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    (Vadlamaneti) Srinivasa Dikshatulu v. (Vadlamaneti) Venkatramiah Pantulu

    JUDGMENT

    1. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted to enforce a mortgage bond executed in 1892 by defendants 1 and 3 in favour of plaintiffs 1 and 3 and defendant 12, who are brothers. The question for decision in this appeal arises out of the plaintiffs' allegation that defendant 12 was no longer entitled to any portion of the amount due under the bond, inasmuch as subsequent to the execution of the bond the plaintiffs became exclusively entitled to it under a partition between the parties. It is admitted that the three brothers became divided in status after the execution of the bond and that some of the family properties have in fact been divided between them. The contest relates to the question whether the bond in question has fallen to the share of the plaintiffs alone or still remains the joint property of all the brothers. The history of the proceedings, between the parties for partition of the family properties is clearly set forth in paras. 4 to 6 of the judgment of the lower Court. The parties resorted to arbitration for effecting a division between them. One Venkatramiah made an oral award in 1893 and afterwards reduced it to writing in 1895, declaring that the three brothers were entitled to equal shares in the family properties, but he did not effect an actual division of the properties. The written award passed into a decree of Court (Ex. E) in Original Suit No. 15 of 1896 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Masulipatam. By the decree certain properties were specifically allotted to the parties and the other properties were directed to be equally divided between them. Various applications were made by the parties for the appointment of a commissioner, and it is the manner in which some of these applications were made by them and dealt with by the Court that has given rise to the present controversy. But it is quite clear from the proceedings that the bond in question was allotted by the commissioner (Ex. G) to plaintiffs 1 and 3 exclusively so early as 1897 and that the allotment was approved, after hearing defendant 12's objections (Exs. R, and R1), both by the Subordinate Judge (Ex. Cl) and by the High Court (Ex. H), though another allotment made by the commissioner was not approved. The allotment of the bond to the plaintiffs was actually accepted by defendant 12, for he sought to attach their rights under the bond for the satisfaction of a portion of his claim under the decree against them. There is no doubt that all the brothers, seem to have felt subsequently that the allotments made by the commissioner were inconvenient and attempts were made by them both to have a fresh reference to arbitration and to have fresh commissioners appointed for making a re-allotment. The applications Ex. 6 in 1902 and Ex. 12 in 1904, were made by them all together for reference to a fresh arbitration and the Court actually complied with their request without noticing that final orders had been already passed approving of the allotment made of various properties. In 1909, when plaintiff 1 applied for execution of a portion of the decree by the appointment of a fresh commissioner, the District Judge refused to do so holding that the report of the former commissioner had already been confirmed by the Subordinate Judge and by the High Court (Ex. N), and the Judge's order was confirmed by this Court in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 96 of 1909.

    2. Defendant 12 now seeks to get behind the order allotting the bond in question to the plaintiffs on two grounds: firstly, he contends that no decree having been passed by the Court in accordance with the report of the Commissioner, as required by Section 396 of the CPC of 1882, the allotment did not become final; and secondly, that the subsequent conduct of the parties had the result of nullifying the allotment.

    3. Both the contentions are untenable. Assuming that it was the duty of the Court to pass a final decree, embodying the result of the allotments made by the commissioner, that fact cannot deprive the orders made by the Court of their validity and conulusiveness. It is immaterial for this purpose whether these orders should be treated as interlocutory, orders passed in the course of the suit, which are required to be followed by a final decree, embodying the allotments made between the parties, as contended by the appellant, or as orders in proceedings in execution of the decree, passed on the award, which should be treated as the final decree in the suit as contended by the respondents. In either case the orders were binding on the parties and each of them became entitled to the allotments which were made by the Court. The cases cited for the appellant, Abdus Samad Khan v. Abdur Razzag Khan(1), Shah Muhammad Khan v. Hanwani Singh(2), Sari Raghunath v. Krishnai Anant Joshi(3) and Mt. Indro Kooer v. Sheik Abdul Barkat(4), really do not touch the point for decision. The question whether a fresh decree should have been passed by the Court would be material, if the matter for determination were as to the mode of carrying out the decree already passed or whether the enforcement of the decree is barred by limitation. But there can be no doubt that all orders passed by the Court are binding on the parties, whatever may be the character of the decree passed, and apart from the question whether a fresh decree should be passed or not.

    4. There is no substance in the second contention that the mere attempt of all parties to have a fresh distribution of the properties, instead of the allotment already made, or any objections raised by them to that allotment would nullify it. If the parties entered into a new final arrangement, in substitution of the previous allotment made by the Court, such arrangement would, no doubt be enforceable in law. But the attempt to do so failed in this case. It would no doubt, also be open to the parties to agree that they should again hold jointly any property allotted to one or more of them by the Court. But it is impossible to hold that Ex. 6 or Ex. 12 evidences such an agreement. Those documents merely show that they wished to replace the allotment already made by a fresh one but do not show that any of them gave up the benefit of the previous distribution unless and until a new arrangement was made. Moreover mere repudiation by any of the parties of the allotment already confirmed by the Court would not be sufficient to extinguish the rights created by the Court's order. In the case of mere contracts, specially where the rights and obligations of both parties are in futuro, a repudiation of the contract by one party assented to by the other might be sufficient to put an end to the contract: see Sarish Chandra Roy v. Banomali Roy(5), but this principle is not applicable to rights of property. See the judgment of this Court in Ganga Varapu Krishna Venamma v. Naraparaju Venkata Mukanda Row(6) Ramsahai Singh v. Dahunookdari Singh(7) and Bishnu Kumar Roy v. Maharaj Joy Hurish Chander Deb Roy(8).

    5. We must therefore hold that defendant 12's contention, that he is entitled to a share of the bond, was rightly overruled by the lower Court. We dismiss the appeal with the costs of respondents 1 and 3 and 14 to 16, two sets. The time for redemption is extended up to 31st August 1913.

    S.N/R.K

    6. Appeal dismissed.

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    (Vadlamaneti) Srinivasa Dikshatulu v. (Vadlamaneti) Venkatramiah Pantulu
    (Apr 23, 1913)