code
  • section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and (2),
  • Sale; section 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 248 Civil Procedure Code
  • sections of chapter XIX, Civil Procedure Code,
  • SECTION 92 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 88 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 87 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 86 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 90 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 62 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 60 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 93 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 203 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • section 212 of the Code of Civil. Procedure
  • section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 540 and 534, Civil Procedure Code,
  • sections 235 and 248, Civil Procedure Code.
  • 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 of section 83 as provisions
  • section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code
  • provision of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • article 179 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Transfer of Property Act in sections 87
  • sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 17 and 43, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 311 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 396 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • Transfer of Property Bill, section 19
  • CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Transfer of Property Act. Both Acts
  • section 310-A, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 224(c), Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 244(c), Civil Procedure Code
  • (section 215-A, Civil Procedure Code).
  • article 179 of the Limitation Act
  • Indian High Courts Act (24 & 25 Vict.,
  • section 311, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 244, Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 649, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 644, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 291, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 647, Civil Procedure Code)
  • section 284, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 235, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 287, Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 230, Civil Procedure Code)
  • section 208, Civil Procedure Code)
  • (section 213, Civil Procedure Code)
  • section 244 of the Code of Civil
  • SECTION 43 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • 764, order 55, rule 2, clause, 14).
  • 3 of section 87 as provisions
  • Act under Order No. 42. Rule 9
  • section 287, Civil Procedure
  • sections 86 and 87, 88 and 89,
  • Rule 9; Order iv, Rule 14;
  • section 311 of the Code
  • sections 86, 87, 88, 89
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses several questions referred to a Full Bench concerning the applicability of certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to sales in execution of mortgage decrees passed under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The core procedural context involves appeals against orders refusing to make an order absolute for sale under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act and the applicability of sections 310-A and 311 of the CPC to such sales. The opinion arises from conflicting decisions among various High Courts on whether applications under section 89 are proceedings in execution and whether appeals lie from orders refusing to make an order absolute for sale.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether sections 310-A and 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to sales in execution of a mortgage decree.
  2. Whether an appeal lies against an order refusing to make an order absolute for sale upon an application made under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  3. Whether an application under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act is an application in execution of the decree passed under section 88 or a step to make a preliminary decree final and executable.

Arguments of the Parties

S. Srinivasa Ayyangar's Arguments

  • Contended that an appeal lies against an order refusing to make an order absolute for sale under section 89 because it is an order passed in execution proceedings, appealable under section 244 of the CPC.
  • Argued that if not an order in execution, the order is a final order and thus appealable.
  • Supported the view that applications for an order absolute are proceedings in execution, citing English practice and various judicial decisions, including Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Ram Kanno Dei and Kedar Nath v. Lalji Sahai.
  • Asserted that the order absolute for sale is an order in execution of the decree passed under section 88, and that multiple such orders may be passed until sufficient property is sold.
  • Cited various authorities and cases supporting the appealability and execution nature of such orders.

K. Srinivasa Ayyangar's Arguments

  • Argued that orders under sections 87, 89, and 93 are not passed in execution but are substantive orders on the same footing.
  • Maintained that the relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee ceases only upon passing such orders, not with the decree under section 88.
  • Contended that the absence of provisions for relief in section 89 analogous to those in other sections indicates these are not execution orders.
  • Emphasized that courts can vary the decree by these orders, such as extending time, which would be impossible if they were mere execution orders.
  • Disputed the assumption that these are proceedings in execution, relying on various judgments and legal treatises.

Reply by S. Srinivasa Ayyangar

  • Referred to English authorities and procedural rules indicating that the decree is final and that subsequent orders are modes of executing the decree.
  • Cited numerous Indian and English cases supporting the execution interpretation of orders under section 89.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Akikunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Das Assumed appeal lies against order under section 89; point not expressly considered. Referenced to show conflicting views and importance of the question.
Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Ram Kanno Dei Proceedings under section 89 treated as proceedings in execution. Supported the contention that order absolute for sale is an execution order.
Kedar Nath v. Lalji Sahai Held order under section 87 appealable under section 244 CPC. Two out of three judges held application under section 89 as appealable execution proceeding.
Oudh Behari Lal v. Nageshar Lal Application under section 89 is a proceeding in execution. Full Bench overruled contrary earlier decision; relied upon for appealability and execution nature.
Ram Lal v. Narain Held a decree under section 88 cannot be executed unless made absolute under section 89. Decision overruled by Oudh Behari Lal Full Bench; reasoning found unconvincing.
Chunni Lal v. Harnam Das Followed Oudh Behari Lal; application under section 89 appealable as order in execution. Supported the view that section 89 applications are execution proceedings.
Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapuratti Conditional decree concept; interlocutory nature of initial decree. Referenced for the view that decree under section 88 is preliminary and order absolute under section 89 is final.
Sri Rajah Papamma Rao Bahadur v. Sri Vira Pratapa Korkonda Execution of conditional decrees under section 88 and 89. Referred to support that order absolute under section 89 is execution of decree.
Tirumal Rao v. Syed Dastaghiri Miyah Sections 310-A and 311 CPC apply to sales in execution of mortgage decrees. Adopted by the Court to affirm applicability of CPC sections.
Krishnaji v. Mahadev Vinayak Same as above; supports applicability of CPC sections to mortgage sales. Accepted by Court as correct view.
Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chundra Lahiry Orders passed subsequent to interlocutory decree not orders in execution. Referenced to distinguish interlocutory and execution orders.
Salt v. Cooper Suit is pending until final decree is satisfied; execution proceedings are continuation. Used to explain the ongoing nature of execution proceedings.
Collinson v. Jeffery Action not dead until final judgment satisfied. Supports principle that suit continues through execution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the relationship between the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the Civil Procedure Code, particularly chapter XIX relating to execution of decrees. It noted that the Transfer of Property Act defines substantive rights concerning mortgages and provides some procedural rules, but the execution of decrees, including sales of mortgaged property, is generally governed by the Civil Procedure Code unless inconsistent with the Act.

The Court analyzed the nature of decrees under sections 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act, concluding that the decree passed under section 88 is conditional or interlocutory and not capable of execution until the order absolute under section 89 is made. However, the order absolute for sale under section 89 is an order in execution of the decree passed under section 88 and is appealable under section 244 of the CPC.

The Court rejected the view that applications under section 89 are not execution proceedings, emphasizing that such applications are governed by the law of execution and limitation applicable to execution proceedings (article 179 of the Limitation Act). The Court found the reasoning of the Calcutta High Court, which treated these applications as non-execution proceedings, unconvincing and inconsistent with the legislative scheme.

Regarding sections 310-A and 311 of the CPC, the Court held that these general provisions apply to sales in execution of mortgage decrees, as there is no real inconsistency with the special provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court reasoned that the right to redeem is extinguished upon the passing of the order absolute for sale, and the mortgaged property is treated as the absolute property of the judgment debtor, thus subject to the general execution provisions of the CPC.

The Court further observed that the Transfer of Property Act and the CPC should be read together harmoniously, with the Transfer of Property Act providing substantive law and the CPC governing procedural aspects of execution. The Court also addressed the legislative intent behind various provisions and the practical implications of treating orders under section 89 as execution orders.

Holding and Implications

1. Sections 310-A and 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to sales in execution of mortgage decrees passed under the Transfer of Property Act.

2. An appeal lies against an order refusing to make an order absolute for sale upon application under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, and such an order is an order passed in execution proceedings appealable under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

3. An application under section 89 is an application for execution of the decree passed under section 88 and not merely an application to make a preliminary decree final.

These holdings clarify the procedural status of orders under section 89, resolving conflicting views among High Courts. The decision confirms that execution provisions of the CPC govern sales under mortgage decrees, ensuring uniformity in the treatment of such sales and appeals. The ruling does not establish new precedent beyond harmonizing existing statutes and judicial interpretations, but it has direct consequences for parties involved in mortgage decree executions and appeals, affirming their rights and procedural avenues under the CPC.

    Mallikarjunadu Setti (Counter-Petitioner) v. Lingamurti Pantulu (Petitioner) .

    With regard to question (iii) the Order of Reference to the Full Bench was made by Davies and Moore, JJ., and was as follows:—

    Order of Reference to the Full Bench.—“The first question is whether, taking this as an appeal from the order of the Subordinate Judge refusing to pass an order absolute for sale applied for under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, such appeal lies.

    “It is contended that the appeal lies as from an order passed in execution. This Court has not decided the question whether applications under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act are or are not applications in execution, while there is a conflict of opinion between the High Courts of Calcutta and Allahabad on the point. Reference may he made to Akikunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Das, and the decisions therein referred to. The subject is one of importance that is frequently arising of late, and as we are not altogether agreed regarding it, we think it should he determined by a Full Bench, and we accordingly refer the following question to a Full Bench:—

    “Does an appeal lie against an order refusing to make an order absolute for sale upon an application made under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act?”

    S. Srinivasa Ayyangar argued in the affirmative it is submitted that an appeal lies from such an order, (1) because, it is an order passed in execution proceedings and appealable under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and (2), if not an order in execution, it is a final order even though applied for under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act; and as such is appealable. The construction most convenient and most in accord with the-scheme of the Transfer of Property Act is that an application for an order absolute is a proceeding in execution. All proceedings subsequent to decree are in execution. If the English practice is any guide, it supports that contention. Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers and Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalbasini Dasi lay down the canon of construction of a Statute. In Maharatah of Bharatpur v. Ram Kanno Dei it was assumed by the Judicial Committee to be a proceeding in execution. There is no difference in principle between sections 86 and 87, 88 and 89, and 92 and 93. A mortgagor paying the mortgage-money under section 92 or other sections is in reality giving effect to the decree—that is, causing to be executed the original decree which determines the rights of both parties. If the mortgagor does not execute the decree by paying, the right to do so reverts to the mortgagee, who takes whatever relief he may he entitled to Under section 87, a defendant is entitled to be put into possession but that can only he done if he has first become entitled to possession under a decree; and, moreover, the machinery for putting him into possession is machinery of the Court, which can only be exercised as under a decree. So, the order absolute for sale referred to in section 89 is an order in execution of the decree passed under section 88. It may he said that sections 86, 88, and 92 lay down substantive rights and sections 87, 89 and 93 determine the procedure by which those rights are given effect to. The change of wording from “final decree” in the last paragraph of section 87 to “decree absolute” shows that the former expression was misleading, and that there is not a final decree in cases under this Act. [He referred to Ghoso on ‘Mortgage’ and Macpherson on ‘Mortgage.’] The form for sale, No. 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure only deals with one decree. In an administration suit the form is a “preliminary order.” Moreover, the form No. 128 only deals with the entire mortgaged-property, which shows that the question as to how much of the mortgaged property should be sold to meet the decree amount can be determined in execution. Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Ram Kanno Dei shows this, Form No. 129 only contemplates one decree. Section 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure shows that where a preliminary order is contemplated it is provided for—as in sections 213, 214 and 215, in the latter of which a decree is passed for accounts. The “order absolute” referred to in section 89 is defined in the latter portion of the section, namely, the order for sale which the Court is to pass on application for an order absolute being made to it. This is shown by section 93. More than one of such orders may be passed, authorizing sale of property until sufficient has been sold to meet the mortgage, debt, and this shows that they are orders in execution. Moreover there cannot be more than one decree in a suit—see the definition. In section 57, by which property may be sold, and which deals with the rights of persons not parties to the suit, a right of appeal is given. No such right is given in the case of application for orders absolute. The explanation of the omission seems to be that a right of appeal exists under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure—such applications being proceedings in execution. In Kedar Nath v. Lalji Sahai, two out of three Judges held that an order under section 89 was appealable under section 244. In Akihunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Das, it is assumed that an appeal lies, the point not being expressly considered, and no reasons being given for the decision arrived at. In Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh, Poresh Nath Mojumdar v. Ramjodu Mojumdar is relied on which has been dissented from by a Full Bench in Madras. An appeal was held to lie, evidently on the ground that the order is a final one. [He referred also to Doolee Chand v. Omda Khanum; Tiluck Singh v. Parsotein Proshad; Tara Prosad Roy v. Bhobodeb Ray; Siva Pershad Marty v. Nundo Ball Kar Mahapatra; Phul Chand Ram v. Nursingh Pershad Misser; Nandram v. Babaji.] In Bhagawan v. Ganu it was held that such applications are applications in execution. The decisions in Allahabad are uniform. In Oudh Behari Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Nageshar Lal…(Decree-Holder).*(12), the Full Bench held an application under section 89 to be one in execution. The decree there was transferred, which could only have happened in the case of a final decree. Decrees for specific performance are similar in that they are conditional. Sections 260 and 267 of the Code of Civil Procedure are instances of decrees that are worked out in execution. In Rahima…(Decree-Holder); v. Nepal Rai…(Judgment-Debtor).*(13), an order under section 87 was held appealable as an order in execution. Ram Lal v. Tulsa Kuar dissents from Poresh Nath Mojumdar v. Ramjodu Mojumdar: In Taniram v. Gajanan an appeal was allowed. [He also referred to. Chunni Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Harnam Das…(Decree-Holder).*; Hira Lal Sahu v. Parmeshar Rai; Elayadath v. Krishna; Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapuratti; Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhry v. Maharani Dasi; Sri Rajah Papamma Rao Bahadur v. Sri Vira Pratapa Korkonda; Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Ram Kanno Dei.]

    K. Srinivasa Ayyangar.—The orders under consideration are not passed in execution. Orders passed under sections 87, 89 and 98 are all on the same footing. The putting in possession provided for by section 98 is effected by an order for that purpose, and not in execution of a decree already passed. If section 93 provides merely a means for executing orders or decrees passed under section 92, it should contain provisions for relief,—such as the delivery up of title-deeds and return of the balance of money recovered. Similarly, if section 87 merely provides relief analogous to a warrant of execution, it should contain the reliefs provided by section 86 to be included in the decree. Orders under sections 87, 89 and 93 cannot be orders in execution, as by these orders Courts can vary the decree, e.g, extend time, which cannot be if they merely carry out the decrees. Further it is only on the passing of orders under these latter sections relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee ceases: not by the decree passed under the previous sections. It will be surprising if the relationship ends not by the passing of a decree, but the passing of an order in execution. If the decree under section 88 is a final one, a further suit will not lie,—but this Court has held that a further suit for redemption, under section 92, does lie—(Ramunni v. Brahma Dattan; Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapuratti on the ground that the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee continues to exist if the decree under section 92 has not been acted on. The principle of those decisions in equally applicable to suits for foreclosure and sale. Even if the decree is final as regards the mortgagor, it does not follow that it is so as regards the mortgogee. See Broom's Legal Maxims, 6th edition-page-322. The decision in Kanara Kurup v. Govinda Karup has been disapproved in Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapuratti, but not the reasoning. It is significant that section 93 is inconsistent with section 203 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though both Acts were passed practically simultaneously. In Fisher on ‘Mortgage,’ the phrase “order absolute” is used throughout. Form No. 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure has the word “order,” which is consistent with the view that the Code contemplates but one final decree. This is supported by Forms Nos. 130, 131 and 132. The intention of the Legislature is also shown by section 87 in the last clause. [He referred to Seton on ‘Decrees,’ volume II, page 1087, under the heading of “Forms for Foreclosure and Sale;” section 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to partition; Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chundra Lahiry, Dwarka Nath Misser v. Barinda Nath Misser, Shah Muhammad Khan v. Hanwant Singh, on the same point; also to section 212 of the Code of Civil. Procedure as to mesne profits; Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen; Ram Kishore Ghose v. Gopi Kant Shaha; Subrahmaniam Pillai v. Narayana Ayyangar and Rayalu Pattar v. Narayana Pattar referred to in Venkatarasu v. Chinna Ramayya on the same point; Narayana Reddi v. Papayya; Venkata Krishna Ayyar v. Thiagaraya Chetti.] No reasons for the decisions that these are applications in execution are given in Ram Lal v. Narain and Oudi Behari Lal v. Nageshar Lal(14), and the former has been dissented from. Ranbir Singh v. Drigpal(15) has also been dissented from in Chunni Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Harnam Das…(Decree-Holder).*(16). Mahabir Prasad v. Sital Singh(17) supports my contention. In Bombay it is held that a second suit does not lie for redemption. [He also referred to Muhammad Ali v. Debi Din.]

    S. Srinivasa Ayyangar, in reply, referred to Day v. Kelland, as showing that the decree is the final adjudication and that nothing remains, but to work it out in execution; and pointed out that the decree is made absolute by ex parte motion as of course, whereas if it were a motion for judgment, it should be with notice, Daniell's ‘Chancery Practice,’ volume II, part I, page 140-5. He referred also to Order xiii, Rule 9; Order iv, Rule 14; Whiting v. Bank of United States where Story, J., regards the original decree for forecloure and sale as final and considers that the title of a purchaser under it would not he extiguished even if the decree should he finally reversed, the ulterior proceedings being merely a mode of execulting the first decree. He also referred to Chicago & Vincennes Railroad Company v. Frosdick; Karuthasami v. Jaganatha; Hari Ravji Chiplunkar v. Shapurji Hormusji; Nainappa Chetti v. Chidambaram Chetti; Erusappa Mudaliar v. Commercial and Band Mortgage Bank, Limited; Venkata Krishna Ayyar v. Thiagaraya Chetti; Narayana Reddi v. Papayya; Sri Rajah Papamma Rao Bahadur v. Sri Vira Pratapa Korkonda; Akikunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Das; Thakur Pershad v. Sheikh Fakir-ullah; Monkhouse v. The Corporation of Bedford:

    Sir Arnold White, C.J:— In Appeal against Appellate Order No. 35 of 1901 and Appeal against Order No. 48 of 1900:— The questions which have been referred to a Full Bench in these cases are—do sections 310-A and 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply in the case of a sale in execution of a mortgage decree?

    First, as regards section 310-A. The Transfer, of Property Act came into force on 1st July 1882. Section 310-A was introduced into chapter XIX of the Code in 1894. Part I of the Code in which chapter XIX occurs is headed “of suit in general” and chapter XIX is headed “of the execution’ of decrees.” Chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the substantive law of mortgage, and with the rights of mortgagors and mortgagees, and also, to a certain extent, with the procedure whereby these rights may he enforced. The last section of the chapter (section 104) empowers the High Court to make rules consistent with the Act for carrying out the provisions contained in the chapter. As regards the Appellate Side of this High Court the powers conferred by this section have not been exercised. This, as it seems to me, is an accident, which does not affect the question of construction which we have to determine.

    Apparently, the scheme of the Legislature in framing the mortgage chapter of the Transfer of Property Act was that substantive rights should he dealt with in the Act, and that the procedure for giving effect to these rights should be government by rules made under the authority of the Act. In my opinion, however, it was not the intention of the Legislature that the Code of rules contemplated by section 104 should be an exhaustive and self-contained Code. I think it was intended that the special rules should be supplementary to the existing general rules of procedure which were applicable to the subject-matter dealt with in chapter IV, and it seems to me that if the Legislature had intended that the Code of rules which they contemplated for the purposes of the Transfer of Property Act should oust the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the rules would have found a place in the body of the Act. A rule which went beyond the powers conferred by section 104 would, of course, as a rule made under these powers, be ultra vires, and it may also be that a rule which was within the powers conferred by the section, but inconsistent with some general provision of the Code, would also be ultra vires, but this question does not now directly arise.

    It is to be observed that sections 310-A and 311 in terms apply where immoveable property has been sold “under this chapter,” i.e, under the chapter XIX of the Code. In my opinion when immoveable property is sold in execution of a mortgage-decree it is sold under, or by the authority of, the special provisions of the Transfer of Property Act which authorise the Court to order the sale. It seems to me, however, that the sale is also “under” the general procedure sections of the execution chapter of the Code which relate to the sale of land in executions of a decree and which, are not in conflict with any special statutory enactment relating to mortgages and mortgage suits. I think the sale of land in execution of a mortgage-decree may he said to be “under” such general provisions of the Code as well as “under” the special provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.

    But there remains, of course, the further question, did the Legislature intend that section 310-A should apply to a sale in execution of a mortgage-decree?

    It is to be borne in mind that the section was inserted in the Code some twelve years after the Transfer of Property Act came into force. The saving clause to section 2 of the Transfer of Property Act only applies to existing enactments at the time the Transfer of Property Act came into operation. Section 310-A applies generally to the sale of immoveable property in the execution of a decree and enables the person whose property has been sold on payment into Court of the prescribed deposit to apply to have the sale set aside, and, if the deposit is made within the prescribed time, the Court is required to set aside the sale. Strictly speaking the section is not a procedure section at all. It does not provide the machinery to enforce a right to which the person whose property has been sold is entitled either in law or in equity. It confers a substantive right.

    The fact, however, that the Legislature introduced the enactment as a supplementary section to the execution provisions of the Code, and the fact that the section is perfectly general in its terms suggest that the Legislature did not intend that the operation of the section should be limited to sales under decrees which had been obtained in suits other than mortgage suits.

    The test to apply is,—are the general provisions of section 310-A consistent, and can they be read together, with the special provisions of the enactment which deals with the special subject-matter of the law of mortgage? If the general provisions of the section are inconsistent with the special provisions of the Act then on the principle generalia specialibus non derogant I think the section ought not to be construed as applying to sales in execution of mortgage-decrees. After, I confess, considerable doubt, I have come to the conclusion that there is no real inconsistency and that section 310-A was intended to apply to sales in execution of mortgage-decrees. No doubt the Transfer of Property Act by special enactment regulates the rights of the party whose property the Court has ordered shall be sold in default of compliance with the orders of the Court with regard to payment. Under the foreclosure sections of the Act (sections 86 and 87) the Court is empowered to postpone the day appointed for payment by the mortgagor. Under the corresponding redemption sections (sections 92 and 93) the Court is empowered to extend the time for payment. Under sections 88 and 89, which deal with suits for sale, no such power is given. It would seem, therefore, that the Legislature advisedly refrained from giving to the Court a power to extend the time for payment where; in a suit for sale, the Court had ordered that, in default of payment in pursuance of the order of the Court; the property should be sold. Now, no doubt, section 310-A confers rights which are outside and beyond any rights given by the Transfer of Property Act, but I do not think the section can be said to confer any further right to redeem. Sections 89 and 93 provide that on the making of an order absolute under either of these sections, the fight to redeem and the security shall both be extinguished. The sections say in effect that on the making of the order absolute the relation of mortgage of and mortgagee shall come to an end. As it is put by Sir Muttusami Ayyar, J., in Ramunni v. Brahma Dattan:—“Between the dates of the order for sale and that of the actual sale the position of the plaintiff is that of a judgment debtor whose property has been ordered to be sold in execution, and he may pay the money as a judgment-debtor and thereby obviate the necessity for the sale.” See, too, the observations of Shephard, J., in Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapuratti, and Macpherson on the ‘Law of Mortgage in British India,’ 7th edition, page 697. Section 310-A does not, as it seems to me, have the effect of extending the time for redemption, because, at the time the section domes into operation, the right to redeem no longer exists and the parties are no longer in the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee. Their position is that of judgment-debtor and judgment-creditor, and their rights are governed by the provisions of the Code which relate to parties in that position.

    It seems to me, therefore, that both section 291, which empowers the Court to adjourn a sale in execution of a decree, and section 310-A, which requires the Court to re-open a sale which has actually taken place, on the requirements of the section being complied with, are consistent with the special provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 310-A no doubt affects the rights of a purchaser, whilst section 291 concerns only the parties to the suit but this does not seem to be a sufficient reason for drawing a distinction between the sections. If a purchaser of immoveable property which is sold in execution of a decree other than a mortgage-decree buys subject to the risk of the transaction being set aside on an application made within thirty days after the date of sale by the person whose property has been sold—and the Legislature has so enacted in unmistakable terms—there seems, on principle, to be no reason why the purchaser of immoveable property which is sold in execution of a decree obtained in a mortgage suit should not buy subject to the same risk. The hardship (if any) to the purchaser is the same in both cases.

    As regards the authorities, so far as this High Court is concerned, it appears to have been assumed in Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Ayyathorai Pillai that section 310-A applied to a sale in execution of a mortgage-decree, and in Tirumal Rao v. Syed Dastaghiri Miyah it was expressly so decided. In the latter case the learned Judges declined to follow the decision of the Calcutta Full Bench in Kedar Nath Raut v. Kali Churn Ram. The Calcutta Full Bench decision proceeded mainly on the question whether section 310-A applied to sales under decrees in mortgage suits by virtue of the rules framed by the Calcutta High Court under the powers conferred by Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act, though no doubt the Court also decided, incidentally, that the section itself did not apply. The decision on this point, however, was based on the view that the sale in execution of a mortgage decree did not take place “under” chapter XIX of the Code. With all respect, it seems to me (as I have said) that although the power to order the sale is given by the Transfer of Property Act, and, therefore, in a sense, is “under” that Act, the sale is also “under” chapter XIX of the Code.

    I agree with the conclusions of the Allahabad High Court in Raja Ram Singhji…(Decree-Holder); v. Chunni Lal…(Objector).* and with those of the Bombay High Court in Krishnaji…(Auction-Purchaser) Applicant; v. Mahadev Vinayak…(Judgment-Debtor) Opponent.* regards section 310-A, I think the question should be answered in the affirmative.

    As regards section 311, I have felt no difficulty. At the time the Transfer of Property Act was passed the enactment which is reproduced as section 311 of the Code had long been in existence. In passing the Transfer of Property Act the Legislature must be taken to have had in mind the existence of such a general provision.

    Section 2 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that nothing in that Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any enactment not thereby expressly repealed. There is, moreover, nothing in the general provisions of the section which can be said to be in conflict with the special provision of the Transfer of Property Act. The section neither restricts nor extends the rights conferred by that Act. It confers a power which, apart from express enactment, may he said to be inherent in every Court—a power to set aside proceedings which are vitiated by a memorial irregularity which has occasioned substantial injury.

    As regards section 311, I think the question should be answered in the affirmative.

    In Appeal against Order No. 156 of 1900:—The question which has been referred to us in this case is—does an appeal lie against an order refusing to make an order absolute for sale upon an application made under section 89, of the Transfer of Property Act?

    The order of reference is in general terms, but the point for determination is, whether the order in question is an order made in execution proceedings to which section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. The conflict of authority upon this question is the reason why the matter has been referred for the consideration of a Full Bench.

    The point put shortly is—Is a “decree” made under section 88 of the Act a decree which in itself is capable of execution or is it a decree which is merely preliminary or conditional and not capable of execution until the “order absolute” referred to in section 89 has been made?

    It the matter had been res integra I should have felt little hesitation in holding that where there are two sections dealing with a particular class of suits the first of which empowers the Court to order that, if there shall he default in payment in pursuance of the order of the Court, something shall be done, and the second of which enacts that when there has been default the Court may make an “order absolute” that the thing be done, there is no complete decree, capable of execution, until the order contemplated by the second section had been made. This appears to me to have been the scheme of the Legislature both in the sections relating to suits for sale (sections 88 and 89) and in the cognate sections relating to suits for foreclosure (sections 86 and 87) and to suits for redemption (sections 92 and 93). Sections 86, 88 and 92 provide for the form of the decree if the plaintiff succeeds, that is to say, if he establishes his right to foreclosure, or sale, or redemption, as the case may be, if payment be not made in pursuance of the order for payment which these sections empower the Court to make. Each of these sections has its correlative or complementary section. Each section contemplates two contingencies. First, that the orders contained in the decrees which the Courts are empowered by the sections to make be complied with; secondly, that they be not complied with; and each of the correlative sections empowers the party to make a further application and authorises the Court to make a further order on the footing, not that something may or may not be done, but on the footing that something has, or has not, been done. The order or decree contemplated by the sections 89, 88 and 92 appears to me to be a preliminary or conditional decree which, in itself, is not capable of execution. Otherwise it is difficult to see why each of these sections should have its correlative section dealing with the legal results which ensue not which may or may (not ensue according as to whether payment is made or not) and empowering the Court to order that certain things shall be done (not that certain things shall be done in a given event). At any rule as regards the foreclosure and redemptions it seems clear that the Legislature had in mind the well-known practice of the Chancery Division in England and that it was intended that there should be no final adjudication until an order absolute was made. I see no good reason for holding that the Legislature intended that in suits for sale the procedure should be otherwise. If the correlative sections, as I have termed them, did nothing more than provide the machinery for enforcing substantive rights which had been already declared and finally adjudicated upon in the previous sections, there would be more force in the argument that the proceedings under the correlative sections were nothing more than proceedings in execution. But this is not the case. For instance, the enactment which empowers the Court to deliver possession of the property to the mortgagee when the Court has ordered that the mortgagor be debarred absolutely of his right to redeem is to be found in section 93 and not in section 92. Again, notwithstanding the “decree” under section 88, the defendant's right to redeem continues to subsist, and the security continues to subsist. It is not until an “order absolute” is made under section 88 that the right and the security are extinguished.

    I do not think that the use of the word “decree” in sections 86, 88 and 92 and the word “order” in the correlative sections is in any way conclusive on the question of construction. The correlative sections enact that the order under each of these sections is an “absolute” order, or that its effect is “absolute.” To my mind, a much stronger inference is to be drawn from the use of the word “absolute,” as contradistinguished from something which is not absolute, than from the use of the word “decree” as contradistinguished from the word “order.”

    In support of the view that an application for an order absolute is an application in execution of a decree, some stress was laid on the words “if the plaintiff succeeds” in sections 86, 88 and 92. But these words only mean if the plaintiff succeeds in showing that he is entitled to certain relief in the event of the defendant not complying with the order of the Court for payment.

    Turning to the authorities, so far as the Madras cases are concerned, there does not seem to be any reported decision on the precise point which is now before us. As regards the decision of the Full Bench in Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapuratti, there does not appear to me to be anything either in the actual decision or in the reasoning on which the decision is based which conflicts with the view which I have expressed. In the Privy Council case of Sri Rajah Papamma Rao Bahadur v. Sri Vira Pratapa Korkonda their Lordships no doubt observe, (see page 253) in dealing with the rights of a simple mortgagee:—“In default of payment a simple mortgage gives to the mortgagee a right not to possession, but to sale, which he must work out in execution proceedings.” But it seems to me these words have reference to what takes place after the “order absolute” provided for in section 89 has been obtained.

    In Narayana Reddi v. Papayya and Venkata Krishna Ayyar v. Thiaggraya Chetti, the point did not arise but the judgments in both these cases are based on the assumption that the decree is incomplete until the further order, in the nature of an order absolute, has been made. In Subrahmaniam Pillai v. Narayana Ayyangar, this Court held that where there had been no order absolute for sale the decree was incapable of execution. In Rayalu Pattar v. Narayana Pattar, the judgment went on the ground of estoppel, but the Court observed that there ought in strictness to have been an order absolute for sale before the order for sale was passed, and that if the objection had been taken before the sale took place it might have prevailed. In the most recent reported Madras case in which the question was raised, Venkatarazu v. Chinna Ramayya, the judgment also went on the ground of estoppel, and the point now before us was expressly-left open.

    Apparently the Bombay High Court has never had occasion to consider the point, but at any rate, so far as foreclosure and redemption suits are concerned, the view of the Bombay High Court is clear—that decrees under sections 86 and 92 are interim or conditional decrees. See for instance Nandram v. Babaji. The case of Bhagawan v. Ganu turned on a question of limitation.

    As regards the Allahabad High Court it was held by a Full Bench of three Judges in Kedar Nath v. Lalji Sahai, the Chief Justice (Sir John Edge) doubting, that an order under section 87 is an order in execution of the substantive foreclosure decree and is appealable under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. About the same time it was held by a Divisional Bench of the same Court (Ram Lal v. Narain that a decree for sale under section 88 could not be executed unless and until it had been made absolute by an orber under section 89. The question involved in the latter case was afterwards argued before a Full Bench of five Judges, of which Sir John Edge was a member, and the Court overruled the earlier decision and held that an application for an order absolute/or sale was a proceeding in execution (Oudh Behari Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Nageshar Lal…(Decree-Holder).*). With all respect, I cannot regard the reasoning upon which the judgment in this case is based as convincing. Sir Douglas Straight, in delivering the judgment of the Court, says:—“Where a decree has been passed under sections 86, 87, 88, 89 or 92 directing payment into Court by a specified date of a sum of money and, in the event of its not being paid, declaring that the foreclosure or sale shall follow, or a right to redeem shall be barred, it would, in my opinion, be a misnomer, if payment is made, to describe such payment as other than one made in execution of decree. On the other hand, it appears equally clear to me that if such payment is not made, the consequences which follow are also matters concerned with the execution of the decree, flowing as a matter of course out of the decree itself, viz., to give it effect against the judgment-debtor for having flailed to satisfy the conditions of the decree.”

    No doubt where payment is made in compliance with a decree directing payment, the payment is in pursuance of, or in obedience to, the decree and, in a sense is in ‘execution’ of the decree, hut, as it seems to me, it does not follow that the application for the order contemplated by sections 87, 89 and 93 is an application relating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of these words as used in section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or that an order made on such an application is an order made in execution proceedings.

    As regards Calcutta, the precise point came before the Calcutta Hugh Court in Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh and Tara Prosad Roy v. Bhobodeb Roy, where it was held that a decree under section 88 could not be executed until it was made absolute under section 89. With regard to the latter case, however, it is to be observed that the learned Judges seem to have relied to some extent on the authority of Ram Lal v. Narain, and their attention apparently was not called to the decision of the Full Bench in Oudh Behari Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Nageshar Lal…(Decree-Holder).*, which in effect overruled the earlier decision.

    There are other decisions of the Calcutta High Court which support the view that an application under section 89 is an application in the suit as distinguished from an application in execution of the decree, and the distinction is a substantial one notwithstanding the explanation to section 647 of the Code. The cases of Siva Pershad Maity v. Nando Lall Kar Mahapatra and Phul Chand Ram v. Nursingh Pershad Misser are decisions the other way.

    The conclusion at which I have arrived is that the decisions of the Calcutta High Court (Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh and Tara Prosad Roy v. Bhohodeb Roy) are in accordance with the intentions of the Legislature, and that the decision of the Allahabad High Court is not.

    In my opinion an order on an application under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act is not an order made in a proceeding in execution and is not appealable as such. Such an order, however seems to me to have the effect of a final decree, and I think an appeal lies therefrom under section 540 of the Code.

    I think, therefore, that the question which has been referred to us should be answered in the affirmative.

    Davies, J.:— In Appeal against Appellate Order No. 35 of 1901 and Appeal against Order No. 48 of 1900.—There can he no doubt that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to cases tried under special Acts, if the trials are in a Court of Civil Judicature and if there are no rules in the special Acts inconsistent with, or substituted for, the general rules of the Code of Civil Procedure. Now, in the Transfer of Property Act, after an order for sale in a mortgage suit has been made, no further rules are laid down as to the subsequent steps to be taken for the conduct of the sale and other incidents attaching to it. These matters must therefore he governed by the Civil Procedure Code as the Transfer of Property Act is silent in regard to them. The rules for the conduct of sales by a Civil Court are to be found in chapter XIX(G) of the Civil Procedure Code and there is nothing in that chapter excluding from its operations sales in pursuance of mortgage decrees under the Transfer of Property Act. section 311 of the Code in that chapter provides one mode of rescinding a sale before it has been confirmed, namely, by showing that there was material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale by which substantial injury was caused Section 310A provides another mode by which a sale may be rescinded, namely, by allowing the judgment-debtor thirty days' grace under certain conditions for paying up the decree amount on account of which the sale was made. It seems to me that if either of these provisions applies to sales in execution of any decree, including a mortgage decree, the other must also do so. The fact that section 310A was enacted at a later date than section 311 and after the Transfer of Property Act had come into operation cannot, in my opinion, make any difference. Section 310A being incorporated as it is in the Civil Procedure Code, now forms part and parcel of it. When property is sold in execution of a mortgage decree, it is not sold as mortgaged property, but as the absolute property of the quondam mortgagor treated as a judgment-debtor. It has been restored to his full ownership by operation of law (see sections 87, 89 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act). Therefore, there is no reason to treat it differently from any other immoveable property belonging to the judgment-debtor.

    My answer to the references accordingly is that both sections 310-A and 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to sales in pursuance of mortgage decree.

    In Appeal against Order No. 156 of 1900.—With regard to the question raised in this reference, namely, whether an appeal lies against an order refusing to make an order absolute upon an application made under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, I think that it lies as from an order passed in execution and not as from a final decree. I entirely agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned colleague, Mr. Justice Bhashyam Ayyangar, especially as it elaborates and confirms the view I took of the matter so far back as 1893 in the case of Ramasami v. Sami. The late Chief Justice, Sir Arthur Collins, and myself there held that a decree passed under section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act is a final decree and that orders passed under section 93 were merely supplementary to the decree made under section 92, showing whether the terms of the decree have or have not been fulfilled, in other words, orders for executing the decree in such respect as it has to be executed. For instance, the decree directs, if the mortgagor has paid the money mentioned in the decree to the mortgagee that the mortgagor shall, if necessary, be put into possession of the mortgaged property. The further order of the Court directing that the mortgagor be put in possession as he has paid the money, is clearly nothing but execution of the decree. It cannot be said to be a confirmation of the decree which it is merely carrying out. So, in the same way, when the mortgagor has failed to pay the amount mentioned in the decree, it is further decreed, that the property be sold, and the subsequent order that the property be sold as the money has not been paid must also be held to be an order in execution and not merely a confirmation of the decree. To hold otherwise would be to hold that one part of the decree is final and that another part is not. There cannot be two final decrees on the same matter in any suit. So that, if the decree under section 92 is a final decree in respect to the delivery of possession of the property to the mortgagor in case he pays, it is also final in respect to the sale of the property in case he does not pay. No doubt the decree is a conditional decree, but the ascertaining which of its conditions has been fulfilled and the passing of orders consequent thereon cannot but he matters relating to its execution. It has been the practice of this Court to treat an application in execution for an order for sale in pursuance of a mortgage decree as tantamount to an application to make an order absolute for sale although these terms are not used. This could never have been permitted if it had been deemed necessary that before making an application for an order for sale in execution, a prior application for making the decree for sale absolute by an order had to be applied for and granted. So that the practice of this Court has been in accordance with the principle that a decree for sale is a final decree and the order for sale, whether it be called absolute or not, is obtainable only in execution of that final decree.

    Benson, J.:— In Appeal against Appellate Order No. 35 of 1901 and Appeal against Order No. 48 of 1900.—I am of opinion that sections 310-A and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code do apply to sales of mortgaged property by order of the Court. There can, I think, be no doubt but that such sales may properly be said to be ‘under,’ i.e, conducted under the authority and in accordance with the provisions of chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Code Before the Transfer of Property Act was passed such sales could only have been conducted in any part of India ‘under’ the Civil Procedure Code and even since the Transfer of Property Act was passed such sales can, in those provinces to which the Transfer of Property Act has not been extended, be conducted only under the Civil Procedure Code. In those provinces to which the former Act has been extended, I think it may properly he said that such sales are ‘under’ both Acts, that is to say, they are held under the authority of, and are conducted in accordance with, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code generally, and such special provisions, if any, as are to be found in the Transfer of Property Act. Both Acts must be read together and effect must be given to the provisions of both unless they are found to be inconsistent.

    In this view the right given by section 311, Civil Procedure Code, to apply to the Court to set aside a sale on the ground of material irregularity, must obviously apply to sales of mortgaged property by order of the Court, for there is nothing in the Transfer of Property Act inconsistent with that section. I think that section 310-A also applies to such sales and for the same reason, viz., that there is nothing in it inconsistent with the Transfer of Property Act.

    When the Civil Procedure Code and the Transfer of Property Act were passed in 1882 there was no provision of law corresponding to that now contained in section 310-A, whereby the Court could set aside a sale after it had taken place, on the judgment-debtor paying up the decree-debt and compensating the purchaser for his disappointment. The law was then in this respect just the same in regard to sales of mortgaged property and sales of other property attached and sold by the Court in execution of a decree. The Court had power, in its discretion, to adjourn the sale, but once the sale had taken place the judgment-debtor could not get it set aside by any payments to the decree-holder and purchaser. The Transfer of Property Act in sections 87 and 93 provided for working out decrees for foreclosure and redemption, respectively, and in both cases gave the Court power to postpone from time to time the day named in the decree for payment. This power of postponement before making an order absolute for foreclosure was necessary in order to prevent hardship in certain cases. It was not given by the Civil Procedure Code, so it was necessary to provide for it in the Transfer of Property Act.

    The Civil Procedure Code did, however, provide as already stated for the adjournment, from time to time, of sales of immoveable property generally, and as the Civil Procedure Code applied to sales of mortgaged property as well as to sales of other property, there was no need to make any special provision in section 88 or section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act for the postponement of sales of mortgaged property.

    Until an order absolute for foreclosure had been made the Court could, under the Transfer of Property Act, postpone the date fixed in the decree for payment of the mortgage money, and even after an order absolute for sale had been made, the Court could, under the Civil Procedure Code, adjourn the sale. But once an order absolute for foreclosure or for sale had been made the mortgagor had no further right to redeem the property. Section 89 provided that when an order absolute for sale was passed the right to redeem was thereupon extinguished and the security was also extinguished, but (as pointed out by Mr. Macpherson, ‘Law of Mortgage in British India,’ 7th edition, page 697) until the sale was effected the mortgagor had the right as a debtor to discharge the decree-debt and thus obviate the necessity for a sale. In that case the property, being freed from the incumbrance, reverted to the mortgagor in full ownership. This was how the law stood in 1882 in places where the Transfer of Property Act was in force, and it: was in this state of the law that Act V of 1894 was passed, whereby section 310-A was introduced into the Civil Procedure Code. The policy of this section is well known to those who have followed the course of Indian legislation in recent years and is succinctly set forth in ‘the statements of objects and reasons’ with which the Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council. That policy, briefly stated, was to obviate the hardships arising from the fact that immoveable property sold by auction in execution of a decree—seldom realized adequate or even a reasonable price, and it was therefore desirable to give persons whose property was so sold a right to recover it on paying to the decree holder the sum for which it was brought to sale and also to the purchaser fair compensation, for the cancellation of his purchase. The section declares, without reservation, that any person whose immoveable property has been sold under this chapter may at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale have it set aside on payment of the judgment-debt, and of compensation to the purchaser. There is no reservation or exception in the case of persons whose immoveable property has been sold under a decree in a suit on a mortgage. The terms of the section include such sales, and effect should be given to its terms unless they are inconsistent with any special provision of law. I cannot see how they are in any way inconsistent with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act relating to sales of mortgaged property. The object of such sales is to obtain for the mortgagee the mortgage money due to him. When the property has been sold the Court has done all that can be done to obtain the money from the property mortgaged. The mortgagee has no longer any claim on the property and is not concerned with its further disposal. Everything which the Transfer of Property Act says shall be done in regard to the property has been done, and the Act has no further concern with it. I do not think it is correct to say that the application of section 310-A in effect provides for an extension of the time for redemption. It has nothing to do with the redemption of the mortgage, but provides for the restoration of the property to the original owner on certain terms after his right to redeem the mortgage has been extinguished (section 89, Transfer of Property Act) and the property has been sold in execution of the decree. It is just the same in the case of property attached and sold in execution of decree other than mortgage decrees. When the property has been sold the judgment-creditor has no longer any concern with the property. In both cases the only person them interested is the purchaser. It is not until this stage is reached that section 310-A comes into operation. In pursuance of the policy which dictated its enactment it says that the owner of the property may even at this stage get hack the property, provided he at once, that is, within thirty days, pays down not only a sum sufficient to pay what the decree-holder has realized by the sale, but the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, (which may be much more than the amount actually realized) and also a sum equal to 5 per cent, of the purchase money to be paid to the purchaser as compensation for his disappointment and any loss that he may have incurred by having his purchase thus set aside. It will be seen that the decree-holder cannot suffer, but may benefit, by action taken under section 310-A. The purchaser is the only person who may suffer, but the Legislature has deliberately imposed this risk on him, and he receives compensation. I think it is impossible to draw any distinction, either in equity or under the terms of the law, between the position of the several persons concerned when the property has been sold under a decree in a mortgage suit or under a decree in any other suit, and, in my judgment, section 310-A applies equally to both classes of debtors. This was the view taken by a Bench of this Court of which I was a member in Tirumal Rao v. Syed Dastanghiri Miyah, and also by the High Courts of Allahabad (Raja Ram Singhji…(Decree-Holder); v. Chunni Lal…(Objector).*) and Bombay (Krishnaji v. Mahadev Vinayak )). For the reasons stated I am respectfully unable to accept the contrary view adopted by the High Court of Calcutta (Kedar Nath Raut v. Kali Churn Ram.

    In Appeal against Order No. 156 of 1900.—As regards the question raised in Appeal against Order No. 156 of 1900, I have had an opportunity of perusing the judgment of my learned colleague, Sir Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., and I entirely concur in his conclusions, that an application under section 89, Transfer of Property Act, must he treated as, in effect, an application for execution of the decree passed under section 88, that it is governed by article 179 of the Limitation Act and that an order thereon is appealable as an order passed under section 244, Civil Procedure Code. I have nothing to add to his exhaustive argument.

    Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.:— The questions referred to a Full Bench in these three cases are respectively the following:—

    (i) Whether section 310-A, Civil Procedure Code, is applicable to a sale of mortgaged property which has taken place in execution of a mortgage decree;

    (ii) Whither section 311, Civil Procedure Code, is applicable to such a sale;

    (iii) Does an appeal lie against an order refusing to make an order absolute for sale upon application made under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    I propose to consider these three references in one judgment as they all depend in a great measure upon one and the same question, viz., the relation between chapter XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ‘execution of decrees’ and chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act on ‘mortgages of immoveable property.

    Dealing with the first two questions together, I am clearly of opinion that the provisions of sections 310-A and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to sales of mortgaged property in execution of mortgage decrees even in provinces in which the Transfer of Property Act is in force.

    The Transfer of Property Act was passed on the 17th of February 1882 and came into force in this Presidency on the 1st July; the Civil Procedure Code was passed on the 17th March and came into force on the 1st of June 1882, section 310-A being introduced into it by an Amendment Act (V) passed in 1894. Though the Transfer of Property Act does not relate to transfer of property by operation of law or by or in execution of decrees or orders, yet an exception is made in regard to the operation of section 57 and chapter IV of the Act [section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act]. It is equally clear that chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Code relates not only to the execution of simple decrees for payment of money, but also to mortgage decrees directing sale of immoveable property; and in provinces to which the Transfer of Property Act has not been extended, the enforcement and execution of mortgage decrees is regulated solely by chapter XIX, Civil Procedure Code; sections 223(c), 295(c), 320 and 322, Civil Procedure Code, directly refer to decrees directing the sale of immoveable property for the discharge of mortgage debts; and sales in execution of mortgage decrees must he conducted only under the provisions of chapter XIX, Civil Procedure Code, and the rules which it is obligatory on the High Court to make under section 287 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    Sections 87, 89 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act prescribe certain rules for the enforcement of decrees in foreclosure suits in suits for sale and ill suits for redemption, such rules being, in my opinion, supplemental to those prescribed by chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Code. Speaking generally, I may mention that with the exception of sections 278 to 284 (relating to claims preferred to or objection made to the attachment of property in execution of a decree) and possibly a few more sections, all the other sections are applicable of their own force to the execution of decrees on mortgages. Section 649, Civil Procedure Code, places this matter beyond all doubt. That section extends the rules contained in chapter XIX to the execution of any judicial process for the sale of property which may be ordered by a Civil Court in any civil proceeding. Such provision is made in view to extend the provisions of chapter XIX which relates only to suite, to sales which may have to be made by a Civil Court in some proceedings other than proceedings in a suit. It is thus obvious that all sales which may have to take place in execution of decrees passed in suits are governed and regulated by chapter XIX Civil Procedure Code.

    Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act empowers the High Court—without making it obligatory on the High Court to do so, as in the case of rules contemplated by section 287, Civil Procedure Code—to make rules, consistent with the Act, for ‘carrying out the provisions’ of chapter IV of the Act. No rules have yet been framed in this Presidency under this section—so far at any rate, as Courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction are-concerned. But, in my opinion, the rules contemplated by section 104 cannot affect the question now under consideration, and indeed, so far as the Courts subject to the superintendence of the High Court are concerned, no rule could be framed under that section inconsistent with sections 310-A and 311, Civil Procedure Code, or any other enactment for the time being in force. Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act must he read subject to section 15 of the Charter Act which provides that the High Court shall have power to make and issue general rules for regulating the practice and proceedings of all Courts which may he subject to its appellate jurisdiction, provided that the rules so made are not inconsistent with the provisions of any law in force, and shall, before, they are issued, have received the sanction of the Governor-General in Council or of the Governor in Council of Madras or Bombay as the case may be. If Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act were construed as enlarging the powers thus conferred upon the High Court, so as to make it competent for the High Court to substitute its own rules for those contained in the Civil Procedure Code, or to make rules which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act will be ultra vires of the Indian Legislature; for under section 22 of the Indian Councils Act (24 & 25 Vict., cap. 67) it is beyond the power of the Governor-General in Council to make any law affecting the provisions of any Act passed in the same session of Parliament, and the Indian High Courts Act (24 & 25 Vict., cap. 104) way was passed in the same session as the Indian Councils Act (24 & 25 Vict., cap. 67). Section 9 of the Charter Act, no doubt subjects all powers and authority for and in relation to the administration of justice, which may he conferred upon the High Courts by Her Majesty's Letters Patent, to the control of the legislative authority of the Governor-General of India in Council. But the power to make rules for regulating the practice and proceedings of the Subordinate Courts is not conferred upon the High Court by Letters Patent, but by section 15 of the Charter Act itself, and such power therefore can in no way he affected by the Indian Legislature. On this point I may refer to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Queen v. Meares and in particular to the following extract therefrom (at page 112)—“After consideration of this question, I think that the meaning of the words, ‘any provisions of any Act passed in the present session of Parliament or hereafter to be passed,’ is provisions in the Act itself. For instance, there is the qualification of the Judges of the High Court. The Governor-General in Council has not power to make an alteration in that. There is an express provision of the Act upon the subject. So also in section 15 there is a provision giving to the High Court superintendence over the Courts which are subject to its appellate jurisdiction. That again is a provision in the Act which cannot he affected or altered by the Governor-General in Council. But I am of opinion that the words ‘provisions in the Act’ do not apply to what is not in the Act itself, but only in the Letters Patent which the Act authorises to be issued, and which can only be said to be a ‘provision of the Act’ by relation—by what is rather a forced construction, namely, that as the section says that the Courts shall have all the jurisdiction which shall be given by the Letters Patent, whatever is given by them becomes fixed, and is in the same state as if the words in the Letters Patent had been in the Act itself. I think that was not the intention of the Legislature and what, has occurred subsequently confirms me in that opinion.” Section 15 of the Charter Act also empowers each of the High Courts to prescrible forms for every proceedings in the Subordinate Courts for which it shall think necessary that a form be provided; and the proviso that they shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of any law in force is equally applicable to them. But section 644, Civil Procedure Code, subjects the forms set forth in the fourth schedule thereto to the power conferred on the High Court by section 15 of the Charter Act.

    Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act, does, not, in my opinion, primarily contemplate the making of rules for the execution of decrees passed under chapter IV of the Act, such rules being already provided for by chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Code, supplemented as they are by sections 87, 89 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act. What the section contemplates is the making of rules for ‘carrying out the provisions’ in the chapter Section 85 provides that all persons having an interest in the property comprised in the mortgage must be joined as parties to any suit relating to such mortgage. But the sections relating to foreclosure, sale and redemption do not provide for successive redemptions and foreclosures and for the adjudication and enforcement of the rights of puisne mortgagees and of other persons having an interest in the property comprised in the mortgage who are joined as parties to the suit. No inconsiderable number of mortgages on which shits are brought are really ‘anomalous mortgages’ and adequate provision is not made in the chapter for dealing with such suits and for working out the rights and liabilities flowing therefrom. The rule-making power conferred on the High Court by section 104 is, in my opinion, principally intended to regulate the procedure to be adopted for carrying out these and similar provisions contained in the chapter. The wording of section 104, however, is sufficiently wide to authorize also the making of rules for more effiectually enforcing decrees that may be passed wider the chapter; but such rules may supplement the provisions of chapter XIX, Civil Procedure Code, provided they are not inconsistent with them, but cannot supersede them.

    With all deference I am unable to concur in the Full Bench decision of who Calcutta High Court in Kedar Nath Rant v. Kali Churn Ram in which it was held that section 310-A, Civil Procedure Code, was not applicable to a sale of mortgaged property in execution of a decree ordering sale thereof. In that decision the learned Chief Justice goes so far as even to doubt whether a rule under Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act extending section 310-A, Civil Procedure Code, to such a sale would not be invalid as being inconsistent with the Transfer of Property Act. The whole reasoning proceeds upon the assumption that section 104 would not have been introduced into the Act, if the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code for the execution of decrees were applicable to sale of mortgaged property in execution of decrees passed under, the Transfer of Property Act. The High Court of Calcutta appears to have framed rules simply extending specified sections of chapter XIX, Civil Procedure Code, to sales of mortgaged property. At the time when such rules were framed, section 310-A had not been enacted. If it had been provided by Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act, that it would he competent for a High Court to extend all or any of the sections of chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Code to sales of mortgaged property, that might, by implication, amount to a legislative declaration that chapter XIX in itself was not applicable to such sales. But that is not how section 104 is framed. What the High Court of Calcutta has done is not to make rules but to extend specified sections of the Code of Civil Procedure to them. The argument that the application of section 310-A, Civil Procedure Code, to the setting aside of a sale of mortgaged property is really to extend the time for redemption and thus to violate the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is far from conclusive. When an order for sale is passed under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act,—and a sale could take place only after such order—the right of redemption and the security are both extinguished, and the property is sold unincumbered by the mortgage, like any other property of the judgment-debtor which has not been mortgaged as security for the decree debt. The judgment-debtor, therefore, by being allowed the statutory benefit of section 310-A is not allowed to redeem, the property from the mortgage, but, as in the case of a sale of any of his other properties not comprised in the mortgage, to rescind the sale and that only on condition of paying compensation for such rescission to the auction purchaser, viz., 5 per cent, of the purchase money.

    The application of section 310-A to such a sale—ordered under chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act but conducted and carried out under chapter XIX, Civil Procedure Code — can no more be regarded as extending the time for redemption of mortgage than the application of section 291, Civil Procedure Code, under which any sale ordered under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act may he adjourned from time to time and in fact stopped, if before the lot is knocked down the mortgage debt and costs are paid into Court. The question as to whether sections 310-A, 291 or other similar sections in the Code of Civil Procedure are, or are not, consistent with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act will be material only if it is proposed to make rules under Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act embodying the provisions of those sections of the Civil Procedure Code on the assumption that those sections in themselves are, by virtue of Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act, rendered inapplicable to sales in execution, of mortgage decrees passed under chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act. But in the view that those sections are in themselves applicable to such sales, and that Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act does not render them inapplicable, the question as to, their being consistent or otherwise with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is immaterial. If in any particular there he a real inconsistency between the provisions, of the Transfer of Property Act — which was passed on the 17th February and came into force, on the 1st July 1882—and of the Civil Procedure Code—which was passed later on the 17th March, but came into force earlier on the 1st June 1882—it may admit of some doubt as to which should prevail., That, in passing the Transfer of Property Act, it was the policy of the Legislature that the Act is not to operate as repealing by implication the provisions of any enactment, is expressly declared in section 2(a), and so far as section 310-A is concerned—which was enacted only in 1894—there can he no manner of doubt that must take effect even if it he inconsistent with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.

    The reasoning on which the above Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High. Court is based, if not its authority, is very much shaken by the decision of a Division Bench of the same Court in Dakshina Mohan Roy v. Srimati Basumati Debi.

    It has been held by this Court as well as by the High Courts of Bombay and Allahabad that section 310-A is applicable to sales of mortgaged property in execution of mortgage decrees (Tirumal Rao v. Syed Dastaghiri Miyah; Krishnaji v. Mahadev Vinayak; and Raja Ram Singhji…(Decree-Holder); v. Chunni Lal…(Objector).*. Several decisions (Birj Mohur Thahoor v. Rai Uma Nath Chowdhry and Mahomed Meera Ravuthar v. Savvasi Vjaya Raghmadka Gopalar have proceeded upon the assumption that section 311 is applicable as well to sales of mortgaged property as to sales in execution of simple money decrees. I see no reason whatever to depart from these decisions and to adopt the view taken by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court.

    As regards the reference made in Appeal against Order No. 156 of 1900, I am clearly of opinion that an appeal does lie from an order refusing to make an order absolute in pursuance of a decree for sale passed under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act. A decree passed under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, either under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 thereof, fulfils in every respect the first part of the definition of ‘decree’ as given in the Civil Procedure Code, viz., ‘decree means the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed or defence set up in a Civil Court, when such adjudication, so far as regards the Court expressing it, decides the suit or appeal.’ This corresponds to what—unless there is something to show an intention to use the words in a more extended sense — in law is regarded, in its strict and proper meaning, as a ‘final judgment,’ that is, ‘a judgment obtained in an action by which a previously existing liability of the defendant to the plaintiffs is ascertained or established, (per Cotton, L.J, in Ex parte Chinery. In the same case Bowen, L.J, in expressing his concurrence with Cotton, L.J observed as follows:—“I think that a garnishee order absolute is not a ‘final judgment.’ There is an inherent distinction between ‘orders’ and ‘judgments.’. It is true that certain acts of Parliament have given to ‘order’ the effect of ‘judgments, but the distinction between them remains. The words ‘final judgment’ having, then, a proper professional meaning, when they are found in a section of an Act of Parliament defining acts of bankruptcy, they should be as strictly construed as if they occurred in a section which was defining a misdemeanour, because the commission of an act of bankruptcy entails disabilities on the person who commits it” (vide also Smith v. Davies).

    The Civil Procedure Code contemplates but one ‘decree’ in a suit, in the above sense, and it nowhere contemplates the passing of a ‘preliminary decree’ as distinguished from a ‘final decree’ or of a ‘decree nisi’ as distinguished from a ‘decree absolute’ (vide sections 213, 215, 215-A, 265 and 396). Sections 213, 215 and 215-A empower the Court, ‘before making its decree’ in the classes of suits therein referred to, to order that accounts be taken. In the case of a suit for the partition of an estate paying revenue to Government, the Court passes but one decree and that is a decree directing the partition. It is then transferred to the Collector for making the partition according to the law, if any, regulating such partition (section 265). No further decree is passed by the Court. In the case of a suit for partition of immoveable property not paying revenue to Government there is to be also but one decree; hut, before making that decree, the Court may appoint a commissioner, to submit a scheme for effecting the partition (section 396). There is, in the section, no reference made to a ‘preliminary decree.’ All that the Section enjoins is that the Court ‘after ascertaining the several parties interested in’ the property, of which a partition is sought ‘and their several rights therein, may issue a commission,’ &c.

    The second part of the definition of ‘decree’ in the Civil Procedure Code enlarges the first part of the definition by including therein ‘an order rejecting a plaint, or directing accounts to be taken, or determining any question mentioned or referred to in section 244, but not specified in section 588.’ But for this enlargement of the definition of ‘decree’ the right of first and second appeals would, under sections 540 and 534, Civil Procedure Code, he restricted only to ‘final adjudication’ of a suit corresponding to a ‘final judgment’ in its strict and proper sense as explained in Ex parte Chinery already quoted. The effect of the enlargement is to extend such right of first and second appeals to ‘order directing accounts to be taken’ prior to final adjudication and to all orders subsequent to adjudication, which orders are passed under section 244, Civil Procedure Code, to give effect to or carry out the adjudication. An order rejecting a plaint is also thus made subject to a first and second appeal.

    The scheme of the Civil Procedure Code is clear, namely, that there is to be only one decree in the suit, corresponding to the first part of the definition, and that all ‘orders.’ subsequent thereto, relating to the execution of such decree, determining any question mentioned or referred to in section 2-54 are also to be treated as ‘decrees’ for purposes of appeal, as also order rejecting a plaint or directing accounts to be taken in the course of a suit. The adjudication of the suit in the sense of. ‘final judgment’ therein is reached when the ‘decree’ according to the first part of the definition is passed; but the suit terminates only when such ‘decree’.is fully effectuated and all proceedings in execution thereof are ‘proceedings in suits’ (vide explanation to section 647, Civil Procedure Code) and until the final judgment (decree) is satisfied the cause is still pending (Salt v. Cooper) and the action is not dead (Collinson v. Jeffery).

    As regards Form No. 129 in the fourth schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, which is headed ‘final decree for foreclosure’ and which by section 87 of the Transfer of Property Act was amended by substituting ‘decree absolute’ for ‘final decree,’ I may mention that in the body of the form reference is made to the order made in this, suit on the day of last and the period of six months has elapsed since the said day of last. It will, thus be seen that the form is not technically accurate; what is referred to as ‘order’ in the body of the form is technically and in reality a ‘decree’ passed under, and referred to as such in section 86 of the Transfer of Property Act. I may add that, according to the English law and practice, the heading of the form ought to be ‘order absolute for foreclosure’ and not ‘final decree for foreclosure.’ I fully concur in the following criticism of this amendment by Macpherson in his ‘Law of Mortgage in India’. [7th edition, page 695, note (4)]—“The amendment of the heading of Form No. 129 of schedule IV of the Civil Procedure Code made by this paragraph seems hardly correct. This Act nowhere refers to a ‘decree absolute,’ though the second paragraph of this section provides for the passing by the Court of an order that the defendant be debarred absolutely of all right to redeem the property. If any amendment of the heading of the form appended to the Code was necessary, it should, it is submitted, have substituted the words ‘order absolute’ for ‘decree final.’ In England also it may be observed, a foreclosure is made ‘final,’ i.e, absolute, by an order, not by a decree (Seton on ‘Decrees’ 4th edition, page 1089).” Dr. Ghose in his Tagore Law Lectures on the ‘Law of Mortgages in India’ (3rd edition at page 893) in noticing this amendment of the heading of Form No. 129, Civil Procedure Code, observes: —“It may be noticed that the amendment in the last paragraph (of section 87) is not very felicitous. The term ‘decree absolute’ should strictly be ‘order absolute’; as foreclosure is made final by an ‘order’ and not by a ‘decree.’”

    Forms, and much less the headings of forms, cannot control the construction of the Act and an amendment of the heading of a form by an Act will really carry no greater weight. This amendment is all the more surprising as in the earlier editions of the Bill which was finally passed into the Transfer of Property Act, the alteration proposed was to substitute ‘order absolute’ for the words ‘final decree.’ I may add that in the body of the form the word ‘decree’ should have been substituted for ‘order.’

    That, in respect of decrees to be passed in mortgage suits under the Transfer of Property Act, the Legislature did not wish to depart from the scheme of the Civil Procedure Code is made abundantly clear by the circumstance that, though in the first edition, of the Transfer of Property Bill, section 19 provided for the passing, in a foreclosure suit, of a ‘preliminary decree’ corresponding to the ‘decree for foreclosure’ in section 86 of the Act and thereafter of a ‘decree for the foreclosure of the mortgage’ corresponding to the ‘order absolute for foreclosure’ in section 87 of the Act, yet in the subsequent editions of the Bill ‘decree’ was substituted for ‘preliminary decree’ and ‘order absolute for foreclosure’ Tor ‘decree for foreclosure.’ And thus sections 86 and 87 of the Transfer of Property Act, as they now stand, are in accordance both with the scheme of the Civil Procedure Code and with the English Chancery law and practice. Similarly in regard to suits for redemption, section 25 of the first edition of the Bill provided for the passing of a ‘preliminary decree’ corresponding to section 92 of the Act, and, in accordance with the English Chancery law and practice, ‘for the suit standing dismissed and the plaintiff being foreclosed of all right to redeem’ (corresponding to section 93 of the Act) in default of payment, within the time fixed, of the amount found due. In the subsequent editions of the Bill the provision for the dismissal of the suit in default of payment within the time fixed was dropped that for the passing of an order absolutely debarring the plaintiff of all right to redeem being alone retained. So far as section 88 is concerned, in which the decree is for sale of the property mortgaged, whether the same be passed in a suit for sale, or in lieu of foreclosure in a suit for foreclosure, the matter is free from any difficulty, and whatever doubt there may possibly be as to the nature and scope of an order absolute for foreclosure under sections 87 and 93, none such exists in regard to an order absolute for sale under section 89, which is the matter immediately under reference. Form No. 128 (fourth schedule, Civil Procedure Code) is the form of a decree for sale as” prescribed by section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, and there is, no form given for an ‘order absolute for sale’ corresponding to the so-called ‘decree absolute for foreclosure’ (Form No. 129). The English form corresponding to Form No. 128, Civil Procedure Code, is Form No. 12 (Sale in Default of Payment) in Seton on ‘Judgments and Orders’ (5th edition) on page 1587. In Seton, as in the Civil Procedure Code, there is no distinct form for an ‘order absolute’ for sale. In the form in Seton, liberty is reserved to apply at Chambers, for directions to effect the sale (vide Annual Practice for 1902, volume I, page 764, order 55, rule 2, clause, 14).

    Under the Transfer of Property Act, an order for sale is obtained under section 89, in default of payment by the mortgagor of the decree amount within the time specified in the decree; on the passing of such order, the security as well as the mortgagor's, right to redeem are both extinguished and the sale is conducted under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as in the case of a simple money decree, in execution of which the property ordered to be sold had been attached, and the ‘security’ of the decree-holder as mortgagee of the property is preserve by the decree by giving him against the sale-proceeds, ‘the same right as he had against’ the property sold. Mr. Macpherson, in commenting upon the effect of the mortgagor's right to redeem as well as the security, being extinguished by the passing of an order absolute for sale, explains it as follows, and I fully concur in the same—(Macpherson—‘Law of Mortgage in British India’—7th edition, pages 697-98)—“As on the passing of an order absolute for sale, the defendant's right to redeem and the security are extinguished, it is clear that the defendant cannot redeem the mortgage after the passing of such an order. And if the effect of this were that the defendant could not pay off the amount due after an order for sale had been passed, this provision would be most inequitable, for it would amount to this, that a mortgagor who was willing to pay the amount of his debt would be absolutely prohibited from doing so and that a Court would be compelled to sell a property in order that a mortgagee might receive payment of that which the mortgagor was before, and at the time of the sale, perfectly ready and willing to pay him. It is submitted, however, that, though the effect of the provision no doubt is to extinguish the mortgagor's right to redeem, he still has the same right as any other judgment debtor has, to pay off the amount of his debt at any time before actual execution, that is, before the property is sold. In other words, though he may not, after the passing of an order absolute for sale, pay the money as a mortgagor, he may do so as a judgment-debtor. There seems to be nothing in this view which is inconsistent with the section, and, as it favours equity it is one which, it is submitted, may well be adopted, Further, as on the passing of an order absolute for sale, the security is extinguished, the mortgagee's interest in the property must then also come to an end. The effect of this must, it is submitted, be that the entire ownership of the property reverts to the mortgagor, for after the mortgagee's interest in the property is extinguished there is nothing to limit the full ownership which is vested in the mortgagor. In the event, therefore, of the mortgagor paying off his debt after such an order as above suggested, no retransfer of the property by the judgment-creditor to the judgment-debtor, would appear to be necessary, inasmuch as the full ownership of the property reverted to the judgment-debtor when the order absolute for sale was made.’

    The absence of a provision in section 89 corresponding to the proviso to sections 87 and 93, empowering the Court to postpone from time to time the day fixed in the decree for payment of the mortgage money, is because the mortgagor under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code is given liberty to arrest the sale by payment before the lot is knocked down, and there is no need for a reconvevance by the mortgagee, inasmuch as, on the passing of an order absolute for sale under section 89, the mortgage security was extinguished and the ownership reverted to the mortgagor by operation of law. Though the absence of a proviso to section 89, empowering the Court to postpone the day appointed in the decree for payment of the amount wall not really prejudice the mortgagor—the judgment-debtor—if the mortgagee should obtain an order absolute for sale, yet if the mortgagee, as he might in some cases, does not choose to do so, the mortgagor will be unable, so far at any rate as the Transfer of Property Act goes, to obtain reconveyance of the property by exercising his right of redemption on payment after the day appointed. It would, therefore, have been better if the proviso for postponing such day, which find as place in sections 87 and 93, had also been added to section 89.

    If the decree for sale passed under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act has only to be executed under the provisions of chapter XIX of Civil Procedure Code, section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, might at first sight seem superfluous. Without saying that section 89 is absolutely necessary in the sense that, but for it, decrees passed under section 88 could not be executed—for mortgage decrees passed prior to the Transfer of Property Act were being executed under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code—section 89 serves two purposes. Under the Civil Procedure Code it is only property that had been attached that could he ordered by the Court to be sold (vide section 284). Hence it was that, prior to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act, and in this Presidency even for some years after it, mortgage decrees used to be executed by first attaching the mortgaged property referred to in the decree and then obtaining under section 284, Civil Procedure Code, an order for sale, the result of which was that claims to the mortgaged property preferred by strangers used to be entertained and summarily adjudicated Upon under the claim-sections of the Civil Procedure Code. This defect in the Civil Procedure Code, by reason of which a difficulty might he raised that an order for sale, of the mortgaged property which had not been attached could not be obtained under, its provisions, was remedied by section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. Another important purpose served by section 89 is to extinguish the security and the correlative right of redemption, so that the decree may be executed as a money decree in respect of the mortgaged property ordered to be sold, and the property be sold as if the mortgagor—the judgment-debtor—were the owner thereof, unincumbered by the mortgage in question, thus obviating the necessity for extension of the time fixed for payment under section 88 as in the case of decrees for foreclosure or redemption.

    In my view, section 89 operates as a provision supplemental to chapter XIX of the Civil Procedure Code, so that a mortgage decree passed under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act may he executed on a scientific basis, and the application to the Court for an order absolute for sale is nothing but an application under section 235, Civil Procedure Code, to work out in execution proceedings (Sri Rajah Papamnia Rao Bahadur v. Sri Vira Pratapa Korkonada, Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Ram Kanno Dei, Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhry v. Maharani Dasi), the decree passed under section 88 of the Transfer, of Property Act. In all these three cases the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council refer to the enforcement of the conditional directions contained in the decree passed under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act as ‘execution’ of the same, and in the last of them, the order absolute passed by the original Court under section 89 is referred to by the Judicial Committee as the granting of ‘execution of the decree to the full amount.’ Section 89 is silent as to the contents of the application, whether it should be verified or not, and notice thereof given or not to the judgment-debtor, because these matters are fully provided for by sections 235 and 248, Civil Procedure Code. A reference to the particulars given by section 235 will show that an application for an order absolute, for sale under section 89, of the Transfer of Property Act must contain all such particulars. Particular ‘j’ after specifying certain reliefs which may be applied for, concludes ‘or otherwise as the nature of the relief sought may require.’ In the case of a mortgage decree as such under section 88 none of the reliefs specifically mentioned in ‘j’ can he applied for, and the ‘other’ relief to be applied for will be an order absolute for sale of the mortgaged property. Whether or not notice of this application is to be given to the judgment-debtor or his legal representative will depend on the provisions of section 248 Civil Procedure Code (Tarapada Ghose v. Kamini Dassi). The order of the Court under section 89, should be to sell either the whole of the mortgaged property, or only, a sufficient portion thereof specifying such portion in the order. Under section 286 the sale will have to be conducted by an officer of the Court and made by public auction. As soon as the order for sale is passed, the duty devolves upon the Court to issue and publish a proclamation of the intended sale under section 287, Civil Procedure Code, and the sale will have to be conducted and completed in the manner provided by the subsequent sections, a warrant of sale being issued to an officer of the Court in the form prescribed by Form No. 145 of the fourth schedule to the Civil Procedure Code.

    That an application under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act for an order absolute for sale is only an application for ‘leave to issue execution’, is also in conformity with the execution chapter containing the rules framed under the Judicature Act under Order No. 42. Rule 9 runs as follows:—“Where a judgment or order is to the effect that any party is entitled to any relief subject to so upon the fulfilment of any condition or contingency, the party so entitled may, upon the fulfilment of such condition or contingency, and demand made upon the party against, whom he is entitled to relief, apply to the Court or a Judge for leave to issue execution against such party. And the Court or Judge may, if satisfied that the right to relief has arisen according to the terms of the judgment or, order, order that execution issue accordingly, or may direct that any issue or question necessary for the determination of the rights of the parties be tried in any of the ways in which questions arising in an action may be tried.” (Annual Practice, 1902, volume I, page 571.) The judgment of decree passed, under, section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, in so far as it orders sale, of the mortgaged property in default of payment within the time fixed in the decree, is a judgment subject to a condition or, contingency as defined in the above rule, and an application to enforce the judgment (vide section 230, Civil Procedure Code) by ordering the sale of the mortgaged property on the ground that the condition or contingency has happened is nothing but an application for leave to issue execution against the mortgagor—the judgment-debtor—as provided in the above rule, and the applicant affords proof that the condition or contingency has happened, entitling him absolutely to an order for sale by verifying his petition which is presented under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, and 235, Civil Procedure code.

    Under section 223, Civil Procedure Code, a decree passed under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act may he sent for execution, under the provisions therein contained, to some other Court and, in my opinion, it may be so sent either before or after the order for sale is passed under section 89. In the latter case, such order should, under section 224(c), Civil Procedure Code, accompany a copy of the decree sent for execution; in the former case the Court to which the decree is sent for execution has, under section 228, the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself and its order in executing such decree are subject to the same rules in respect of appeals as if the decree had been passed by itself. If the Court, to which a decree passed under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act is sent for execution, is by fiction of law to be deemed the Court which passed the decree itself, the order for sale under section 89 can of course be passed by that Court itself and need not be passed by the Court which in fact passed the decree, either as a Court of First Instance or as an Appellate Court.

    That section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act does not contemplate the passing of a ‘decree absolute’ by making absolute the decree which was passed only conditionally under section 88, is placed beyond all doubt by the fact that the conditional decree in favour of the defendant—the mortgagor—against the plantiff—the mortgagee—is not required to be made absolute by an application to be made by the defendant—the mortgagor—under section 89. In every decree passed under section 88, the defendant on payment, on of before the date fixed in the decree, of the amount found due and declared, is entitled to a recovery from the plaintiff of all documents relating to the mortgaged property, to a reconveyance of the property and, if necessary, to be put into possession of it. The defendants on fulfilling the condition of payment is of course entitled to the above reliefs by executing the decree, and, if so, why is section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act entirely silent about any order absolute, at the instance of the defendant, for all or any of these reliefs? The reason is that the sections of the Civil Procedure Code relating to the enforcement of decrees for delivery of chattels or of immoveable property or for the execution of conveyances are ample in themselves and may be carried out without the aid of a supplemental provision in section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, as in the case of an order for sale of mortgaged property. I have already suggested the probable reason for this supplemental provision in section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act in regard to an order for sale of mortgaged property. Be this as it may, the scope and object of section 89 is not to convert a ‘decree nisi’ passed under section 88 into a ‘decree absolute,’ or a ‘preliminary decree’ into a ‘final decree.’ If that were the object, it is inconceivable that it would be carried out only so far as the decree nisi or preliminary decree is in favour of the plaintiff and not in so far as it is in favour of the defendant and every decree under section 88 is necessarily of this dual nature. The decree passed under section 88 is the only and the final decree in the suit and section 89 is only a supplemental provision for the effectual execution on a scientific basis, of such decree, in so far as it is in favour of the plaintiff no such supplemental provision being considered necessary for the execution of the decree in so far as it is in favour of the defendant.

    That the framer of the Transfer of Property Act steadily and distinctly kept in view the difference between a ‘decree’ and an ‘order,’ though such order may have the force of a decree, i.e, the difference between ‘decree’ according to the first part of its definition in the Civil Procedure Code and ‘decree’ according to the second part of the definition, is significantly brought out by section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act immediately following section 89. That section provides for the Court passing a decree (not an ‘order’) against the judgment-debtor, for the recovery of the balance of the mortgage debt remaining due after payment to the mortgagee of the not proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property. Such decree will have to be executed under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as a simple decree for money, and the object of the section is to obviate the necessity of the mortgagee having to bring a fresh suit on payment of the institution fees—and that, in most cases, probably in a Court different from that which passed the mortgage decree or is executing it—to recover the balance of the debt from the mortgagor, on his covenant to pay. If, in the original suit itself, the mortgagee had included a personal claim against the mortgagor for payment of the mortgage debt and obtained a decree for payment of the debt ‘personally’ [Dymond v. Croft; Farrer v. Lacy, Hartland & Co., per North, J.; Bissett v. Jones; Fisher on ‘Mortgages,’ 5th edition, paragraphs 806 and 990 and also a decree under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act for sale of the mortgaged property, there would be no necessity for his applying under section 90 for a fresh decree after the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property have proved insufficient to satisfy the debt. But there may be cases in which, with reference to the provisions of sections 16 and 17, Civil Procedure Code, the mortgagee would he unable to include both claims in one and the same suit, by reason of the cause of action not having arisen or the defendant not residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court having jurisdiction over the mortgaged property. In such a case, under the ordinary law, he will have to bring a separate suit in the Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action on the covenant to pay has arisen or the mortgagor is residing, for enforcing his claim against the mortgagor personally, and that only if, under section 43, Civil Procedure Code, he obtained the leave of the Court in which the first suit was instituted, to reserve his personal remedy against the mortgagor. section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act substitutes an application for a separate suit and thus enables the mortgagee to steer clear of the processual difficulties arising under sections 17 and 43, Civil Procedure Code, and obtain, on application made to the Court executing the mortgage decree, a personal decree for payment of the balance due. Such application should, however, be regarded as an application for execution of the mortgage decree and therefore governed by the law of limitation applicable to the execution of the mortgage decree. But the application would be infructuous under section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act unless the mortgagee's personal remedy against the mortgagor is also not barred by the general law of limitation. The decree under section 90 being virtually a decree in a suit in the form of an application—which application is made in pursuance of a prayer in the plaint [vide Form No. 109, paragraph 3(c), fourth schedule to the Civil Procedure Code]—its execution will be governed by article 179 of the Indian Limitation Act and the mortgagee will have to make a separate application under section 235, Civil Procedure Code, for execution of this fresh or supplemental decree.

    With all deference, I am compelled to dissent from the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in more cases, than one (Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh and Tara Prosad Roy v. Bhobodeb Roy) that an application for an order absolute for sale under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act is not an application for the execution of the decree passed under section 88, that there is no period of limitation prescribed for such application, that the decree passed under section 88 is only a preliminary decree or a decree nisi, and that the order passed under section 89 is a final decree or decree absolute. I entirely agree with the decisions of the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts that an application under section 89 is an application for execution of the decree passed under section 88, that it is governed by article 179 of the Limitation Act and that an order thereon is appealable as an order passed under section 244(c), Civil Procedure Code (Oudh Behari Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Nageshar Lal…(Decree-Holder).*; Chunni Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Harnam Das…(Decree-Holder).*; Bhagawan v. Ganu). In Bhagawan v. Ganu Parsons, J. (Acting Chief Justice) forcibly observes as follows—and I fully adopt his observations. Referring to an application made under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act he observed:—“If the Subordinate Judge had avoided technicalities and treated it as what it really is, namely, an application to the Court for an order for the sale of mortgaged” property, all his difficulties would have disappeared. There is no particular magic in the word ‘absolute’ and it is not necessary that the application for the order should state the Act or the section thereof under which it is made.”

    I do not think it necessary to refer to the arguments addressed by way of analogy on sections 86, 87, 92 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act, and to the various decisions, that were cited bearing upon decrees and orders passed under those sections. In the view. I take of the matter; I regard the provisions made in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of section 87 as provisions for enforcing or executing the, decree for foreclosure passed under section 86 and the provisions, in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 of section 83 as provisions for enforcing the decree, for redemption, passed under section 62 of the Transfer of Property. Act But it is unnecessary to elaborate my view in regard to these decisions with reference to the English Chancery practice; and decisions, English and Indian, or express any decided opinion—especially as a reference has recently been made to a Full Bench for a reconsideration of certain decisions of this Court, which were strongly relied upon, in which it has been held that, notwithstanding that a decree for redemption of a mortgage, has been passed, yet subsequent suits for redemption of the same mortgage could he maintained, if no order absolute, for foreclosure had been passed in the meanwhile. I may, however, mention that I entirely dissent from more than one decision of this Court (Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapuratti; Narayana Reddi v. Papayya; Elayadath v. Krishna) in which it is assumed and held that the time fixed for payment in a decree for foreclosure or for redemption cannot be postponed under the proviso to section 87 or 93 of the Act on the application of the mortgagor, unless he makes, such application in answer to an application by the mortgagee for an order absolute for foreclosure, which application by the mortgagee can necessarily be made only after the expiration of the time fixed for such payment. The proviso contemplates postponement of such day and I am clearly of opinion that the mortgagor can apply, and should ordinarily apply, for postponement; before the mortgagee applies for an order absolute for foreclosure after the expiration of the time so appointed; though according to decisions both in England and here the time appointed may also be retrospectively postponed and extended even on an application made after the day appointed. Every such order of postponement is pro tanto within, the meaning of section 244(c), Civil Procedure Code, an order relating to the stay of execution of the decree (Hulas Rai v. Pirthi Singh; Rahima…(Decree-Holder); v. Nepal Rai…(Judgment-Debtor).*). Until the mortgagee obtains an order absolute for foreclosure the action will be pending, though final judgment has been given, and it will be competent to the Court executing the decree on application made by the mortgagor, for good and sufficient cause, to extend the time for payment, whether such application be made before or after the day appointed for payment. And with all deference I dissent from the view taken by the High Court of Calcutta in more cases than one (Poresh Nath Mojumdar v. Ramjodu Majumdar; Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh) that the mortgagor can, even after the expiration of the time limited for redemption by the decree, redeem the mortgage on payment of the amount, without obtaining an extension of such time, so long as the mortgagee has obtained no order absolute for foreclosure. The question as to whether, in the absence of an order absolute for foreclosure, a fresh suit for redemption could be brought, is altogether a different one, the solution of which depends upon the scope and operation of the principle of res judicata and of section 244, Civil Procedure Code. I am unable to see bow any party seeking to enforce or execute a decree for redemption can claim to do so without complying with the conditions imposed by the decree, as conditions precedent for redemption. It is to mitigate the hardship that may be caused to the mortgagor by non-payment of the amount on or before the day fixed in the decree, that provision is made by sections 87 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act, empowering the Court executing the decree to extend the time fixed for payment.

    The whole difficulty which has led to numerous conflicting decisions of the various High Courts in working chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act (vide preface to the 3rd edition of the ‘Law of Mortgage in India’ by Rash Behary Ghose) is chiefly due to the fact that a number of sections which ought really to find a place in the Civil Procedure Code have been incorporated with the Transfer of Property Act. As in the case of sales and leases, the chapter relating to mortgages in the Transfer of Property Act should simply define the different kinds of mortgages and the rights and liabilities of mortgagors and mortgagees of the different classes. The sections relating to the contents of decrees, to the manner of providing therein for various remedies of the mortgagor and the mortgagee and to the enforcement of such remedies in execution proceedings, should be entirely eliminated from a Code defining the substantive law as to transfer of property by act of parties, and the words, save as provided by section 57 of chapter IV of this Act in section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, deleted, and section 104, dropped. These sections (83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 102 and 103) should, in my opinion, he simplified and recast, certain defects therein being rectified, and with two or three additional sections providing for successive redemptions and foreclosures inserted in the new Civil Procedure Code under the heading of ‘Decrees in foreclosure, sale and redemption suits,’ partly in chapter XVII relating to ‘judgments and decrees’ and partly in chapter XIX relating to the ‘execution of decrees,’ sections 96 and 97 however being incorporated with section 295 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    In recasting sections 86, 88, and 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, the direction as to the retransfer or reconveyance of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor by the mortgagee should, in my opinion, be restricted to ‘English mortgages’ and ‘mortgages by conditional sale’, the direction in the case of simple and usufructuary mortgages and charges being (as provided by section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act) simply to execute (and, where the mortgage or charge has been effected by a registered instrument, to have registered) an acknowledgment in writing that any right in derogation of the mortgagor's interest, transferred to the mortgagee or created in favour of the charge-holder has been extinguished—a provision which was evidently intended to meet cases other that ‘English mortgages’ and mortgages by conditional sale, but apparently overlooked in the decretal sections 86, 88 and 92. The direction in the decree as to the delivery, by the mortgagee to the mortgagor, of ‘all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property’ without specifying the same in the decree, and providing for the payment of a sum of money in respect of each such document (vide section 208, Civil Procedure Code) or for the giving of an indemnity, as an alternative, if delivery cannot be had, is vague and indefinite and leads to complicated and vexatious proceedings in execution. In the case of a simple or usufructuary mortgage or a charge, there is nothing to be retransferred or reconveyed after the discharge of the debt, any more that there is in the case of a lease after the termination of the lease. But every mortgage decree now contains as a matter of form a direction for retransfer or reconveyance of the property, by the mortgagee or his assignee to the mortgagor, free from all incumbrances created by the mortgagee, or, in the case of his assignee, by those under whom such assignee claims, and in the vast majority of cases, this direction, which is simply unintelligible and puzzling to the parties concerned,—especially when they are furnished with a translation of the same in the vernacular, languages of the district—remains a dead letter.

    Moore, J.:— In Appeal against Appellate Order No. 35 of 1901 and Appeal against Order No. 48 of 1900.—There can, as it appears to me, be no reasonable doubt that section 311 of the Civil Procedure Code should be held to apply to sales which have taken place in execution of a mortgage decree. That section contains a broad general rule which must, I consider, he held to apply to all sales of immoveable property held under the order of a Court. It is in no way inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. If it were to be held that this section did not apply to sales held under mortgage decrees, it would follow that even where it was shown that grave irregularities had occurred in connection with the sale which has caused gross injustice, the Court would be powerless to set matters right and redress the injury proved to have been inflicted. This cannot have been the intention of the Legislature.

    The question as to whether section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code applies to sales under mortgage decrees is one of considerable difficulty as is shown by the conflicting views of the several High Courts regarding it, Madras (Tirumal Rao v. Syed Dastaghiri Miyah, Bombay Krishnaji v. Mahadev Vinayah) and Allahabad (Raja Ram Singhji v. Chuni Lal answering the question in the affirmative, while Calcutta (Kedar Nath Raut v. Kali Churn Ram) gives a negative response. At the conclusion of the arguments addressed to the Full Bench I felt disposed to concur with the Calcutta High Court, mainly on the ground that the provisions of section 310-A appeared to me to be inconsistent with section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section provides that, on an application being made to the Court for an order absolute for sale of the mortgaged property, the Court shall pass an order that such property be sold and that the proceeds of the sale be dealt with as provided for in section 88 and that, thereupon, the defendant's right to redeem and the security shall both be extinguished; to allow the person whose property has been sold in accordance with this order to have the sale set aside subsequently, under section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code, appears to me to be inconsistent with the clear provisions of this section of the Transfer of Property Act. A perusal of the draft of the revised Civil Procedure Code and the statement of objects and reasons with the annexed notes on clauses appended thereto shows that the Government of India in the Legislative Department looks at the matter in the same light. In this draft section 310-A is ammended so as to make it apply to sales under mortgage decrees and it is provided that the following words shall be added to section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act “save in so far as is otherwise provided by section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code.” With reference to these alterations it is observed as follows in the notes on clauses—“Though sections 291 and 310-A of the present Code are somewhat inconsistent with section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is considered desirable to enact that they apply to sales in the execution of decrees for the enforcement of mortgages.”

    On thinking the matter over I am, however, somewhat doubtful as to whether there is really any greater inconsistency between section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code and section 89, Transfer of Property Act, than there is between sections 291 or 311 of the Civil Procedure Code and the Transfer of Property Act (vide remarks of the Bombay High Court as to this, Krishnaji…(Auction-Purchaser) Applicant; v. Mahadev Vinayak…(Judgment-Debtor) Opponent.* 88 and 89 of the Transfer of Property Act provide that on the plaintiff (mortgagee) getting a decree for sale in case the defendant (mortgagor) does not pay the amount due within the prescribed time, the plaintiff (mortgagee) can apply to the Court for an order absolute for sale. The Court then passes an order for sale and directs that the proceeds of the sale shall be dealt with as mentioned in section 88 and the section then provides that ‘thereupon’ the defendant's (mortgagor's) right to redeem shall be extinguished. ‘Thereupon’ means I believe on the order absolute for sale being passed’ and not ‘on the sale having been completed.’ The sale takes place, the property is purchased by a third party, the sale-proceeds are applied under section 88 and the mortgagee is completely paid off. A few days subsequently the mortgagor, being a person whose immoveable property has been sold, comes in under section 310-A, maker the payments these required and gets the sale set aside and his land restored to him. All this is not, I think, really inconsistent with section 89, Transfer of Property Act. The mortgagor has got back his property but the order absolute under which his right to redeem was extinguished is still in force. The arguments in Kedar Nath Raut v. Kali Churn Ram are mainly based on a consideration of the rules framed by that High Court under Section 104 of the Transfer of Property Act, but those arguments have little force in Madras as we have framed no rules under that section except for the Original Side of the High Court. I am for these reasons not disposed to disagree with the view taken by my learned colleagues that the provisions of section 310-A of the Civil Procedure Code do apply to sales, under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    In Appeal against Order No. 150 of 1900.—The question referred for decision to the Full Bench is, “Does an appeal lie against an order refusing to make an order absolute for sale upon an application made under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act?” The real point at issue is as to whether an application to make the abovementioned order is an application to the Court to make final the preliminary decree already passed under section 88, or is an application for execution of a final decree already passed and capable of being executed. Whichever view lie taken, it is clear that there is an appeal. If the application is one for execution an appeal lies under section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, while, if it be held that till an application for an order absolute for sale is granted or refused under section 89 there is no decree capable of execution, it follows that such an order, whether under it the prayer is granted or refused, is a decree from which an appeal lies in the ordinary course. The question, however, as to whether an application under section 89 for an order absolute for sale should he looked on as an application for execution of a decree, or as one for such an order as will make a decree, which up till then has been unexecutable, capable of being executed, is one of great importance regarding which the several High Courts have arrived at widely divergent conclusions. The principle underlying the procedure prescribed by law with respect to suits relating to mortgages, partnership and partition, appears to be that a suit remains pending until a final decree is made directing a party to pay a certain sum of money, to deliver possession of particular property, etc. Until such a decree is made there is nothing which the Court can execute, inasmuch as a proceeding in execution is a proceeding to enforce an order requiring a party to perform or abstain from perforating a particular act.

    Applying this principle, it appears to me that it must he held that, in a mortgage suit for sale or foreclosure, the first decree which declares the rights of the parties is merely a preliminary or interlocutory decree and is not capable of execution. An application for the passing of an order absolute must accordingly he considered to be an application in a pending suit and is therefore not governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or of the Limitation Act relating to execution. This is the view which has for years past been consistently taken by the Calcutta High Court. Reference may he made to Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh; Tiluck Singh v. Parsotein Proshad; Tara Proshad Roy v. Bhobodeb Roy; and Akikunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Das. It was also the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Ranbir Singh v. Drigpal, but that decision has been overruled by the judgment in Chunni Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Harnam Das…(Decree-Holder).*, which follows the earlier rulings of that Court (Ram Lal v. Narain and Oudh Behari Lal…(Judgment-Debtor); v. Nageshar Lal…(Decree-Holder).*). For the same reason in a redemption suit the mortgagee on the failure of the mortgagor to redeem may apply at any time for an order absolute for sale or foreclosure, and the mortgagor can also at any time before the passing of an order absolute under section 93 of the Transfer of Property Act ask the Court to grant him an extension of time for payment under the last clause of that section (Nandream v. Babaji). As observed by Farran, C.J, in the decision there reported. “We think that the Court has power to give effect to the proviso to section 93 if the postponement is made at any time before the final decree—the decree absolute—is made … The original decree is we think only in the nature of a decree nisi … and the order passed under section 93 is in the nature of a decree absolute”. The Full Bench decision (Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapmratti) is in no respect inconsistent with this Bombay ruling. All that was decided there was that the plaintiff (the mortgagor) having made default in payment of the mortgage money within the time fixed by the decree was not entitled to apply for execution. He must, in the first instance, apply to the Court for extension of the time within which payment is to be made. The same principle as to preliminary and final decrees is followed in suits for the recovery of immoveable property and mesne profits. Where the Court passes a decree for possession of immoveable property and directs an enquiry as to mesne profits, in the former respect the decree is final and may be executed but, as regards the mesne profits, it is, interlocutory merely, and the subsequent proceedings are in continuation of the original suit, and, until these proceeding are brought to a close and the amount due has been declared, there is no final decree. If the defendant dies subsequently to the interlocutory decree, by which his liability for mesne profits is declared, his representatives must be added as parties to the suit; otherwise they will not he bound by the final decree. Reference as to this may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council (Maharaja Radha Parshad Singh v. Lal Sahab Rai). In the case there disposed of it appears that it was decreed in 1856 that the plaintiff was entitled to certain lands and to mesne profits up to the date on which he recovered, possession. “That decree,” as their Lordships observe, “no doubt found that the defendants in the suit were accountable for mesne profits, and by that finding they were bound; but it did not ascertain the amount of such profits, or determine the important question whether the defendants were liable jointly or severally in respect of their wrongful possession. There was no adjudication upon any of these matters until March 1877, when for the first time, the appellant (plaintiff) obtained a money decree-which was capable of being put into execution.” The father of the respondents before the Privy Council was one of the defendants against whom the decree of 1856 was passed, but he died before 1877 and his sons were not brought in as parties prior to March 1877. Under these circumstances, their Lordships held that, as an operative decree, by which the exten and quality of the defendant's liability already declared in general termst were for the first time ascertained, had not been obtained till after the death of the defendant, it could not hind his representatives as they had not been brought in as parties to the suit prior to the passing of the operative decree.

    The same principle is followed in administration suits (section 213, Civil Procedure Code) and in suits for the dissolution of partnership (section 215, Civil Procedure Code) and for an account between principal and agent (section 215-A, Civil Procedure Code). In all such cases the Court is bound in the first instance to pass an interlocutory order or preliminary decree declaring the rights of the parties and then to proceed to determine the actual amounts due to them; the suits still remains pending and it is only when these amounts have been ascertained that a final decree can be passed and proceeding is execution can he instituted. As to suits for the dissolution of partnership, reference may be made to the judgment in Thirukumaresan Chetti v. Subbaraya Chetti, and to Forms Nos. 132 and 133 in the fourth schedule attached to the Civil Procedure Code. It will be remarked that Form No. 132 dissolving the partnership is termed an order, and that it is not till the actual sums that have to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, or vice versâ, have been definitely, ascertained that a decree, is passed (vide Form No. 133). Similarly, in a suit for partition a decree declaring the rights of the parties and directing partition, although appealable (vide the Full Bench decision in Dulhin Golab Koer v. Radha Dulari Koer), is not the final decree in the suit, but is an interlocutory or preliminary decree, and an order made in the proceedings subsequently taken to effect the partition must he treated as an order made in the suit and not as one passed in execution of a decree. As was held by O'Kinealy, Macpherson, Trevelyan and Banerjee, JJ., in the Full Bench judgment in Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chandra Lahiry, and order passed in a suit for partition subsequently to the preliminary decree appointing a commission to make the partition is not an order in execution, and such being the case is not appealable under section 244, Civil Procedure Code. It is an interlocutory order pending the suit which has not been finally decided. “I am unable” observes Trevelyan, J., “to see how there can he any execution except of a final order or decree which is capable of being enforced against the person or property of a party hound by it. The subsequent proceedings, after an interlocutory decree, are the natural consequences of that decree, but are not, as far as I can see, within the ordinary acceptation of the term, in execution of it.” Where, under section 396 of the Civil Procedure Code, a commissioner is appointed to make partition of immoveable property, the proceedings for the purpose of effecting the partition are proceedings in the suit itself and not proceedings in execution of the decree (Dwarka Nath Misser v. Barinda Nath Missir) and it is not till the commissioner has actually divided the land by metes and hounds that the final decree in the suit can be passed. The general principle that, it appears to me, is followed consistently in the Civil Procedure Code and in those sections of the Transfer of Property Act which deal with decrees in mortgage suits is that, until the specific sums due to the several parties or the defined item of landed property, etc. to be handed over have been finally and definitively determined a suit remains pending and the Court is bound to proceed with it and of its own motion or on an oral application by a party to take the necessary steps for to final determination. It of course follows from the view that has now been expressed as to the exact significance of the order passed under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act that there is no limitation as to the time within which an application for an order absolute under section 89 can be made. As to this, the Calcutta High Court holds that such an application is not governed by any limitation and then adds:— “We do not, however, mean to say that, in dealing with such matters, the Court will not be guided by considerations as to whether any delay on the part of the mortgagee has not been unreasonable so as to bring it within the rules applied in such cases by Courts of Equity” Tiluck Singh v. Parsotein Proshad). It has been urged before us that the procedure thus contemplated is likely to give rise to considerable abuse and that it cannot have been the intention of the Legislature that there should be no limitation as to the period within which applications under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act can be made. Once, however, it is clearly recognised that everything that is done up to the passing of the order absolute is a proceeding prior to the final decree, there is no danger that there will be undue delay in the passing of such an order. If the supervising Courts insist on Subordinate Courts retaining on their files as pending every suit in which final orders under section 89 have not been passed, the Judges of such Courts may he trusted to see that prompt steps are taken to bring about a final adjudication and relieve their, file of the suit. For these reasons I am of opinion that we should reply to the reference made to us to the effect that an order refusing to make an order absolute for sale upon an application under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act is not an order in execution, and as such appealable under section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, but that it is a decree from which, as such, an appeal lies.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mallikarjunadu Setti (Counter-Petitioner) v. Lingamurti Pantulu (Petitioner) .
    (Feb 10, 1902)