Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Sometime towards the end of January 1934 the plaintiff and the defendant contracted that the defendant would supply 905 bags of Saharanpur chapati atah to the plaintiff in February 1934 at Rs. 6-3 per bag. The defendant supplied only 151 bags, creating a deficit of 754 bags. The plaintiff sued in the Small Cause Court at Allahabad for damages for breach of contract. The defendant's defences were (1) lack of jurisdiction of the Allahabad Court, (2) denial of breach, and (3) that the damages claimed were excessive.

The Small Cause Court at Allahabad originally tried the suit on 26 November 1934 and awarded damages at Re. 1 per bag for 754 bags and overruled the jurisdictional objection. The defendant obtained a revision to this Court. A learned Judge of this Court remanded the case after correcting the subordinate Court on a question of law concerning the proper method of assessing damages when a market exists. On remand the Small Cause Court Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit on 30 September 1935, holding there was no evidence that the plaintiff had purchased substitute flour elsewhere and therefore the suit must be dismissed in accordance with the law as stated by this Court. The plaintiff filed the present application in revision against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Allahabad Courts had jurisdiction to try the suit despite a contractual provision or facts pointing to Saharanpur.
  2. What is the correct measure of damages for the seller's breach of a contract for the sale of goods when an available market exists: specifically, whether damages are the difference between market price and contract price, and whether the buyer must have actually purchased substitute goods to claim that measure.
  3. What is the proper date to determine market price for assessment of damages (i.e., the date of breach)?
  4. Whether any allowance or set-off should be made to the defendant for the plaintiff instituting the suit in Allahabad in breach of any forum agreement and the extra trouble/expense thereby caused.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff (Applicant) — summary of positions apparent in the opinion

  • The plaintiff sought damages for the defendant's failure to supply 754 bags as contracted.
  • The plaintiff maintained the right to recovery in the Allahabad Court and pursued an assessment of damages based on prevailing market rates (as argued in the litigation history).

Defendant (Opposite Party) — arguments as presented in the opinion

  • The Allahabad Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and the plaint should be returned for presentation in Saharanpur.
  • The earlier view of a learned Judge of this Court (inter partes) is binding on all points and should preclude a different result on jurisdiction or other questions.
  • The defendant also argued that the contract had been entered into at two places (canvasser at Allahabad and proprietor at Saharanpur) and relied on authority to contend the Allahabad Courts had no jurisdiction.
  • The defendant contended that, because the suit was brought at Allahabad in violation of the contract for forum, some allowance or set-off should be made for extra trouble and expense occasioned to the defendant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Achratlal Kesavlal Mehta & Co. v. Vijayam (1925 Mad 1145) Where two Courts would normally have jurisdiction, parties may agree between themselves that the suit should be brought in one of those Courts (i.e., forum agreement between parties is permissible). The Court cited this authority for the general proposition that parties may agree on forum; but distinguished the present procedural posture and declined to direct that the plaint be returned for presentation in Saharanpur, noting prior adjudication and merits having been tried below.
A. Milton & Co. v. Ojha Automobile Engineering Co. (1931 Cal 279) Same rule as above: parties may agree to bring suit in one of two competent Courts. Referred to support the principle that forum agreement between parties is valid; used in reasoning to refuse defendant's plea to return the plaint to Saharanpur.
Tilakram Chaudhari v. Kodumal Jethananad Wadha (1928 Bom 175) Same rule concerning parties' right to agree upon the forum when two Courts would otherwise have jurisdiction. Cited along with the other authorities to establish the general principle; the Court held the present case was different in circumstances of prior trial and remand and therefore refused to send the plaint away.
J. D. John v. Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. (1929 Mad 347) Authority referenced on questions of place of contract and consequent jurisdiction when acts occur at different places. The Court distinguished the facts of that case from the present facts and found no flaw in the subordinate Judge's reasoning that part of the cause of action arose at Allahabad; therefore J. D. John did not oust Allahabad jurisdiction here.
Erroll Mackey v. Kameshwar Singh (1932 P C 196) Where there is an available market at the date of breach, damages for breach of contract of sale of goods are based on the difference between the market price and the contract price; re-sale contract is immaterial because law presumes buyer can mitigate damage by purchasing in the market. The Court treated this Privy Council decision as the controlling principle on measure of damages. It applied that principle, reaffirmed its earlier statement consistent with the Privy Council, and used it to assess damages in the present case (by determining prevailing market price at the date of breach).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Jurisdiction:

The Court first addressed the repeated jurisdictional objection. It accepted the established principle (citing authorities) that where two Courts would normally have jurisdiction, parties may contract to bring suit in one of them. The Court observed that in the present case the subordinate Court had found that it had jurisdiction and had tried the merits on two occasions; the revisional Court had earlier declined to interfere on the jurisdictional question. Given that background and the inconvenience and hardship that would be entailed by sending the parties to another forum after merits had been tried, the Court refused to direct that the plaint be returned for presentation to Saharanpur. The alternate plea that Allahabad had no jurisdiction because the contract was entered into at two different places was considered and the Court distinguished the J. D. John authority on the facts, accepting the subordinate Judge's reasoning that part of the cause of action arose at Allahabad and that there was therefore jurisdiction.

Measure of Damages and Requirement to Purchase Substitute Goods:

The Court analysed the law on assessment of damages where a market is available. It accepted and relied on the Privy Council decision in Erroll Mackey v. Kameshwar Singh (1932 P C 196), reciting the principle that if a market exists at the date of breach, damages are in general the difference between the market price and contract price because the law presumes the buyer can mitigate loss by procuring substituted goods in the market. The Court explained that the earlier statement by a Judge of this Court was not intended to go beyond that Privy Council authority.

The Court addressed an apparent literal reading of the prior direction — that the plaintiff must have actually purchased substitute goods to recover the market difference — and rejected that literal rule. Instead, the Court held that the plaintiff need not literally have bought substitute goods; he may prove the prevailing market price at the relevant date and recover damages based on the difference between market price and contract price, provided the market was an available one and the buyer had an opportunity to mitigate. The Court identified the relevant date of breach as the time when the contract ought to have been but was not fulfilled — in this case around the beginning of March 1934 (contract to be fulfilled by end of February).

Application to the Evidence:

The Court reviewed the evidence: a letter dated 24 February 1934 (Ex. B) suggesting a Saharanpur market price of Rs. 6-9-0 per bag; defendant's evidence that flour prices rose in mid-March at Saharanpur; and plaintiff's evidence that about the end of February he bought flour at Allahabad at Rs. 6-10-0 per bag (though those purchases were pursuant to contracts made in January). On the totality of evidence the Court considered it reasonable to approximate that an available market price about the date of the breach would have been Rs. 6-8-0 per bag. Using that figure against the contract price of Rs. 6-3-0, the Court computed a loss of 5 annas per bag.

Allowance for Forum Irregularity:

The Court acknowledged the defendant's contention that bringing the suit in Allahabad contrary to any covenant to sue in Saharanpur had caused extra trouble and expense; it noted an earlier observation by Kendall, J., that defendant might claim set-off for extra trouble. The Court agreed some allowance was warranted and therefore reduced the award from 5 annas to 4 annas per bag.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Revision allowed; decree of the Court below set aside; plaintiff's suit decreed for Rs. 188.8-0 — calculated for 754 bags at the rate of 4 annas per bag.

Costs:

The plaintiff must pay his own costs in all Courts, and must pay to the defendant costs in all Courts in proportion to the amount to which his suit has been dismissed.

Implications:

The Court applied the established Privy Council principle that where an available market exists at the date of breach, damages are generally the difference between market price and contract price. The Court clarified that it did not intend to require as a strict rule that a buyer must have actually purchased substitute goods before recovering market-difference damages; instead, proof of prevailing market price at the relevant date may suffice. The opinion does not purport to lay down law contrary to earlier decisions of this Court or the Privy Council and therefore does not announce a new legal principle beyond those authorities. The direct effect is to reverse the dismissal below and to enter judgment in favour of the plaintiff in the stated amount while apportioning costs as above.

    Gopal Das Agarwala v. L. Hari Kishan Das

    1. This is an application in revision by the plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed by the Court below. The facts may be briefly stated. Sometime towards the end of January 1934 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract by which the latter was to supply 905 bags of Saharanpur chapati atah to the plaintiff in the month of February 1934 at the rate of Rs. 6-3 per bag. The defendant could supply only 151 bags, and thus there was a deficit in the supply of 754 bags. The plaintiff, therefore, brought a suit in the Small Cause-Court at Allahabad for the recovery of damages arising on the breach of the contract made by the defendant. The defence was that the Small Cause Court at Allahabad had no jurisdiction; that there was no breach of contract by the defendant and that the amount of damages was excessive. This case had had a chequered career, in the sense that the Small Cause Court at Allahabad tried this suit on 26th November 1934 and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to damages at the rate of Re. 1 on 754 bags. He overruled the preliminary objection that the Allahabad Courts had no jurisdiction. There was a revision to this Court by the defendant and a learned Judge of this Court remanded the case after having corrected the Court below on a question of law. What the Court below had done in the first instance was to find out the contract price of each bag and that was very easy. It worked out to be Rs. 6-3 per bag. The Court then tried to find as to what was the prevailing rate in Allahabad at which Saharanpur chapati atah was sold about the end of February or the beginning of March 1934.

    2. That rate was Rs. 7-3 per bag, and the Court below was of the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to damages per bag on the difference between Rs. 7-3 and Rs. 6-3 because that was the profit which the plaintiff could make. It was pointed out by this Court that this method of assessing damages was contrary to law. It was said that if the plaintiff took no steps to buy flour elsewhere in order to make up the deficiency, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to a decree merely because he might have made a profit if the defendant had supplied the flour. When the case went back to the Small Cause Court Judge he dismissed the plaintiff's suit on 30th September 1935 with the finding that there was no evidence at all on behalf of the plaintiff on the point mentioned by this Court and therefore the suit must be dismissed in accordance with the law laid down for the subordinate Court by this Court. The plaintiff has now come up in revision, and before I proceed to dispose of the contention advanced by the plaintiff it is necessary that I should mention some of the points taken by the defendant opposite party. It is once more argued before me that the Allahabad Court had no jurisdiction. It is submitted by learned Counsel for the opposite party that the view taken by the learned Judge of this Court inter partes is binding on all points, and if it is said to be not binding on any particular point it should be held to be not binding on any point whatsoever. It is, therefore, said that if I intend to hold a view different from what was held by this Court on the former occasion, I should also consider the question as to whether the Allahabad Court had jurisdiction in the matter, a point which was decided against the defendant on the former occasion.

    3. The plea, therefore, that is advanced before me in the very beginning is that the plaintiff should be directed to present his plaint at Saharanpur. Now there can be no doubt that where there are two Courts, both of which would normally have jurisdiction to try the suit, the parties may be allowed to agree among themselves that the suit should be brought in any of those Courts and not in the other. This was held in Achratlal Kesavlal Mehta & Co. v. Vijayam, & Co. 1925 Mad 1145; A. Milton & Co. v. Ojha Automobile Engineering Co. 1931 Cal 279 and Tilakram Chaudhari v. Kodumal Jethananad Wadha 1928 Bom 175; but it did not happen in any one of those cases that the Court below had decided that a particular Court (different from the one for which the parties had contracted) had jurisdiction in the matter and the superior tribunal had interfered in revision on the ground that the suit ought to have been instituted in the Court for which the parties had contracted. In the present case this matter was agitated before this Court, and this Court came to the conclusion that on the question of jurisdiction it should not interfere. I am of the same opinion. The object of parties entering into a contract of this nature is to afford facility or convenience either to both the parties or to one of the parties, and it is unfair that any one of the parties should resile from the contract entailing hardship and inconvenience to the other party. At the same time it is common ground that the other Court also has jurisdiction, and when it is found that the Court below, holding that it has jurisdiction, has tried the merits of the case between the parties, it would not be proper for the revisional Court to interfere and to entail fresh hardship on both parties. This was the view taken by this Court on the former occasion, and I find that the wisdom of this view is all the greater now, when on two occasions the merits have been discussed by the subordinate Court. I, therefore, refuse to accede to the plea taken by the defendant that the plaint should be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court.

    4. Connected with the point just discussed, another plea was raised that the Allahabad Courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter, and this plea was based not on the fact that there was a binding contract between the parties by which the suit ought to be instituted in a different Court, but it is said that the contract was entered into at Allahabad by a canvasser of the defendant and the proprietor himself signed the contract at Saharanpur. My attention was drawn to the case in J. D. John v. Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. 1929 Mad 347. To my mind the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. The learned Judge of the Court below has taken great pains to show that a part of the cause of action arose at Allahabad and as such the Allahabad Courts had jurisdiction. I see no flaw in the reasoning of the Judge, and I cannot possibly hold that the Allahabad Courts had no jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter.

    5. Coming now to the question of damages, once more it is argued that the view taken by the learned Judge of this Court on a former occasion is binding between the parties. Without deciding the larger question as to whether it is binding on me or not, I am definitely of the opinion that Kendall, J., did not intend to hold and could not hold anything beyond what was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Erroll Mackey v. Kameshwar Singh 1932 P C 196. Their Lordships observed that in the case of breach of contract of sale of goods, if there was an available market for the goods at the date of breach, the damages must be based on the difference between the market price and the contract price: a contract of re-sale becomes immaterial, because if there was a market, the law presumes that the buyer can minimise his damage by procuring substituted goods in the market, so that he is thus in the same position, apart from the difference in price, as if the seller had not made default. Hence the difference of price, if the market price exceeds the contract price, is the sole damage in general recoverable. This is exactly what was said in different words by this Court on the former occasion. It was observed:

    The plaintiff however must have been in a position to purchase the flour elsewhere and to sell it at the rate of Rs. 7-3 0, and possibly to make a profit on it at that rate, and if so he could only claim compensation to the amount of the difference between the profit he actually made and the profit he might have made if the defendant had not broken his contract.

    6. I am, therefore, not trying to lay down any law different from what was laid down by this Court on 22nd May 1935.

    7. The learned Judge of the Court below now says that there is no evidence at all on behalf of the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff took any steps to buy flour elsewhere in order to make up the deficiency, and if he did so what he had to pay for it. It is quite true that interpreting literally what was said by this Court on the former occasion, the plaintiff's suit was liable to be dismissed, if he did not as a matter of fact purchase flour elsewhere in order to make up the deficiency, but that is not what the intention of this Court was nor is it the law. It may well be that the plaintiff may not buy the goods, which he had contracted to buy from the defendant, elsewhere from an available market, but in that case he would not be entitled to damages on the basis worked out by the Court below on the first occasion; but there is no reason why, if the plaintiff is able to prove the market price prevailing in an available market about the date of the breach, he should not be given damages based on the difference between the market price and the contract price. One has therefore got to determine what was the date of the breach in the present case, and it was held in the Privy Council case, to which reference has been made already, that the date of the breach was the date when the contract ought to have been but was not fulfilled, and in the present case the contract was to have been fulfilled by the defendant up till the end of February, and the date of the breach would therefore be about the beginning of March 1934. If, for instance, in the present case the plaintiff might have tried to purchase chapati atah in an available market about the end of February 1934, and if the defendant had chosen to fulfil the contract by the end of February 1934, the plaintiff might have had more flour than he had contracted to sell to others or which he could dispose of easily, and the plaintiff while trying to minimise his damages by procuring substituted goods in the market might have placed himself in difficulties. Up till the date of the breach therefore the plaintiff had to wait, and it is only when he got fully convinced that the defendant was not going to perform his part of the contract that he should have been alert and tried to minimise the damages.

    8. The inquiry therefore should be as to what was the market price about the beginnnig of March. The case not having been understood in the Court below quite correctly, there is some lacuna in the evidence. There is however on the record of this case a letter dated 24th February 1934, Ex. B, from which it would appear that the market price at Saharanpur about that time was Rs. 6-9-0 a bag. There is also the evidence of the defendant that the rate of flour went high about the middle of March in Saharanpur. There is also the evidence of the plaintiff that about the end of February he bought flour at Allahabad at the rate of Rs. 6-10-0 a bag. It is true that these purchases were made in pursuance of contracts made in advance in January. From all these facts it would be reasonable to assume that the plaintiff could have obtained in an available market flour of the kind contracted between the parties at the rate of Rs. 6-8-0 a bag. That is the figure at which I have arrived at approximately on the entire evidence, and after all in a matter like this approximation can be the only guide. The plaintiff therefore suffered a loss of 5 annas per bag, the contract price being Rs. 6-3-0 per bag.

    9. Learned Counsel for the opposite party also drew my attention to the fact that the plaintiff brought the present suit at Allahabad in violation of the contract entered into between the parties on account of which the suit ought to have been instituted in Saharanpur, and if it had been so instituted, the defendant would have had some greater facilities, and some allowance should be made for the extra trouble and expense to which the defendant has been put by the plaintiff. My attention was also drawn to an observation in the judgment of Kendall, J., to the effect that it might be possible for the defendant to claim as a set off compensation for this extra trouble. I feel inclined to agree with the contention of the defendant that some allowance should be made, and I therefore do not give to the plaintiff a decree at the rate of 5 annas per bag, but only at the rate of 4 annas per bag. As a result of what I have said above, I allow this revision, set aside the decree of the Court below and decree the plaintiff's suit for Rs. 188.8-0 for 754 bags at the rate of 4 annas per bag. In view of all the circumstances the plaintiff must pay his own costs in all Courts, and should pay to the defendant costs in all Courts in proportion to the amount to which his suit has been dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Gopal Das Agarwala v. L. Hari Kishan Das
    (Mar 27, 1936)