1. This was a suit for a declaration that a deed of sale executed by one Mt. Deonandi Kuer was without any legal necessity and was void and ineffectual as against the plaintiff. It appears that Mt. Deonandi Kuer has a married daughter, aged 18 or 19 years, who would succeed to the property left by Deonandi's husband before the present plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge who tried the case refused to grant a decree. He remarks: “it must also be borne in mind that during the lifetime of Bhubani Kuer the plaintiff has no chance of getting the property, and Bhubani Kuer is aged 18 or 19 and the plaintiff is an old man of 50.” From this observation it appears that the learned Subordinate Judge exercised the discretion which is given him by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act;. When the case came up on appeal the learned District Judge seems to have lost sight of the fact, that a decree under S. 42 could only be granted in the exercise of his discretion. His findings in the case itself are very difficult to reconcile. In one place he says: “The plaintiff can hardly say that no consideration passed.” and in another he says: “The defects in the defendant's evidence indicate that the sale is either a bogus transaction or an act of waste.” It is impossible to reconcile these separate findings. But it is not, in our opinion, necessary to go into that question or to come to any decision on the point whether the sale was good or had.
2. In the circumstances of the case we think that the learned (Subordinate Judge exercised his discretion wisely in refusing this declaration and that the learned District Judge was not right in interfering with that exercise of his discretion and indeed seems to have overlooked that there was any question of his discretion before him. Reference has been made to the case of Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Hari Nath Shaha . [1905] 32 Cal. 62. All that was held in that case was that a suit of this nature was maintainable, and the learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly aware of that as appears from his judgment. The decision quoted shows that there has been considerable conflict of judicial opinion on this point, but, be that as it may, the case is clearly no authority for holding that a Court cannot in the exercise of its discretion under S. 42 refuse such a declaration as is asked for in this case. The exercise of such a discretion must necessarily depend upon the peculiar circumstances of each case and therefore the matter cannot very well be concluded by precedent.
3. In the circumstances of the case we think that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was right and should be restored, but we do not allow costs in this Court.
4. It must be understood that this appeal is decreed because we think that in the circumstances of the case the learned Subordinate Judge exercised his discretion rightly. We express no opinion on the questions of legal necessity or of the validity of the sale.
V.B/R.K
5. Appeal decreed.