The point argued in this appeal is that the learned Judge was wrong in excluding from consideration, Ex. A, relied on, by the plaintiff in support of his claim. The plaintiff is the appellant here. The learned District Judge, though he held that he could not exclude Ex. A, from the record, held that in as much as it was a copy of a copy, he could not hold that the contents of the document were relevant. The document, Ex. A, purports to be a copy of a document in the Taluq office. The plaintiff, who claimed to have had a grant of the land on darkast, in the year 1894, relied upon Ex. A, as evidence of the grant in 1894. This document was put in evidence, in the proceedings previous to the institution of the suit. In the plaint, he relied upon this document and, when it was produced in Court and filed, no objection was taken by the defendant to its reception, on the ground that it was not a proper copy. The plaintiffs succeeded in the first Court and the defendant appealed to the District Court. Even in the memorandum of appeal, he did not take exception to this document. Evidently this objection was raised at the time, when the appeal was argued, before the Lower Appellate Court. It is argued on behalf of the respondent that Ex. A, being a copy of a copy, is not admissible in evidence, under any circumstances; and secondly, that the contents could not be held to have been proved, by the production of such a copy. The rules as regards the production of documents and strict proof of documents, as contained in the Evidence Act, can be dispensed, with, by consent of parties and, when the parties agree to treat a document as evidence, it is not open to one side or the other, to object to such a document in appeal, or at a later stage. Any document may be objected to, if it is an irrelevant document; where the document is relevant and the contents are relevant, it is open to the other party to dispense with strict proof; and in this case, both parties went to trial, dispensing with the proof of the original order of the Thasildar. In appeal, the learned Judge held that being a copy of a copy, there was no proof of the contents of the document; in other words, there was no proof that an order, as extracted in column 16, was really made by the Thasildar. This being a public document, which purports to have been signed by the Thasildar, there is no reason to suppose, that things were not done, as they should have been, or anything was done, which ought not to have been done. There is a presumption in favour of the genuineness of public documents and that acts of public servants were done properly and according to procedure. That being so, I fail to understand how the learned Judge could have held that the contents of the document were not proved. The document is put in, for the purpose of proving the contents. When this document was allowed to go in, without being challenged, by the other side, and when the other side consented to its being filed as it was, it cannot be said, that the contents should be separately proved, by other evidence. The learned Judge has erred on this point and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, solely on the ground that the contents of Ex. A have not been proved. I reverse the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court and direct the District Judge to restore the case to his file and dispose of it, according to law. The appellant will have costs of this appeal. The appellant will also have a refund of the Court fee, paid in this Court.
K.V.SAppeal allowed; Case remanded.