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Opinion Summary — Maclean, C.J. (with Banerjee, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a suit for ejectment. The defendants' principal defence was that their tenure of the land in question was of a permanent nature. The matter is before the Court on a second appeal and, accordingly, the Court states it is bound by the findings of fact made by the Courts below.

Key factual findings by the Court below, as referenced in the opinion, are:

  • The defendants and their ancestors had long possession of the land.
  • A document (a pottah) produced by the defendants purporting to show permanent tenure was found by both Courts below to be not genuine.
  • Pucca buildings were erected many years ago on the land by successive tenants, and those buildings have stood for a considerable time.
  • The land had been transferred by succession and purchase among tenants, and the landlord had acquiesced in, or accepted rent from, the transferees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants' production of a forged pottah precludes them from setting up an alternative case (i.e., long possession, transfers, pucca buildings and landlord's acquiescence) to establish a permanent tenure.
  2. Whether the alternative case relied on by the defendants was sufficiently and properly pleaded.
  3. Whether, on the facts found by the Court below (long possession, pucca buildings erected by predecessors, transfers with landlord's acquiescence, rent acceptance), the Court below was justified in presuming that the tenure was of a permanent nature.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • Initially relied on a pottah to show the tenure was permanent (the pottah was later found to be not genuine by the Courts below).
  • As an alternative (if the pottah is not genuine), the defendants argued that long possession by themselves and predecessors, repeated transfers by succession and purchase, the erection and long existence of pucca buildings by successive tenants, and the landlord's permission/knowledge and acceptance of rent together warranted an inference or presumption that the tenure was of a permanent nature.

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The appellant argued that because the defendants first based their case on a fraudulent pottah, they should not be allowed to set up the alternative case based on possession and improvements.
  • The appellant also contended that, in view of the language of paragraph 15 of the defence, the alternative case was not sufficiently or properly pleaded.
  • The appellant cited authorities (including Ramsden v. Dyson and Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal) though the Court observed those authorities dealt with a different point and were not directly relied upon for the present question.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranee Surnomoyee v. Maharajah Sutteeschunder Roy Bahadoor When false witnesses or forged documents are produced, that fact creates suspicion as to the case, and may affect the weight or credibility of evidence dependent on such witnesses/documents. The Court cited this passage to reject the submission that production of a false pottah precluded the defendants from advancing an alternative case; the forged document creates suspicion but does not bar reconsideration of other evidence.
I.L.R. 21 All. 504 Acquiescence is a question of legal inference from facts found and the judgments of Appellate Courts on such inferences are not necessarily final (as referenced). The opinion notes this authority when discussing acquiescence, and states that in the present case the inference as to acquiescence was well founded.
Baboo Dhunput Singh v. Gooman Singh Long and uninterrupted enjoyment together with recognition of hereditary and transferable character makes it unlikely that a suit by the zemindar could not be successfully resisted. Used to support the proposition that the facts of long possession and recognition of transferability here warrant presuming a permanent tenure.
Gungadhur Shikdar v. Ayimuddin Shah Biswas Where land was let for building and substantial buildings were erected long ago by ancestors who ever since occupied them, Courts may presume that the land was granted for building purposes and that the grant was of a permanent character. The Court treated this case as analogous and relied on it to show that pucca buildings erected long ago by predecessors support presuming a permanent grant.
Prosunno Coomar Chatterjee v. Jagun Nath Bysack If land is let for building pucca houses, or if with landlord's knowledge the tenant expends large sums on buildings or substantial improvements, coupled with long enjoyment and unknown origin of tenancy, a presumption of permanent grant may be justified; mere occupation alone is insufficient unless the buildings were erected by tenant or predecessors. The Court invoked this passage to emphasize that the origin of the tenancy is not known in the present case and that substantial, long-standing buildings by predecessors support the presumption of permanence.
Ismail Khan Mahomed v. Jaigun Bibi When the origin of a tenancy is unknown, evidence of the mode of dealing with the land and the conduct of the parties constitutes the best evidence of the nature of the tenancy; but where the origin is known, such evidence may be insufficient or may even militate against a permanent-tenancy inference. The Court cited this case to distinguish situations where the origin is known; because in the present case the origin was not ascertained, the mode-of-dealing evidence could legitimately support a presumption of permanent tenure.
Ramsden v. Dyson Reference to a well-known authority on relevant property-tenure principles (cited by the appellant). The Court stated it need not refer to this case because the present matter did not engage the precise point decided there.
Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal Privy Council authority cited by the appellant (linked in the opinion). The Court noted the Privy Council case but said it was not necessary to discuss it because the present question differed from that decided there.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a stepwise manner:

  1. Binding nature of facts: The matter is on second appeal and the Court stated it was bound by the findings of fact made by the Court below.
  2. Forged document issue: The Courts below found the pottah offered by defendants to be not genuine. The appellant argued that reliance on a forged document should prevent the defendants from advancing an alternative case. The Court rejected that contention, applying the principle from Ranee Surnomoyee that production of false documents or witnesses creates suspicion but does not bar a party from presenting an alternative case or bar the Court from weighing other evidence.
  3. Pleading sufficiency: The Court rejected the submission that the alternative case was insufficiently pleaded. It noted that the defendants' intention to raise the alternative case was reasonably clear, the plaintiff was aware (the issue in the First Court specifically raised the question whether the tenure was permanent), evidence was led without objection, and the appellant did not raise the pleading point as a ground of appeal. The Court treated the objection as an afterthought and without merit.
  4. Core factual question (presumption of permanence): The Court summarized the material facts found below: long possession by the vendor defendants and their ancestors; landlord permitted a pucca house to be built which has stood a long time; the house has been built or added to by successive tenants; the tenure has been transferred by succession and purchase with the landlord's acquiescence or at least with his knowledge as rent was accepted.
  5. Application of authorities: The Court applied and compared the present facts with a line of authorities which hold that long continued enjoyment, the erection of substantial buildings by ancestors or tenants with landlord's knowledge, recognition of hereditary or transferable character, and unknown origin of tenancy can justify presuming a permanent grant. The Court observed that the origin of the tenancy in this case had not been ascertained, which made those authorities particularly relevant.
  6. Distinguishing contrary authorities: The Court noted that some cited authorities (Ramsden v. Dyson; Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal) were not directly on point and therefore need not be discussed for the present question.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Having applied the authorities to the facts found, the Court concluded that those facts were sufficient to warrant presuming the tenure was of a permanent nature.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED — the Court held that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The Court affirmed the view that the specific facts found by the Courts below (long possession by defendants and predecessors, pucca buildings erected and long-standing, transfers by succession/purchase with landlord acquiescence and acceptance of rent, and unknown origin of the tenancy) justified presuming that the tenure was of a permanent character.
  • The production of a forged pottah created suspicion but did not bar the defendants from advancing an alternative factual case nor prevent the Court from considering that alternative evidence.
  • The Court did not announce or purport to establish a novel principle of law beyond applying existing authorities to the facts; its decision is framed as an application of established precedents to the particular factual findings. No broader new precedent is claimed in the opinion; the immediate effect stated is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Concurring opinion: Banerjee, J. stated he was entirely of the same opinion. The formal order records: "Appeal dismissed."

This summary is strictly confined to the content and statements appearing in the provided opinion. No outside facts, dates, or inferences beyond the opinion text have been introduced.

    A. Caspersz v. Kader Nath Sarbadhikari

    Maclean, C.J:— This is a suit for ejectment. The defence is that the defendants are not liable to be ejected, as their tenure of the land in question is of a permanent nature. The matter comes before us on second appeal, and we are, therefore, bound by the findings of fact of the Court below.

    In support of their case the defendants first set up a pottah, which purported to show that the tenure was of a permanent nature. That document has been found by both the Courts below not to be genuine. But then the defendants say that, even if the pottah be not genuine, they have been for a very long time in possession of the land in dispute, that it has been from time to time transferred by succession and purchase from one tenant to another, that pucca buildings have, many years ago, been erected upon it by successive tenants, and that has been done with the permission and knowledge of the landlord, and that, upon these facts, the Court would be justified in inferring or presuming that the tenure was of a permanent nature. To which the appellant replies that as the defendants in the first instance based their case upon a fraudulent pottah, it is not open to them to set up the alternative case upon which they now rely. I do not think this contention can properly prevail. When parties to a litigation set up a false document, as here, that circumstance no doubt induces the Court to view the evidence which they tender upon some other part of the case, with great care and possibly with some suspicion, but it does not prevent the parties from setting up such alternative case, nor prevent the Court from duly weighing and considering the evidence adduced in support of it. In this connection I may refer to the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Ranee Surnomoyee v. Maharajah Sutteeschunder Roy Bahadoor(1). The passage I refer to is at page 149 and runs thus: “When false witnesses or forged documents are produced in support of a case, the fact naturally creates suspicion as to the case itself; and if the evidence on which their Lordship's act depended in any degree for its credibility or weight on such witnesses, or document, they would have paused as to their conclusion.” The fact is not so, however, in the present case; their Lordships believe they have to deal with a just cause, foolishly and wickedly attempted to be supported by false evidence.” That disposes of the first point.

    The second point is that, having regard to the language of para 15 of the defence, this alternative case has not been sufficiently or properly pleaded. This, to my mind, savours of too much refinement, for it is reasonably clear that the defendants intended to raise this case, and it is equally clear from the second issue in the First Court, which runs as follows: “Whether the Adhikaries held the tenure as a permanent one either by express or implied grant; if so, is the suit maintainable?” that the plaintiff was aware that this case was raised and was in no wise misled by the pleadings. Moreover, evidence was gone into on the question without objection, and the appellants have not even raised this point as one of their grounds of appeal, and so it cannot be discussed without our permission. To my mind it is a mere afterthought, and there is nothing in it.

    I now pass to the substantial question in the cage, and, that is, whether upon the facts found by the Court below, the Court was justified in presuming that the tenure was of a permanent nature. The Judge sums up the matter as follows: “In the absence of all documentary evidence, I must hold that the long possession of the vendor defendants and their ancestors, and the fact that the landlord permitted a pucca house to be built upon the land by the tenant, which house has stood for a very considerable time, raises the presumption that the original grant was some kind of permanent building grant.” I must also refer to one or two other passages in his judgment. He says “there can be no doubt on the evidence that the house on the land in dispute has been built by successive tenants,” and a little earlier in relation to the question of transfer he says, “At any rate the landlord acquiesced, and it is admitted that, for at least two generations, the Sarbudhikaris have occupied the land as tenants of the estate, paying a rent which was increased at irregular intervals from Rs. 5 in 1239 to Rs. 18-10 in 1291. “I may point out in passing that acquiescence is not a question of fact, but of legal inference from the facts found; and upon it the judgments of the Appellate Courts are not final (see, I.L.R 21 All. 504) However, it has not been suggested that the inference quâ the question of acquiescence was not in the present case well founded.

    Upon these findings of fact it is urged that the Court below was not justified in presuming that the tenure was of a permanent nature. Now in substance what facts are found? We have the fact of the long possession by the defendants and their ancestors, the fact of the landlord having permitted them to build a pucca house upon it, that the house has been there for a very considerable time, that it has been built (this probably means added to) by successive tenants, and that the tenure has from time to time been transferred by succession and purchase, in which the landlord is found to have acquiesced, or of which he could not have been ignorant as he accepted rent from the transferees. In my opinion these facts are sufficient to warrant the Court in presuming that the tenure was of a permanent nature, and the authorities appear to me to support this view. I will first refer to the case of Baboo Dhunput Singh v. Gooman Singh, and the passage which I propose to read is at page 466: “And, upon the proof here given of long and uninterrupted enjoyment, accompanied by the recognition of its hereditary and transferable character, it is almost impossible to suppose that a suit by the zemindar in the Civil Court to disturb the possession of the respondent, could not be successfully resisted.”

    I now pass to the case of Gungadhur Shikdar v. Ayimuddin Shah Biswas(2). This case in its circumstances is not dissimilar from the present; it is not suggested that the lands in the present case were let out for agricultural purposes and the Court said: In this case we think there was quite sufficient ground to justify the Court below in presuming a grant of a permanent nature in favour of the defendants' ancestors. It is conceded that the land in question was Dever let for agricultural purposes. It was apparently let upwards of 60 years ago for building purposes, because it is found that after the grant (whatever it was) these buildings, which are of a substantial character were erected some 60 years ago by the defendants' ancestors, and that they and their ancestors have lived there ever since. Under these circumstances, we think that the Courts below were at liberty to presume, if they thought fit, that the land was granted for building purposes, and that the grant itself was of a permanent character.” In the present case we have the element of pucca buildings, built a very long time ago by the ancestors and predecessors in title of the defendants and apparently added to by successive tenants.

    The case last cited virtually followed the case of Prosunno Coomar Chatterjee v. Jagun Nath Bysack, where this passage occurs: “No doubt, if land is let for building pucca houses upon it, or if the tenant with the knowledge of the landlord, does in fact lay out large sums upon it in buildings or other substantial improvements, that fact, coupled with a long continued enjoyment of the property by the tenant or his predecessors in title might justify any Court in presuming a permanent grant, especially if the origin of the tenancy could not be ascertained.” There I pause to observe that the origin of the tenancy has not been ascertained in the present case. If there were any document, a pottah for instance, which showed the original nature of the tenancy, very different considerations would arise. “But the mere circumstance of a tenant occupying buildings upon property would not justify such presumption, unless it could be shown that they were erected by him or his predecessors, because a landlord might let property of that kind in the same way as agricultural land, at will, of from year to year.”

    There is only one other case, a recent case, that of Ismail Khan Mahomed v. Jaigun Bibi, which I need refer to in this connection. That was a regular appeal and the Court could go and did go into the evidence. There I find this statement of the law: “When the origin of a tenancy and the circumstances attending its creation are not known, evidence of the mode of dealing with the land demised and of the acts and conduct of the parties generally, constitutes the best and indeed the only evidence to prove the nature of the tenancy. If that, had been the case, the evidence of the mode of dealing with the property, such as we have here, might perhaps, have been sufficient to raise the presumption of a permanent tenancy. But where, as in this case we know when and under what circumstances the tenancy was created, evidence such as has been adduced is not sufficient for that purpose. Indeed, the circumstances attending the creation of the tenancy positively militate against any inference that it was intended to be permanent.” These authorities appear tome to establish that upon the facts found, the Court below was justified in presuming that the tenure was of a permanent nature. I need not refer to the well-known case of Ramsden v. Dyson and to the Privy Council case of Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal(3), which have been cited by the appellant, for we are not, in the present case, dealing with the point which was there decided.

    In my opinion the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    Banerjee, J.:— I am entirely of the same opinion.

    S.C.G
    Appeal dismissed.

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    A. Caspersz v. Kader Nath Sarbadhikari
    (Jul 12, 1901)