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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arose from litigation concerning the Vedanta Desikar shrine at Srivilliputhur and whether that shrine is an adjunct of the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple. A prior adjudication in Original Suit No. 2 of 1896 (Subordinate Judge's Court, Tinnevelly) had established that the right to the Adhyapakam office in the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple and its attached shrines was vested in the Thengalai and other Thirtakars, and that the Vadagalais (other than the Thirtakars) possessed no interest in the office. The prior suit's plaintiffs had acted on behalf of the Thengalais, while the defendants in that suit had represented the Vadagalais by a Court notification under Section 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In the present suit the plaintiffs are members of the Vadagalai community of Srivilliputhur and claim hereditary trusteeship and management rights in respect of the Vedanta Desikar shrine, including the Adhyapakam office. The question whether the Vedanta Desikar shrine is attached to the Nachiar temple was contested; execution proceedings in the earlier suit treated the shrine as attached, but the Court noted that the present plaintiffs were not impleaded as actual defendants in the prior suit and thus could not be proceeded against in execution for disobedience of that injunction.

The High Court reserved judgment to consider (a) the binding effect of the 1896 adjudication on the present claim, and (b) an argument (by Mr. P.R. Sundara Aiyar) that, even if the shrine were attached, the plaintiffs in their capacity as trustees could impeach the earlier judgment as res inter alias acta. The High Court directed the Subordinate Judge to inquire into specified issues, accepted the Subordinate Judge's findings that the Vedanta Desikar shrine was an independent institution, reversed the Subordinate Judge's earlier decree, and ultimately declared the plaintiffs to be Dharmakartas entitled to manage the Vedanta Desikar temple and to hold the Adhyapakam office to the exclusion of the defendants, with injunctions restraining interference and an award of costs to the plaintiffs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs are the hereditary trustees entitled to the management of the Vedanta Desikar shrine.
  2. Whether the Vedanta Desikar shrine is one of the shrines attached to the Nachiyar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs are disentitled to a declaration of their alleged right as trustees with reference to the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
  4. Whether, if the shrine is an adjunct of the main temple, the prior adjudication in O.S. No. 2 of 1896 (which held the Adhyapakam office vested in Thengalais) is binding on the present plaintiffs (including the question whether they are concluded by that judgment or may challenge it in their character as trustees — the contention framed as res inter alias acta).
  5. Whether the plaintiffs or the defendants are the holders of the Adhyapakam office in the Vedanta Desikar temple, and if the defendants are entitled, further questions identified as the 7th and 8th issues in the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Argument advanced by Mr. P.R. Sundara Aiyar (on behalf of the plaintiffs)

  • Even if the Vedanta Desikar shrine were subordinate/attached to the Nachiar temple, the earlier finding that the Adhyapakam miras belonged exclusively to the Thengalais was rendered with reference to the plaintiffs' special capacity as trustees (res inter alias acta), and therefore it should be open to the plaintiffs, in their trustee capacity, to prove that the rightful holders of the office are the Vadagalais and to obtain relief (including restraining Thengalais from interfering and ensuring the Vadagalais perform the office duties).

Contentions / Evidence relied on by the defendants (Thengalai side)

  • The Thengalai defendants contended that the Vedanta Desikar shrine is a shrine attached to the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple (which, if accepted, could make the prior adjudication relevant).
  • The defendants' principal evidential support was the payment of paditaram from the Nachiar temple funds to the Vedanta Desikar shrine; the opinion notes this as the defendants' strongest evidence but records that it is not conclusive.

Claims made by the plaintiffs in the substantive suit

  • The plaintiffs asserted that the Vedanta Desikar shrine is an independent institution, that from early 19th century their predecessors and themselves have managed its affairs, that they are Dharmakartas (trustees) and hereditary holders of the Adhyapakam office, and that their rights have not been interfered with by the Nachiar temple trustees.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sadagopa Chart v. Krishnama Chari (1889) I.L.R. 12 M. 356 Principle that persons not impleaded as actual defendants in a suit are not liable to execution for alleged disobedience of an injunction in that suit. Used to hold that the execution finding in the earlier suit could not be treated as res judicata against the present plaintiffs because they had not been impleaded as actual defendants and therefore could not be proceeded against in execution.
Candee v. Lord, 51 Am. Dec. 294; 2 N.Y. 269 Illustrative authority for the exception to the general rule that judgments in personam bind only parties and privies: a judgment is conclusive evidence in a creditor's suit as against other creditors of the plaintiff's status and amount, unless impeached for fraud or collusion. Relied upon to explain and apply the exception (res inter alias acta / estoppel against third persons) — the Court used the reasoning to support the conclusion that, absent fraud, a judgment affecting the title to property can be conclusive against others who claim through the party concluded by the judgment.
Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar (1903) I.L.R. 27 M. 243 (Full Bench) Applied the principle that a decree against a father may create a debt binding on his sons under Hindu law, resting on the same principle that a judgment can be conclusive as to certain relations and obligations. Noted by the Court as appearing to rest on the principle set out in the Candee reasoning; cited in support of the general doctrine that certain adjudications operate conclusively on related persons absent fraud.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by stages:

  1. It first examined the effect of the earlier adjudication (O.S. No. 2 of 1896) which had declared that the Adhyapakam office in the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple and attached shrines belonged to the Thengalais and that Vadagalais (other than Thirtakars) had no interest. The Court observed that the prior suit's parties had represented the relevant communities (Thengalais as plaintiffs and Vadagalais as defendants by court notification under Section 30 CPC), and that the present plaintiffs are members of the Vadagalai community; accordingly, if the Vedanta Desikar shrine were an attachment to the Nachiar temple, the earlier adjudication would prima facie bind the present plaintiffs.
  2. The Court noted a limitation: execution proceedings in the prior suit had treated the Vedanta Desikar shrine as attached, but those execution findings were made in the context of enforcing an injunction against particular defendants. Because the present plaintiffs had not been impleaded as actual defendants in the prior suit, they could not be bound by execution proceedings for alleged disobedience — so that execution findings were not res judicata as to persons not impleaded (citing Sadagopa Chart v. Krishnama Chari).
  3. The Court then addressed the key argument (advanced by Mr. P.R. Sundara Aiyar) that, even if the shrine were attached, the judgment in the earlier suit was res inter alias acta (i.e., in effect conclusive only as between parties and not as against trustees or third parties) and that the plaintiffs, in their trustee capacity, could relitigate or establish a contrary right. The Court evaluated that contention against the doctrine set out in Bigelow on Estoppel and the Candee v. Lord reasoning: judgments (without fraud or collusion) may operate as conclusive evidence against third persons in certain relationships, particularly where rights claimed by third persons depend on the title or estate of those concluded by the judgment.
  4. The Court explained the policy basis of that exception (quoting Gardiner J.'s reasoning in Candee): where a judgment establishes a relation to property (e.g., creditor-debtor), other claimants whose rights are derived through the party concluded by that judgment are estopped from relitigating that relation except on proof of fraud or collusion. Applying that reasoning to the present facts, the Court held that the right of a trustee to require observance of institutional usage in respect of an hereditary office (which stands on par with immovable property interests) is dependent upon and subordinate to the right of the exclusive mirasi holders; therefore an adjudication obtained against those mirasi holders would, absent fraud, be binding on a trustee who claims only through or in relation to those mirasi holders.
  5. Consequently, the Court concluded that, on the special facts alleged by the plaintiffs (that the Adhyapakam office was exclusively vested in the Vadagalais hereditarily), the previous adjudication in favour of the Thengalais would bind the plaintiffs unless the prior decision were impeached for fraud. The Court therefore rejected Mr. Sundara Aiyar's contention that the plaintiffs, in their capacity as trustees, could avoid the effect of the earlier adjudication.
  6. Notwithstanding that reasoning, the Court directed trial of factual issues to determine (1) whether the plaintiffs are hereditary trustees of the Vedanta Desikar shrine, (2) whether the shrine is attached to the Nachiar temple, and (3) whether the plaintiffs are disentitled under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The Subordinate Judge found the shrine to be an independent institution and in favour of the plaintiffs on the relevant issues. The High Court accepted those findings, reversed the Subordinate Judge's earlier decree (the one under appeal), and declared that the Vedanta Desikar temple and specified property were not attached to the Nachiar temple and that the plaintiffs' rights were not affected by the 1896 decree or its execution proceedings.
  7. Because not all questions were finally adjudicated on the record, the Court ordered further inquiry on whether the plaintiffs are holders of the Adhyapakam office to the exclusion of the defendants. The Subordinate Judge later found that the plaintiffs were affirmative holders and that the defendants were not entitled; the High Court accepted those findings and issued final declarations, injunctions and costs in favour of the plaintiffs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court declared that the Vedanta Desikar temple and the property in the plaint schedule are not attached to the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple within the meaning of the decree in Original Suit No. 2 of 1896; the plaintiffs are Dharmakartas (trustees) of the Vedanta Desikar temple and are entitled to manage it and its property independently; the plaintiffs are the holders of the Adhyapakam office in the Vedanta Desikar temple to the exclusion of the defendants; and injunctions were granted restraining the trustees of the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple from interfering with the plaintiffs in management and the performance of the Adhyapakam duties. The plaintiffs' costs throughout were awarded against the contesting defendants.

Implications (direct effects):

  • The immediate legal effect is that the plaintiffs maintain exclusive management and control over the Vedanta Desikar temple and its property, free from interference by the trustees of the neighbouring Nachiar temple.
  • The plaintiffs are entitled to perform and to restrain interference with performance of the duties of the Adhyapakam office in the Vedanta Desikar temple; the defendants are restrained from interfering in management and in performance of those duties on the occasions specified in the judgment.
  • The Court applied established principles about the binding effect of judgments and the narrow exception (estoppel against third persons) when rights of third parties depend upon the title of those concluded by a prior judgment; the decision turned on the specific factual findings (notably that the Vedanta Desikar shrine is independent) and on the absence of any charge of fraud in the earlier adjudication. The opinion does not purport to create a novel precedent beyond applying those established doctrines to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is confined to the matters expressly set out in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that opinion.

Show full summary ...

    Srinivasa Aiyangar And Ors. v. Srinivasa Aiyengar And Ors.

    1. Judgment in this case was reserved as we wished to consider, in connection with an argument of Mr. P.R. Sundara Aiyar, to be noticed presently, the true effect, with reference to the present claim, of the adjudication in O.S. No. 2 of 1896 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Tinnevelly, where it was established that the right to the Adhyapakam office in the temple of Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar in Srivilliputhur as well as in all the shrines attached thereto was vested in the Thengalai and other Thirtakars, residents of that place, as found in the decree and judgment, and that the Vadagalais other than the Thirtakars possessed no interest whatsoever in the office. As was intimated by us in the course of the argument, t here can be no doubt that in that litigation the then plaintiffs acted on behalf of all the Thengalais, while the then defendants respresented the Vadagalais of the place, having been duly constituted so to represent by the notification issued by the Court under Section 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the present plaintiffs belong to the community of Vadagalais of Srivilliputhur, the previous adjudication cleary binds them as mere Vadagalais, if the Vedanta Desikar shrine be, as contended on behalf of the Thengalai defendants in the present suit, a shrine attached to the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple.

    2. No doubt, in the execution proceedings taken in that suit, it was held that the shrine in question was one so attached. The execution was, however, with reference to the enforcerment of the order restraining the then actual defendants from interfering with the discharge of the duties of the Adhyapakam office. The present plaintiffs, not having been impleaded in the previous suit as defendants actually, were not liable to be proceeded against in execution for any alleged disobedience of the injunction granted therein-Sadagopa Chart v. Krishnama Chari (1889) I.L.R. 12M. 356. Consequently the finding in the execution proceedings as regards the question whether the Vedanta Desikar shrine was appurtenant to the main temple or an independent institution, is not res judicata, and that question would have to be tried in the present suit regarding the plaintiffs as "mere members of the Vadagalai community and a fortiori if, as the plaintiffs allege, the right of management of the shrine belongs to them.

    3. Before, however, passing orders as to the trial of the point, we proceed to deal with the argument of Mr. Sundara Aiyar referred to, viz., that even on the assumption that the shrine in question is subordinate and attached to the big temple, the finding that the Adhyapakam miras belongs exclusively to the Thengalais, and the Vadagalai Thirtakars, is with reference to the plaintiffs' special capacity as trustees of the shrine, res inter alias acts and therefore it is open to them to prove that the rightful holders of the office are not the Thengala is but the Vadagalais, to restrain the former from interfering with the office and to ensure the observance of the usage of the institution by executing the duties of the office from the Vadagalais. Though the decision of the question thus raised is not altogether free from difficulty, we are of opinion that the contention ought not to prevail, as the office of Adhayapakam in the shrine belongs, according to the plaintiffs, exclusively to the Vadagalais of Srivilliputhur and is vested in them and their descendants hereditarily, and as between that community and the Thengalais of the place the adjudication in favour of the latter in the litigation of 1896 is as already stated, absolutely binding. The case, with reference to these special facts, must be held to be governed by the rule stated in Bigelow on Estoppel as an exception to the general doctrine that judgments in personam bind only parties and privies, according to which exception the relation established between parties by such judgments is conclusive against third persons in the absence of fraud upon them. (5th Edition, p. 150). A clear instance of this exception is furnished by Candee v. Lord 51 Am. Dec. 294 ; 2 N.Y. 269, followed in other cases, where it was held by the Supreme Court of New York that a judgment is conclusive evidence in a creditor's suit founded on it, as against the other creditors of the debtor that the plaintiff is a creditor and to the amount awarded him by the judgment, unless it is impeached for fraud or collusion. In the absence of any precedents, Indian or English, elucidating this point, the reasoning of Gardiner J. who delivered the judgment may usefully be set forth. He observed :-"A debtor may be said to sustain two distinct relations to his property, that of owner and quasi trustee for his creditors. As owner he may contract debts to be satisfied out of his property, confess judgments, create liens upon it, sell or give it to others at pleasure and, so far as he is personally concerned, will be bound by his own acts. But the law lays upon him an obligation to pay his debts and holds him, in behalf of his creditors, to the exercise of good faith in all transactions relating to the fund upon which they must depend for payment. He can, therefore, neither create a debt nor do any of the things above mentioned mala fide to their prejudice. The common law, of which the English Statute and our own is but the exposition, declares that every such debt, judgment or assurance contracted or given with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors is as against them to be void. And equity in many cases holds the debtor and his confederates in the fraud as trustees for the parties aggrieved. The rights of creditors to the property of the debtor are to be worked out through the different relations to which I have alluded. In creating debts or establishing the relation of creditor and debtor, the debtor is accountable to no one unless he acts mala fide. A judgment therefore obtained against the latter without collusion is conclusive evidence of the relation of debtor and creditor against others : (1) because it is conclusive between the parties to the record who in the given case have the exclusive right to establish it ; and (2) because the claims of other creditors upon the debtor's property are through him and subject to all previous liens, preferences or conveyances made by him in good faith. Any deed, judgment or assurance of the debtor, so far at least as they conclude him, must estop his creditors and all others. Consequently neither a creditor nor stranger can interfere in the bona fide litigation of the debtor or retry his cause for him or question the effect of the judgment as a legal claim upon his estate. A creditor's right, in a word, does not arise until the latter has violated the tacit condition annexed to the debt, that he has done and will do nothing to defraud his creditors.

    4. Where, however, fraud is established, the creditor' does not claim through the debtor but adversely to him and by a title paramount which over-reaches and annuls the fraudulent conveyance or judgment by which the latter himself would be estopped. It follows, from the principles suggested, that a judgment obtained without fraud or collusion and which concludes the debtor, whether rendered upon default, confession, or after contestation is, upon all questions affecting the title to his property, conclusive evidence against creditors to establish first the relation of creditor and debtor between the parties to the record ; and, second, the amount of the indebted-"ness" (51 Am. Dec. at pp. 295, 296.)

    5. The Full Bench ruling in Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar (1903) I.L.R. 27 M. 243 that, independently of the original transaction, the decree against a father creates by its own force a debt against him which his sons according to Hindu Law are bound to pay, unless it is illegal or immoral, would seem to rest on the principle enunciated in the passage quoted above.

    6. Turning to the present case, it is clear that the right of the trustee to require compliance with the usage of the institution in regard to the Adhayapakam office, which office, by virtue of its hereditary character stands, according to the law of this country, on a par with interests in immoveable property, is necessarily linked with, dependent upon and subordinate to the right of the exclusive mirasi holders of the office-dependent and subordinate because it is by them and by them only that he can get the functions of the office performed. It follows that an adjudication obtained against them would be as binding on him as it is on them in the absence of fraud or collusion. A different view would be to uphold a contrariety of conclusions leading to a deadlock, that is to say, on the one hand the Thengalais are entitled to exclude every Vadagalai interfering with their exercising the functions of the office in the shrine by virtue of the former decision, and yet, on the other hand, the trustee thereof is entitled to insist on the Vadagalais performing them. It would, therefore, seem to be the better opinion that the trustee is also concluded by the judgment which declared that the body of people put forward by him as entitled to the office were not so entitled. It is scarcely necessary to say that there was nothing to prevent the present plaintiffs in their alleged character of trustees making themselves parties to the former suit and resisting the claim of the Thengalais as best they could and if possible preventing an adjudication in their favour. The omission to do so could not properly be held to give them the right to get rid of the effect of a decision against those very parties in whose right in truth the plaintiffs are now endeavouring to deny the title of the successful party. As the previous adjudication has not been impeached on the ground of fraud, the contention under consideration must be held to fail and it will not be open to the plaintiffs to question the title of the, Thengalais to the office of Adhyapakam in the Vedanta Desikar shrine, if that is found to be an adjunct of the main temple.

    7. The Subordinate judge is called upon to submit within three months from this date findings on the following points :-

    (1) Whether the plaintiffs are the hereditary trustees entitled to the management of the Vedanta Desikar shrine:

    (2) Whether the said shrine is, or is not, one of the shrines attached to the Nachiyar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple : and (3) Whether the plaintiffs are disentitled to a declaration of their alleged right as trusees with reference to the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.

    8. We direct that the trustees of Nachiyar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple be made defendants in the case. The trial of the issues should take place after these newly added defendants have had notice of their inclusion as parties and after they have had time to appear and file written statements. If necessary, further issues may be framed on their written statements.

    9. Fresh evidence may be received.

    10. Seven days will be allowed for filing objections.

    11. In compliance with the above order, the Subordinate Judge, Tinnevelly, submitted the following

    12. FINDINGS:-* * * That the Vadanta Desikar shrine is an independent institution and is not under the control of the Vishnu Committee and of the Nachiar Devasthanam trustees and is not attached to that Devasthanam He also found the 1st issue in plaintiff's favour

    13. As regards the 3rd issue he found that the plaintiffs were in full possession of all their rights in respect of this Desikar shrine and this issue therefore he found in their favour.

    14. This appeal coming on for hearing, after the return of the above finding, 16th, 17th and 18th March 1909 the Court delivered the following

    15. The Subordinate Judge has dealt very fully with the evidence on the issues sent down to him and we accept his findings.

    16. The plaintiffs have shown that from the early years of the 19th century their predecessors and themselves have managed the affairs of the Vedanta Desikar temple, and there is on the other side nothing to show that the trustees of the Nachiar temple have ever interfered with them.

    17. The strongest evidence in support of the defendants' case is the payment of paditaram from the Nachiar temple funds but that, as the Subordinate Judge shows, is not by any means conclusive. Exhibit XI-A shows that paditaram is paid by the Nachiar temple trustees to persons and institutions who are not shown to be in any way under their control. Apart from this evidence there is really nothing else to rebut the evidence on the side of the plaintiffs. The Subordinate judge shows that the admissions on which the defendants rely (sic) not amount to admissions that the temple is under the control of the Nachiar Kovil trustees and the circumstances in which those admissions were made indicate that they cannot be taken as conclusive. The fact that till recently the plaintiffs have not styled themselves Dharmakartas but only Archakas is of no value when the two offices, as occurs not infrequently in the case of small temples, are united in the same person or persons.

    18. The temple in question, though close to the gate of the Nachiar temple, is not within its walls, and the presumption to be drawn from its position is not strong. Against this evidence the plaintiffs bring evidence that before the formation of the Temple Committee under the Act of 1863 the Government treated their temple as a separate institution and that since that date they have rendered no accounts to the trustees of the neighbouring temple and have not acted in obedience to them or deferred to their authority.

    19. In this state of the evidence we must accept the findings and reverse the decree of the Subordinate Judge.

    20. In our decree, therefore, we shall have to declare that the Vedanta Desikar temple and the property in the plaint schedule are not attached to the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple within the meaning of the decree in Original Suit No. 2 of 1896 on the file of the Temporary Subordinate Judge's. Court, Tinnevelly, and the rights of the plaintiffs in respect of the Vedanta Desikar temple are not affected by that decree or the execution proceedings taken thereunder, and that the plaintiffs are Dharmakartas of the Vedanta Desikar temple and entitled to manage it and its property uncontrolled by the trustees of the Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple. And we shall have to add an injunction restraining the trustees of Nachiar and Vatapatra Sayanar temple from interference with the plaintiffs in their management of the temple.

    21. But in order to decide all the questions in the suit it will be necessary to ask the Subordinate Judge to record a finding on the issue whether the plaintiffs are holders of the Adhyapakam office in the temple of Vedanta Desikar to the exclusion of the defendants or whether the defendants are also entitled thereto, and if the defendants are found to be entitled to the Adhyapakam office, then a finding should be recorded on the 7th and 8th issues in the suit. Fresh evidence may be taken.

    22. The finding should be submitted in six weeks, and seven days will be allowed for filing objections.

    23. In compliance with the above order, the Subordinate Judge of Tinnevelly submitted the following.

    FINDING:-* * * I find the former part of the issue in the affirmative and the latter part in the negative.

    24. In view of the above finding, the remaining two issues need not be tried according to the order of remand of the High Court. But the evidence given by plaintiffs covers these two issues also and on it I shall find the 7th issue in the suit referred to above in the affirmative. On the 8th issue burden lies on defendants to prove the point but they have not adduced any evidence in support of it. On the contrary plaintiffs' witnesses swear that Adhyapakam is performed in the Vedauta Desikar temple in all the days in the year but not on the Adhyana festival days and on the annual Thiruuakshatram day only as contended by defendants. My finding on the 8th issue is in the negative.

    25. This Appeal coming on for final hearing after the return of the above finding, the Court delivered the following

    26. We cannot give any weight to the affidavit in support of an application for adjournment made before the Subordinate Judge and we accept the Subordinate Judge's findings on the evidence.

    27. In the result, the plaintiffs will have the declaration for which we have already provided as to their right to manage the temple and, in regard to the matter now in question, a. declaration that the plaintiff's are the holders of the Adhyapakam office in the Vedanta Desikar temple to the exclusion of the defendants and a further declaration, as set out in the 7th issue, that they and the Vadagalai Vaishnavite Brahmans are entitled to perform the recitations there set out on the occasions mentioned there and in prayer II of the plaint. They will also have an injunction as before provided in regard to the management of the temple, and an injunction prohibiting the defendants from interference with the plaintiffs in the performance of the duties of the Adhyapakam office and with them the Vadagalai Vaishnava Brahmans on the occasions in respect of which the declaration has been given under the 7th issue. The plaintiffs' costs throughout will be paid by the contesting defendants.

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    Comments

    Srinivasa Aiyangar And Ors. v. Srinivasa Aiyengar And Ors.
    (Feb 7, 1910)