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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from a suit brought under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code concerning a temple and several properties alleged to have been dedicated to that temple. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are hereditary archakas (temple priests). The District Judge (Subordinate Judge) had passed a preliminary decree directing the removal of the defendants from the trusteeship and found that, except for two items (Nos. 5 and 12), the properties were endowments of the plaint temple, which was characterized as a public temple. Items Nos. 5 and 12 were treated by the Subordinate Judge as service inams (grants made to ancestors for the performance of archaka service). The appellate court examined sanads, Inam Registers, title deeds and takeeds associated with the disputed properties and considered objections and admissions advanced before it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the properties in dispute constitute endowments to the temple (devadayam) or are personal/inams of the defendants' family.
  2. Whether, if the grants are to the temple, any surplus income remaining after performance of naivedyam and deeparadanai was intended for appropriation by the archakas (defendants).
  3. Whether specific items (notably Item No. 5 and Item No. 12) are service inams (hereditary grants burdened with archaka service) or endowments to the temple.
  4. Whether the defendants (hereditary archakas and trustees) should be removed from office and, relatedly, whether their past accounts should be called for and investigated.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments (as presented through Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar)

  • Even if the historical grants were made to the temple, any surplus remaining after the performance of naivedyam and deeparadanai (as mentioned in the sanads) was intended to be appropriated by the defendants (i.e., the archakas and their descendants).
  • Counsel for the defendants referred to a number of English cases to support the general proposition that when a gift is made to a donee charged with performing certain charities, any surplus income after the charitable obligations may accrue to the donee (or manager) unless the instrument indicates otherwise.

Appellants' Arguments

  • The language of certain sanads (e.g., Exhibit XI dated 2 June 1764) indicates the grant was made to the god installed in the temple and that the archaka (defendants' ancestor) was to have possession and enjoyment only in the capacity of performing the daily naivedyam and deeparadanai; on this construction any surplus would not belong to the archakas personally but to the temple.
  • Documentary evidence such as Inam Registers, title-deeds and recommendations of the Inam Commission describe the land as devadayam and recommend continuation of the inam to the pagoda, supporting the position that the grants were to the deity/temple and not to private individuals.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abhiram Gosurami Mahant v. Shyama Charan Nundi Rule of construction concerning interpretation of ambiguous instruments affecting religious trusts (referred to as an authority on construction). The court stated it was unnecessary to discuss the rule from this case because, on the facts, the grant was clearly to the temple; therefore the rule need not be applied to alter that clear construction.
Attorney-General v. Wax Chandilers' Co. Principle discussed by Lord Cairns: where beneficial interests are portioned among objects, surplus income is to be applied consistent with the objects of the gift; in similar contexts surplus does not automatically go to the individual performing the duty but to the donee/charitable object. The court invoked Lord Cairns' discussion to reinforce the conclusion that where the donor's intention appears to devote the entire income to the deity, any surplus should be applied for the benefit of the temple (the donee), not appropriated by the archakas.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by close textual and documentary analysis. Its reasoning can be traced in discrete steps:

  1. Examination of primary sanads: The court treated a representative sanad (Exhibit XI, dated 2 June 1764) as illustrative. That document expressly described a dedication of land as "maniam" for conducting daily naivedyam and deepardanai by the named archaka. The concluding words conveyed that the archaka and his descendants "shall enjoy the same for ever and render the daily naivedyam and deeparadanai" of the Sri Swamivaru (the deity).
  2. Construction of the instrument: The court interpreted those words as evidence that the grant was to the god (the temple) and that the archaka was given possession and enjoyment only in his capacity to carry out the objects of the gift (i.e., to perform worship). The archaka was not the donee of the gift; the deity/temple was.
  3. Documentary corroboration: The Inam Registers, title-deeds and takeeds support that construction. The Inam Register described the land as devadayam, recommended continuation of the inam to the pagoda, and the title-deed was issued to the manager (for the time being) of the pagoda — facts which pointed to the temple as the beneficiary.
  4. On the claim of ambiguity and conduct of parties: Although defendants and their ancestors had historically appropriated surplus income after meeting worship expenses and thus acted on a contrary footing, the court declined to permit long-standing conduct of trustees to control construction in the face of clear documentary dedication to the temple. The court warned against adopting a broad principle that trustees' long practice of personal appropriation should alter the express terms of trust deeds.
  5. Consideration of general rules referenced by counsel: The court recognized the English doctrinal rule (as cited in argument) that where a donee is to perform charitable obligations out of property, surplus may accrue to the donee. But the court emphasized that, applied properly to the present facts, that doctrine would give the surplus to the temple (the donee), not to the archakas (because the temple, not the archaka personally, is the donee).
  6. Specific analysis of Items Nos. 5 and 12: For Item No. 5 the language (in Exhibit II, sanad of 1776) expressly granted produce to the archaka for service and stated the archaka would cultivate and enjoy the produce — supporting the Subordinate Judge's finding that item No. 5 was a hereditary service inam. Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar conceded that the finding as to item No. 5 could not be successfully attacked. For Item No. 12, while language differed slightly in some documents, the sanad, cheknama and Inam Register described it as a gift for daily naivedyam and deeparadanai and as devadayam; there was no indication the donor contemplated surplus should go to the person performing the service. The court therefore found no substantial distinction between Item No. 12 and other items (Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8) and concluded Item No. 12 should be treated on the same footing as those items (i.e., as devoted to the temple).
  7. On removal of defendants and accounting: The Subordinate Judge had directed removal of the hereditary archakas from trusteeship on two principal grounds: (a) undesirability of combining the office of archaka with that of trustee (concern about lack of supervisory authority), and (b) that the defendants had denied the temple's title to a substantial portion of the income and appropriated it. The appellate court observed that the defendants may have acted in good faith (given longstanding practices by ancestors), and it considered it appropriate to remit the question of removal to the Subordinate Judge for full investigation of the charges and proper findings. Similarly, while the Subordinate Judge had not required the defendants to render accounts, he was permitted to investigate past accounts insofar as necessary to decide whether to retain the defendants as trustees and on what conditions.
  8. Disposition: The court remitted the case to the lower court for further inquiry and for framing of a proper scheme, leaving final decisions on removal and certain other incidentals to that court after further investigation. The Subordinate Judge was directed to dispose of the costs of the appeal and the memorandum of objections.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appellate court upheld the construction that, with the exception of Item No. 5, the properties in suit were endowments (devadayam) to the temple and that surplus income, where any exists after performing the designated temple services, must be applied for the benefit of the temple rather than being appropriated by the archakas. The court remanded the case to the Subordinate Judge for further inquiry and framing of a scheme and left the question of removal of the defendants to the lower court after proper investigation.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • Most disputed properties (including Item No. 12 and items Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8) are treated as endowments to the temple — the temple (or deity) is the donee and entitled to the income in accordance with the gift.
  • Item No. 5 remains treated as a hereditary service inam (a grant in favour of the archaka's ancestor for archaka service); the court accepted that the Subordinate Judge's finding in respect of Item No. 5 could not be successfully attacked.
  • The defendants are not finally removed by the appellate court; the Subordinate Judge is to investigate the charges (including alleged misappropriation of income) and decide whether removal is warranted and whether past accounts should be called for and examined.
  • The case is remanded to the lower court for further inquiry and framing of a proper scheme. The Subordinate Judge will also dispose of costs of the appeal and the memorandum of objections.

Broader Legal Implications

The opinion reiterates established principles of construction for religious endowments: documentary words that clearly show a gift to a deity or temple govern the rights to income, and long-standing conduct of trustees does not automatically alter the expressed dedication in the documents. The court also endorsed the principle (as discussed in English authorities) that, when property is dedicated to a charitable purpose and a donee is charged with performing obligations, any surplus is to be applied consistent with the objects of the gift — on the facts here, in favour of the temple (the donee), not the archakas personally. The appellate court, however, did not lay down new law; it remitted factual and managerial questions (including removal and account inquiries) to the Subordinate Judge for findings.

Disposition: Case remanded to the lower court for further enquiry and framing of a scheme; Subordinate Judge to dispose of costs and the memorandum of objections.

    (Mutteyi) Srinivasacharyulu v. Dinavahi Pratyanga Rao

    JUDGMENT

    1. The appeal arises out of a suit brought under section 92 of the CPC with respect to a temple and the properties alleged to have been dedicated to the temple. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are the hereditary archakas of the temple. The District Judge has passed a preliminary decree directing the removal of the defendants from the trusteeship and found that the properties in suit were, with the exception of two items, in fact the endowments of the plaint temple, which was a public one. As regards the question whether the properties formed the endowment of the plaint temple or were personal inams of the defendants' family, as contended by defendants, we have sanads as well as Inam Registers and title deeds and takeeds in connection with these properties. Items Nos. 5 and 12 are the properties which are found by the Subordinate Judge to be service inams, that is to say, grants to the defendants' ancestors for the performance of archaka service. As regards the other items the Subordinate Judge found that the grants were made to the idol, and that consequently the temple is entitled to the entire income.

    2. The contention of the defendants with regard to those properties, as urged by Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar before us in the appeal, is that even if the grants were to the temple, any surplus that accrues after the performance of naivedyam and deeparadanai, mentioned in the sanad, was intended to be appropriated by the defendants.

    3. It is not necessary to refer to all the sana's, it would be sufficient to take one of them as a sample. Exhibit XI, dated 2nd June 1764, is styled: “Deed of gift of land executed by two persons in favour of Akilandakoti Brahmananda Nayaka Sri Swamivaru of Buchpeta.” The document goes on to say: “We have dedicated 4 kathis of land: one kathi dry, one kathi wet, in all 2 Kathis, in Yudumudi Guadooru Pargana and 2 Kathis, one dry and one wet, in Karakatoor as maniam for conducting your daily narvedyam and deepardanai by archaka Muthuvei Vydya Padmanabhacharlu (the defendants' ancestor).” The concluding words of the grant are “so he shall cultivate the same every year and use the produce thereof; he, his sons and grandsons in succession shall enjoy the same for ever and render the daily nalvedyam and deepardinai of Sri Swamivaru and live happily.” The argument of the appellants is that the latter Words indicate that, so long as the archakas performed the daily naivedyam and deep aralanai, they were entitled to use the surplus income of the land for their own purpose. The Subordinate Judge did not accept this contention and we are unable to say that the construction which he placed on the sanads is wrong. The grant is expressly to the god installed in the temple, the purpose for which the grant is made is the performance of the daily nalvedyam and decparadanai, the ancestor of the defendants is described as archaka, and it is in that capacity that he is to have possession and enjoyment of the land, which is given to the god as the donee. The archaka is not the donee, but is only to carry out the objects of the gift. In arriving at this conclusion we are strengthened by the decision of the Inam commission which appears from the Inami Registers, title-deeds and takeeds issued in connection therewith. The Inam Register describes the land as devadayam granted for the expenses attending the performance of certain rites in the pagoda. The grantee is mentioned as Bachupet Sri Venkateswaraswami and the recommendation of the Commission is that the inam should be continued to the Venkateswaraswami Pagoda at Bachupet. The title-deed is issued to the manager for the time being of the Sri Venkateswaraswami Pagoda, i.e, to the ancestor of the defendants.

    4. The inam is also described as devaduyam inam for the support of the temple. It is true, as pointed out by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar and as found by the Subordinate Judge, that the defendants and their ancestors have all along acted on the footing that whatever income was left after meeting the ordinary expenses of naivedyam and deeparadanui (lighting of temples, etc., could be appropriated, and was in fac) appropriated, by them. It is argued that this is a case of an ambiguous document and that we ought to so interpret it, taking into account the conduct of the parties. It is not necessary for us to discuss the rule of construction which is referred to in Abhiram Gosurami Mahant v. Shyama Charan Nundi(1), as in the present case we are clearly of opinion that the gift was to the temple and as far as back as 1764, in any event, the defendants' ancestor accepted that position and never before this proceeding have the defendants put forward the present claim that they are entitled to all the surplus income, after meeting the ordinary expenses of ndivedyam and deeparadanai. It would be a dangerous proposition to lay down that, if the trustees of religions trusts have for many years been applying the income to their own personal use, we must construe the trust-deed in the light of such conduct. There is really no room here for any such construction as is sought to be put upon the sanad by the appellants. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar referred us to a number of English cases in support of the proposition that, where there is a gift to a corporation or an individual and the donee is to perform certain charities out of the properties, the subject of the gift, any surplus income left after the performance of the charities indicated, accrues to the benefit of the donee. Even if that proposition were accepted in general terms as contended for by the appellants, it is difficult to see how it would, in any way, help the appellants case, as the donee in this case was not the ancestor of the defendants but the temple or the god. The result of that doctrine, which, no doubt, is a sound rule of construction, if properly applied, would give the surplus income to the temple and not to the defendants. This rule of interpretation is discussed by Lord Cairns in Attorney-General v. Wax Chandilers' Co.(2). The learned Lord says: “It appears to me that the difficulty is much more apparent than real………Cases of that kind are not cases of condition at all, they are cases where the beneficial interest in the land is portioned out among various objects.” Here the intention of the donor apparently was that the entire income was to be devoted to the use of the god. The donor did not contemplate, having regard to the actual income at the time, that any surplus would be left. If any surplus is left, as is now the case, that must, according to the general rule applicable in such circumstances, be applied for the benefit of the temple.

    5. As regards the two items Nos. 5 and 12 which the Subordinate Judge found were the hereditary inams of defendants' family burdened with the performance of archaka service, Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar, who objects to the finding of the Subordinate Judge with respect to them in his memorandum of objections, conceded before us that the finding in respect of item No. 5 could not be successfully attacked. As for item No. 12, no doubt the language used is somewhat different from that with respect to the items Nos. 6, 2, 4 and 8. The Subordinate Judge has held with reference to item No. 12 that it is an anchaka service inam. But his construction was not sought to be upheld, and very rightly, by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar. The deed of gift with respect to this land, Exhibit 12, is in these terms: “Deed of gift in favour of Mathevi Vydya Padmanabhacharlu (an ancestor of the defendants) for the daily naivadyam and deeparadamai of Sri Swamivaru, Buchupeta.” In Cheknama also, Exhibit 12(c), the land is described as being given in favour of “Akilandakodi Brahmanandanayaka Sri Swamivaru of Buchupeta, that is, the god installed in the temple for daily naivedyam and deeparadanai.” In the Inam Register Exhibit 12(b) the land is described as Devadayam. These documents show that this is a gift for the performance of the worship of the deity and that the ancestors of the defendants were holding this land for the performance of that worship; while with respect to item No. 5 (Cherukumithi village) that is granted expressly to the defendants' ancestor for rendering archaka service to the god. There is a striking difference in the language used in Exhibit II, a sanad of 1776, with reference to item No. 5 (Cherukumadi) and the remaining items, Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8. As regards item No. 5 the document says that the produce of the lands was granted for archakas service and that the archakas will cultivate the land and enjoy the produce, whereas in the cases of the other items the words are: “He (the archaka) will enjoy the produce of the lands for ever by rendering to the Sri Swamivaru daily naivadyam and deeparadanai service”. This also appears to support the construction which we have placed on the sanuds in the earlier portion of our judgment. We do not think that there is really any substantial distinction between the grant of item No. 12 and of items Nos. 6, 2, 4 and 8. There is no suggestion in Exhibit 12 that the donor contmeplated that if any surplus was left it should go to the person who had to look after the service. So far as item No. 12 is concerned, the memorandum of objections must be allowed and it must be treated on the same footing as items Nos. 6, 2, 4 and 8.

    6. The next question which remains to be considered relates to the removal of the defendants from their office. As already stated, they are the hereditary trustees and archakas of the temple. The Sub-Judge has directed their removal mainly on two grounds, the first of which is that, in his opinion, it is not desirable that the office of archaka should be combined with that of the trustee. No doubt generally speaking, this would be so, for in such cases, there would be no authority to supervise the work of the archukas. At the same time, there are temples in this Presidency where the office of trustee is combined with that of archaka; and it is possible to appoint a committee or some other authority to supervise the management. The other ground given by the learned Subordinate Judge for removing the defendants is that they have all along denied the title of the temple to a large portion at least of the income of the properties and that they have appropriated the income after defraying the necessary expenses of daily worship. On this point it is possible, though we do not express any definite opinion in this connection, that the defendants might have acted in good faith, for apparently the defendants' ancestors also have been acting in this way for a very long time and it would be more satisfactory if the Subordinate Judge were to enquire into all the charges made against the defendants and come to a conclusion on this question upon the result of such investigation. We, therefore, do not decide the question of the removal of the defendants and leave it to the Subordinate Judge to decide it after proper investigation.

    7. As regards the accounts of the previous management the Subordinate Judge, in the circumstances, did not think it necessary to call upon the defendants to render an account of their past management. But it will be open to him to investigate such accounts, in as far as it may be necessary in coming to a conclusion upon the question as to whether the defendants should be retained in the office of trustees and, if so, under what conditions. In these circumstances, we will remit the case to the lower Court for further enquiry and for the framing of a proper scheme. The Subordinate Judge will dispose of the costs of this appeal and the memorandum of objections.

    8. Case remanded.

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    (Mutteyi) Srinivasacharyulu v. Dinavahi Pratyanga Rao
    (Feb 27, 1920)