It is now established by a uniform course of decisions that a debt incurred by the father which is not shown to be illegal or immoral is, even during the life-time of the father, binding upon the son's interest in the family property, and that any alienation, voluntary or involuntary, made to discharge the debt is binding upon the son. In the case of a mortgage debt incurred by the father the debt is the primary obligation and is binding upon the son if it is not for an illegal or immoral purpose, and the mortgage is only a collateral security for the discharge of the debt either by the receipt of the rents and profits by the mortgagee or by causing it to be sold after the debt has become payable. If the debt is binding upon the son, the discharge of the debt, either by making a usufructuary mortgage or by, informing the security by sale, is equally binding upon the son inasmuch as he is thereby exonerated from liability to discharge the debt of the father by means of other joint family property. If a sale of joint family property made by the father for the purpose of discharging his debt which is not illegal or immoral is binding, it is difficult to see on what principle it case be held that a mortgage executed by the father, as security for the discharge of the debt will not bind the son simply because the debt was not anterior to the mortgage but was incurred at the same time as the mortgage, and the mortgage was executed as security therefor. In the case of Sami Ayyangar v. Ponnammal(1) it was, no doubt, held that the mortgage as such will not bind the son's share, unless it was executed as security for an antecedent debt, that is, for a debt that existed independently of the mortgage transaction. The authority of this decision has been considerably shaken by the two later decisions of this Court in Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar and Palani Goundan v. Rangayya Goundan(2) which decide that unless the son shows that the mortgage executed by the father on which decree was passed against the father alone was for an illegal or immoral debt, the mortgage decree, as such, will bind also the sons share in the mortgage-property. The same view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Lala Suraj Prasad v. Golal Chand(3) and by the Allahabad High Court in Debi Dat v. Jadu Rai(4) and by the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra v. Fakirappa(5).
On principle it is difficult to make any distinction between a mortgage given for an antecedent debt and a mortgage given for a debt then incurred, for in either case the debt is binding upon the ton, and the enforcement of the security exonerates the son, from the burden of the father's debt. Such a distinction does not really afford any protection to the son, for is share in the mortgage property can, as a general rule, be seized and brought to sale, even in the latter case, for the recovery of the debt as a personal debt due by the father (though also secured by a mortgage), unless such share has been validly alienated in favour of a third party, since the date of the mortgage but prior to its attachment.
We therefore allow this appeal, and, reversing the decree of the Lower Appellate Court in so far as it modifies the decree of the District Munsif, we restore the decree of the District Mussif with costs in this and in the Lower Appellate Court.