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  • provisions of Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P.C.,
  • provisions of Order 41, Rule 25, Civil P.C.,
  • provisions of Order 43 Rule 1, Civil P.C.
  • provisions of Order 41, Rule 23
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P.C.,
  • provisions of Order 41, Rule 25, Civil P.C.,
  • provisions of Order 43 Rule 1, Civil P.C.
  • provisions of Order 41, Rule 23
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the defendant (tenant) against the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Bogra dated 30th May 1932, which had reversed the decision of the Munsiff of Bogra dated 31st March 1931.

The underlying suit was brought by the plaintiffs (landlords/respondents) for recovery of arrears of rent for the years 1333 to 1336 for two jamas: Rs. 39-14-2 and Rs. 3-12-0 (lump rental Rs. 45). The defendant pleaded that the landlord had dispossessed him of a portion of the holding and that rent should be suspended.

Both lower courts found that the land now in possession of a third person (Jahiruddin) had once been part of the defendant's tenancy, and that dispossession was by the landlord and was forcible (there was a regular fight and the landlord's gomastha was wounded). The Munsiff accepted the tenant's defence and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge remanded the suit to the trial Court for determination of what proportion of rent should be abated, holding that a proportionate abatement (not total suspension) was appropriate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Subordinate Judge's order remanding the suit was appealable to this Court in view of the differing provisions of Civil Procedure Code (issues raised regarding Order 41, Rule 23 and Rule 25 and the applicability of Order 43, Rule 1).
  2. When the rental is a lump (indivisible) rent and the tenant has been forcibly dispossessed by the landlord from part of the demised premises, whether the proper legal consequence is (a) total suspension of the entire rent until restoration to possession of the whole, or (b) a proportionate abatement of rent for the dispossessed portion.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Tenant / Defendant)

  • The remand order could not have been properly passed under Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P.C.; consequently, no appeal lies to this Court from the order of remand (preliminary objection).
  • On the substantive point, where the rent is a lump rental and the landlord has forcibly dispossessed the tenant from part of the demised premises, there should be a total suspension of rent until the tenant is restored to possession.
  • Relied on authorities (including Privy Council and several Calcutta decisions) interpreted to support total suspension in the case of lump rent and forcible dispossession.

Respondents' Arguments (Plaintiffs / Landlord)

  • The Subordinate Judge's approach was correct: instead of total suspension the proper remedy is a proportionate abatement of rent.
  • Relied on later decisions (notably Jogesh Chandra v. Emdad Meah 1932 P.C. 28) as modifying the doctrine of total suspension and supporting apportionment where appropriate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagat Hari Saha v. Medun Bardhan (1927 Cal 642) Held that remands of this sort should be treated under Order 41, Rule 25 (view taken by Page and Graham, JJ.). Cited in connection with the preliminary objection on appealability of the remand; the Court examined it and treated it as one of two decisions divergent from the consistent view of other Benches, ultimately overruling the preliminary objection and permitting the appeal under Order 43, Rule 1.
Basumati v. Taritbasini (1920 Cal 569) One of the earlier authorities considered in reviewing the scope of remand and appealability. Viewed as part of the body of authorities supporting the conclusion that an appeal to this Court is permissible under Order 43, Rule 1 where the appellate Court remands the suit for final determination by the trial Court.
Prasanna v. Baidyanath (1920 Cal 124) One of the authorities relied upon in the review of remand/appeal jurisprudence. Used to show a consistent Bench view contrary to Jagat Hari Saha; supported overruling the preliminary objection.
Kayem v. Bahadur Khan (1925 Cal 1258) Another authority relevant to remand/appeal procedure. Formed part of the body of decisions relied on to permit the appeal despite the provision cited by the appellant (Order 41, Rule 23).
Katyayani Debi v. Udoy Kumar Das (1925 P.C. 97) Privy Council: The doctrine of suspension of payment of rent applies where rent is a lump rent for the whole land treated as indivisible; it does not apply where rent is so much per acre or bigha. Cited as central authority on the doctrine of suspension of rent in lump-rent tenancies and relied upon to support the proposition that a lump rent gives rise to suspension of the whole rent when part of the land is not given in possession.
Mahim Chandra v. Karamali (1929 Cal 516) Single-judge decision (author of the present opinion sat singly) taking the view that total suspension of rent is appropriate in lump-rent forcible dispossession. Cited as one of the Calcutta decisions that adopted the total-suspension view; the Court notes it was challenged and an appeal under Section 15 (Letters Patent) was summarily dismissed.
Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra (1929 Cal 568) Reviewed English and Indian cases; held that where rent is an entire lump sum and tenant is not given occupation of the whole, the landlord has no right to the entire rent and the whole rent is suspended unless there is equity to apportionment. Treated as a principal Calcutta decision articulating reasons for total suspension; the present Court adopts and follows its reasoning.
Susil Kumar v. Rajani Kanta (1927 Cal 787) B.B. Ghose and Roy, JJ., expressed the view that the Privy Council's observations in Katyayani Debi were not authority for mandatory apportionment in every lump-rent dispossession case. Noted as taking a different view; the present Court treats B.B. Ghose's observations as obiter and contrasts them with the consensus favouring total suspension.
Sajjad Ahmad v. Trailakhya Nath (1928 Cal 479) Sir George Claus Rankin, C.J., laid down that the doctrine of suspension depends on the rent being an entire sum; if tenant not given occupation of whole, landlord cannot claim the entire rent unless entitled to apportionment. Cited (via Abhoya Charan) as stating the true rule underpinning suspension of rent in lump-rent tenancies; relied upon by the Court.
Krishna Chandra v. Surendra Nath (1932 Cal 385) Followed Abhoya Charan; held that where lessor forcibly enters part of the land the lessee is discharged from payment of whole rent until restored. Recorded as a subsequent decision adopting the total-suspension principle and supporting the appellant's position.
Gopanund Jha v. Govinda Persad (1869) 12 WR 109 Early English/Indian authority cited as marking the commencement of a consensus that forcible entry by lessor into part of the land discharges the lessee from paying the whole rent. Referred to as the starting point of the long-standing consensus relied on by the Court in favour of total suspension in cases of forcible dispossession by the landlord.
Jogesh Chandra v. Emdad Meah (1932 P.C. 28) Privy Council decision: related to a case where the landlord could not put the tenant into possession of part of the leased land because title to that part was paramount in third persons; led to apportionment in that factual context. Closely examined and distinguished: the Court held Jogesh Chandra concerned title-paramount eviction (not forcible dispossession by landlord) and therefore does not alter the rule that forcible dispossession by the landlord in a lump-rent tenancy leads to suspension of the whole rent.
Imambundi v. Kamaleswar (1894) 21 Cal 1005 Authority that where eviction is by title paramount (not by the landlord), there is equity to an apportionment and proportionate abatement of rent rather than suspension of the whole. Quoted in Jogesh Chandra and relied upon to show that Jogesh Chandra dealt with title-paramount eviction (a different category) and therefore is not an authority against total suspension where dispossession is by the landlord.
Sakhisona Dasi v. Pran Krishna Das (1933 Cal 566) Mukerji, J.: mere fact tenancy is governed by one lease is not decisive; must consider whether deprivation of one parcel necessarily interferes with enjoyment of others. The Court considered this decision but concluded it does not assist the respondents; the quoted observation was treated as going against the respondent's position in the present case.
Dhirendra Nath Roy v. Bhabatarini Debi (1929 Cal 395) Page, J. took the view that there should be total suspension in case of dispossession from part. Cited as an authority supportive of total suspension and as a precedent referred to by Mukerji, J. in Sakhisona Dasi.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in two main stages: (A) the procedural preliminary objection as to appealability of the remand order, and (B) the substantive rule governing suspension or abatement of rent in lump-rent tenancies where part of the demised premises has been taken from the tenant.

A. Procedural Point — Appealability of the Remand Order

A preliminary objection argued that the remand order could not have been made under Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P.C. (because the trial Court had not decided the suit on a preliminary point) and therefore no appeal lay to this Court. The appellant relied upon a decision (Jagat Hari Saha v. Medun Bardhan) treating such remands as made under Order 41, Rule 25.

The Court examined Jagat Hari Saha and other authorities (Basumati, Prasanna, Kayem) and concluded that Jagat Hari is one of two authorities taking a view divergent from several Benches of the Court. The Court held that even if Order 41, Rule 23 might not strictly apply in every remand case, an appeal to this Court is permissible under Order 43, Rule 1 where the appellate Court remands the suit to the first Court to determine the suit finally. On that basis the preliminary objection was overruled and the appeal was heard on the merits.

B. Substantive Point — Suspension vs. Apportionment of Lump Rent

The principal question was whether, in a lump-rental tenancy, forcible dispossession by the landlord of part of the demised premises (here about one-tenth of the demised area) entitles the tenant to total suspension of rent or only to a proportionate abatement.

The Court reviewed authorities starting with the Privy Council decision in Katyayani Debi v. Udoy Kumar Das (1925 P.C. 97), which stated the doctrine of suspension applies where the rent is a lump rent treated as an indivisible subject, and does not apply where rent is per acre or bigha. The Court then surveyed a number of Calcutta decisions (including Mahim Chandra, Abhoya Charan, Susil Kumar, Sajjad Ahmad, Krishna Chandra) and English/earlier authorities (including Gopanund Jha).

The Court identified a consistent line of authority — commencing nearly from Gopanund Jha — that where the lessor forcibly enters into part of the land, the lessee is discharged from payment of the whole rent until he is restored to possession of the whole. The reasoning (as articulated notably in Abhoya Charan and by Sir George Claus Rankin, C.J., in Sajjad Ahmad) is that the doctrine depends on the rent being an entire sum; if the tenant is not given occupation of the whole, the landlord has no right to the entire rent unless there is some equity to an apportionment.

The Subordinate Judge had relied on a more recent Privy Council decision, Jogesh Chandra v. Emdad Meah (1932 P.C. 28), as suggesting the doctrine had been significantly modified toward apportionment. The Court examined Jogesh Chandra closely and distinguished it on its facts: Jogesh Chandra was a case where the landlord could not put the lessee in possession of part because title to that part was paramount in third persons (i.e., eviction by title paramount), not a case of forcible dispossession by the landlord after the tenant had been put in possession.

The Court noted that Jogesh Chandra relied on Imambundi v. Kamaleswar (1894) 21 Cal 1005 (a title-paramount case) to support proportionate abatement — and therefore, because the factual matrix differs, Jogesh Chandra does not govern cases of forcible dispossession by the landlord. Consequently, the Court concluded that the present case (a deliberate and forcible expulsion by the landlord of a tenant from part of the demised premises) falls squarely within the line of authority that entitles the tenant to suspension of the entire rent until restored to possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge are set aside and those of the Munsiff are restored, with costs in all Courts.

Implications:

  • The Court applied the established rule that in a lump-rent tenancy, forcible dispossession by the landlord of part of the demised premises entitles the tenant to entire suspension of rent until restoration to possession of the whole; proportionate abatement is not appropriate in such a case.
  • The Court distinguished Jogesh Chandra v. Emdad Meah (1932 P.C. 28) on factual grounds (title-paramount eviction vs. forcible dispossession by landlord) and held that Jogesh Chandra does not alter the rule applicable to forcible dispossession by a landlord.
  • The direct effect on the parties is the restoration of the Munsiff's dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit (i.e., tenant's successful defence), and costs awarded to the tenant in all Courts.
  • The Court's decision follows the existing consensus of prior authorities (as surveyed in the opinion) rather than announcing a novel principle; it reaffirms that forcible dispossession by the landlord in a lump-rent tenancy generally leads to suspension of the whole rent until restoration.

Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion's content has been added.

    Mahammad Ali Fakir v. Karam Ali Taluqdar

    1. This is an appeal by the defendant against the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Bogra dated 30th May 1932 reversing the decision of the Munsiff of Bogra dated 31st March 1931. The suit in which this appeal has arisen is a suit brought by the plaintiffs now respondents for recovery of arrears of rent for the years 1333 to 1336 for two jamas one of Rs. 39-14-2 and the other of Rs. 3-12-0. The defence to the suit was that the landlord had dispossessed the defendant of a portion of the holding and that the rent should be suspended. The tenancy being one indivisible with a lump rental of Rs. 45 both the Courts below have come to a concurrent conclusion that the land now in possession of one Jahiruddin was at one time a part of the defendant's tenancy and further that it was abundantly clear from the evidence that the dispossession was by the landlord and that the dispossession was a forcible dispossession seeing that there was a regular fight at the time of the dispossession and the gomastha of the landlord was wounded. The Subordinate Judge says that he agrees with the learned Munsif that the defendant was dispossessed in the year 1324 B.S. of a portion of the tenancy. The tenancy was originally admittedly of Rs. 45. A portion of the land was found to be a Diara land and for this portion a separate khatian was made and the rent of Rs. 3-12-0 was settled for this khatian under Section 104, Ben. Ten. Act. In respect of the other land there has been one khatian with a rent of Rs. 39-14-2. Both the Courts proceeded on the footing that the rent is a lump rent and not at so much per bigha. The Munsif gave effect to the defence of the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The Subordinate Judge on appeal was of opinion that no case had been made for suspension of the entire rent but that there should be a proportionate abatement; and for that purpose he remanded the suit to the trial Court for re-admitting it under its original number and for determining what rent should be abated for the land from which the defendant had been dispossessed and then passing a decree in accordance with the observations made in the judgment.

    2. Against this order of remand the present appeal has been brought by the tenant defendant. A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of this appeal on the ground that the order could not have been passed properly under the provisions of Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P.C., as the trial Court did not decide the suit on a preliminary point. Consequently no appeal from the order of remand lies to this Court. One decision has been cited which lays down that cases of this kind must be treated as cases in which a remand is made under the provisions of Order 41, Rule 25, Civil P.C., as if the appeal was being kept in the file of an appellate Court and the appellate Court was merely setting aside the findings of the first Court on a particular issue which had been sent down. There is no doubt a decision of Page and Graham, JJ., to that effect in Jagat Hari Saha v. Medun Bardhan 1927 Cal 642. We have examined that decision and we find that on a review of all other authorities, viz., Basumati v. Taritbasini 1920 Cal 569, Prasanna v. Baidyanath 1920 Cal 124 and Kayem v. Bahadur Khan 1925 Cal 1258 that decision is one of the two cases which takes a view different from the view taken consistently by the several Benches of this Court which have held that although the provisions of Order 41, Rule 23 might not strictly apply where, the Court of appeal has remanded the, suit to the first Court which has been asked to determine finally the suit by the order of remand, an appeal to this Court is permissible under the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1, Civil P.C. We therefore do not think that there is any substance in the preliminary objection which must be overruled.

    3. The real question in controversy before us is as to whether, when the rental is a lump rental as in the present case and the tenants have been dispossessed and forcibly dispossessed from a part of the demised premises-in this case about one-tenth of the demised area-there should be a total suspension of rent or a proportionate abatement. The appellant contends upon the authorities that there should be a total suspension. On the contrary the learned advocate for the respondents, supporting the judgment of the Subordinate Judge contend that there should be a proportionate abatement and not total suspension. The question as to whether in the case of a lump rental where there has been dispossession from a part of the demised premises there should be a total suspension of rent did come before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Katyayani Debi v. Udoy Kumar Das 1925 PC 97. Their Lordships observed thus:

    The doctrine of suspension of payment of rent, where the tenant has not been put in possession of part of the subject leased, has been applied where the rent was a lump rent for the whole land leased treated as an indivisible subject. It has no application to a case when the stipulated rent is so much per acre or bigha.

    4. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant in support of the contention that there should be a total suspension of rent not only on this decision, but on several decisions of this Court which has interpreted the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee to mean that in the case of lump rental where there is a dispossession of a part of the demised premises there should be a total suspension of rent until the tenant is restored to possession. To some of these decisions I was a party. Reference may be made to the case of Mahim Chandra v. Karamali 1929 Cal 516 which is a decision of mine sitting singly. In that decision the view contended for by the appellant was taken. There was an appeal in this case under Section 15, Letters Patent, from my decision and that appeal was dismissed by C.C. Ghose and Mallik, JJ., summarily. The next decision is that of Jack, J., and I was also a party to that decision. This is the decision in Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra 1929 Cal 568 where cases both of the English and Indian Courts from the very earliest times were reviewed and it was pointed out that all the earlier cases with the exception of a single case to which reference has been made in the judgment of the appellate Court in the present case took the view that in the case of a tenancy with lump rental where there has been dispossession by a landlord of tenant from a part of a demised premises there should not be a proportionate abatement of rent but the entire rent should be suspended. The reasons for this view are given with gratefulness in my decision in Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra 1929 Cal 568 and it is not necessary to reproduce these reasons here again. It is to be noticed that in Susil Kumar v. Rajani Kanta 1927 Cal 787 B.B. Ghose and Roy, JJ., expressed the opinion that the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Katyayani Debi v. Udoy Kumar Das 1925 P.C. 97 were no authority for the proposition that there should be any apportionment in every case of dispossession by the landlord of the tenant from a part of the demised premises where the rent was a lump rental. It was further pointed out in Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra 1929 Cal 568 that it is difficult to read the decision of the Judicial Committee in the same way as the learned Judges in Susil Kumar v. Rajani Kanta 1927 Cal 787 seem to have read it. The true rule is that which was laid down by the Sir George Claus Rankin, C.J., in Sajjad Ahmad v. Trailakhya Nath 1928 Cal 479 referred to in Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra 1929 Cal 568 that the doctrine of suspension of rent depends solely on this that the rent due is an entire sum in respect of the land demised. If therefore the tenant is not given occupation of the whole of the land demised, the landlord has no right to the entire rent, and unless he has a right or some equity to an apportionment, he can recover nothing on the contract. But the whole basis of the doctrine is that the rent due is one entire sum.

    5. That there is no difference between the English and the Indian law on the subject was pointed out in the earlier decisions of this Court to which reference has been made in my decision in Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra 1929 Cal 568. B.B. Ghose, J., took a different view. But the observations of the learned Judge in that case were of the nature of obiter dictum. Apparently the view taken in Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra 1929 Cal 568is the view contended by the appellant. The decision in Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra 1929 Cal 568 has been followed by Suhrawardy and Graham, JJ., in Krishna Chandra v. Surendra Nath 1932 Cal 385. The learned Judges agreeing with the view taken in Abhoya Charan v. Hem Chandra 1929 Cal 568 already referred to and dissenting from the view taken by B.B. Ghose, J., in Susil Kumar v. Rajani Kanta 1927 Cal 787 observed that it is not profitable to discuss the question whether in some cases total suspension should not be allowed and effort should be made to apportion rent, for the consensus of authorities commencing almost from Gopanund Jha v. Govinda Persad (1869) 12 WR 109 is that where the lessor enters forcibly into part of the land, the lessee is discharged from payment of the whole rent till he is restored to possession of the whole, because it is the duty of the lessor to protect and defend the lessee and not to disturb him in his possession. It may be that where the lessor commits an honest mistake about the extent of the property leased, including in it some portion over which he had no disposing power, or was the innocent cause of the dispossession of the lease by a third party from a portion of the lease-hold or otherwise acts bona fide, he is entitled to some relief.

    6. The case before us being a case of deliberate and forcible expulsion of a tenant from a part of the demised premises no question of equity to an apportionment can possibly arise, and the tenant is entitled to entire suspension of rent till he is restored to possession of the dispossessed portion.

    7. The Subordinate Judge however inclines to the view that a later decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Jogesh Chandra v. Emdad Meah 1932 PC 28 has modified considerably the doctrine of total suspension of rent in case of dispossession by landlord from a part of the tenancy with a lump rent. It becomes necessary therefore to examine closely and critically the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in this recent case. The facts, when examined, show that it was not a case of dispossession of the tenant by the landlord at all but it was a case of landlord not being able to put the, tenant in possession of a part of the tenancy, by reason of title paramount in a third person. Briefly stated the position was this: There was a tenancy of one Homer Ali under the appellant Jogesh Chandra Roy.

    8. In 1910 the appellant before their Lordships instituted a, suit for possession of Jote No. 83 against Hamer Ali's widow and the respondent before their Lordships Emdad Ali obtained a decree in his favour in 1912. He executed the decree in 1913. In 1916 the appellant brought a similar suit for possession of Jote No. 98 against not only the widow and the respondent before their Lordships, Emdad, but also against Hamer Ali's four daughters as well. In October 1917, this suit was compromised as between the appellant before their Lordships and Hamer Ali's widow and the respondent, the daughters being first excluded from the category of defendants on the petition of the appellant before their Lordships, Jogesh Chandra Roy a solenama was then executed by the appellant, the widow and the respondent under which out of the 20 drones odd of which the holding consisted, the widow and the respondent Emdad were to hold 11 drones odd under the appellant at a rent thereby fixed and the appellant Jogesh Chandra Boy was to get Khas possession of the balance of 8 drones odd. The respondent Emdad further agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,400 in respect of the appellant's costs and mesne profits by instalments and executed a mortgage therefor. It was a part of the settlement of that suit, which related to Suit No. 98, that the respondent Emdad should execute the kabuliyat. relative to Jote No. 83, dated 11th October 1917, which formed the basis of the suit in which the appeal before their Lordships had arisen. By that kabuliyat the respondent Emdad took a bekaemi or non-permanent settlement as a yearly tenant of 10 drones odd land out of 14 drones odd at a certain yearly rental. In January 1920, the respondent's sisters, that is the daughters of Hamer Ali brought a suit against Jogesh the landlord and Emdad for a declaration of their right and confirmation of their possession to the extent of their share as co-heirs of Hamer Ali in Jote Nos 83. That suit was ultimately decreed and it was held that the sisters' share which amounted to 9 as 4 gds. in Jote No. 83 was not affected by the previous decrees and sales.

    9. The result was that Jogesh the landlord had failed to put the respondent Emdad in possession of the entire subject which was the land covered by the kabuliyat of 11th October 1917. The Courts in India dismissed the suit of Jogesh Chandra Roy, but before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee a plea was taken for the first time that the suit should not have been dismissed in its entirety, but a decree for a proportionately abated rent should have been given it being taken into account that the respondent Emdad's sisters are entitled to 9 as. 4 p. share under the decree of 1928. This is not a case like the case before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee as the latter case was not a case of forcible dispossession by the landlord from a portion of the tenancy in which the tenant had already been put into possession. This case before their Lordships was a case where the landlord could not put the lessee in possession of a portion of the demised premises because the possession was not available to him by reason of the title to a certain share of the tenancy being not in the plaintiff landlord, but in some of the heirs of the original tenant, whose rights had not been extinguished by the sale by the landlord. The case we are considering is a very different case. The title of the landlord and his power to give possession to the tenant in the present case was undoubted. After granting a lease to the defendant in the present case the plaintiff put the defendant in possession and included a portion of the tenancy in a subsequent lease to one Jahiruddin and on the strength of that subsequent lease and with the assistance of the landlord Jahiruddin dispossessed the present defendant from a portion of the demised premises.

    10. The case before the Privy Council was a case when the landlord by reason of a paramount title to a portion of the demised premises in the original tenancy could not get possession of a certain share of the said premises and could not put the tenant with whom he had leased the Jote No. 83 in 11th October 1917, in possession of that share. This decision in our view does not affect the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Katyayani Debi v. Udoy Kumar Das 1925 P.C. 97 referred to above. A careful examination of the facts to which we have referred shows that the case of Jogesh Chandra v. Emdad Meah 1932 PC 28 relates to a very different state of facts and circumstances which cannot affect the previous decision in Katyayani's case. And we are strengthened in our conclusion by the following further examination of the case. In support of the contention that the landlord Jogesh Chandra Roy should have been given a decree for proportionate part of rent Mr. Pringle who was appearing for the landlord appellant before the Privy Council referred to Imambundi v. Kamaleswar (1894) 21 Cal 1005 which was a case of the landlord not putting the lessee in possession by reason of eviction by title paramount and Mr. Pringle's contention succeeded. In Imambundi v. Kamaleswar (1894) 21 Cal 1005 their Lordships make the following observations which will make it clear that they were not dealing with a case of dispossession by the landlord after the tenant was put into possession, but was dealing with a case where the tenant could not obtain possession by reason of the landlord being evicted by title paramount. Their Lordships say: As Imambundi did not prove that she entered into possession under the leases and was then dispossessed there was not an eviction in the proper sense of the word. But when Imambundi was alleged to bring a suit to obtain possession and succeeded in obtaining a part of what was granted in mokarari and was precluded by the result of the suit from having possession of a substantial and a longer part she was in a similar position to having been evicted from that part and there is same equity to an apportionment as in the case of eviction. Here the eviction was not by landlord, but by title paramount. In such a case there must be proportionate abatement. For as Foa points out in his Law of Landlord and Tenant, Edn. 6, p. 195, where the eviction by title paramount is only from a part of the demised premises the effect (unlike that in the case of eviction by lessor himself) is not to suspend the whole rent, but to render the tenant liable to have it apportioned. Jogesh Chandra v. Emdad Meah 1932 PC 28 cannot govern the case of forcible dispossession by the landlord where the tenant having been put into possession has been forcibly dispossessed from a part of demised premises after this. This Court almost unanimously with the single exception of the decision of B.B. Ghose, J., held in favour of the contention raised by the appellant.

    11. The result therefore is that this appeal must be allowed. The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge must be set aside and those of the Munsif restored with costs in all Courts. It remains to notice the case which has been cited on behalf of the respondents. This is a decision of my learned brother Mukerji, J., in Sakhisona Dasi v. Pran Krishna Das 1933 Cal 566 and requires serious consideration. The learned Judge observed this:

    My view is that the mere fact that the tenancy is governed by one lease and so in law may be regarded as one tenure is not enough; what has to be seen is whether, in fact, the parcels are such that deprivation from one necessarily interferes with the due enjoyment of the others.

    12. Previous to this remark the learned Judge referred to the decision of Page, J., in Dhirendra Nath Roy v. Bhabatarini Debi. 1929 Cal 395 which took the view that there should be total suspension in case of dispossession from part. Mookerji, J., refers to the following observation of Page, J.:

    Was it one indivisible tenancy and was there interference by the landlord with the due enjoyment of the previous or any part of them?

    13. I do not think however in order to decide the present case one need consider whether the tenancy consists of separate mouzas, that is properties rented separately or whether the tenancy in effect in law is indivisible or divisible. Towards the end of the judgment Mukherji, J., refers with approval to the following observation of Page, J., as he then was:

    It is not possible for the landlords to assert that any portion of the rent is payable in respect of any portion of the premises for in law every pice of rent is payable out of every portion of the premises demised.

    14. Applying this principle to the present case there is no question of the tenancy consisting of several parcels of land separately assessed to rent and consequently total suspension must be the result. We are therefore of opinion that this decision does not help the respondent. On the other hand the remark just quoted goes against him.

    Patterson, J.

    15. I agree.

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    Comments

    Mahammad Ali Fakir v. Karam Ali Taluqdar
    (Jun 27, 1934)