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  • Section 15, Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 (Madras Act I [1] of 1947),
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 2, Defence of India Act,
  • Section 2 (1), the Provincial Government
  • Section 15 of Madras Act I [1] of 1947
  • Local Government Act of 1888,
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 2
  • Madras Act I [1] of 1947
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 15, Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 (Madras Act I [1] of 1947),
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 2, Defence of India Act,
  • Section 2 (1), the Provincial Government
  • Section 15 of Madras Act I [1] of 1947
  • Local Government Act of 1888,
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 2
  • Madras Act I [1] of 1947
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicants were Indian nationals who had been living in Malaya and were involved in Communist activities; the Malayan Government detained some Communist leaders under the Malayan Emergency Regulations but subsequently released and repatriated these Indian nationals. The applicants arrived in India by S.S. Vasna in November 1948. On 19 November 1948 they were arrested by the Madras police, detained, produced before the Commissioner of Police, remanded initially for 9 days and the remand period was later extended.

On 30 November 1948, orders of detention under Madras Act I of 1947 were passed by His Excellency the Governor of Madras under Section 2(1) directing detention of the applicants in Central Jail, Vellore. Grounds of detention were served on 24 December 1948, and the applicants submitted representations to the Government on 7 January 1949. The Advisory Council had not yet considered the matter and no final orders under Section 3(5) of the Act had been passed at the time of the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether His Excellency the Governor of Madras had power to pass orders of detention under Section 2(1) of Madras Act I of 1947 when the Provincial Government had issued G.O. No. MS. 907 (21 March 1947) delegating the powers conferred by Section 2(1)(a) to District Magistrates and the Commissioner of Police, Madras.
  2. Whether the grounds of detention served on the applicants were vague and indefinite.
  3. Whether the detaining authority could take into consideration the activities of the applicants outside the Province of Madras (specifically activities in Malaya) in arriving at the satisfaction under Section 2(1) that the person was acting or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • It was contended that by G.O. No. MS. 907 dated 21 March 1947 the powers conferred on the Provincial Government by Section 2(1)(a) of the Act had been delegated to District Magistrates and the Commissioner of Police, Madras, and therefore His Excellency the Governor of Madras had no power to pass orders of detention under Section 2(1); the Commissioner of Police should have been the proper authority to pass the detention order.
  • It was also argued that the grounds of detention were vague and indefinite.
  • Further, the applicants argued that activities of the petitioners that occurred outside the Province of Madras should not have been taken into account in reaching the satisfaction under the Act that they were acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or public order.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent Government's written arguments in the same structured form as the applicants' contentions; the Court’s response and reasoning are recorded in the analysis below.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, (1945) 2 M. L. J. 325; A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 156 Passage stating that Sub-section (5) of Section 2 (Defence of India Act) allows delegation in the "strict sense" implying transfer of power with divestiture of Governor's responsibility. The Court observed that this passage refers specifically to the manner of delegation under that Defence of India Act provision and is not authority for the proposition that a provincial government is absolutely prohibited from exercising a power where the delegation is circumscribed. The Court limited the passage's applicability to cases of absolute transfer by delegation.
Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 391 (59 L.J.M.C. 120) Principle that delegation does not necessarily imply a permanent divestiture of power; the delegating authority can resume or continue to exercise powers unless controlled by statute; delegation is often subject to revocation or variation. The Court adopted and relied on this authority to hold that the Provincial Government was not deprived of the power under Section 2(1) merely by authorising subordinate officers to exercise it; the Court preferred Huth v. Clarke as directly applicable.
Blackpool Corporation v. Locker, 1948-1 K.B. 349 Observations (by Scott L.J.) regarding the interpretation of delegated legislation and effect of delegation in a regulatory context (Regn. 51 of Defence (General) Regulations, 1939). The Court distinguished Blackpool Corporation v. Locker as addressing delegated legislation rather than statutory delegation of powers under an Act. The Court found Scott L.J.'s dicta not applicable to the present case and declined to follow it, preferring Huth v. Clarke.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining Section 15 of Madras Act I of 1947, which empowers the Provincial Government "by order" to direct that any power or duty conferred upon the Provincial Government be exercised or discharged by any officer or authority subordinate to the Provincial Government. The Government Order (G.O. No. MS. 907 dated 21 March 1947) expressly directed that the powers conferred on the Provincial Government by Section 2(1)(a) "shall be exercised also by all the District Magistrates and the Commissioner of Police, Madras, within their respective jurisdictions."

The applicants' primary contention was that this delegation divested the Provincial Government (and thus the Governor acting for it) of the power to make orders of detention under Section 2(1). The Court considered a passage from Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji which appeared to describe a form of delegation that transfers power with a corresponding divestiture of the delegating authority's responsibility. The Court held, however, that that passage relates to a particular mode of delegation under the Defence of India Act and does not establish a general rule that any permitted delegation necessarily prevents the principal authority from exercising the delegated power in all circumstances.

Analysing the terms of the Government Order, the Court found it to be a partial delegation: it empowered District Magistrates and the Commissioner of Police to exercise Section 2(1) powers "also" — i.e., in addition to the Provincial Government — rather than an absolute transfer that excluded the Provincial Government. The Court read Section 15 itself as permitting delegation to be effected "in such circumstances and under such conditions as may be specified," which allowed the Provincial Government to reserve part of the power to itself.

The Court then turned to English authority on delegation and preferred the rule in Huth v. Clarke (1890) that delegation does not necessarily imply a permanent denudation of power; a delegating authority can, unless the statute provides otherwise, resume or continue to exercise powers delegated to subordinates. The Court thereby concluded that the Provincial Government was not deprived of its power under Section 2(1) merely because it had authorised subordinate officers to exercise that power as well.

The decision in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker was considered but distinguished: the Court noted that Scott L.J.'s observations there concerned delegated legislation rather than delegation of a power or duty under an Act and therefore were not apposite to the facts of the present case.

On the challenge to the sufficiency of the grounds, the Court examined the grounds of detention and concluded they were not vague or indefinite. The grounds identified the applicants as members of specific Communist groups (the Communist Strong Arms Intimidation Squad of the Singapore Harbour Labour Union and the Singapore Harbour Labour Union Thondar Padai), described recent violence (beating and stabbing of Chinese labourers during a strike) and stated that the applicants took active part in intimidating labourers on orders of Communist leaders. The Court held such particulars were sufficient.

Addressing whether activities outside the Province could be considered, the Court reasoned that the person against whom the order was made was within the Province of Madras at the time of the order and that the detaining authority had material (including antecedent activities in Malaya) to form the required satisfaction under Section 2(1). The Court held antecedent history outside the Province is relevant material so long as it is proximate enough in date and is capable of producing the requisite satisfaction that the person is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order in the Province. The Act applies to the whole Province and the relevant danger is that to public safety and order of the Province; antecedent conduct elsewhere can therefore be relevant to the assessment.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court held that the orders of detention made by His Excellency the Governor of Madras under Section 2(1) of Madras Act I of 1947 were legal. The applications were dismissed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the detention orders challenged in these applications remain in force and the Court refused to interfere with them.
  • The Court confirmed that a delegation effected under Section 15 which authorises subordinate officers to exercise a power "also" does not necessarily divest the delegating authority of that power; partial delegation or delegation subject to reservation is permissible under the Act. The Court relied on Huth v. Clarke to support this position and distinguished authorities dealing with delegated legislation.
  • No broader new legal principle was announced beyond the Court's application and preference for existing authority (Huth v. Clarke) and its distinction of other authorities; the opinion resolved the disputes in the present cases without purporting to lay down a novel, sweeping rule beyond the reasoning recorded above.

    P. Ramiah & Others v. The Chief Secretary To The Government Of Madras & Another

    1. The applicants in all these applications are Indians who were living in Malaya for some years, and as they were engaged in Malaya in Communist activities, the Malayan Government seems to have detained some of the important leaders under the Malayan Emergency Regulations. But as they are Indian nationals, the Malayan Government released them and repatriated them. The applicants along with others arrived in India by S. S. Vasna in November 1948. Immediately after the arrival, on 19th November 1948 they were arrested by the police in Madras and were detained in custody. They were later produced before the Commissioner of Police, Madras, who remanded them for 9 days, and the period of remand was later extended by a further order. On 30th November 1948 orders of detention under Madras Act I [1] of 1947 were passed by His Excellency the Governor of Madras under Section 2 (1) of the Act directing the detention of the applicants in the Central Jail, Vellore. The grounds of detention were served on these applicants on 24th December 1948, and they submitted their representations to the Government on 7th January 1949. The matter does not seem to have received the attention of the Advisory Council and the Government has not yet passed final orders under Section 3 (5) of the Act.

    2. The grounds of detention of the applicants in all the cases are substantially the same. The learned advocate for the applicants contended that His Excellency the Governor of Madras had no power to pass an order of detention under Section 2 (1), as His Excellency had already delegated the powers conferred on the Provincial Government by Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act to the District Magistrates or the Commissioner of Police, Madras as evidenced by G. O. No. Ms. 907, dated 2lst March 1947, and that the proper authority to have passed an order of detention under the Act was the Commissioner of Police, Madras and not His Excellency the Governor of Madras. Secondly, it was argued that the grounds of detention are vague and indefinite, and that, in any event, the activities of the petitioners which were outside the Province of Madras should not have been taken into consideration in arriving at the satisfaction under the Act that they were acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order.

    3. Section 15 of Madras Act I [1] of 1947 empowers the Provincial Government by order to direct that any power or duty conferred upon the Provincial Government be exercised or discharged by any officer or authority subordinate to the Provincial Government, One of the powers exercisable by the Provincial Government under the Act is the power to pass an order of detention under Section 2 (1) of the Act. G. O. No. MS. 907 dated 21st March 1947 empowered the District Magistrates and Commissioner of Police, Madras, within their respective jurisdictions to exercise the power conferred on the Provincial Government by Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act. It is in these terms :

    "In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 15, Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 (Madras Act I [1] of 1947), His Excellency the Governor of Madras hereby directs that the powers conferred on the Provincial Government by Section 2 (1) (a) of the said Act shall be exercised also by all the District Magistrates and the Commissioner of Police, Madras, within their respective jurisdictions.

    (By order of His Excellency the Governor)."

    4. The contention urged on behalf of the applicants is that when once a transfer of the power was effected by virtue of the power of delegation conferred under Section 15 upon the Provincial Government, the Provincial Government had no further power to exercise that particular power which has been so delegated, and in support of this proposition a passage from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, (1945) 2 M. L. J. 325 at p. 334 : (A. I. R. (32) 1945 P. C. 156) was relied on, Referring to Sub-section (5) of Section 2, Defence of India Act, the Judicial Committee therein observed:

    "Their Lordships would also add, on this contention, that Sub-section (5) of Section 2 provides a means of delegation in the strict sense of the word, namely, a transfer of power or duty to the officer or authority defined in the sub section with a corresponding divestiture of the Governor of any responsibility in the matter, whereas under Section 49(1) of the Act of 1935, the Governor remains responsible for the action of his subordinate taken in his name."

    This passage in the judgment of the Judicial Committee, in our opinion, refers to the manner and the mode of delegation contemplated by Sub-section (5) of Section 2, Defence of India Act. It is not authority for holding that, where under a power of delegation permitted under an Act, the transfer of the power is circumscribed and is restricted in the manner in which we find in the G. O. now under discussion, the Provincial Government is absolutely prohibited from exercising the power so transferred. In the present case, the Government order makes it clear that the District Magistrates and the Commissioner of Police, Madras, were also empowered to exercise powers under Section 2 (1) in addition to the Provincial Government. It is not an absolute transfer by the Provincial Government of the power to pass an order of detention under Section 2 (1) of the Act but a partial delegation or transfer of its power which is not prohibited by Section 15 of the Act. Section 15 itself lays down that the transfer may be effected in such circumstances and under such conditions as may be specified in that direction. In view of this language of the section it would be perfectly open to the Provincial Government to say that they would not part with the power under Section 2 (1) entirely and would reserve to themselves a part of it. Of course in the case of the same person the Provincial Government and the Commissioner of Police at Madras cannot exercise the power of detention under Section 2(1) of the Act. But there is nothing in the provisions of the Act to limit or restrict the authority of the Provincial Government to delegate its powers in the manner in which it was effected in the G. O. above referred to. The observations of the Judicial Committee must be taken to be confined to cases where the actual wording of the delegation is not restricted in its scope but is absolute. This view of the Government order is really sufficient to dispose of this aspect of the case.

    5. We are however of opinion that in cases where a statute authorises an authority to delegate its power or duty, the principles laid down by Coleridge C. J. and Wills J. in Huth V. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 391 : (59 L.J.M.C. 120) would be more apposite than the observations of Scott L. J. in the decision in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker, 1948-1 K.B. 349. In Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 391, under the Local Government Act of 1888, an executive committee of a county council was authorised to appoint a sub-committee or sub committees and delegate to them all or any of the powers of the executive committee with or without restrictions and from time to time to revoke or alter any such delegation. The point raised was whether after this delegation the executive committee of the county council could exercise the power under the Act notwithstanding the fact that there was a delegation of the power to the sub-committee. The argument raised in that case was that delegation implied a denudation of the power and authority, and that therefore the executive committee had no right to exercise the power. Coleridge C. J. answered the contention thus :

    "But delegation does not imply a denudation of power and authority; Schedule 6 of the Act provides that the delegation may be revoked or altered and the powers resumed by the executive committee. The word 'delegation' implies that powers are committed to another person or body which are as a rule always subject to resumption by the power delegating, and many examples of this might be given. Unless, therefore, it is controlled by statute, the delegating power can at any time resume its authority. Here the executive committee has exercised the power which the sub-committee might have exercised but did not--and no question of conflict of jurisdiction arises."

    Wills I considers the legal import of the word "delegation" and he observes at p. 395 :

    "Delegation, as the word is generally used, does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself . . . . The notion, therefore, that the use of the word 'delegate' implies that the executive committee parted with their own authority is misconceived."

    In view of this authority of Coleridge C. J., and Wills J. even if the language of the G. O. were otherwise, we think that merely because the Commissioner of Police is authorised by the Provincial Government by virtue of Section 15 of the Act to exercise the power under Section 2 (1), the Provincial Government is not deprived of that power. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker, 1948-1 K.B. 349, on which reliance was placed by the learned advocate for the applicants does not conflict with the decision in Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 391 : (59 L. J. M. C. 120). The point was considered only by Scott L. J. and Evershed L. J. did not think it necessary to consider the question in the view he took of the case. The observations of Scott L. J. dealing with the interpretation of Regn. 51 of Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, particularly, Clause 5, proceeded on the assumption that what the Lord Justice was called upon to consider was the effect of delegated legislation and not a case of delegation of a power or duty under an Act. We are not now concerned here with a case of delegated legislation, and therefore we think that the dicta of Scott L. J. in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker, 1948-1 K. B. 349 are not applicable, and we prefer to follow the decision in Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 391 : (59 L.J.M.C. 120) which is more in point.

    6. We have perused the grounds in all these cases, and we do not agree with the contention strongly pressed on behalf of the applicants that the grounds are indefinite and vague. It was definitely stated in the grounds that these people were members of the Communist Strong Arms Intimidation Squad of the Singapore Harbour Labour Union; that a special feature of this group of Communists was that they have been noted for their violence lately seen in the beating and stabbing of Chinese labourers during the strike; that these applicants were members of the Singapore Harbour Labour Union Thondar Padai; and that they took active part in intimidating labourers under the orders of the Communist leaders of the Union. In case of some of the applicants there were also further grounds. These grounds cannot be said therefore to be indefinite or vague.

    7. The argument that it is not open to the detaining authority to take into consideration the activities of the applicants outside the Province in arriving at the satisfaction contemplated by Section 2 (1) of the Act is, in our opinion, unsound. The person against whom action was proposed under Section 2 (1) at the time of the order was within the Province of Madras. The detaining authority had before it material to reach the satisfaction that the person is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. The basis for this satisfaction was the activity of the person concerned in Malaya, and his activity therefore certainly would be proper material for consideration under Section 2 (1) of the Act in coming to a conclusion whether the person of that description would or would not act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. The Act applies to the whole of the Province, and the danger contemplated was the danger to the public safety and maintenance of public order of this province. The antecedent history of the person -- whether he lived in Malaya or elsewhere it does not matter--so long as it was proximate enough in date, if it is such as to produce the satisfaction in the mind of the detaining authority that the person concerned was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety and the maintenance of public order, will be perfectly relevant material under the section. We see no objection for taking into consideration under Section 2 (1) of the Act the activity of the person outside the Province to justify action under Section 2 (1) of the Act.

    8. For these reasons we are of opinion that the orders of detention of the applicants are legal, and that no interference is called for. The applications are dismissed.

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    P. Ramiah & Others v. The Chief Secretary To The Government Of Madras & Another
    (Apr 5, 1949)