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Case Number

Appeals from Appellate Decrees Nos. 2108 to 2113 of 1920

Advocates

Babus Mohendra Nath Roy and Peari Mohan Chatterjec for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Dr. Dwarka Nath Mitter and Babu Probodh Chandra Chatterji for the Defendants-Respondents.

Judges

Mookerjee
Chotzner, JJ.

Acts

Sections 4 and 16 of Act X of 1859 and Sections 4 ,and 17 of Act VIII of 1869 B. C.
Bengal Government, 1881, Section 15, Exp. 1;
Rent Commission, 1880, Section 16, Exp. 1;
Section 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Section 3(5) of the Bengal Tenancy
Sections 28, 29, 30, 53
1884, Section 64(3).

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Six appeals arose from six suits instituted by tenants under Section 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act against their landlords. In the Record of Rights the plaintiffs were recorded as settled raiyats under the defendants; the plaintiffs claimed to be raiyats holding at fixed rents. Each tenant produced rent receipts showing a uniform rent for over twenty years. In each case the rent shown in the receipts was composed partly of cash and partly of the money value of a fixed quantity of paddy (rent in kind). In one illustrative tenancy the rent receipts showed a consolidated cash amount after 1902, whereas earlier receipts had delineated the cash portion separately from the money value of the fixed paddy portion.

The Revenue Officer in the court of first instance held that Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not apply because, in his view, the term "rent" in that Section did not include rent in kind; consequently the suits were dismissed. On appeal the Special Judge adopted the same construction and confirmed dismissal. The tenants appealed to the present Court, contending that Section 50 had been wrongly interpreted by the courts below.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the term "rent" in Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act includes rent payable partly or wholly in kind (produce) as defined by Section 3(5), or whether "rent" in Section 50 must be read as limited to "money-rent".
Whether it is permissible to refer to the Report of the Select Committee (and other legislative proceedings or history) in construing Section 50 and related statutory provisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Tenants)

The tenants argued that Section 50 had been misinterpreted by the courts below and that the statutory definition of "rent" in Section 3(5) (which includes rent payable in money or kind) must be read into Section 50, making the protections and presumptions of Section 50 applicable where rent is paid partly or wholly in kind.
They relied on the textual definition of "rent" in Section 3(5) and on the preponderance of prior judicial decisions recognizing produce rents as capable of being treated as fixed rents for analogous statutory protections.

Respondents (Landlords)

The landlords pressed for a restricted construction of Section 50, submitting that "rent" in that section should be read as limited to money rent and should not include rent in kind.
A principal plank of the landlords' argument was reliance on the legislative history: they pointed to the omission, at the final stage, of a clause that would have expressly extended the twenty-year presumption to produce rents and to the Report of the Select Committee which stated that opinions were generally opposed to making the presumption applicable to produce rents.
They also relied upon certain earlier judicial decisions (including a decision of Jenkins, C.J., to which reference was made) said to imply that rent partly in money and partly in kind cannot be regarded as fixed in amount.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Thakooranee Dossee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee (3 W.R.)	One of a long series of decisions answering affirmatively that a produce rent fixed as to proportion may be treated as a fixed rent for statutory purposes under earlier Acts.	Placed among authorities showing a preponderance of judicial opinion that rents paid in kind can qualify for statutory protection akin to Section 50.
Miterjeet Singh v. Toondun Singh (12 W.R.; 3 B.L.R. App.)	Affirmative authority that produce rents fixed by proportion can be treated as fixed rents; also disapproved Mahomed Yacoob Hossein decision.	Used to demonstrate earlier judicial willingness to treat produce rents as within the notion of a fixed rent.
Ram Dyal Singh v. Luchmee Narain (14 W.R.; 6 B.L.R. App.)	Similar affirmative authority that produce rents can be fixed rents for statutory protection; Jackson J. criticized contrary rulings.	Shown as part of the weight of authority supporting the tenants' construction; demonstrates disapproval of contrary cases.
Jutto Moar v. Basmuttee Koer (15 W.R.)	Included among decisions treating produce-based rents as capable of being fixed rents.	Contributed to the Court's finding of a preponderance of judicial opinion favouring inclusion of produce rents under statutory protection.
Hanuman Parshad v. Kaulesar Pandey (1 A 301; 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 119)	Another authority counted among decisions affirming that produce rents may qualify as fixed rents.	Relied on to show historical judicial treatment favourable to the tenants' position.
Mahomed Yacoob Hossein v. Wahed Ali (4 W.R. Act X Rul. 23)	Represented the contrary judicial opinion that produce rent was not a fixed rent for the relevant statutory purposes.	Cited as part of the minority line of authority; noted that this decision was later disapproved by other cases such as Miterjeet Singh.
Thakoor Pershad v. Nowab Syed Mahomed Baker (8 W.R.)	Another case representing the contrary view that produce rents are not fixed rents.	Identified as part of the minority view which the Court regarded as outweighed by other authorities.
Jotindra Mohan Tagore v. Jarao Kumari (33 C. 140)	Quoted for Sir Arthur Wilson's observation that the statutory definition of "rent" clearly expresses the ordinary meaning.	Used to support the argument that Section 3(5) provides the relevant meaning of "rent".
Baneswar Mukherji v. Umesh Chandra Chakrabarti (7 Ind. Cas. 875; 37 C. 626)	Decision of Jenkins, C.J., mentioned as implying that rent partly in money and partly in kind cannot be regarded as fixed in amount.	The Court observed that this decision did not assist resolution here, noted it turned on document construction and had not been accepted in later decisions.
Nilmadhab Mahapatra v. Keshab Lal (40 Ind. Cas. 819; 26 C.L.J. 94)	Later decision reviewing earlier authorities on rent in kind.	Referenced among subsequent decisions that did not accept the actual decision in Baneswar Mukherji.
Asutosh Mukhopadhya v. Haran Chandra Mukherji (53 Ind. Cas. 382; 30 C.L.J. 41)	Later decision on related questions about rents and their character.	Used to show jurisprudential developments that undermined reliance on Jenkins C.J.'s earlier implication.
Gurudas Sen v. Gobinda Chandra Sinha (54 Ind. Cas. 914)	Another later decision relevant to treatment of rents in kind.	Cited as part of the later authorities inconsistent with treating rent partly in kind as not fixed.
Basiruddi Chowdhuri v. Afsarannessa Bibi (40 Ind. Cas. 833)	Further decision reviewing the law on rents.	Mentioned among authorities that did not accept the restrictive view.
Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick (22 I.A. 107; 22 C. 788; 11 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 522 (P.C.))	Held that proceedings of the legislature (e.g., Select Committee reports) cannot be referred to as legitimate aids in construing an Act of the Indian Legislature; reasons parallel to those excluding such consideration for British statutes.	The Court relied on this Judicial Committee ruling to hold that reference to the Report of the Select Committee was not permissible in construing Section 50.
Administrator-General of Bengal v. Prem Lall Mullick (21 C 732)	The decision of this Court which was reversed by the Judicial Committee in the above-mentioned appeal.	Cited as the decision that was reversed; used to show the authoritative effect of the Judicial Committee's ruling.
Queen-Empress v. Kartick Chunder Das (14 C. 721)	Full Bench decision that had adopted the method of referring to legislative proceedings (mentioned in juxtaposition to the Judicial Committee rule).	Noted as an instance where legislative history had been referred to, but the Court treated the Judicial Committee authority as controlling against such practice.
Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855) 6 De G.M. & G. 1	Recognized that light may be thrown on the scope of a statute by looking at what Parliament was doing contemporaneously and at the history of the statute.	Quoted to show that, in some limited senses, historical material can illuminate scope, but the Court proceeded to show many authorities limiting such use.
Herron v. Rathmines Commissioners (1892) A.C. 498	Authority indicating that a Court may not regard the Bill by which an ambiguous statutory provision was introduced when construing the statute.	Included among authorities illustrating limits on reliance upon legislative history or bill materials.
Miller v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303	Cited as authority that courts should not rely on what has been said in Parliament when construing statutes.	Used to support the proposition that debates in Parliament are not a proper aid to interpretation.
South Eastern Railway Co. v. Railway Commissioners (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 586	Another authority on the inadmissibility of parliamentary debates for statutory construction.	Relied on as part of the body of authorities restricting reference to parliamentary debates and committee proceedings.
Rex v. West Riding of Yorkshire County Council (1906) 2 K.B. 676	Discussed the limits on reference to parliamentary proceedings and the history of clauses; cited for the proposition that antecedent debates are not admissible and are untrustworthy.	Quoted to emphasise that construction must be of the Act as printed and published and not from antecedent committee history.
Martin v. Hemming (1854) 10 Ex. 478	Cited among authorities limiting referenceto legislative history.	Part of the Court's catalogue of cases showing the established rule against using legislative proceedings as constructional aids.
Ewart v. Williams (1854) 3 Drew. 21	Used to illustrate limits on reliance upon committee history or other legislative material.	Included in the list of authorities supporting the exclusionary rule.
Barbat v. Allen (1852) 7 Ex. 609	Authority that the court cannot look at the history of a clause or the introduction of a proviso for construction.	Used to support the principle that antecedent legislative proceedings are not admissible in construing an Act.
R. v. Capel (1840) 12 A. & E. 382	Another authority indicating the inadmissibility of legislative committee history in construction.	Part of the authorities relied upon to exclude the Select Committee report from consideration.
R. v. Whittaker (1848) 2 C. & K. 636	Authority cited for the proposition that debates in Parliament are not admissible for construction.	Reinforced the Court's stance against using parliamentary debates or committee records.
Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter (1850) 5 Ex. 630	Case cited as part of the body of jurisprudence that rejects reliance on parliamentary debate for statutory meaning.	Included among cases supporting the exclusionary principle.
Donegall v. Layard (1860) 8 H.L.C. 460	Authority emphasizing that enquiries into the legislative history cannot legitimately assist construction and alterations in committee do not affect the construction of clauses that became law.	Quoted to underline that rejection of proposed clauses does not change construction of enacted clauses.
Attorney-General v. Sillem (1863) 2 H. & C. 431 (affirmed 1864 10 H.L.C. 704)	Express language (Pollock, C.B.) stating that courts cannot construe statutes by reference to suggested committee alterations or amendments proposed by opponents of a bill.	Quoted to reinforce the principle that committee alterations and suggestions are not legitimate aids to construction.
In re Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1896) 166 U.S. 290	Referred to among foreign decisions illustrating approaches to statutory construction and historical material.	Used to show consonant views in other jurisdictions cautioning about reliance on legislative history.
Gosselin v. R. (1903) 33 Canada S.C. 255	Referred to as a Canadian authority relevant to the admissibility of legislative history in construction.	Included with other Commonwealth decisions that the Court cited to support its view.
Sydney Municipal Council v. Commonwealth (1904) 1 Com. L.R. 208	Australian authority cited on the same point of construction and legislative history.	Relied upon to show international judicial caution about the use of legislative proceedings as constructional aids.
Hilder v. Dexter (1902) A.C. 474	Quoted (Lord Halsbury) for observations relevant to statutory construction and the reliability of antecedent debates.	Used to illustrate authoritative commentary cautioning against reliance on draftsmen's or proponents' post-hoc explanations.
Stradling v. Morgan (1858) 1 Plowden 199	Quoted as stating principles of construction applicable to Acts of Parliament.	Referred to as part of settled principles the Court relied upon in declining to consult Select Committee proceedings.
Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comptroller General (1898) A.C. 571	Quoted approvingly for general principles of statutory construction.	Used as authority supporting established principles that antecedent discussions are not admissible.
Nilmani Kar v. Sati Prasad Garga Bahadur (61 Ind. Cas. 82; 48 C. 556) (F.B.)	Full Bench decision cited approving the principles of construction quoted by the Court.	Referred to as an example where the principles were applied by a Full Bench, reinforcing the Court's conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's approach proceeded in two linked strands: statutory interpretation of Section 50 read with the statutory definition of "rent" in Section 3(5); and assessment of the permissibility and weight (or lack thereof) of legislative history (in particular, the Report of the Select Committee).

1. Textual construction with Section 3(5): The Court observed that Section 50 must be read together with Section 3(5), which defines "rent" to include whatever is lawfully payable or deliverable in money or kind by a tenant to his landlord for use or occupation of land. The Court found nothing repugnant between that definition and Section 50, and therefore the term "rent" in Section 50 may be replaced by the definition in Section 3(5). On that basis the Court concluded that the substantive rule and the presumption in Section 50 apply equally where rent is payable partly or wholly in kind.

2. Legislative history and the Select Committee report: The Court examined the landlords' contention that omission, at the final stage, of an express clause dealing with produce rents (and the Select Committee report saying opinions were generally opposed to making the presumption applicable to produce rents) justified a restricted construction of Section 50. The Court undertook a pointed analysis of whether reference to the Report of the Select Committee is permissible as an aid to statutory construction.

a. The Court held that reference to Select Committee proceedings is not permissible as a legitimate aid when construing an Indian statute. The Court relied principally on the Judicial Committee's ruling in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick, which reversed an earlier local decision and declared that proceedings of the legislature leading to statute provisions are not legitimate aids to construction. The opinion emphasised that the same reasons which exclude consideration of legislative proceedings in construing British statutes are equally cogent for Indian statutes.

b. Even assuming, for argument, that reference to the Select Committee report were permissible, the Court found that the omission of the draft clause did not (and could not) alter the effect of the statutory definition of "rent" contained in Section 3(5) in the enacted Bill. The Court noted that the Bill as enacted contained the comprehensive definition of "rent" and that the mere omission of the draft clause failed to alter the meaning to be given to "rent" in Section 50.

c. The Court reviewed the earlier body of case law dealing with whether produce rents (whether varying in amount year to year but fixed as to share/proportion) could be treated as fixed rents for statutory protection. It found there was a marked preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of treating rents payable in kind, partially or wholly, as within the protective ambit of the statutory presumption analogous to Section 50.

d. The Court therefore concluded that the attempted restrictive construction urged by the landlords (seeking to confine "rent" in Section 50 to money rent) was incorrect. The Court expressly stated that "rent" in Section 50 cannot be restricted to "money-rent" and bears the meaning ascribed to it in Section 3(5).

3. Remedies and costs: On the applied facts (receipts showing uniform rent for over twenty years, albeit partly in kind), the Court allowed the appeals and decreed the suits with costs in all courts; it also fixed the hearing fee in this Court at one gold mohur in each appeal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEALS ALLOWED; SUITS DECREED.

The Court held that:

The term "rent" in Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not restricted to money-rent; it must be read in the light of Section 3(5) and thus includes rent payable in money or in kind.
Accordingly, the substantive rule and statutory presumption in Section 50 apply where a tenure-holder or raiyat and predecessors have held at a rent payable partly in cash and partly in kind (or entirely in kind) for the relevant period.
Reference to the Report of the Select Committee (legislative proceedings) is not a permissible aid to statutory construction in this context; even if such reference were permissible it would not assist the landlords' argument in the present cases.

Consequences for the parties (as given in the opinion):

The six appeals were allowed and the underlying suits were decreed with costs in all the courts below.
The hearing fee in this Court was assessed at one gold mohur for each appeal.

The opinion does not purport to announce any broader rule beyond these holdings; it limits its holdings to the statutory interpretation applied and the concrete relief granted in these appeals.

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Dina Nath Pal v. Raja Sati Prosad Garga Bahadur

1. These six appeals have arisen out of as many suits, instituted by tenants, under Section 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, against their landlords, for the decision of disputes regarding entries which had been made in a finally published Record of Rights. The plaintiffs had been recorded as settled raiyats under the defendants; they claimed that they were raiyats at fixed rents. In support of their contention, they produced rent receipts which showed that each of them had held at a uniform rent for over 20 years. In each case, however, the rent consisted partly of CJPII and partly of the money value of a fixed quantity of paddy. To take ere illustration : in the ease of one tenancy, the amount of rent as shown in the tent receipts was Rs. 20-ia-12gds-2k; this amount is made up of Rs. 18-13a-18gds-2k as cash rent and Rs. 1-3as-14gds as the money value of two kuris 3 mans 1 khupi of paddy. These two items are shown separately in the receipts up to the year 1902, and, thereafter, the consolidated sum alone is shown as cash rent. Similar observations apply to each of the other cases. In these circumstances, the Revenue Officer who tried the suits in the Court of first instance held that Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was not applicable. In his opinion the term 'rent' in that section did not include rent in kind. The result was that the suits were dismissed. On appeal, the Special Judge adopted the same construction of Section 50 and confirmed the decision of the Revenue Officer. In this Court, the tenants have urged that Section 50 has not been correctly interpreted by the Courts below.

2. Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides as follows:

50 (1). Where a tenure-holder or raiyat and his predecessors in-interest have held at a rent or rate of rent which has not been changed from the time of the Permanent Settlement, the rent or rate of rent shall not be liable to be increased except on the ground of an alteration in the area of the tenure or holding.

(2). If it is proved in any suit or other proceeding under this Act that either a tenure-holder or raiyat and his predecessors-in-interest have held at a rent or rate of rent which has not been changed during the twenty years immediately before the institution of the suit or proceeding, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that they have held at that lent or rate of rent from the time of the Permanent Settlement.

3. This section must he read along with Section 3(5) which provides that, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, rent means whatever is lawfully payable or deliverable in money or kind by a tenant to his landlord on account of the use or occupation of the land held by the tenant. This definition is in no way repugnant to the subject or context of Section 50, and the term 'rent' in that Section may well be replaced by its equivalent as given in Section 3(5). This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the substantive rule formulated in Section 50(1) and the presumption embodied in Section 50(2) do not become inapplicable because a tenure-holder or raiyat holds at a rent payable partly in cash and partly in kind or entirely in kind.

4. A determined effort was successfully made in the Courts below on behalf of the landlords--and the attempt has been resolutely repeated here--to place a restricted construction on Section 50, by reference to the report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General which considered the draft of the Bengal Tenancy Bill at the final stage. It is well-kwnon that there was, at one time, some divergence of judicial opinion on the question, whether a produce rent, which, though varying annually with the varying amount of the yearly produce was yet fixed as to the proportion it was to bear to such produce, was a fixed rent for the purposes of Sections 4 and 16 of Act X of 1859 and Sections 4 ,and 17 of Act VIII of 1869 B. C. The question was answered in the affirmative in a long series of decisions; Thakooranee Dossee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee 3 W.R. Act X Rul. 29; Miterjeet Singh v. Toondun Singh 12 W.R. 14 : 3 B.L.R. App 88; Ram Dyal Singh v. Luchmee Narain 14 W.R. 388 : 6 B.L.R. App. 25; Jutto Moar v. Basmuttee Koer 15 W.R. 479; Hanuman Parshad v. Kaulesar Pandey 1 A 301, 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 119. The contrary opinion, however, was maintained in Mahomed Yacoob Hossein v. Wahed Ali 4 W.R. Act X Rul. 23 : 1 Ind. Jur. (N.S.) 20 and Thakoor Pershad v. Nowab Syed Mahomed Baker 8 W.R. 170. But the decision in Yacoob Hossain v. Wahed Ali 4 W.R. Act X Rul. 23 : 1 Ind. Jur. (N.S.) 20 was disapproved in Miterjeet Singh v. Toondun Singh (2) and in Ram Dyal Singh v. Luchmee Narain 14 W.R. 388 : 6 B.L.R. App. 25, Jackson J., when pressed with the decisions in Yacoob Hossain v. Wahed Ali 4 W.R. Act X Rul. 23 : 1 Ind. Jur. (N.S.) 20 and Thakoor Pershad v. Nowab Syud Mahomed Baker 8 W.R. 170 described in graphic terms the injustice of the rule favoured therein :

"I confess I would have considerable difficulty in assenting to the rulings in these cases; because, if the rulings are correct, the Legislature must have intended that raiyats who have held land upon one principle, that is to say, upon one fixed ratio of division of the produce of their land with the landlord, from the time of the Permanent Settlement, would be entitled to no protection whatever, but would after these 80 or 90 years be subject to a suit for enhancement or for commutation of their rent at such money rates as the landlord might be enabled to prove. I cannot believe that the Legislature could have intended any such injustice to raiyats in those parts of the country where the bhaolee system is prevalent as it is in many parts of Behar. In those parts of the country, there being no such thing as a rate of rent in money, raiyats holding from the time of the Permanent Settlement would have no protection whatever, unless the Legislature meant to include under the words rate of rent the mode or principle of bhaolee payment. But it is net necessary for us to determine the case upon this point; if it had been so, I should have been inclined to propose a reference to a Full Bench."

5. There can thus be no doubt that there was a marked preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the view that raiyats who paid their rent in kind, partially, or entirely, were not disentitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption corresponding to the rule now embodied in Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

6. But the respondents have invited our attention to the fact that while legislation, which ultimately culminated in the present Bengal Tenancy Act, was in hand, an attempt made to insert the following Clause, so as to give effect to the view adopted in the majority of judicial opinions, was abandoned:

When a raiyat has paid as rent a fixed share or the value of the fixed share of the produce of the land, the rent or rate of rent shall not be deemed to have been changed within the meaning of this section, merely by reason of the amount paid having varied from year to year, or by reason of the rent having been commuted, with the consent of both the raiyat and his landlord, to a fixed money rent." (Digest of the Law of Landlord and Tenant prepared by C.D. Field, Section 38; Bill prepared by the Rent Commission, 1880, Section 16, Exp. 1; Bill submitted by the Bengal Government, 1881, Section 15, Exp. 1; Bill as introduced in the Legislative Council, 1883, Section 16; Bill as amended by the Select Committee of the Legislative Council, 1884, Section 64(3).

7. This provision was omitted at the final stage, as appears from the following passage from the Report of the Select Committee:

We have omitted from the section, which enacts the well-known presumption arising from holding at a rent unchanged for twenty years, the sub-section which made the presumption applicable to produce rents, as opinions generally were opposed to it." Gazette of India, dated 21st February 1885, Part V, page 64).

8. We shall presently consider whether reference is premissible to the Report of a Select Committee in aid of the interpretation of a statutory provision. But, even if we assume for a moment that such reference is legitimate, it is plainly of no assistance in the present case. The omission of the clause left the Bill as it was, and that Bill, it cannot be overlooked, contain a comprehensive definition of the term 'rent'. Act X of 1859 did not contain a definition of the term 'rent', and this opened up, as is well known, various opportunities for controversies of a recondite character. The Legislature remedied this defect by the insertion of a definition of the term 'rent', in Section 3(5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act--a definition which, as Sir Arthur Wilson observed in Jotindra Mohan Tagore v. Jarao Kumari 33 C. 140 at p. 149 : 3 C.L.J. 7 : 10 C.W.N. 201 : 1 M.L.T. 8 : 33 I.A. 30 (P.C.)

"seems to express very clearly the meaning of the word 'rent' as it would be understood without any satutory definition."

We need not speculate whether the members of the Select Committee fully realised the effect of this definition on the other provisions of the Bill they had then under consideration. But this much is clear that if they intended to alter the current of judicial opinion under the old Law, they unquestionably failed to achieve their purpose by the mere omission of the clause we have mentioned. The result might have been different, if the term 'rent' in Section 50 had been replaced by the phrase 'money rent' which makes its appearance in Sections 28, 29, 30, 53 and 61. We may add that the decision of Jenkins, C.J., in Baneswar Mukherji v. Umesh Chandra Chakrabarti 7 Ind. Cas. 875 : 37 C. 626, which was mentioned in the course of argument, does not assist us in the solution of the question raised before us. That case turned upon the construction of a document then before the Court though, no doubt, it implies the opinion that rent payable partly in money and partly in kind cannot be regarded as fixed in amount. It may further be pointed out that the actual decision in that case has not been accepted in later decisions, which will be found reviewed in Nilmadhab Mahapatra v. Keshab Lal 40 Ind. Cas. 819 : 26 C.L.J. 94; Asutosh Mukhopadhya v. Haran Chandra Mukherji 53 Ind. Cas. 382 : 30 C.L.J. 41 : 23 C.W.N. 1021 : 47 C. 133; Gurudas Sen v. Gobinda Chandra Sinha 54 Ind. Cas. 914 : 24 C.W.N. 85; Basiruddi Chowdhuri v. Afsarannessa Bibi 40 Ind. Cas. 833 : 21 C.W. N. 860. We are, however, of opinion that reference is not permissible to the Report of the Select Committee. The Judicial Committee ruled in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick 22 I.A. 107 : 22 C. 788 : 6 Sar.P.C.J. 603 : 11 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 522 (P.C.), which reversed the decision of this Court in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Prem Lall Mullick 21 C 732 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1118, that reference is not permissible to the proceedings of the legislature which result in the provisions of an Act as legitimate aids to its construction, and Lord Watson observed that the same reasons which exclude their consideration when the clauses of an Act of the British Legislature are under construction, are equally cogent in the case of an Indian Statute. In that case, reference had been made by Petheram, C.J., and Prinsep, J., to the Report of a Select Committee when the Bill, which subsequently became the Administrator-General's Act, was before the legislative Council; Trevelyan, J., had, on the other hand, hesitated to adopt such a course, even though there was precedent in its favour in the Full Bench decision in Queen-Empress v. Kartick Chunder Das 14 C. 721 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 478 (F.B.). The Judicial Committee cannot be deemed to have departed from the rule enunciated by them in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick 22 I.A. 107 : 22 C. 788 : 6 Sar.P.C.J. 603 : 11 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 522 (P.C.), merely because they did not again express their disapproval of a similar method of interpretation adopted by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of In the matter of Parbati Charan Chatterji 22 I.A. 193 : 17 A. 498 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 635 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 644 (P.C.). Lord Watson and Sir Richard Couch were members of the Board on each occasion, and there is no indication that the Judicial Committee had, in the course of a few months, altered their opinion on the subject.

9. As regards the principles which, as indicated by Lord Watson in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick 22 I.A. 107 : 22 C. 788 : 6 Sar.P.C.J. 603 : 11 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 522 (P.C.), (at page 118*), exclude the consideration of proceedings of the Legislature when the clauses of an Act of the British Legislature are under construction, it may be taken as well-settled that, although light may be thrown on the scope of a Statute by looking at what Parliament was doing contemporaneously and at the history of the-Statute : Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855) 6 De G.M. & G. 1 at p. 22 : 106 R.R. 1 : 24 L.J. Ch. 332 : 1 Jur. (N.S.) 481 : 3 W.R. 194 : 3 Eq. Rep. 348 : 43 E.R. 1129; yet even when words in a Statute are so ambiguous that they may be construed in more than one sense, regard may not be had to the Bill by which it was introduced. Herron v. Rathmines Commissioners (1892) A.C. 498 : 67 L.T. 658, nor to what has been said in Parliament: Miller v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303 : 98 E.R. 201; South Eastern Railway Co. v. Ry. Commissioners (1881) 50 L.J.Q.B. 201 : 6. Q.B.D. 586 : 44 L.T. 203 : 45 J.P. 388; Rex v. West Riding of Yorkshire County Council (1906) 2 K.B. 676 at p. 716 : 75 L.J.K.B. 933; or elsewhere: Martin v. Hemming (1854) 10 Ex. 478 : 102 R.R. 686 : 24 L.J. Ex. 3 : 18 Jur. 1002 : 3 W.R. 29 : 156 E.R. 526; Ewart v. Williams (1854) 3 Drew. 21 : 61 E.R. 808 affirmed on appeal (1855) 7 De G. M. & G. 68 : 109 R.R. 32 : 44 E.R. 27. The view has been consistently maintained that the Court cannot look at the history of a clause or of the introduction of a proviso: Barbat v. Allen (1852) 7 Ex. 609 at p. 616 : 21 L.J. Ex. 155 : 16 Jur. 339 : 155 E.R. 1093; R. v. Capel (1840) 12 A. & E. 382 at p. 411, 54 R.R. 580 : 4 P. & D. 87 : 2 L.J. (N.s.) M.C. 65 : 4 Jur. (N.S.) 886 : 113 E.R. 857; nor at debates in Parliament, R. v. Whittaker (1848) 2 C. & K. 636 at p. 640; Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter (1850) 5 Ex. 630 at p. 667 : 82 R.R. 797 : 19 L.J. Ex. 376 : 14 Jur. 876 : 155 B.R. 276 nor at amendments and alterations made in Committees: Donegall v. Layard (1860) 8 H.L.C. 460 at pp. 465, 472, 473 133 R.R. 39 : 11 E.R. 308; Attorney-General v. Sillem (1863) 2 H. & C. 431 at pp. 321, 522 133 R.R. 731 : 33 L.J. Ex. 93 : 10 Jur. (N.S.) 262 9 L.T. (N.S.) 261 : 12 W.R. 257 : 159 E.R. 178 affirmed on appeal (1864) 10 H.L.C. 704 : 10 Jur. (N.S.) 446 : 10 L.T. (N.S.) 434 : 4 N.R. 29 : 13 W.R. 641 : 133 R.R. 382 : 11 B.R. 1200; In Marquis of Donegall v. Layard (1860) 8 H.L.C. 460 at pp. 465, 472, 473 133 R.R. 39 : 11 E.R. 308 at page 472, Lord Campbell observed:

I must lament that his (Smith, M.R., Ireland) zeal to do justice has led him into enquiries respecting this Act of Parliament which could not legitimately assist him in construing it, and which I think unfortunately induced him to change the sound construction which he had twice before put upon it. Surely, the fifth section ought to receive the same construction, whether it was first introduced in the House of Commons or in the House of Lords, and whether it was introduced in the Committee or on the third reading, and whether it was or was not altered after it was introduced. Nor could the rejection of the clauses moved by Lord Beaumont on behalf of the Marquis of Donegall in any way affect the construction of the clauses which were allowed to form part of the Act when it became law.

10. In Attorney-General v. Sillem (1863) 2 H. & C. 431 at pp. 321, 522 133 R.R. 731 : 33 L.J. Ex. 93 : 10 Jur. (N.S.) 262 9 L.T. (N.S.) 261 : 12 W.R. 257 : 159 E.R. 178 affirmed on appeal (1864) 10 H.L.C. 704 : 10 Jur. (N.S.) 446 : 10 L.T. (N.S.) 434 : 4 N.R. 29 : 13 W.R. 641 : 133 R.R. 382 : 11 B.R. 1200, Pollock, C.B., said :

"No Court can construe any Statute, and least of all a criminal Statute, by what Counsel are pleased to suggest were alterations made in Committee by a member of Parliament, who was 'no friend to the Bill', even though the Journals of the House should give some sanction to the proposition. This is not one of the modes of discovering the meaning of an Act of Parliament recommended by Plowden or sanctioned by Lord Coke or Blackstone."

11. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in In re Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1896) 166 U.S. 290 : 41 Law. Ed. 1007, of the Supreme Court of Canada in Gosselin v. R. (1903) 33 Canada S.C. 255 at p. 364 and of the High Court of Australia in Sydney Municipal Council v. Commonwealth (1904) 1 Com. L.R. 208 at p. 213. We may also usefully recall the observations of Lord Halsbury in Hilder v. Dexter (1902) A.C. 474 at p. 476 : 71 L.J. Ch. 781 : 87 L.T. 311 : 51 W.R. 225 : 7 Com. Cas. 258 : 9 Manson 378 : 18 T.L.R. 800.

12.

"I have more than once had occasion to say that, in construing a Statute, I believe the worst person to construe it is the person who is responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which, in fact, has been employed. At the time he drafted the Statute, at all events, he may have been under the impression that he had given full effect to what was intended, but he may be mistaken in construing it afterwards, just because what was in his mind was what was intended, though, perhaps, it was not done."

13. We must further remember that, as pointed out by Farwell, L.J., in Rex v. West Riding of Yorkshire County Council (1906) 2 K.B. 676 at p. 716 : 75 L.J.K.B. 933, we have only to deal with the construction of the Act as printed and published, that is the final word of the legislature as a whole, and the antecedent debates and subsequent statements of opinion or belief are not admissible. But they would be quite untrustworthy in any case. In the case of an Act dealing with a controversial subject, ambiguous phrases are often used designedly, each side hoping to have thereby, expressed its own view, and the belief of each that it has succeeded is more often due to the wish than to any effort of reason. The generality of public understanding is quite incapable of proof and is beside the mark, unless as an appeal to timidity. The principles of construction applicable to Acts of Parliament are well settled; they will be found stated in Stradling v. Morgan (1858) 1 Plowden 199 at p. 204 : 95 E.R. 305, which received the approval of Turner, L.J., in Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855) 6 De G.M. & G. 1 at p. 22 : 106 R.R. 1 : 24 L.J. Ch. 332 : 1 Jur. (N.S.) 481 : 3 W.R. 194 : 3 Eq. Rep. 348 : 43 E.R. 1129, of Lord Hals bury in Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (1898) A.C. 571 at p. 575 : 67 L.J. Ch. 628 : 79 L.T. 195 : 47 W.R. 152 : 15 R.P.C. 476 : 14 T.L.R. 527, and were quoted with approval by the Full Bench in Nilmani Kar v. Sati Prasad Garga Bahadur 61 Ind. Cas. 82 : 48 C. 556 : 32 C.L.J. 302 : 25 C.W.N. 230 (F.B.); they certainly do not admit of any such considerations. We hold accordingly that reference could not be made to the Report of the Select Committee, and that even if reference were permissible, the contention of the landlords would not be advanced thereby.

14. Our conclusion is that in Section 50, the terra 'rent' cannot be restricted to 'money-rent' and that it bears the meaning attributed to it in Section 3, Clause (5). The result is that these appeals are allowed and the suits decreed with costs in all the Courts. The hearing fee in this Court will be assessed at one gold mohur in each appeal.

Dina Nath Pal v. Raja Sati Prosad Garga Bahadur

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Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Tenants)

Respondents (Landlords)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Dina Nath Pal v. Raja Sati Prosad Garga Bahadur

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