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Summary of the Opinion — Full Bench on Admissibility and Weight of Dying Declarations

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were convicted of the murder of Nammalwar Naickar. The first, second and fourth appellants were sentenced to death; the third and fifth appellants were sentenced to transportation for life.

Facts as recorded in the opinion: between 5 and 6 a.m. on 31 March 1939 the deceased was attacked and received thirty-eight injuries; he died shortly after midnight. Three persons in the vicinity were attracted by his cries; they did not see the assault but saw five persons running away. When these persons reached the dying man, he identified five assailants by name (the names matching the five appellants) and also named their fathers. Additional witnesses (including the deceased's brother-in-law and another person) gave evidence consistent with these statements. At about 8 a.m. the village munsif recorded a statement by the deceased implicating the appellants, and a dying declaration was recorded by a Magistrate at about 2:30 p.m., again implicating the appellants.

There was proved enmity between the deceased and the appellants (who belonged to the Marava caste), although they were not the only members of that caste with whom the deceased was at enmity.

Procedurally, a question of law was referred to a Full Bench because two Division Benches of the Court had rendered conflicting judgments on the legal effect of dying declarations where there is no other corroborative testimony. The Full Bench (Sir Lionel Leach, C.J., with Lakshmana Rao, J., and Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., concurring) answered the reference; later, on final hearing, the Court (Burn and Mockett JJ.) delivered the judgment confirming convictions and sentences and dismissed all appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the statements of a deceased person of the nature described in the case (dying statements recorded at different times and places), without other testimony except as to the number of the assailants, the appellants can properly be convicted of murder.
  2. How to resolve the conflict between two Division Bench decisions on the necessity (or otherwise) of corroboration before acting upon a dying declaration relevant under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Criminal Appeal No. 653 of 1935 (Beasley C.J. and Gentle J.; judgment delivered by Gentle J.) Gentle J. (quoting Taylor on Evidence and referring to other cases) observed that, while dying declarations can be relied upon without corroboration, it is "dangerous, imprudent and opposed to practice" to convict on them absent corroboration. The Full Bench (Leach C.J.) rejected this observation as being "far too wide" and not correctly stating the position. The opinion treats the statement as an over-generalisation and declines to adopt a rule requiring corroboration in every such case.
Referred Trial No. 112 of 1937 (Burn J.; Leach C.J. concurred) Case in which a dying declaration, without corroboration, was accepted on the facts and used to uphold a conviction. Leach C.J. referred to this case as demonstrating that, depending on surrounding circumstances and the facts, a dying declaration may be accepted without corroboration; this decision contributed to the Full Bench answer.
Emperor v. Akbarali (Akbardli) Karimbhai Beaumont C.J. observed that as a rule of prudence declarations relevant under Section 32 but not made in immediate expectation of death and not made in presence of the accused "ought not to be acted upon unless there is some reliable corroboration," while acknowledging there is no absolute rule requiring corroboration. Leach C.J. accepted that the evidential value of such declarations varies with circumstances but refused to adopt an absolute rule of corroboration. He relied on the principle that each case must be judged on its facts and surrounding circumstances.
In re Dabbukota Statement that dying declarations, not being subject to cross-examination, are worth little or nothing if not substantially borne out by independent evidence and the probabilities of the case. Leach C.J. characterised that statement as "far too sweeping" and said it offends against the law of evidence in India; he declined to adopt a rule that dying declarations must always be corroborated in the sense suggested.
Endapalle Ella Reddi v. Emperor Illustrates a case where circumstances made it unsafe to convict the accused on a bare dying declaration; the declaration was not accepted as sufficient for the Crown. Leach C.J. accepted that in Endapalle Ella Reddi the particular circumstances rendered conviction unsafe on the bare dying declaration and that that outcome was appropriate in that factual context; he drew a distinction between such cases and cases where the court can be fully convinced of the truth of the declaration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench's analysis focused on statutory provisions and the factual context in which dying declarations are made. The Court reviewed the relevant provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and applied them to the facts before it:

  • Section 32: The Court noted that statements of relevant facts made by a person who is dead (including statements as to the cause of his death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death) are admissible as evidence whether or not the declarant was under expectation of death when he made them. Thus, a declaration by a deceased person as to the cause of his death is admissible evidence under Section 32 even if not made in immediate expectation of death.
  • Sections 157 and 158: The Court observed that these sections deal with corroboration and matters provable to corroborate or impeach statements. The Court acknowledged that there may be no corroboration in the sense contemplated by Section 157, or matters provable under Section 158, leaving a bare dying declaration as the only direct evidence admissible under Section 32.
  • Comparative assessment of evidential weight: The Court rejected the formulation that dying declarations must automatically be corroborated. It explained that the probative value of a dying statement depends on circumstances:
    • If a statement is made immediately after a mortal injury, it is of high probative value regarding the cause of the injury unless specific reasons to doubt it are shown.
    • If the statement is made after a considerable interval during which the declarant has been surrounded by relatives and friends, its weight is reduced; however, it may still be accepted if it fits with earlier declarations made when the declarant could not have been influenced and if those earlier statements are unimpeachable.
  • On precedent and prudence: The Court considered authorities (including Beaumont C.J.'s remarks in Emperor v. Akbarali and dicta in text books such as Taylor on Evidence) cautioning against acting on dying declarations made out of immediate expectation of death and not in the presence of the accused. The Court agreed that prudence requires care but held that there is no absolute rule requiring corroboration in every such case.
  • On overly broad dicta: The Court criticised dicta in cases such as In re Dabbukota as too sweeping, stating that such dicta offend the law of evidence in India if they are taken to establish a hard-and-fast rule that a dying declaration is worthless without corroboration.
  • Conclusion of analytical approach: The Full Bench held that no universal rule can be laid down. Each case must be decided on its facts and circumstances. If, after considering all circumstances and evidence, the Court is fully convinced of the truth of the dying statement, it is the Court's duty to convict even in the absence of corroboration in the strict sense — provided there is nothing in other evidence or surrounding circumstances to raise suspicion as to the statement's credibility.
  • Application to the present facts: The Court found the declarations and surrounding circumstances sufficiently reliable to sustain conviction. Thereafter, on final hearing Burn and Mockett JJ. confirmed convictions: they held that the third and fifth accused, who held the victim's legs while others stabbed him, were directly responsible for the murder (making section 149 IPC unnecessary to invoke), and that the sentences pronounced by the trial court (death for the first, second and fourth accused; transportation for life for the third and fifth) were appropriate and were confirmed.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Full Bench answered the reference by holding that a dying declaration admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act may, depending on the facts and surrounding circumstances, be sufficient to support a conviction even in the absence of corroboration; the trial court must be fully convinced of the truth of the statement before convicting. On final hearing the Court (Burn and Mockett JJ.) confirmed the convictions and sentences: the sentences of death on the first, second and fourth appellants were upheld, and the sentences of transportation for life on the third and fifth appellants were upheld. All appeals were dismissed.

Implications:

  • The decision emphasises a case-by-case approach: there is no absolute rule mandating corroboration of every dying declaration admissible under Section 32.
  • The Court made clear that the evidential weight of a dying declaration depends on the circumstances in which it was made (immediacy after injury, surrounding influences, consistency with earlier statements, presence or absence of motives to fabricate), and the trial court must be "fully convinced" of its truth to convict on that basis alone.
  • Direct consequences for the parties: convictions for murder were confirmed; death sentences for the first, second and fourth appellants were confirmed; transportation for life for the third and fifth appellants was confirmed.
  • The opinion rejected overly broad dicta that would categorically require corroboration in every instance and clarified that certain prior decisions and dicta must be read in context of their facts.

This summary is prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that text.

    Guruswami Tevar, In Re

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sir Lionel Leach, C.J:— In order to appreciate the question which has been referred it is necessary to state certain of the facts. The appellants have been convicted of murder. The first, second and fourth appellants have been sentenced to death and the third and fifth appellants to transportation for life. Between five and six o'clock on the morning of 31st March 1939 one Nammalwar Naickar was attacked by a band of men and received thirty-eight injuries from which he died shortly after midnight. As the result of his cries three persons who were in the vicinity were attracted to the spot, where the deceased was lying. They had not seen the assault, but they said that they had seen five persons running away. When these witnesses reached the deceased, he told them that he had been attacked by five men and gave their names and the names of their fathers. The names given were the names of the five appellants. One of these witnesses went and called the deceased's brother-in-law and another person, both of whom also gave evidence. These two witnesses went to the spot and the deceased informed them that the appellants were his assailants. The village munsif was called to the scene of the crime at about 8 a.m and recorded a statement made by the deceased. In that statement also the deceased implicated the appellants. The deceased was removed to the hospital at Ettiyapuram and at about 2-30 p.m his dying declaration was recorded by a Magistrate. In that statement the deceased again said that his assailants were the appellants. It was proved that there was enmity between the deceased and the appellants, who are of the Marava caste, but they were not the only members of that caste with whom he was at enmity. The question of law which arises is whether on the statements of a deceased person of the nature of those indicated without other testimony, except as to the number of the assailants, the appellants can be convicted of murder. The question has been referred to a Full Bench because the judgments of two Division Benches of this Court are in conflict. Neither of these judgments has been reported.

    The first of the two cases which have given rise to this reference is Criminal Appeal No. 653 of 1935, which was decided by Beasley C.J and Gentle J. The judgment was delivered by Gentle J. who, after quoting from Taylor on Evidence and referring to Emperor v. Akbardli Karimbhai. In re Dabbukota and Endapalle Ella Reddi v. Emperor, observed:

    “Whilst the contents of a dying declaration can be relied upon as evidence for the prosecution in the absence of any corroboration of its contents, it is clear from the authorities and text books that it is dangerous, imprudent and opposed to practice to do so, even when no justifiable criticisms can be levelled against the declaration.”

    The judgment which is in conflict is the judgment in Referred Trial No. 112 of 1937, which was delivered by Burn J. and in which I concurred. In that case, there was no corroboration of a dying declaration, but the facts were such that my learned brother and I had no hesitation in accepting it as reliable evidence and we upheld the conviction of the accused. The question at issue has been fully argued before this Full Bench and I am unable to accept the observations which I have just quoted from the judgment of Gentle J. as correctly stating the position. With great respect I regard the statement as being far too wide.

    Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act says that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in certain specified cases. The first case specified is when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, where the cause of death comes into question. The section declares that such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. Therefore a statement made by a person who is dead as to the cause of his death is evidence notwithstanding that he was not under expectation of death when he made it.

    There are two other sections of the Evidence Act which may have important bearing in a case of this nature, namely, sections 157 and 158.

    Section 157 says:

    “In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved.”

    Section 158 is in these words:

    “Whenever any statement, relevant under section 32 or 33, is proved, all matters may be proved either in order to contradict or to corroborate it, or in order to impeach or confirm the credit of the person by whom it was made, which might have been proved if that person had been called as a witness and had denied upon cross-examination the truth of the matter suggested.”

    There may not be corroboration of the nature contemplated by section 157, or matters provable under section 158, and the only direct evidence may be a statement by the deceased made admissible by section 32. It does not, however, necessarily follow that this evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. In such a case the surrounding circumstances will have an important bearing. The evidence of an accomplice is tainted, and section 114 of the Evidence Act, illustration (b), says that the Court may presume that he is unworthy of credit unless corroborated; but a dying declaration is on a much higher plane and the Act places no such restriction on its acceptance.

    The reference which Gentle J. made to Taylor on Evidence consisted of a quotation from section 722 of the Eleventh Edition. This section deals with dying declarations and the quotation was as follows:—

    “It should always be recollected that the accused has not the power of cross-examination—a power quite as essential to the eliciting of the truth as the obligation of an oath can be—and that where a witness has not a deep sense of accountability to his Maker, feelings of anger or revenge, or, in the case of mutual conflict, the natural desire of screening his own misconduct, may affect the accuracy of his statements, and give a false coloring to the whole transaction.”

    This, of course, may be the case, but I should regard a statement by a person who has received a mortal wound, made immediately after the injury was caused, as being of high probative value when it relates to the cause of the injury, unless there is some reason shown to doubt its truth. The probative value of a statement of a person who has been mortally injured, but made after a considerable interval, during which time he has been surrounded by his relatives and friends, is certainly much less; but here again it seems to me it may be accepted if it fits in with earlier statements made when he could not have been influenced and they were otherwise unimpeachable.

    In Emperor v. Akbarali Karimbhai Beaumont C.J observed:

    “Generally speaking, and as a rule of prudence, I am of opinion that a declaration, relevant under section 32, but not made by one in immediate expectation of death, and not made in the presence of the accused, ought not to be acted upon unless there is some reliable corroboration.”

    The learned Chief Justice, however, agreed that there is no rule which requires that a dying declaration should not be acted upon unless it is corroborated and he pointed out that the evidential value of a declaration relevant under section 32 varies very much in accordance with the circumstances in which it is made. Here I respectfully agree, but I am not prepared to go so far as to say that a declaration relevant under section 32, though not made in immediate expectation of death and not made in the presence of the accused, necessarily requires corroboration.

    In In re Dabbukota it was said:

    “It is to be remembered that though dying declarations tare in some respects deserving of a degree of consideration and credence to which ordinary statements are not, they are not subject to the test of cross-examination, and, if not substantially borne out by independent evidence and the probabilities of the case, or admitted facts, are worth little or nothing.”

    By this I presume is meant there must be corroboration before a dying declaration can be accepted. I have said sufficient to indicate that this statement is far too sweeping and it is open to the further objection that it offends against the law of evidence in India.

    With regard to the case of Endapalle Ella Reddi v. Emperor all that need be said is that the circumstances showed that it was unsafe to convict the accused on the bare dying declaration put in evidence in that case and naturally it was not accepted as being sufficient to prove the case for the Crown.

    In my judgment it is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule when a dying declaration should be accepted, beyond saying that each case must be decided in the light of the other facts and the surrounding circumstances, but if the Court, after taking everything into consideration, is convinced that the statement is true, it is its duty to convict, notwithstanding that there is no corroboration in the true sense. The Court must, of course, be fully convinced of the truth of the statement and, naturally, it could not be fully convinced if there were anything in the other evidence or in the surrounding circumstances to raise suspicion as to its credibility.

    I would answer the reference in this sense.

    Lakshmana Rao, J.:— I agree.

    Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.:— I agree.

    The case came on for final hearing after the expression of the opinion of the Full Bench, and the Court (Burn and Mockett JJ.) delivered the following Judgment:—

    In view of the decision of the Full Bench, we confirm the conviction of the appellants for murder. Since the evidence is that the third and fifth accused took part in the murder by holding the legs of the victim while the others stabbed him, they are directly responsible for the murder. There was no reason to invoke section 149. Indian Penal Code, and we do not quite understand what the learned Sessions Judge means by saying: “The public prosecutor preferred to frame a charge against them under section 302 read with 149.” The duty of framing the proper charge is thrown on the Court.

    The sentences of death passed upon the first, second and fourth accused are the only possible sentences in this case, where five assassins have attacked a single man and killed him by stabbing him in thirty-eight places. We confirm the sentences of death passed on the first, second and fourth accused. The third and fifth accused have been fortunate to escape the extreme sentence on the ground that they did not actually stab Nammalwar Naickar, but only held his legs. We confirm the sentences of transportation for life passed upon the third and fifth accused. All the appeals are dismissed.

    V.V.C

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    Comments

    Guruswami Tevar, In Re
    (Dec 4, 1939)