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  • sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, read with sec. 106,
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  • sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, read with sec. 106,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the decision of the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal regarding apportionment of compensation for land acquired under a declaration dated 27 March 1918 for the Calcutta Improvement Trust. The dispute was between the lessor (the mutwalli of a wakf) and the lessee (successor tenant), over entitlement to the compensation awarded for the land. The Tribunal president held that the lessor was entitled to the entire compensation; the lessee appealed to this Court.

The material facts found by the Tribunal (and not seriously disputed here) were: the land was a valid wakf; the lessor was the mutwalli; successive ten-year pattas/leases were granted (1880, 1891, 1901) to Rakhal Chandra De (and later occupation by his son), each containing covenants about renewal and about allocation of compensation (lessor to receive land compensation; lessee to receive compensation for structures). The last ten-year term (from 14 March 1901) expired on 14 March 1911 and no fresh lease was granted before the acquisition; the lessee held over after expiry.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the covenant for perpetual renewal contained in the 1901 patta operated to create a permanent lease at a fixed rent binding on the wakf such that the lessor would be limited to the capitalised value of rent and the lessee entitled to the corpus (land) compensation.
  2. Whether the mutwalli had the authority to grant a perpetual or long-term lease of wakf property, and if not, whether such a covenant could be specifically enforced in equity.
  3. If the covenant could not be enforced, what was the legal status of the lessee at the date of acquisition (e.g., tenant from month to month under the Transfer of Property Act)?
  4. Whether the lessee could, by adverse possession or lapse of time, acquire a permanent tenancy or right in the wakf corpus to defeat the wakf's interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (lessee)'s Arguments

  • The covenant for perpetual renewal in the 1901 patta should be construed as converting the lease into a permanent lease at a fixed rent, thereby entitling the lessee to compensation for the land (or limiting the lessor to the capitalised value of the rent).
  • Alternatively, by continuous possession and professing to be a permanent lessee, the appellant claimed to have acquired such status by adverse possession for twelve years from the date of the last lease.
  • The appellant also invoked equitable doctrines (Walsh v. Lonsdale and the doctrine of part performance) to argue that in equity he should be treated as if a proper renewal had been granted.

Respondent (lessor/mutwalli)'s Arguments

  • The lessor relied on the mutwalli's limited authority to lease wakf property and argued that if the covenant for renewal would legally operate as a perpetual grant, it would have been created in excess of the mutwalli's authority and thus would not bind the wakf estate.
  • The lessor contended that the covenant for renewal was ultra vires the mutwalli's powers and therefore could not be specifically enforced or relied upon to defeat the wakf's corpus.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sujat Ali v. Zumeerooddeen Authority for the proposition that a lease in perpetuity at a fixed rent granted by a mutwalli in respect of wakf property was void. The Court relied on this case to support the view that perpetual leases by a mutwalli are not operative against a wakf.
Dalrymple v. Khoondekar Contrasting (opposite) view to Sujat Ali, which was criticized. The Court pronounced the contrary view unsupported by authority and unsound in principle and therefore did not follow it.
Walsh v. Lonsdale Equitable rule treating parties in possession under an agreement as if a proper lease had been executed (i.e., equity treats as done what ought to be done). The Court held Walsh v. Lonsdale inapplicable here because the covenant for renewal was ultra vires and not specifically enforceable; equity will not enforce a contract requiring a party to do an act beyond his lawful power.
Foster v. Reeves Illustrative authority that specific performance could not be obtained before the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal (cited for procedural limitation). Used to emphasize that specific performance was not available before the Tribunal and therefore the equitable remedy peculiarities could not be invoked there.
Angel v. Jay Same procedural point as Foster v. Reeves regarding availability of specific performance before tribunal. Cited alongside Foster v. Reeves to support the view that specific performance could not be pursued before the Tribunal.
Shyam Kishore v. Dinesh Chandra Review of earlier decisions on part performance and related equitable doctrines. Referenced as reviewing earlier decisions which bear on the application of part performance and Walsh v. Lonsdale doctrines.
Bibi Jawahir Kumari v. Chhaterput Singh Earlier decision considered in the chain of authorities about part performance/constructive enforcement. Referred to as part of the sequence of cases considered in Shyam Kishore and Haripada v. Nirod Krishna.
Haripada v. Nirod Krishna Discussion of the cumulative result of cases on part performance and Walsh v. Lonsdale. Used to explain that the outcomes in several cases can be reached via part performance doctrine or Walsh v. Lonsdale, but subject to enforceability limits.
Maddison v. Alderson (and Alderson v. Maddison) Doctrine of part performance (that certain acts may take an agreement out of the Statute of Frauds and render it specifically enforceable in equity). The Court observed that part performance doctrine was not of assistance to the appellant because mere retention of possession was insufficient and, in any event, the contract for renewal was not specifically enforceable where it was ultra vires.
Mahommed Musa v. Aghore Kumar Judicial Committee's application or affirmation of part performance doctrine. Referred to as an example where the Judicial Committee followed the part performance doctrine; used to contextualize equitable remedies.
Secretary of State v. Forbes Principle that a lessee ready and willing to accept renewal may in equity be treated as if a proper lease had been granted (subject to enforceability). Quoted with other like cases to show that equitable treatment requires the covenant for renewal to be specifically enforceable; not applicable where covenant is ultra vires.
Lani Mia v. Mahommed Yasen Same equitable principle as Secretary of State v. Forbes (lessee's position in equity). Cited to illustrate the same point about equitable position contingent on enforceability of the covenant.
Secretary of State v. Digamber Same equitable principle cited with related cases. Used as part of the line of authorities showing equitable treatment is conditional on the covenant's enforceability.
Secretary of State v. Siba Prosad Same equitable principle cited with related cases. Also cited as supporting the conditional equitable rule.
Harnett v. Yeilding Authority that a party seeking specific performance must not require the other to do an act which he is not lawfully competent to do (equity will not enforce an ultra vires covenant). Applied to hold that specific performance will not be granted where compliance would require the doing of an act that the party lacks lawful authority to perform (as here, a trustee/mutwalli granting an ultra vires lease).
Byrne v. Acton Held that a tenant for life who agreed to grant a lease beyond his power was only bound to grant such a lease as was warranted by his power. Applied to support the proposition that courts will refuse to order specific performance of an agreement that would require action beyond the actor's lawful powers.
Bellringer v. Belgrave Held that a Court will not interfere to enforce a covenant for renewal that would enable or assist a breach of trust. Relied on to show established practice that equity will not facilitate breaches of trust by enforcing ultra vires lease covenants; the Court applied that line of reasoning.
Mortlock v. Butter One of the authorities referred to in Bellringer on limits to enforcement. Cited in Bellringer and noted as part of the authorities supporting non-enforcement of ultra vires covenants.
Ord v. Noel Another authority referred to in Bellringer on the same point. Referred to as part of the established line of cases indicating courts will not enforce covenants enabling breaches of trust.
Baikuntha v. Sibdas Local authority applying the principle that a court will not grant specific performance of an ultra vires covenant by a trustee/mutwalli. Listed among decisions of this Court that have followed the non-enforcement principle; used to show consistency of domestic jurisprudence.
Sarbesh Chandra v. Kshetrapal Same as Baikuntha: domestic precedent refusing enforcement of ultra vires covenants. Included in the list of this Court's decisions supporting the conclusion that the covenant for renewal could not be enforced here.
Moti Das v. Madhusudhan Same local principle cited. Part of the Court's catalogue of domestic cases applying the non-enforcement rule.
Narayan v. Akshoy Same local principle cited. Also cited among decisions supporting non-enforcement of ultra vires covenant.
Mahommed Esmat v. Nanda Dulal Same local principle cited. Included in the line of domestic authorities relied upon.
Khulna Loan Company v. Jahir Goldar Same local principle cited. Also cited as part of consistent domestic authority refusing specific performance where covenant exceeds fiduciary power.
Trailakhya v. Sarat Rule that, where a lease expires and the lessee holds over, the lease may be renewed from month to month under the Transfer of Property Act (sec. 116 read with sec. 106). Applied to conclude that the lessee's status after expiry was that of a month-to-month tenant.
Manilal v. Nandlal Similarly cited in relation to month-to-month renewal under the Transfer of Property Act. Used with Trailakhya to support the statutory renewal conclusion.
Clayton v. Blakey Also cited on the point of statutory renewal from month to month. Referenced as additional support for the conclusion that the lease became a month-to-month tenancy.
Vidya Varuthi v. Valusami Judicial Committee decision that possession under a permanent lease granted in excess of authority was not adverse to the endowment during the life of the head who granted the lease. Relied on to reject the appellant's adverse-possession argument; possession was not adverse against the wakf while the appointing head lived.
Magdalen College v. Attorney-General Noted as inapplicable by analogy to the present facts. The Court distinguished this case and said the facts here had no analogy to it.
Attorney-General v. Davey Applied Magdalen College (in a prior decision). Mentioned to show the line of authority; the Court indicated the present case was different from the Magdalen College line applied in Davey.
Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts Holds that if any rent has been reserved and received, however small, the legal relation of a tenancy from year to year is created and the statute of limitations cannot run. Applied to show that receipt of rent preserves the tenancy relationship and prevents the statute of limitations from running in favour of an adverse-possession claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured analytical sequence, adhering closely to the facts found by the Tribunal and established principles concerning wakf property and equitable remedies.

  1. The Court accepted the Tribunal's primary factual findings: the land was a valid wakf and the lessor was the mutwalli; the rents and profits had long been appropriated to mosque expenses; documents described the property as wakf. The litigation was therefore decided on the premise that the property was a wakf.
  2. The Court examined the successive ten-year leases (1880, 1891, 1901) and the recurring covenant for renewal in them. It noted the fundamental rule that a mutwalli's power to grant leases is limited: generally one year for houses and three years for land unless the wakf deed expressly permits longer terms or the Court (kazi/judge) authorises a longer lease for the benefit of the wakf.
  3. After surveying Muslim juristic authorities and authoritative texts, and domestic precedents, the Court concluded that each ten-year lease was prima facie beyond the mutwalli's authority and liable to be annulled unless established to be for the wakf's benefit—a showing not made here.
  4. The appellant's contention that the 1901 covenant for perpetual renewal converted the lease into a permanent lease at a fixed rent was rejected. The Court explained that equitable doctrines invoked by the appellant (Walsh v. Lonsdale and part performance) could not assist because the covenant was ultra vires the mutwalli's powers and thus not specifically enforceable in equity. The Court emphasized established equitable principles that equity will not compel a party to perform an act he is not lawfully authorised to do.
  5. The Court applied established authority (Harnett v. Yeilding; Byrne v. Acton; Bellringer v. Belgrave and subsequent domestic cases) to hold that specific performance will not be ordered where doing so would require performance of an ultra vires covenant and thereby facilitate a breach of trust.
  6. Consequently, when the 1901 term expired and the lessee held over, the Court held that under section 116 read with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the lease was renewed from month to month. The Court cited Trailakhya v. Sarat, Manilal v. Nandlal and Clayton v. Blakey to support this statutory renewal outcome.
  7. The Court rejected the adverse-possession argument. Relying on Vidya Varuthi v. Valusami, the Court held that possession by a lessee under a purported permanent lease granted in excess of authority is not adverse to the endowment during the life of the appointing head. The Court also invoked the principle from Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts that receipt of rent preserves a tenancy relationship and prevents the statute of limitations from running.
  8. Having applied these principles, the Court concluded that the lessee at the time of acquisition had no higher status than a tenant from month to month and that any claim to appropriate the corpus of the wakf estate lacked legal foundation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decree of the lower Court was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The lessor (mutwalli) is entitled to the compensation for the land awarded on acquisition.
  • The lessee was held to be a tenant from month to month at the time of acquisition; the covenant for perpetual renewal was not specifically enforceable against the wakf, and the lessee's claim to the wakf corpus was rejected.
  • The Court assessed the hearing fee at one hundred rupees; costs are to be paid by the Receiver out of the estate in his hands.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles concerning the limited authority of trustees/mutwallis to grant long or perpetual leases of wakf property and the corresponding refusal of equity to enforce ultra vires covenants that would facilitate breaches of trust. The Court did not purport to create new law; it applied and reaffirmed existing jurisprudence as summarized in the reasoning above.

    Gajendra Nath Dey v. Moulvi Ashraf Hossain .

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Mookerjee, J.:— This appeal is directed against the decision of the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal in a case for apportionment of compensation in respect of the land acquired for the Calcutta Improvement Trust under a declaration published on the 27th March 1918. The rival claimants are the lessor and the lessee of the disputed property. The President has decided that the lessor is entitled to the entire compensation money awarded for the land. The lessee has consequently appealed to this Court.

    The President has found that the land in question was valid wakf and that the lessor was the mutwalli. No serious attempt has been made in this Court to controvert this conclusion. The evidence show's that the rents and profits have been for many years appropriated to defray the expense of a mosque, and the property is described throughout as wakf in all the relevant documents. The case must consequently be decided on the footing that the land acquired was a valid wakf.

    On the 14th April 1880, Rakhal Chandra De, the father of the present lessee, who had already been a tenant in occupation on a rent of Rs. 22 monthly, took a lease of the land from Abdul Ali mutwalli and executed a kabuliyat in his favour. A premium of Rs. 50 was paid, the rent was fixed at Rs. 23 monthly, and the tenancy, it was provided, would last for a term of ten years from the 12th April 1880 to the 12th April 1890. The kabuliyat embodied a covenant for the renewal of the lease for a period of ten years after the expiration of the term granted by the lease, and stated expressly that if the land should be acquired by the Government the lessor alone would get the compensation for the land and the lessee would take the compensation for the brick-built structure. The term of the lease expired and the lessee held over. On the 27th January 1891, Abdul Ali mutwalli, the landlord, again granted a lease to Rakhal Chandra De, on a rental of Rs. 23 a month and for a term of ten years from the 13th January 1891 to the 13th January 1901. The patta reproduced the provision of the earlier lease for distribution of compensation money in the event of acquisition, and further contained a covenant that on the expiry of the term a fresh settlement would be made at a proportionate rent. The term expired and the tenant again held over. On the 9th March 1901, a fresh patta was granted by mutwalli Ashraf Hossain (who had meanwhile succeeded to the office) to Rakhal Chandra De on a monthly rent of Rs. 23 and for a term of ten years from the 14th March 1901 to the 14th March 3911. The patta stated that if it should be necessary for the Government to acquire the land, the lessor would take the compensation for the land in accordance with the rules, while the lessee alone would get the compensation paid for the building. There was further a covenant that the lessee would be entitled, on the expiry of the term, to get fresh pattas for ten years at a time on a rent of Rs. 23 monthly and thus remain in possession with heirs in succession. The term of this lease expired on the 14th March 1911 and though the tenant continued in occupation, no fresh lease had been granted up to the time of the acquisition. The lessor now claims the entire compensation under the terms of the lease; the lessee, on the other hand, contends that by virtue of the covenant for perpetual renewal, he must be deemed to hold under a permanent lease at a fixed rent, so that the landlord is not entitled to anything beyond the capitalised value of the rent. In reply, the lessor urges that if the legal effect of the covenant for renewal be to transform the lease into a perpetual grant at a fixed rent, the lease does not bind the wakj estate because created by the mutwalli in excess of his authority. The President has held that the lease is not operative as a permanent lease of the wakj estate and that, at the date of the acquisition, the lessee had no higher status than that of a tenant from month to month. He has further held that the lessee did not by lapse of time acquire the status of a perpetual tenant at a fixed rent to the detriment of the wakf estate.

    It is well settled that a mutwalli should not lease wakf property, if it be agricultural, for a term exceeding three years, and, if non-agricultural for a term exceeding one year, unless he is expressly authorised by the deed of wakf to do so, or, where he has no such authority, unless he has obtained the leave of the Court to do so. Tyabji (Mahomedan Law, sec. 502) states that where the wakj property consists of a house dedicated to the poor or other charitable object the mutwalli may validly grant a lease of it for a year, and where it consists of lands, he may validly grant a lease for three years, provided that where the mutwalli purports to grant a lease for a longer term than a year or three years respectively, it is not void but voidable. This is in accord with the statement in Baillie (Mahomedan Law, Vol. I, p. 606): “When the Superintendent of a wakf has let a mansion appropriated for the poor for more than a year, the lease is unlawful. In the absence of any condition, the approved doctrine is that the lease of estate in land may be decreed to be lawful for three years, unless it be for the benefit of the wakf to annul them; and that with regard to leases of other property, they should be decreed to be unlawful when they exceed one year, unless it be for the benefit of the wakf to sustain them. But this varies with the change of places and times. This is approved for the fatwa.” Substantially to the same effect is the statement by Sir Ronald Wilson (Anglo-Mahomedan Law, sec. 337). The original authorities collected by Ameer Ali (Mahomedan Law, Vol. I) show that the limitation with regard to the duration of a lease, imposed by the earlier jurists in respect of wakj property, has been gradually modified, and the rule now stands in a much more elastic form than when it was first enunciated.

    In the Fatawai Kazikha which is one of the earlier authorities, it is stated in substance that “where the wakif has made no provision in the document of wakf (about the grant of leases in respect of the wakf property) the mutwalli has a discretion to do what is proper and to the advantage of the poor (in other words, the beneficiaries), subject to the condition that he should not lease a house for a longer term than one year, for a long lease is apt to give rise to the idea that the lessee is the owner. And he may not give a longer lease of land than is necessary for purpose of cultivation. Should the wakf have imposed a condition that the land shall not be leased for more than one year, and people are not willing to take such a short lease, and it is to the advantage of the beneficiaries to lease the property for a longer period, the Kyyum (the mutwalli) cannot act contrary to the condition in the wakf and give a longer lease, unless he submits the matter before the kazi who can sanction a longer lease on the ground that it is to the advantage of the wakf, for the kazi is the supervisor over (the interests of) the poor, the absent and deceased persons.”

    “And should the wakif have provided in the document of wakf that the mutwalli shall not grant a lease for more than a year unless it is for the advantage of the poor (the beneficiaries), in which case he (the mutwalli) may do so himself (i.e, of his own authority) if he considers it expedient, and it does not require being taken to the Court of the kazi, for the wakif has (already) given him the power.”

    “In case the mutwalli has created a lease for five years, Sheikh Abdul Kassim of Balkh has declared that it would not be valid over a year, unless some need has arisen for expediting the rent; but says the jurist Abu Baker Mahommed-bil-al-Fazl that he does not consider such a lease should be held to be void, but the Hakim (Judge) should take note of it, and if it is to the injury of the wakf he should cancel it.”

    “Abu'l Hassan alias Sugdi has expressed the same view. And it is stated from the jurist Abu Lais that where the wakif had imposed no condition against a lease being granted for more than a year he permitted it to be given for three years, irrespective of the question whether the property was house or land. It is reported from Imam Abu Hais Bokhari that he permitted the lease of land for three years. But there is a difference of opinion regarding (the effect of) a lease for more than three years; the majority of the jurists of Balkh have held that such a lease is not valid, whilst others have declared that it is to be submitted to the kazi, so that he may cancel it, this doctrine the jurist Abu Lais has adopted.”

    In the Durr-ul-Mukhtar, the rule is given a more compendious form. “Any condition imposed by the wakf regarding the leasing of wakf property must be followed, and the Kyyum (mutwalli) cannot act contrary to it, but the kazi may, for to him appertains the supervision over the interests of the poor, the absent and deceased people. So, where the wakf has left indeterminate the period for which a wakf property may be leased, some (jurists) have said, the Kyyum has a general discretion as to the length of the term; whilst others have said, the limit should be one year in all cases. And the fatwa is with regard to a year for (the lease of) houses and three years in respect of land, unless expediency is opposed to this, and expediency varies according to time and locality.”

    The author of the Radd-ul-Mukhtar in commenting on the above passage makes an important statement on the authority of the Fatawal Kari-ul-Hedaya: “When the repairs of the wakf premises cannot be effected without letting (some portion of) it, the matter must be placed before the Judge who can direct the grant of a lease long enough for that purpose.”

    The view thus indicated was adopted by this Court in Sujat Ali v. Zumeerooddeen , where a lease in perpetuity at a fixed rent, granted by a mutwalli in respect of wakf property, was declared void, even on the supposition that the office of the mutwalli was hereditary, and the contrary view adopted in Dalrymple v. Khoondekar was pronounced to be unsupported by any authority and unsound in principle.

    In the case before us, each of the three successive leases for a term of ten years was primâ facie in excess of the authority of the mutwalli and was liable to be annulled as unlawful, unless established to be for the benefit of the wakf which has not been done in this case. The contention that the lease granted on the 9th March 1901 for a term of ten years with a perpetual covenant for renewal should be interpreted as a permanent lease at a fixed rent and should be deemed operative against the wakj is manifestly untenable. The lease has not in fact been renewed; but the lessee invokes the aid of Walsh v. Lonsdale and urges that this is immaterial for, in equity, he is precisely in the same position as if the lease had been renewed. This argument is fallacious. No doubt, it is well-settled, as the result of a long series of decisions in this Court, that when in pursuance of an agreement to transfer property, the intended transferee has taken possession, though the requisite legal documents had not been executed and registered, the position is the same as if the documents had been executed, subject to the all important proviso the specific performance can be obtained between the parties to the agreement, in the same Court and at the same time as the subsequent legal question falls to be determined. We need not here emphasise the circumstance that specific performance could not be obtained before the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal; cf. Foster v. Reeves and Angel v. Jay (5). Apart from this, reference may be made to the decision in Shyam Kishore v. Dinesh Chandra , which reviews the earlier decisions from Bibi Jawahir Kumari v. Chhaterput Singh (7). As was pointed out in Haripada v. Nirod Krishna , the result of these cases may be reached either by the application of the doctrine of part performance enunciated in Maddison v. Alder son (9), which was followed by the Judicial Committee in Mahommed Musa v. Aghore Kumar (10), or by the application of the rule in Walsh v. Lonsdale . The doctrine of part performance is clearly of no avail to the Appellant. For, assuming with Baggallay, L.J, Alderson v. Maddison (11), that mere retention of possession is not in itself sufficient to constitute part performance, though the contrary view has been sometimes favoured, Lanyon v. Martin (12), and assuming further that special circumstances must be established to show that it is necessarily referable to an agreement for a lease or contract for renewal, Dowell v. Dew (13), such contract for renewal must be enforceable in a Court of equity. Nor is the rule in Walsh v. Lonsdale of greater efficacy to the Appellant, unless the contract for renewal is valid and operative. For, though on the assumption made in Secretary of State v. Forbes (14), Lani Mia v. Mahommed Yasen (15), Secretary of State v. Digamber (16) and Secretary of State v. Siba Prosad (17), the position of a lessee, who has always been ready and willing to accept a renewal on proper terms, is the same in equity, as if a proper lease has been granted, it is essential that the covenant for renewal should be such as may be specifically enforced. In the case before us, the lessor was not competent to grant a lease of this description. It cannot be disputed that no Court of equity will grant specific performance where a trustee has entered into a contract for a lease which is in excess of his power or has entered into a covenant for renewal which is ultra vires. In Harnett v. Yeilding , Lord Redesdale, L. C, said that the party who comes into equity for a specific performance, must show that in seeking the performance, he does not call upon the other party to do an act which he is not lawfully competent to do, for if he does, a consequence is produced that quite passes by the object of the Court in exercising the jurisdiction, which is to do more complete justice; if a party is compelled to do an act which he is not lawfully authorised to do, he is exposed to a new action for damages at the suit of the person injured by such act. To the same effect is the decision of the House of Lords in Byrne v. Acton (19), where it was held that a tenant for life, who had agreed to grant a lease for thirty-one years, in excess of his power which was limited to the grant of leases for twenty years or three lives, was bound to grant such a lease as was warranted by the power. Again, in Bellringer v. Belgrave (20), Knight Bruce, V.C, referred to Mortlock v. Butter (21) and Ord v. Noel (22) and ruled that the Court would not interfere for the purpose of performance of a covenant for renewal such as would enable or assist parties to commit a breach of trust. This view has been repeatedly followed in this Court, see, for instance, Baikuntha v. Sibdas (23), Sarbesh Chandra v. Kshetrapal (24), Moti Das v. Madhusudhan (25), Narayan v. Akshoy (26), Mahommed Esmat v. Nanda Dulal (27) and Khulna Loan Company v. Jahir Goldar . The conclusion follows that in this case the covenant for renewal could not be specifically enforced. Consequently, when upon the expiry of the lease, granted on the 9th March 1901, the lessee held over, the lease was, under sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, read with sec. 106, renewed from month to month. Trailakhya v. Sarat (29), Manilal v. Nandlal (30), see also Clayton v. Blakey (31).

    As a last resort, the Appellant has contended that as he always professed to hold as a permanent lessee, he acquired such status by adverse possession for twelve years from the date of the last lease. This contention is clearly opposed to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Vidya Varuthi v. Valusami , which shows that where the manager of a religious endowment had granted a permanent lease in excess of his authority, the possession of the lessee was not adverse to the endowment during the life of the head who granted the lease. The case before us has no analogy to the decision of the House of Lords in Magdalen College v. Attorney-General , which was applied in Attorney-General v. Davey (34), it rather falls within the rule recognised by the House of Lords in Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts (35), namely, that if any rent has been reserved and received, however small, the legal relation of a tenancy from year to year has been created, and the statute of limitations cannot have run. We hold accordingly that the President has correctly concluded that at the time of the acquisition, the lessee was a tenant from month to month and that his claim to appropriate what is in substance the corpus of the wakf estate has no legal foundation.

    The result is that the decree of the lower Court is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at one hundred rupees. The costs will be paid by the Receiver out of the estate in his hands.

    J.N.R
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Gajendra Nath Dey v. Moulvi Ashraf Hossain .
    (Jun 6, 1922)