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  • Act, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Court.Sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • sec. II of the Land Acquisition Act
  • sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act;
  • sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
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  • Act, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Court.Sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • sec. II of the Land Acquisition Act
  • sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act;
  • sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for recovery of money which had been allowed as compensation for lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and which the Defendant had withdrawn. The lands were acquired for a Railway. Both the Plaintiff (the zamindar) and the Defendant (the putnidar) were served with notices under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector apportioned the compensation equally between them. Neither party applied for a reference under section 18 of the Act. The Defendant (putnidar) withdrew the sum awarded to him. The Plaintiff then sued to recover the amount withdrawn by the Defendant, contending that under the putni kabuliyat the putnidar was not entitled to any portion of the compensation. The Defendant defended inter alia on the ground that the Plaintiff ought to have applied for a reference under section 18 and that no separate suit lay. The Courts below overruled that contention and gave decree(s) for the Plaintiff; the Defendant appealed to this Court. The Court below's decrees were set aside and the suit was dismissed by the present Court, which directed each party to bear their own costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, where a person served with notice under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act is dissatisfied with the Collector's apportionment award, that person is bound to seek a reference under section 18 (and thereby cannot maintain a separate suit in the ordinary Civil Court).
  2. Whether the Collector's apportionment under section 11 and the finality provision of section 12 (subject to section 18) oust the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts to adjudicate inter se apportionment disputes among persons who received or claimed compensation.
  3. How to construe the proviso to section 31(2) of the Act that preserves liability of any person who may receive compensation to pay it to the person lawfully entitled to it — specifically, to whom that proviso applies (e.g., persons not served with notice or under disability).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff (zamindar) claimed that by virtue of the putni kabuliyat the putnidar was not entitled to any portion of the compensation money and therefore sought recovery of the sum withdrawn by the Defendant.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff ought to have applied for a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that no separate suit in the ordinary Civil Court lay to challenge the apportionment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhandi Singh v. Ramadhin Roy Supports the proposition that where special jurisdiction is conferred by statute for investigation of matters in controversy, that special jurisdiction is ordinarily exclusive of ordinary Civil Court jurisdiction. The Court referred to this authority in discussing exclusivity of the Land Acquisition Court's jurisdiction and considered the decision in the context of parties who had obtained a reference under section 18 but failed to pursue it; the present Court relied on the principle of exclusivity to hold that a party served with notice must apply under section 18 rather than institute a separate suit.
Stevens v. Jeacocke; West v. Downman; Rama Chandra v. The Secretary of State for India in Council Expresses the established principle that when a statute provides a specific mode of redress for injury resulting from exercise of statutory powers, the ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Courts is ousted and the statutory mode is exclusive. The Court invoked this established principle to support the proposition that the Land Acquisition Act creates a special jurisdiction and remedy which ordinarily excludes recourse to ordinary Civil Courts when the Act provides the remedy.
Raja Nilmani Singh Deo Bahadur v. Ram Bandhu Rai Interpreted a proviso (to the earlier Act) preserving the liability of a person who receives compensation to pay it to the person lawfully entitled; held the proviso applies to persons whose rights have not been adjudicated upon (e.g., persons not before the Court under specified sections of the earlier Act). The Court relied on the Judicial Committee's exposition to read the proviso to section 31(2) of the present Act narrowly — as applying only to persons under disability or not served with notice — and to distinguish cases under the earlier Act where compulsory reference procedures differed.
Punnabati Dai v. Pudmanand Singh Held that as between claimants inter se, an award by a Collector under the Act does not amount to adjudication of apportionment questions and that such questions can be determined only by the Civil Court. The present Court stated it was unable to follow Punnabati Dai. It explained differences in procedural provisions between the earlier Act and the Act of 1894 (notably the Collector's power under section 11) and rejected the broader proposition that ordinary Civil Courts retain concurrent jurisdiction in cases where parties were served and could have sought a reference under section 18.
Hurmut Jan Bibi v. Padma Lochan Das Under the earlier Act, apportionment proceedings were distinct and bound only those who had notice or who were actually before the Court; a person not served with notice of apportionment proceedings could not be bound by them. The Court agreed with this principle to the extent that a person who had no notice of apportionment proceedings cannot be bound by the award; it used this to limit the operation of the proviso to protect persons not served with notice or under disability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out the relevant statutory framework in the Land Acquisition Act: section 9 (notice to persons known or believed to be interested), section 11 (Collector's inquiry and power to award area, compensation and apportionment among persons known or believed to be interested), section 12 (filed award being, except as provided, final and conclusive evidence as between Collector and persons interested), section 18 (right of an interested person to apply to the Collector within prescribed time for reference of specified matters to the Court) and section 30 (power of the Collector to refer disputes as to apportionment of compensation to the Court of his own motion).

From these provisions the Court observed that the Act creates a special jurisdiction and a special remedy for disputes about apportionment and that ordinarily such special jurisdiction is exclusive. The Court relied on the established statutory principle — supported by earlier authorities — that when a statute prescribes a particular mode of redress for an injury caused by statutory action, the ordinary civil remedy is ordinarily ousted.

The Court confronted a potential difficulty raised by the proviso to section 31(2), which preserves the liability of a person who has received compensation to pay it to the person lawfully entitled. The Court examined earlier decisions under the previous Act (Act X of 1870) — notably Raja Nilmani Singh's case and Punnabati Dai — and explained relevant differences between the two enactments. Under the old Act, the Collector had no power to decide apportionment and was bound to refer such questions to the Civil Court; under the 1894 Act the Collector is empowered by section 11 to apportion and the award is final under section 12 subject to the right under section 18 to obtain reference.

Given that (a) the Act gives the Collector power to apportion and provides a procedure for reference to the Court by an aggrieved party, and (b) the proviso cannot reasonably be read to allow suits in all cases (for example, by parties who were served and could have sought a reference within the prescribed period), the Court concluded that the proviso must be given a limited application. The Court interpreted the proviso to apply only to particular persons — specifically, those who are under a disability or who were not served with notice of the proceedings before the Collector — rather than to persons who were served and who failed to seek the statutory remedy.

The Court addressed earlier decisions: it declined to follow Punnabati Dai (which had held Collector's award did not constitute adjudication inter se) because that decision did not sufficiently take account of the different statutory powers under the Act of 1894 and because the Judicial Committee's observations in Raja Nilmani Singh's case pointed to a narrower scope of the proviso. The Court agreed with Hurmut Jan Bibi to the limited extent that persons not served with notice cannot be bound by apportionment proceedings.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the Plaintiff had been served with notice under section 9 and, being dissatisfied with the award, was therefore bound to apply for a reference under section 18. Having not done so, the Plaintiff could not maintain a suit in the ordinary Civil Court to recover the amount withdrawn by the Defendant.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the decrees of the Courts below and dismissed the suit; the appeal was allowed. The core ruling is stated as: The Plaintiff, having been served with notice under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, was bound to apply for a reference under section 18 and could not maintain a suit in the ordinary Civil Court.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Plaintiff's suit for recovery of the sum withdrawn by the Defendant is dismissed; the lower courts' decrees in favour of the Plaintiff are set aside. Each party is directed to bear their own costs in all Courts.
  • Statutory interpretation: The Court construed the proviso to section 31(2) narrowly — as applying principally to persons who are under a disability or who were not served with notice of the proceedings — and held that where a person is served under section 9 and does not avail himself of the statutory remedy under section 18, he cannot subsequently maintain a separate suit in ordinary Civil Court. The Court expressly declined to follow Punnabati Dai on this point.
  • No broader new precedent beyond the decision's statutory interpretation was expressly announced; the ruling operates to reinforce that where the Act provides a special remedy and procedure (including a reference under section 18), parties who were duly notified are generally expected to pursue that statutory remedy rather than institute separate civil suits.

    Saibesh Chandra Sarkar v. Sir Bejoy Chand Mahatap Bahadur

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    This appeal arises out of a suit for refund of money which had been allowed as compensation for certain lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and withdrawn by the Defendant.

    It appears that the lands in question were acquired for a Railway. The Plaintiff (the zamindar) and the Defendant, (the putnidar) were served with notices under sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector apportioned the compensation half and half between the zamindar and the putnidar. Neither party applied for any reference under sec. 18 of the Act and the putnidar withdrew the amount awarded to him by the Collector. The zamindar thereupon brought the suit out of which this appeal arises, for recovery of the amount which had been withdrawn by the Defendant, on the ground that under the putni kabuliyat, the putnidar was not entitled to any portion of the compensation money. The defence inter alia was that the Plaintiff ought to have applied for reference under sec. 18 of the Act and that no separate suit lies. The Courts below have overruled that contention and the Defendant has appealed to this Court.

    Sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) provides for notice being given by the Collector to all persons known or believed to be interested in the land acquired. Sec. 11 provides for inquiry by the Collector into the objections (if any) which any person interested had stated pursuant to the notice given under sec. 9 to the measurements made under sec. 8, and into the value of the land, and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation, and further provides for an award being made by him under his hand of—

    (i) the true area of the land;

    (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and

    (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him.

    Sec. 12 lays down (1) that such award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested (2) that the Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.

    Under sec. 18 any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. This application for reference is to be made within the time fixed by sub-sec. (2) of that section. Sec. 30 provides that if any dispute arises as to apportionment of the compensation or as to the persons among whom it is payable, the Collector may of his own motion refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. The “Court” means the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction unless the local Government has appointed a Special Judicial Officer to perform the functions of the Court under the Act, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are to apply to proceedings before the Court under the Act.

    The Act creates a special jurisdiction and provides a special remedy. And ordinarily when jurisdiction has been conferred upon a special Court for the investigation of matters which may possibly be in controversy, such jurisdiction is exclusive. [See Bhandi Singh v. Ramadhin Roy ].

    It is an established principle that whore by an Act of the Legislature powers are given to any person for a public purpose from which an individual may receive injury if the mode of redressing the injury is pointed out by the Statute, the ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted and in the case of injury the party cannot proceed by action [see Stevens v. Jeacocke , West v. Downman and Rama Chandra v. The Secretary of State for India in Council ].

    A difficulty, however, arises from the proviso to sec. 31, cl. (2) which lays down “provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.” There was a similar proviso to sec. 40 of Act X of 1870 and the proviso was considered by the Judicial Committee in the case of Raja Nilmani Singh Deo Bahadur v. Ram Bandhu Rai . In that case the Appellant Kaja Nilmoni Singh was a party to the apportionment proceedings under sec. 38 of Act X of 1870 and it was held that he could not reopen the question by a regular suit. Their Lordships with reference to the proviso observed: “Such a proviso, which appears to have been but a repetition of a provision in a previous Act in pari materia, is necessary in this as in almost all acts of a similar character. It is necessary for the Government or the persons or company entitled to take property compulsorily, to deal with those who are in possession, or ostensibly the owners; but it may happen, and frequently does happen, that the real owners, possibly being infants or persons under disability, do not appear, and are not dealt with in the first instance; and therefore a provision of this sort is necessary for the purpose of enabling the parties who have a real title to obtain the compensation money. Their Lordships went on to observe that the proviso applied only to persons whose rights had not been adjudicated upon in pursuance of the secs. (38 and 39). This is the passage on which reliance has been placed in Punnabati Dai v. Pudmanand Singh in which it was held that as between the claimants inter se an award by a Collector under sec. II of the Land Acquisition Act does not amount to an adjudication of any question regarding the apportionment of compensation adjudged under the Land Acquisition Act, and that any such question can be determined only by the Civil Court.

    In that case the learned Judges observed:—“Their Lordships decided the case of Raja Nilmani Singh v. Ram Bandhu Rai under the old Act X of 1870, and the proviso that their Lordships had to construe is word for word the same as the last proviso to sub-sec. 2 of sec. 31 of the present Act, and their Lordships' referring to an adjudication in pursuance of secs. 38 and 39 go clearly to show that it is an adjudication of the Civil Court upon a reference by the Collector that their Lordships had in view.”

    It is to be observed, however, that the Collector under Act X of 1870 had no power to decide the question of apportionment in any case. Whenever there was any question of apportionment, he was bound to refer the matter to the Court, i.e, the Civil Court, and the Civil Court had to decide the matter under secs. 38 and 39 of the Act. This appears to be the reason why their Lordships in Raja Nilmani Singh's case referred to the adjudication under secs. 38 and 39.

    Under Act I of 1894, compulsory reference was abolished, and the Collector has full power to deal with the question of apportionment under sec. 11, and his award, subject to the other provisions of the Act, is final under sec. 12, no doubt, as between the Collector on the one hand and the persons interested on the other. The person aggrieved by the award whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested may apply to the Collector for a reference to the Court. The “Court,” by which is meant the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction or a Judicial Officer specially empowered to perform the functions of the Court, under the Act has to decide the questions referred to the Court. That being so it is not reasonable to hold that the Act while creating a special Court to decide such questions intended an adjudication of any question relating to apportionment by the Ordinary Civil Courts. The proviso as it stands under the present Act, or as it stood under the old Act, is very general in its terms. Admittedly it cannot be given effect to in its entirety: it cannot be held that a suit lies notwithstanding a reference to the Court upon the application of a party under sec. 18 or by the Collector of his own motion under sec. 30. The proviso therefore must be given a limited application, and we think that it applies only to cases where the person is under a disability or is not served with notice of the proceedings before the Collector.

    In the case of Punnabati Dai v. Pudmanand Singh , cited above the learned Judges, although they referred to the contention that there being a special remedy provided by the Act, the general remedy was not available, did not discuss the question, and the observations of the Judicial Committee in Raja Nilmani Singh's case as to the persons to whom the proviso was applicable do not appear to have been considered by them. Then again, the contention raised in that case that a separate suit if allowed would enable a party to avoid the limitation prescribed by sec. 18, namely, six weeks from the date of the Collector's award where the party was present before the Collector, or six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector, or six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire, was disallowed on the ground that there is no limitation prescribed for a reference under sec. 30. Sec. 30, however, applies only to a reference made by the Collector of his own motion presumably before the final award is made; whereas sec. 18 deals with a reference upon an application made by a party. For the above reasons therefore and with all respect to the learned Judges we are unable to follow the decision in the case of Punnabati Dai v. Pudmanand Singh .

    In the case of Hurmut Jan Bibi v. Padma Lochan Das , the Plaintiff who brought the suit was no party to the apportionment proceeding, and Wilson, J. pointed out that “apportionment of the compensation is intended to be a proceeding distinct from that of settling the amount of compensation under the previous provisions of the Act and any dispute as to the apportionment is only decided as between those persons who are actually before the Court. A separate notice therefore of the apportionment proceedings is requisite to bind any person by those proceedings and where such a notice has not been served, any person interested, although served with notice of the proceedings for settling the amount of compensation, cannot be considered a party to the proceedings for apportioning it.” The decision was under the old Act (Act X of 1870), and apportionment proceedings under that Act were taken before the “Court” under secs. 38 and 39 of the Act.

    We quite agree in holding that where a person has no notice of the apportionment proceedings, he cannot be bound by the award or by the decision.

    In the case of Bhandi Singh v. Ramadhin Roy certain persons who were parties to a land acquisition proceeding being dissatisfied with the apportionment of the compensation money made by the Collector obtained a reference to the Court under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act; but as they did not appear at the hearing before the Court it was struck off. It was held that the suit instituted by them in the Civil Court for the apportionment of the compensation money was barred under sec. 103, C.P.C, as the procedure to be observed by the Court is the same as that laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case Mookerjee, J., discussed the question whether, when special jurisdiction had been conferred, such jurisdiction was exclusive or not, and came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was exclusive. He, however, expressed an opinion, having regard to the provisions of sec. 31, cl. (2) and the decision in the case of Raja Nilmani Singh Deo Bahadur v. Ram Bandhu Rai that a question as to the persons to whom compensation is payable or its apportionment among the persons interested may be determined either under a reference as contemplated by sec. 18 cl. (1) or by a suit at the instance of a person lawfully entitled to it as against another who has drawn the compensation money but that if a party has once availed himself of a reference to the Court under sec. 18 he cannot again ask for an injunction to litigate the same matter in the ordinary Civil Court. In that case as stated above, the Plaintiff had obtained a reference under sec. 18, which was dismissed for his non-appearance. Consequently no suit was maintainable. It was unnecessary therefore to consider whether the special Court under the Land Acquisition Act, and the ordinary Civil Court have or have not concurrent jurisdiction, and it is to be noticed that the observations of their Lordships in Raja Nilmani Singh's case as to the persons to whom the proviso is applicable do not appear to have been considered by the learned Judges.

    Although the Legislature has created a special Court (the principal Court of original jurisdiction or a Judicial Officer specially empowered to perform the functions of a Court under the Act) to adjudicate all questions of apportionment upon a reference made within the period fixed by the Act, the effect of holding that such Court and the ordinary Civil Courts have concurrent jurisdiction will be that a party may institute a suit even in a Munsif's Court, (in cases where the amount in dispute does not exceed Rs. 1,000) and that long after the periods prescribed by sec. 18. The Act expressly provided that any party dissatisfied with the award of the Collector as regards apportionment, may apply to the Collector for a reference under sec. 18 and on such a reference he can get relief in the same way as he can do in the ordinary Civil Court as the procedure in the Court under the Act is the same as in ordinary Civil Courts with a right of appeal to the High Court. It would not be reasonable to hold that the Legislature having provided a, special remedy in the Land Acquisition Court intended to make it optional with a party to apply for a reference under sec. 18 or to institute a suit in ordinary Civil Court. The scope of the proviso may be amply satisfied by holding that it applies only to particular persons. The Collector under sec. 9 has to serve notices upon the persons known or believed to be interested in the land. There may be persons who are not known to the Collector and who might not be in possession, and the interests of this class of persons are protected by the proviso to sec. 31, sub-sec. (2).

    We are of opinion that the Plaintiff having been served with notice under sec. 9 of the Act was bound to apply for reference under sec. 18 when he was dissatisfied with the award, and he cannot maintain a suit in the ordinary Civil Court.

    In this view it is unnecessary to consider the question whether the word in the kabuliyat includes land taken for the purpose of a Railway.

    We accordingly set aside the decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the suit, but we direct each party to bear his own costs in all Courts.

    J.N.R
    Appeal allowed.

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    Saibesh Chandra Sarkar v. Sir Bejoy Chand Mahatap Bahadur
    (Dec 16, 1921)