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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Order XLI, rule 23, of the Civil Procedure Code
  • rule 23 of Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Order XLI, rule 23, of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • Order XLI, rule 11, of the Civil Procedure Code
  • rule 23 and under rule 25 of Order XLI.
  • rule 23 or rule 25 of Order XLI.
  • Order XLIII, rule 1, sub-rule (u),
  • Order XLIII, rule 1, clause (u),
  • Order XLI, rule 1, clause (u).
  • section 115 of the Code.
  • Order XLI, rule 23,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Order XLI, rule 23, of the Civil Procedure Code
  • rule 23 of Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Order XLI, rule 23, of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • Order XLI, rule 11, of the Civil Procedure Code
  • rule 23 and under rule 25 of Order XLI.
  • rule 23 or rule 25 of Order XLI.
  • Order XLIII, rule 1, sub-rule (u),
  • Order XLIII, rule 1, clause (u),
  • Order XLI, rule 1, clause (u).
  • section 115 of the Code.
  • Order XLI, rule 23,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Kulwant Sahay, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are appeals filed by the plaintiffs challenging the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarpur, which remanded the suits to the trial court for a fresh trial and laid down certain issues for consideration. The respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of a Second Appeal to this Court. The appellants contended that the orders of the Subordinate Judge were decrees, so a Second Appeal would lie to this Court. The Court was required to determine whether the order of remand constituted a decree against which a Second Appeal could be entertained. The Court further considered whether, alternatively, it should set aside the remand order in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of remand made by the Court of Appeal (the Subordinate Judge) under its inherent powers — and not under Order XLI, rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code — constitutes a "decree" within the meaning of the Code, so as to permit a Second Appeal to this Court.
  2. Whether, if no Second Appeal lies, the present appeals ought to be entertained in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the remand order.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Objection

  • The remand was made under the inherent power of the Court and not under Order XLI, rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code; therefore, no appeal (Second Appeal) lies to this Court under Order XLIII, rule 1, clause (u).
  • The order making the remand was not a "decree" within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure; accordingly, the present appeals as appeals against the appellate decree of the Subordinate Judge were not maintainable.

Appellants' Arguments

  • The orders of the learned Subordinate Judge were decrees; consequently, a Second Appeal would lie to this Court as an appeal against a decree.
  • Alternatively, the appellants argued that the present appeals could be treated as applications in revision and that this Court ought to set aside the remand order in exercise of revisional power under section 115 of the Code, on the ground that the Court of Appeal below lacked jurisdiction to make the remand and should have disposed of the appeal itself.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Chandra Rao v. Narain Lal Held (in earlier handling) that an appeal which was originally directed against an order of remand (not under Order XLI, r.23) was admitted as an appeal from the decree of the lower appellate court; the order admitting the appeal gave no reasons why the remand order should be treated as a decree. The Court examined this decision, noted the absence of reasons supporting the treatment of a remand under inherent power as a decree, and concluded that Ram Chandra Rao does not support the proposition that a remand under inherent power is a decree appealable as such.
Second Appeal No. 1382 of 1922 (Bucknill, J.) Followed the decision in Ram Chandra Rao in admitting an appeal as an appeal from decree despite remand not being under Order XLI, r.23; provided no reasons for treating the remand order as a decree. The Court noted that Bucknill, J.'s decision merely follows Ram Chandra Rao and likewise gives no reasons; the Court treated this authority as not supporting the appellants' contention.
Brijmohan Pathak v. Deobhajan Pathak Held that a remand not made under Order XLI, rule 23 was not appealable (i.e., position that remand under inherent power is not appealable under that provision). The Court observed that this case does not lay down that a remand under inherent power can be appealed against as a decree; it was relied upon by earlier judges but does not support treating inherent-power remands as decrees.
Bhadai Sahu v. Sheikh Manowar Ali Discussed whether an order appealed against came under rule 23 or rule 25 of Order XLI; held there could be an order under both rules 23 and 25 simultaneously and explained how remedies would lie in respect of each portion. The Court read this decision as not supporting the proposition that a remand under rule 23 itself is appealable as a decree; instead, it clarified the separate remedies available depending on which rule applies. The Court used it to show that earlier authorities did not decide that a remand under inherent power is a decree.
Raghunath Das v. Jhari Singh Held that where the appellate court on appeal conclusively determines rights of the parties regarding some matters in controversy (for example, reversing trial court and granting possession), that decision may be properly treated as a decree and be appealable as such. The Court distinguished this case: it supported the proposition that where an appellate court conclusively determines rights (and thus effectively passes a decree on merits), that determination is a decree. The Court noted that Raghunath Das was not analogous to the present remand under inherent power because in Raghunath Das the appellate court had in effect concluded rights on some issues.
Bhairab Chandra Dutt v. Kali Kumar Dutt (Calcutta High Court) The Calcutta High Court treated an order made in exercise of inherent power as a decree that reversed the decree of the Court of first instance, and held the appeal competent as an appeal from a decree under section 96 read with section 100. The Court explicitly disagreed with this view, stating it cannot accept that an inherent-power remand is a "decree" unless the remand itself conclusively determines rights; therefore, Bhairab Chandra Dutt was not followed.
Ghuznavi v. The Allahabad Bank, Ltd. (Full Bench) Referred to as explaining the exercise of the inherent power of the Court. The Court referenced this Full Bench explanation when discussing the Calcutta decision but did not adopt the Calcutta court's extension of inherent-power remand into a decree; it emphasized that the inherent-power character of an order does not automatically make it a decree.
Order admitting the present appeals (Das and Foster, JJ.) Das and Foster, JJ. admitted the appeals under Order XLI, r.11 and expressed grave doubt whether an appeal would lie; they observed that a "decree" is the formal expression of an adjudication that conclusively determines rights, and that in the present case there was no expression of such adjudication. The Court agreed with the view expressed by Das and Foster, JJ. — namely, that the remand did not amount to a decree because it did not express an adjudication conclusively determining rights — and relied on that agreement in holding that no Second Appeal lies.
Letters Patent Appeal (appeal against Bucknill, J. decision) — 1925 (no specific citation) Matter taken on appeal but the question of maintainability of the Second Appeal as an appeal against a decree was not raised or decided in that Letters Patent Appeal. The Court noted the question remained undecided in that Letters Patent Appeal and thus it did not furnish support for the appellants' position.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a structured legal analysis:

  1. Identification of the preliminary objection: respondents argued no Second Appeal lies because the remand was made under the inherent power of the appellate court and not under Order XLI, rule 23; therefore the remand was not appealable under Order XLIII, rule 1(u), and the remand order was not a "decree" as defined in the Code.
  2. Consideration of appellants' contention that the orders of the Subordinate Judge were decrees and therefore appealable as Second Appeals.
  3. Examination of authorities relied upon by the appellants:
    • The Court carefully reviewed Ram Chandra Rao v. Narain Lal and related decisions (including the Bucknill decision) and observed that in those instances earlier courts admitted appeals as appeals from decrees without giving reasons for treating an inherent-power remand as a decree; the present Court found those decisions did not establish the proposition that a remand under the inherent power is itself a decree.
    • In Brijmohan Pathak and Bhadai Sahu, the Court noted the actual holdings do not support treating an inherent-power remand as a decree appealable as such; rather, they clarify distinctions between orders under different rules (rules 23 and 25 of Order XLI) and the remedies applicable to each.
    • Raghunath Das v. Jhari Singh was recognized as authority for the converse proposition: where an appellate court conclusively determines rights on some matters it may be treated as having passed a decree; but that case was distinguished because there the appellate court in effect decided substantive rights (e.g., decreed possession) before remanding other matters.
    • The Calcutta decision in Bhairab Chandra Dutt v. Kali Kumar Dutt, which treated an inherent-power remand as a decree, was considered but explicitly rejected: the present Court could not accept that mere reversal of a trial court's decree and deprivation of rights automatically transforms a remand into a "decree" unless the remand order itself conclusively determines rights in the sense of the Code's definition of decree.
  4. Emphasis on statutory definition of "decree": the Court repeatedly invoked the Code's definition that a decree is the formal expression of an adjudication which, insofar as the court expressing it is concerned, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy. The Court held that unless an appellate remand itself satisfies that definition by conclusively determining rights, it must be treated as an order and not a decree.
  5. Application to the facts: the Court found that the remand in the present case merely set aside the trial court's decree and did not itself decide any of the points raised for determination; the Subordinate Judge thought certain issues should be decided by the trial court before final disposal. Consequently, the remand did not amount to a decree for the purposes of a Second Appeal.
  6. Consideration of revision under section 115: appellants asked the Court to exercise revisionary jurisdiction and set aside the remand as beyond the subordinate court's jurisdiction. The Court found no question of jurisdiction was involved; the Subordinate Judge had directed the remand because certain issues required determination by the trial court. Therefore, there was no ground to set aside the remand in revision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are dismissed; the Court held that no Second Appeal lies in the present cases because the remand made by the Subordinate Judge in the exercise of its inherent power is not a "decree" within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure unless the remand itself conclusively determines rights. In this matter the remand did not decide rights and therefore must be treated as an order and not appealable as a decree.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the appeals brought by the plaintiffs are dismissed with costs; the order of remand to the trial court stands.
  • On broader law: the Court rejected the approach that an order of remand made under the inherent power of an appellate court automatically amounts to a decree. The Court emphasized that to qualify as a decree the appellate order must itself express an adjudication that conclusively determines rights on a matter in controversy. Where the remand only sets aside the trial court's decree and requires further proceedings, it remains an order not a decree.
  • The Court declined to exercise revisional powers under section 115 to overturn the remand because no jurisdictional error was found — the remand was based on the Subordinate Judge's view that certain issues needed trial-court determination.
  • There is no indication in the opinion that this Court intended to create a new expansive precedent converting inherent-power remands into decrees; instead it reaffirmed the statutory definition of "decree" and limited the circumstances in which an appellate determination may be treated as a decree.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed. (Adami, J. concurred.)

    Permanand Kumar v. Bhon Lohar

    Kulwant Sahay, J.:— These are appeals by the plaintiffs filed against the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarpur whereby he remanded the suits to the trial court for fresh trial laying down certain issues for consideration.

    A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the respondents that no Second Appeal lies in these cases. The objection is based on the ground that the remand was made not under the provisions of Order XLI, rule 23, of the Civil Procedure Code against which an appeal would lie under Order XLIII, rule 1, clause (u), but that the remand was under the inheret power of the Court and, that, therefore, no appeal would lie to this Court as an appeal from an order; and that the order making the remand was not a decree within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the present appeals as appeals against the appellate decrees of the Subordinate Judge were not maintainable.

    On behalf of the appellants it is contended that the orders of the learned Subordinate Judge were decrees and, therefore, second appeal would lie to this Court as an appeal against a decree.

    The question for determination, therefore, is whether there was any decree made by the Court of Appeal below against which an appeal would lie to this Court.

    The learned advocate for the appellants relies on four decisions; three of which are decisions of this Court and one is a decision of the Calcutta High Court. The decisions of this Court relied upon are Ram Chandra Raon v. Narain Lal, Achutd Singh v. Hit Narain Singh and Raghunath Das v. Jhari Singh. The decision of the Calcutta High Court relied upon is in Bhairab Chandra Dutt v. Kali kumar Dutt. It is necessary to consider these decision in detail.

    The case of Ram Chandra Rao v. Narain Lal was decided by Jwala Prasad, J., sitting alone. It appears that this appeal was originally filed as an appeal from an order and it was directed against an order of remand which did not come under Order XLI, rule 23. The Registrar was of opinion that the appeal was incompetent and he referred the case to the Bench for orders. The matter came up before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Adami, J., and their Lordships made the following order on the 13th June, 1919: “The learned Vakil for the appellant consenting, let this appeal be admitted as an appeal from the decree of the lower Appellate Court reversing the decree of the Munsif. Send for the record and issue the usual notices. This order is subject to a further report from the Stamp Reporter as to the sufficiency of the stamp on a memorandum of appeal on the above basis. The memorandum must be amended accordingly”. The appeal was accordingly admitted as an appeal against the decree and it ultimately came on for hearing before Jwala Prasad, J., sitting alone, when an objection was taken on behalf of the respondents that the appeal did not lie. Jwala Prasad, J., overruled this objection. His Lordship observed that the remand in that case was not under Order XLI, rule 23, and, therefore, no appeal lay under Order XLIII, rule 1, clause (u), but an appeal lay against the decree made by the lower appellate court setting aside the decree of the trial court. His Lordship relied upon a decision of this Court in Brijmohan Pathak v. Deobhajan Pathak, and upon the order of the learned Chief Justice and Adami, J., dated the 13th June, 1919, referred to above. His Lordship also referred to the decision in Bhadai Sahu v. Sheikh Manowar Ali. No reasons are given by his Lordship for holding that the order setting aside, the decree of the trial court was itself a decree. In Brijmohan Pathak v. Deobhajan Pathak, relied upon by the learned Judge, it was merely held that a remand which was not made under rule 23 of Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code was not appealable. There was no decision in this case that the order could be appealed against as a decree. In the order of the learned Chief Justice and Adami, J., dated the 13th Jung, 1919, directing the appeal to be admitted as an appeal-against the decree of the lower appellate court no reasons are given as to how the order appealed against could be treated as a decree. In Bhadai, Sahu v. Sheikh Manawar Ali, the question as to whether an appeal could be filed against an order of remand treating it as a decree was not raised or discussed. The question raised there was whether the order appealed against came under rule 23 or rule 25 of Order XLI. Their Lordships observed that there was no reason why there could not be at one and the same time an order both under rule 23 and under rule 25 of Order XLI. In such a case the orders although made upon one piece of paper would in effect be quite separate, and the party affected would be competent to pursue the remedy by an appeal provided by the Code in respect of each; that, with regard to the order under rule 23 he could appeal against the decree or against the remand order itself under Order XLIII, clause (u); and, that, the order under rule 25 could be attacked in a second appeal against the final decree in the suit. Now, when their Lordships observed that with regard to the order under rule 23 the party affected could appeal against the decree, I apprehend that what was intended was that an appeal would lie against the final decree made in the case and in that appeal the older of remand under rule 23 could be challenged. It was not laid down that the order of remand itself under rule 23 could be appealed against as an appeal against a decree. The language used by their Lordships is: “With regard to the order under rule 23 it is open to him either to appeal against the whole decree or to appeal against the order of remand only under Order XLIII”. Their Lordships merely pointed out that it was open to the party to appeal against that portion of the order which was under rule 23 or lie would wait and appeal against the final decree and in that appeal object, to the order under rule 23 I am, therefore, of opinion that the cases relied upon by Jwala Prasad, J., in Ram Chandra Rao v. Narain Lal do not support the contention that an appeal would lie against the decree of the lower appellate court remanding a case to the trial court, the remand being under the inherent power of the court and not under Order XLI, rule 23, of the Code.

    The decision of Bucknill, J., in Second Appeal no. 1382 of 1922 merely follows the decision of Jwala Prasad, J., in the case referred to and the order of the learned Chief Justice and Adami, J., made on the 13th June 1919 referred to above. His Lordship gives no reason whatsoever for holding that the order appealed against could be treated as a decree and an appeal could lie against it as an appeal from decree. It is remarkable that the judgment of Bucknill, J., in Second Appeal no. 1382 of 1922, was appealed against in Letters Patent Appeal no. of 1925; but the question of maintainability of the Second Appeal as an appeal against a decree was not raised or decided in the Letters Patent Appeal.

    In Raghunath Das v. Jhari Singh, the appeal was originally filed as an appeal from an order of remand under Order XLI, rule 1, clause (u). An objection was taken by the respondent that the appeal was really not an appeal from the order of remand but from an appellate decree. The trial court had dismissed the suit on various grounds. On appeal by the plaintiff the District Judge had held that the plaintiff was entitled to the land which he claimed and that the suit was within limitation and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for possession and the remand was made by the District Judge for determining the question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to mesne-profits and if so, what; and whether the plaintiff had any cause of action against defendant no. 6. The learned District Judge directed that after determining these issues the lower court will pass a decree accordingly. It was held by this Court that the District Judge did really reverse the decree of the first court on merits and that he should have passed a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff and sent the case to the court below for inquiry as to mesne-profits. Their Lordships, therefore, treated the order of the District Judge as a decree for possession and held that the defendant's appeal against the decision of the District Judge must be considered as an appeal against an appellate decree. The decision of this Court in that case proceeded on the assumption that the District Judge on appeal had conclusively determined the rights of the parties with regard to some of the matters in controversy in the suit and that such a decision was a decree within the definition of the term as given in the Code of Civil Procedure. In this view of the case it was clear that the decision of the District Judge in that case could be treated as a decree and appealed against as such. This case, therefore, does not help the appellants in the present appeals.

    It now remains to consider the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bhairab Chandra Dutt v. Kali Kumar Dutt. This decision, no doubt, is in favour of the appellants in the present case. There also the appeal was against an order which did not purport to have been made, under Order XLI, rule 23, of the Civil Procedure Code, but it had been made in the exercise of the inherent power of the Court as explained by the Full, Bench in Ghuznavi v. The Allahabad Bank, Ltd.. The Learned Judges, however, remarked as follows: “The order so made (i.e, in exercise of the inherent power of the Court) is a decree which reverses the decree of the Court of first instance and deprives the plaintiffs of the valuable right they had acquired thereunder. The appeal is consequently competent not as an appeal from order under Order XLIII, rule 1, sub-rule (u), but as an appeal from a decree under section 96 of the Code read with section 100”.

    With very great respect to the learned Judges, I am unable to agree with the view taken by them. I fail to understand how an order of remand under the inherent power of the Court can be treated as a decree unless the order can be brought within the definition of “decree” as given in the Code of Civil Procedure in other words, unless the Court of appeal making the remand conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit so far as that court is concerned. Where the order of remand merely sets aside the decree of the trial court and does not itself decide any of the points raised for determination and does not determine the rights of the parties with regard to any of the matters in controversy in the suit, I am of opinion that it cannot amount to a “decree” and must be treated as an order; and no appeal would lie against it as a decree. The mere fact that the order reverses the decree of the trial court and deprives the plaintiffs of the valuable right they had acquired thereunder would not make an order of remand a “decree”, unless that order itself determines any of the points arising for determination in regard to the matter in controversy in the suit. Das and Foster, JJ., in admitting the present appeals, now before us, under Order XLI, rule 11, of the Civil Procedure Code expressed grave doubt whether an appeal would lie in the present case. It was conceded before their Lordships that no appeal lay against the order as an order; but it was contended that the order appealed against amounted to a decree and that, as such, it was appealable. Their Lordships observed: “But a decree has been defined in the Civil Procedure Code as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. In this case there is no expression of an adjudication conclusively or otherwise, or at all determining the rights of the parties. All that the Court says is that it is unable to determine the rights of the parties unless certain other matters are decided by the Court of first instance”. Their Lordships, however, admitted this appeal in view of the ruling of this Court in Ram Chandra Rao v. Narain Lal, referred to above. I fully agree with the view expressed by Das and Foster, JJ., in the above order. I, therefore, hold that no Second Appeal lies in this case.

    It has then been contended by the learned Advocate for the appellants that the present appeals might be treated as an application in revision and that we ought to set aside the order of remand in exercise of our power of revision under section 115 of the Code. In my opinion there is no question of jurisdiction involved in the case. It is contended that having regard to the finding of the trial court, the Court of Appeal below had no jurisdiction to make the remand and its proper duty was to dispose of the appeal itself. But it appears from the order of remand that the learned Subordinate Judge thought it necessary that certain issues framed by him should be decided before the suit could be finally disposed of. I am, therefore, of opinion that there is no reason to set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge in exercise of our revisional powers.

    These appeals must be dismissed with costs.

    Adami, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Permanand Kumar v. Bhon Lohar
    (Jul 8, 1926)