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  • Section 2 '(11), Civil P.C.
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  • Section 2 '(11), Civil P.C.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from a suit instituted by the plaintiff (respondent 1) to set aside a mortgage decree obtained by defendants 2 and 3 and to recover properties which had been sold at an execution auction and purchased by defendant 1 (appellant 1). The plaintiff claimed title to the suit properties under a will of Honnappa by which Honnappa's second widow Gangamma obtained the properties, and by Gangamma's will these properties were bequeathed to the plaintiff. The mortgage suit related to a mortgage made by Honnappa, and it proceeded by making Gangamma the sole party defendant. After a preliminary decree was passed and Gangamma died, the plaintiff in that mortgage suit did not bring the present plaintiff (as Gangamma's legal representative) on record but the mortgage decree proceeded with senior widow Peramma (defendant 4 in this suit) being made the legal representative on record; a final decree was obtained and the properties were sold in execution, purchased by defendant 1 (appellant).

At first instance the trial Court held against the plaintiff's will-based claim and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court found both wills to be genuine and held in favour of the plaintiff. This Court remanded the case to the lower appellate Court to decide whether the estate of Gangamma was sufficiently represented by Peramma (defendant 4) being brought on the record as legal representative, and whether the plaintiff in the mortgage suit acted bona fide in bringing Peramma on the record. The Sub-Judge of Bellary was directed to obtain findings on those two questions, evidence was taken, and the Subordinate Judge found (1) that the plaintiff in the mortgage suit acted bona fide in bringing Peramma on record as Gangamma's legal representative, and (2) that Peramma sufficiently represented the estate for the subject-matter of the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was sufficient representation of the estate (the subject matter of the mortgage suit) by Peramma (defendant 4) being brought on the record as the legal representative of the deceased Gangamma.
  2. Whether, in bringing Peramma on the record in the mortgage suit, the plaintiff acted bona fide believing that she was the legal representative.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (defendant 1) contended that Peramma sufficiently represented the estate of Gangamma in the mortgage suit, thereby rendering the final decree and sale binding on the true representative (the plaintiff) despite the plaintiff not having been made a party to the later proceedings.
  • Implicitly, the appellant relied on authority and principle that where a person is prima facie the heir and is impleaded bona fide as representative, the proceedings against that person can bind the true heir if there is no fraud or collusion.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (plaintiff) argued that under Gangamma's will he became the absolute owner of the mortgage properties and that Peramma had no interest and therefore could not legally represent the estate; accordingly, neither the final decree nor the sale held in execution could affect him because he was not made a party to those proceedings.
  • The respondent relied on authorities and submissions aimed at showing that a decree or sale is void as against persons not impleaded or not properly represented, particularly where a prima facie heir has been ignored and no satisfactory explanation is offered for that ignorance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khiarajmal v. Daim [1905] 32 Cal. 296 That a court has no jurisdiction to sell the property of persons who are not parties to the proceedings or not properly represented on the record; such decrees or sales would be nullities as against such persons. The Court cited the case for the general proposition but distinguished it on the facts: Khiarajmal did not involve a wrongly impleaded representative; here, the Court found Peramma to have been a prima facie representative and thus the reasoning of Khiarajmal did not invalidate the sale in the present case.
General Manager of the Raj Durbhanga v. Ramaput Singh [1871] 114 M.I.A. 605 Instances where a suit brought against a person as legal representative, though that person is not ultimately the true representative, can nevertheless bind the true representative if the person was impleaded bona fide and proceedings were conducted honestly. The Court relied on this authority as supporting the proposition that a wrong party impleaded in a representative capacity (when done bona fide) may bind the true representative; it was used to justify holding Peramma's representation effective.
Gnanambal Ammal v. Veerasami Chetty [1915] 29 M.L.J. 698 Illustrates circumstances where a person who appeared to have prima facie title and was impleaded as representative could bind a later-established true representative; discussed as a supporting authority. The Court treated this case as supportive of the appellant's contention that a bona fide impleading of a prima facie representative can make the decree and sale binding on the actual heir later discovered.
Kadir Mohideen v. Muthukrishna Ayyar [1903] 26 Mad. 230 Example of a case where the wrong party was impleaded during the pendency of the suit and the legal consequences of such impleading were considered. Cited as one of the authorities showing situations where a wrong party may have been impleaded during pendency; used to frame the general principle and factual permutations relevant to the present dispute.
Madavarayadu v. Subbamma [1920] 31 M.L.J. 222 Held that where the prima facie heir was ignored and no satisfactory explanation was provided for that ignoring, the decree obtained was not binding on the true heir. The Court distinguished this case from the present facts, noting that in Madavarayadu there was no attempt to justify ignoring the prima facie heir and therefore bona fides was absent; in the present case the Court found bona fides and possession by Peramma.
Malkarjun v. Narhari [1901] 25 Bom. 337 An instance where a person who was not the legal representative was brought on the record as such despite objection, and the Court's erroneous acceptance was later considered. Referred to in the context of distinguishing Khiarajmal: Malkarjun involved a wrongly impleaded person whose objection was overruled; the present Court used such examples to map the categories of cases where representation may bind or not bind the true heir.
Ramasami Chettiar v. Oppilamani Chetti [1910] 33 Mad. 6 Where a defendant died after decree and a rival claimant (who appeared to have better title at the time) was brought on record for execution, the sale made in execution was held binding on the real heir even though title was later found against the person brought on record. The Court applied this authority to support the conclusion that bringing on record a rival claimant who appears prima facie entitled can render a subsequent sale binding on the true heir when the steps are bona fide and free from fraud.
Kaliappan Servaikaran v. Varadarajulu [1910] 33 Mad. 75 Shows limitations: dealt with a creditor suing a widow as legal representative and subsequent execution; has been explained as holding that the true representative cannot, after the decree, be brought on the record for execution of the deceased debtor's property in that same suit. The Court discussed this case and explanatory commentary (noting Sadasiva Ayyar, J.'s explanation in Gnanambal) to set boundaries to the rule; it was used to clarify that some decisions are reconcilable with the general principle only when properly explained.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, relying only on the findings and evidence contained in the opinion:

  1. Scope of remand: The Court first reiterated the remitted issue — whether Peramma's being brought on record sufficiently represented Gangamma's estate and whether the plaintiff acted bona fide in so bringing her on record. Both factual and legal aspects were to be determined on evidence.
  2. Findings on remand: The Subordinate Judge, after receiving and referring to evidence, found that (a) the plaintiff in the mortgage suit acted bona fide in bringing Peramma on the record as Gangamma's legal representative; and (b) Peramma sufficiently represented the estate for the subject-matter of the suit. The Subordinate Judge noted that Peramma was in possession of the properties, pattah transfers were made to her name after Gangamma's death, she paid kists for the lands, and she took possession of the house comprised in the mortgage.
  3. Assessment of the plaintiff's conduct and timing of the will: The Court observed that the will on which the plaintiff based his claim was not put forward until the present suit (instituted on 27 February 1922). The plaintiff had been a minor at the time the pattah transfers and possession took place and no guardian or other person advanced his rights under the will earlier. There was nothing to show that the plaintiff or his transferee (defendant 2) were aware of Gangamma's will during the mortgage suit or execution.
  4. Application of legal principles: The Court set out existing law: (a) prima facie, no person is bound by a decree to which neither he nor his predecessor was a party; (b) however, where a person is impleaded as legal representative in good faith and with due care and the decree or sale is free from fraud or collusion, a wrongly impleaded representative who appears prima facie entitled may sufficiently represent the estate so as to bind the true representative; (c) the presumption that a person prima facie the heir-at-law represents the estate unless facts are known to displace that presumption; and (d) an erroneous judicial decision that a person is legal representative, when arrived at by the Court in the suit or execution proceedings, confers that character for the purposes of the proceedings.
  5. Evaluation against the facts: The Court compared the present facts to decided cases and distinguished cases where bona fides or satisfactory explanation was lacking (for example Madavarayadu v. Subbamma). The Court found that Peramma was prima facie heir and in possession of some of the mortgaged items; the will relied on by the plaintiff was first asserted only at the time of the sale's conclusion; there was no showing of fraud or collusion in impleading Peramma or in executing the decree; and the steps taken by the decree-holder and defendant 2 in bringing Peramma on the record and executing the decree appeared honest.
  6. Conclusion from law and fact: Bringing these findings together, the Court concluded that Peramma did effectively represent the estate of Gangamma for purposes of the mortgage suit and execution; accordingly, the sale in execution of the decree is binding on the plaintiff.
  7. Final disposition: On this basis the Court set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court (which had held for the plaintiff) and dismissed the suit with costs in favour of the appellant (defendant 1).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs of appellant (defendant 1) throughout.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The sale held in execution of the mortgage decree (purchased by defendant 1) is declared binding on the plaintiff; the plaintiff's suit to set aside that sale is dismissed and the appellant recovers costs.
  • On legal principles: The decision applies established principles summarized by the Court — notably that where a person is prima facie the heir and is impleaded as legal representative bona fide and without fraud or collusion, that person may sufficiently represent the estate so that a decree or execution sale will bind the true representative even if the latter was not a party. The Court relied on prior authorities to apply this principle to the facts of the case.
  • No broader precedent beyond application here: The opinion does not purport to create a new rule; it applies and reconciles existing authorities to the factual circumstances before the Court. (The opinion's reasoning is grounded in prior case law rather than announcing a novel legal principle.)

    Sanna Govappa v. Rodda Sanna Govappa

    1. The suit from which this second appeal arises was one instituted by the plaintiff, respondent 1, for the purpose of setting aside a mortgage decree obtained by defendants 2 and 3 and recovering the properties which were at the auction held in execution of such decree purchased by defendant 1. Defendant 1 is appellant 1 before us. The plaintiff's claim was that under a will of Honnappa his second widow Gangamma obtained the suit properties absolutely, that she in her turn by her will bequeathed these items of property to the plaintiff, that the mortgage suit, though it related to a mortgage made by Honnappa, proceeded making only Gangamma party defendant in the action and when after the preliminary decree was passed she died the plaintiff in that suit without making him the plaintiff in this action, as the legal representative, somehow made the senior widow defendant 4 as the legal representative and proceeded to get the decree absolute and had the property sold. The first Court held against the will under which the plaintiff claimed and dismissed the suit but the lower appellate Court has found both the wills, above referred to, to be genuine. We must, therefore, take it on those findings that at the time of the mortgage suit when Gangamma died the proper legal representative would undoubtedly have been the plaintiff. That, no doubt the lower appellate Court has found, but that clearly is not sufficient. Having regard "to the circumstances of the case and the pleadings, it is incumbent on the lower appellate Court to proceed further and 'find whether the estate of Gangamma was sufficiently represented by the present defendant 4 in the case and whether in making the present defendant 4 party 'legal representative in the mortgage suit the plaintiff acted bona fide. As the lower appellate Court had proceeded to grant a decree in favour of the plaintiff merely on the finding that he was the 'proper legal representative and without considering the sufficiency or otherwise of the representation of the estate of Gangamma, or with regard to the bona fides of the steps taken by the plaintiff in that suit for the purpose of procuring such representation on the record, it is clear that the lower appellate Court was wrong in proceeding to dispose of the case without adverting to these ques-tions. As the case cannot satisfactorily 'be disposed of without a finding with re-gard to these matters, the case will be remanded to the lower appellate Court for finding on the following issue, whether there was sufficient representation of the estate, the subject matter of the suit, by defendant 4 being brought on the record as the legal representative and whether in bringing defendant 4 on the record the plaintiff acted bona fide believing that he was the legal representative. Both parties will be at liberty to adduce such evidence oral or documentary as they may think fit. The lower appellate Court will be also at liberty to require such evidence to be taken, if deemed fit, by the trial Court. Time for the return of the fin-dings two months from the date on which records reach the lower appellate Court. Time for objection 10 days.

    2. In compliance with the order contained in the above judgment, the Sub-Judge of Bellary submitted the following Finding-I have been directed by the High Court to submit findings on the following issue:

    Whether there was sufficient representa-tionof the estate, the subject matter of the suit, by defendant 4 being brought on record as legal representative and whether in bringing defendant 4 on the record plaintiff acted bona fide believing that she was the legal representative.

    4. On the two fresh issues remitted to the learned Subordinate Judge in the order of remand, he finds as follows : (1) that the plaintiff in the mortgage suit (defendant 3 in this suit) acted bona fide in bringing on the record of that suit Peramma (defendant 4 in this suit) as the legal re-presentive of the deceased Gangamma and (2) that there was sufficient representation of the estate as regards the subject-matter of the suit by the said Peramma being so brought on the record. She was in possession of the properties which were the subject-matter of that suit after the death of Gangamma and could therefore have been rightly impleaded as her legal representative as defined in Section 2 '(11), Civil P.C. Even otherwise there was sufficient representation by her of the estate.

    5. These findings are objected to on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. The evidence taken on remand which is re" ferred to by the Subordinate Judge fully supports his findings on the question of fact involved in the said issues. The plaintiff's claim in this suit is based on a will executed by Gangamma on 8th November 1918. The genuineness of that will was denied by the defendants. The District Munsif upheld that plea, but on appeal the Sub-Judge held the will to be genuine and that finding is binding on us. But this will was never heard of or set up by the plaintiff until he instituted the present suit on 27th February 1922. But for the will, the proper legal representative of Gangamma in respect of the properties forming the subject matter of the mortgage suit would undoubtedly be Peramma. The evidence adduced in the remand showed that the pattah for the lands being items 2 and 3 comprised in the mortgage was transferred to her name after Gangamma's death and that she paid to the Government the kists for those lands and that she also took possession of the house, item 1, which also was comprised in the mortgage. It may be that when all this took place, the plaintiff was a minor, but his rights under the will were not put forward by his guardian or any other person on his behalf. There is nothing to show that either the plaintiff in that suit or his transferee, defendant 2 was aware of Gangamma's will.

    6. It is argued for the respondent that the plaintiff was in possession of the house as he was himself living in it. He had been brought up by Gangamma and her husband and had been living in the house with them during their lifetime. His continuing to live in the house after Gangamma's death, even if true, would not by itself indicate that he had any title to the house or how that title was derived. Gangamma died after the preliminary decree in the mortgage suit was passed and the plaintiff therein had to bring on record her legal representative for obtaining a final and executable decree. In the circumstances of the case there can be hardly any doubt that defendant 2 to whom the preliminary de-reo was transferred by defendant 3 acted bona fide in bringing on record Peramma as the legal representative of the deceased Gangamma. There is also nothing to show that in the proceedings taken by him in execution of the decree against Peramma as the legal representative of Gangamma, he acted otherwise than honestly. Even after the plaintiff had ceased to be a minor, he took no steps to intervene in the proceedings in execution of the mortgage decree. Indeed it was only when the purchaser in the Court sale hold in the execution of the mortgage decree went to take possession of the house, item 1, that the plaintiff's claim appears to have been first put forward. In the present suit the plaintiff does not question the preliminary mortgage decree passed against Gangamma; nor does he say that any further amount was paid beyond what the decree-holder himself has admitted. The only ground on which the plaintiff has brought the present suit is that he is not bound by the proceedings in the mortgage suit, subsequent to the death of Gangamma, as he was not made a party thereto. Under Gangamma's will,, he became the absolute owner of the mortgage properties and Peramma had no interest whatever therein. She could not therefore legally represent the estate. Neither the final decree nor the sale held in execution can affect the" plaintiff as he was not made a party to those proceedings. If this contention is well founded the sale of the mortgaged properties to defendant 1 in execution of the decree is void and the plaintiff will have a right to pay off the mortgage decree. That was the view taken by the lower appellate Court. The appellant contends that this is not a correct view and that in the circumstances of the case Peramma sufficiently represented the estate.

    7. The respondent on the other hand' supports the view taken by the lower ap-pellate Court. The question we have to determine is the question of law, whether Peramma, notwithstanding she had no title or interest in the suit properties, sufficiently represented the estate in that suit so as to make the final decree and the sale held in execution thereof binding on the plaintiff.

    8. Prima facie no person can be held bound by a decree or order to which neither he nor the person from whom he claims was a party. In Khiarajmal v. Daim [1905] 32 Cal. 296, their Lordships of the Privy Council observe:

    that a Court has no jurisdiction to sell the property of persons who are not parties to the proceedings or properly represented on the record. As against such persons the decrees or sales purported to be made would be a nullity and might be disregarded without any proceedings to set them aside.

    9. But their Lordships and the several High Courts have also held that in certain circumstances, a person who is impleaded as the legal representive of another which he is not, in a suit or in proceedings for the execution of a decree sufficiently represents the estate with the result that a decree or order which is passed against him in an assumed representative character is held to be bind-ing on the true representative though the latter was no party to the same. The wrong party may have been impleaded at various stages of the litigation. It may have been at the very outset by the suit itself being instituted against him as the legal representative of the deceased person, as in the General Manager of the Raj Durbhanga v. Ramaput Singh [1871]114 M. I.A. 605 and Gnanambal Ammal v. Veerasami Chetty [1915] 29 M.L.J. 698, or during the pendency of the suit as in Kadir Mohideen v. Muthukrishna Ayyar [1903] 26 Mad. 230 and Mada-varayadu v. Subbamma [1920] 31 M.L.J. 222, or after the decree and for the purpose of executing the decree as in Malkarjun v. Narhari [1901] 25 Bom. 337 and Ramasami Chettiar v. Oppilama-ni Chetti [1910] 33 Mad. 6. The question then is, under what circumstances, can the representation of such a person be held to be effective against the true representative? One of the essential conditions is that the plaintiff or decree-holder must have acted bona fide, that is, not only in good faith but also with due care and caution. Whether in the particular case the impleading of the wrong party was done bona fide is a question of fact which will have to be determined with reference to all the facts of the case.

    10. The next condition is that the decree or order so obtained must be free from any taint of fraud or collusion. It must also be clear from the proceedings, that the person is impleaded in a representative capacity and that the decree or order is passed against him as representing the estate of the deceased. The person who is prima facie the heir-at-law to a deceased person may and ought to be presumed to be his legal representative for the purposes of the suit or execution proceedings and may be impleaded as such unless the plaintiff or decree-holder is aware of facts which operate to displace the title of the heir-at-law. If in ignorance of such facts he impleads the heir-at-law as the legal representative in the suit either before or after the decree and the person having the real title does not intervene during the pendency of the suit or execution proceedings, the decree or orders passed will be binding on the latter unless he makes out any fraud or collusion in obtaining the same. Where there are rival claimants to the estate of a deceased, it is open to the plaintiff or decree-holder to choose as the legal representative for the purposes of the suit or execution proceedings, the one who in the circumstances as they then exist appears to have the prima facie title, and if such a person is impleaded bona fide and the further proceedings are conducted honestly, the person so impleaded sufficiently represents the estate so as to make the decree or execution sale binding on the person who is subsequently found to be the person really entitled to the estate. Lastly when any question is raised in the suit or execution proceedings as to whether the person impleaded is the legal representative and the Court trying the suit or conducting the execution proceedings decides that be is the legal representative, such a decision, even if erroneous, operates to confer on him that character for the purpose of the suit or proceeding.

    11. These propositions are fully supported by the cases cited above to which reference was made during the arguments before us. In support of the respondent's contention that we cannot hold that Peramma sufficiently represented the estate, his learned advocate has drawn our attention to the following cases. Khiarajmal v. Daim, Madavarayadu v. Subbamma and Kaliappan Servaikaran v. Varadarajulu [1910] 33 Mad. 75. Khiarajmal v. Daim, is not a case where any person was wrongly brought on record as the legal representative of a deceased person; but it was a case where as regards some of the parties no legal representative was brought on record at all. It is thus distinguished by their Lordships them-selves from their previous decision in Malkarjun v. Narhari where a person who was not the legal representatives was brought on the record as such in spite of his objection which was erroneously overruled by the Court.

    12. In Madavarayadu v. Subbamma on the death of the defendant-mortgagor his divided brother's son was brought on the record as his legal representative ignoring his daughter who was the legal representative and it was held that the decree was so obtained was not binding on the daughter, the real heir. In this case no attempt appears to have been made to justify the ignoring of the person who was prima facie the heir to the deceased defendant and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation the plaintiff cannot be held to have acted bona fide.

    13. In Kaliappan Servaikaran v. Varadarajulu creditor of a deceased Hindu sued his widow as his legal representative for recovery of the debt due to him and obtained a decree against her. The daughter's son of the deceased claimed his properties under a will left by him which was contested by the widow. He had also brought a suit against her on that will. The trial Court dismissed that suit and the daughter's son had preferred an appeal to the District Court against that decree. It was during the pendency of that appeal that the creditor's suit against the widow was brought. The District Court subsequently upheld the will and the creditor thereafter applied for execution against the daughter's son, of the decree he had obtained against the widow as the legal representative. That application was dismissed. This decision is explained by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Gnanambal Ammal v. Veeraswami Ayyar (a case like the present which strongly supports the appellant's contention) as merely deciding that the true legal representative cannot, after the decree, be brought on the record for the purpose of execution and, that the deceased debtor's property in his hands cannot be attached and sold in that same suit; see at pp. 701 and 702.

    14. The learned Judge also observes that if the decision is to be relied on as an authority for the broader proposition that the decree is altogether void as against the daughter's son on the ground that he was not impleaded as the legal representative, it is not reconcilable with General Manager of Raj Durbhanga v. Ramaput Singh. In General Manager of the Raj Durbhanga v. Ramaput Singh and Ramasami Chettiar v. Oppilamani Chetti the suit was brought (or continued) against a widow as the guardian of her son for recovery of a debt due by her husband. She alleged that her son was adopted into a different family and that she was consequently the heir to her husband and her objection was allowed and the suit proceeded against her as the legal representative of her husband and a decree was obtained; and her husband's properties were sold in execution of the decree. The adoption of the son into another family was subsequently found against. It was held that the decree obtained against the widow as the legal representative of her husband and the sale held in execution thereof were binding on the son, though he was no party either to the decree or to the execution proceedings.

    15. In Ramasami Chettiar v. Oppilamani Chetty the defendant died after the decree and in execution thereof the plaintiff brought on record one of the rival claimants who appeared to have a better title at the time. His title was subsequently found against. Nevertheless it was held that the sale which was made in execution of the decree was binding on the real heir to the property whose title was subsequently established.

    16. Upon the authorities- above referred to, we think there can be hardly any doubt as to the correctness of the finding of the Subordinate Judge that Peramma sufficiently represented the estate of Gangamma, The preliminary decree in the mortgage suit had been obtained against Gangamma herself and it was, therefore, binding upon her estate. That decrees though not executable did not leave open any question as to the liability of the estate for the decree amount, but only gave time for the payment of that amount, It is, therefore, substantially a case of bringing on the record a wrong; party for executing the decree. Peramma was, prima facie, the heir of the deceased and was also in possession of at least some of the items of the mortgage property. The will on which the appellant relies was not heard of until the* sale in the mortgage-decree was concluded. Under these circumstances it must be held that Peramma effectually represented the estate and that the sale is binding on the plaintiff. The decree of the lower appellate Court is, therefore, set aside and the suit dismissed with costs of appellant defendant 1 throughout.

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    Comments

    Sanna Govappa v. Rodda Sanna Govappa
    (Nov 29, 1928)