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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921 and Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922. The Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921
  • Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921. As regards Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922,
  • Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921
  • Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921 and Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922. The Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921
  • Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921. As regards Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922,
  • Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921
  • Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The testator Monmohan Das died on 2 March 1908 leaving movable and immovable property and the following survivors: two widows (Hemangini Dasi and Bhagwati Sundari Dasi), a son alleged to be of unsound mind (Gubind Chand Das, who died 10 April 1908 leaving a widow Budheswari Dasi), a deceased daughter’s son, and two unmarried daughters (Nanibala and Khudibala). Khudibala later died unmarried. Monmohan Das left a Will appointing six executors and providing that the opinion of the majority of executors should prevail.

The six executors applied for probate; the two widows intervened asserting implied appointment as executrices. On 18 January 1909 probate was granted to the six executors and to the two widows. Two of the six executors subsequently died (circa 1912–1913), after which administration was by the surviving executors and the widows.

A dispute arose between the two widows over the adoption of a boy named Shyamapada Das as a son of the testator. That dispute was settled circa Asar 1325 B.S., by an agreement dividing accumulated income (approximately Rs. 77,000) among the widows, Nanibala and the grandson Sachindra in certain proportions, and Hemangini agreed to execute an ekrar acknowledging the validity of the adoption by Bhagwati. The adopted son Shyamapada subsequently died in Kartick 1325.

In 1919 Hemangini (who alleged non-payment of her portion) instituted suit No. 361 of 1919 for construction of the Will and administration of the estate. The suit named many defendants (four surviving original executors among others). On 16 September 1920 Hemangini filed an application to dispose of the suit by a proposed compromise with three executors (Defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5) under which she would receive Rs. 24,500 from the estate. An affidavit filed by Rakhal Chandra Das noted that the proposed compromise was beneficial to the infant Defendant No. 14 but that the guardian ad litem (Defendant No. 1, Sreemati Bhagwati Dasi) refused to consent; it sought removal of Defendant No. 1 and appointment of Girish Chunder Das (the natural father of the infant) as guardian ad litem. Girish Chunder Das filed a petition on 18 September 1920 seeking appointment as guardian ad litem.

The proposed compromise, as drafted, involved Hemangini relinquishing claims and recognising Defendant No. 14 (an adopted minor) as sole heir in return for the Rs. 24,500 payment. The application to approve the compromise was contested by Sreemati Bhagwati and by a dissenting executor, Madanmohan Das, before the Sub-Judge. A separate application to the District Judge sought permission to compromise and sanction the Rs. 24,500 payment; the Sub-Judge reported on 7 October 1920 that the petition should be approved, but recorded on the order-sheet that the Sub-Judge would await the District Judge's order and directed the plaintiff to file a certified copy of the District Judge's order.

The District Judge, on 8 October 1920, expressed reservations about approving the compromise, referring to charges of mal-administration and describing the proposed Rs. 24,500 payment as a potentially improper, dictatorial demand; he advised determination of the administration suit by regular course. A fresh application to compromise was then filed on 4 December 1920 including a prayer for removal of Defendant No. 1 as guardian ad litem and appointment of Girish Chunder Das.

On 15 December 1920 the Sub-Judge refused to remove Defendant No. 1 and refused to appoint Girish Chunder Das, holding there were not sufficient grounds; the Sub-Judge further observed that a second administration suit already commenced by Defendant No. 1 meant the proposed compromise would not end the litigation, and accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's application. The plaintiff and Defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5 appealed from that original order.

Several ancillary Civil Rules were before the Court: Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921 (against an order of the District Judge dated 9 October 1920 refusing permission to make over War Bonds worth Rs. 15,000 to the plaintiff in part satisfaction of a claim for Rs. 24,000), Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921 (by Defendant No. 10 against an order dated 15 December 1920 expunging names of Defendants Nos. 10 and 12), and Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922 (by Defendant No. 1 Sreemati Bhagwati Dasi seeking appointment of a Receiver of the estate pending appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Sub-Judge was precluded from reconsidering and changing the view he had earlier expressed in his report to the District Judge on 7 October 1920.
  2. Whether the Court below ought to have found that Defendant No. 1 (the guardian ad litem of the infant Defendant No. 14) was acting fraudulently or against the infant's interests in opposing the proposed compromise, and therefore should have been removed and replaced by Girish Chunder Das (or another guardian ad litem).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Sub-Judge's final findings were inconsistent with his own earlier report to the District Judge of 7 October 1920 and therefore the Sub-Judge was precluded from changing his opinion.
  • The Sub-Judge should have held on the facts that Defendant No. 1 was acting fraudulently in opposing the compromise; accordingly, the Court should have removed Defendant No. 1 from the guardianship of the infant and appointed Girish Chunder Das (or another suitable person) as guardian ad litem.

The opinion records that other parties (notably Sreemati Bhagwati and the dissenting executor Madanmohan Das) vigorously contested applications before the Sub-Judge, but the text does not set out their detailed legal arguments in the judgment here.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Re: Birchall: Wilson v. Birchall The established rule that a court cannot force a compromise upon infants against the opinion of their guardian or next friend; if a guardian is acting improperly and against the infant's interests, the court may remove and substitute the guardian. The Court applied this principle to hold that it could not enforce the proposed compromise against the guardian's objection absent clear proof that the guardian was acting contrary to the infant's interests; because the record did not show the proposed compromise to be manifestly and entirely for the minor's benefit and because litigation over the estate would continue notwithstanding the compromise, the Court upheld the Sub-Judge's refusal to remove the guardian or to force the compromise.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the two principal contentions in turn.

On the first contention (alleged inconsistency between the Sub-Judge's report to the District Judge of 7 October 1920 and his later order of 15 December 1920), the Court observed that nothing on the record legally bound the Sub-Judge to the opinion he had earlier expressed in a report. A judicial officer is free to reconsider and change views prior to the making of a final order. Although the appellants might legitimately feel aggrieved at the change of view, the Court concluded that the Sub-Judge was not precluded from arriving at a different conclusion when finally disposing of the matter; accordingly the first contention failed.

On the second contention (that the guardian ad litem ought to have been removed for acting fraudulently or against the infant's interests), the Court began by stating the established principle: while a court may and must approve a compromise on behalf of infants, it will not force a compromise upon infants against the opinion of their guardian or next friend. The Court cited Re: Birchall (Wilson v. Birchall) for this proposition and acknowledged that, if a guardian were acting improperly and against the infant's interests, the court could remove and substitute the guardian.

Applying that principle to the present record, the Court concluded that it was not possible at the interlocutory stage to say that the terms of the proposed compromise were so plainly for the infant's benefit that further inquiry should be foreclosed and the compromise immediately enforced. The Court noted several material considerations:

  • The proposed compromise would not terminate all litigation about the estate because important questions of Will construction remained to be determined and a second administration suit had been initiated by Defendant No. 1.
  • The allegation that the second suit was malafide (instituted only to frustrate the compromise) was an allegation, not proof; the record did not enable the appellate Court to pronounce on that charge.
  • The Court had not seen the Will nor heard detailed arguments on the parties' competing rights; paragraphs 9 to 13 of the plaint raised matters requiring investigation.
  • Given the absence of decisive materials showing that the guardian was acting against the infant's interest, the Sub-Judge's refusal to remove the guardian and to appoint Girish Chunder Das could not be said to be unsustainable.

On ancillary procedural points, the Court held that the order complained of under Or. 1, r. 10, C.P.C. (which led to Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921) did not fall within the purview of section 115 of the C.P.C., and declined to make orders in respect of Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The primary appeal (Appeal from Original Order No. 9) was dismissed. The Court specifically held that (a) the Sub-Judge was not precluded from changing his earlier opinion and (b) there was no sufficient basis on the record to remove Defendant No. 1 as guardian ad litem or to compel the compromise in favour of the infant without further inquiry.

Consequential rulings recorded in the judgment:

  • DISPOSED OF: The Appeal from Original Order was dismissed with costs assessed at 5 gold mohurs.
  • Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921 must also fail (no order for costs as regards Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921 was made).
  • No orders were considered necessary in respect of Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922.
  • Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921 was discharged with costs assessed at 2 gold mohurs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Sub-Judge's order of 15 December 1920 stands and the guardian ad litem (Defendant No. 1) was not removed; the proposed compromise was not sanctioned without further inquiry. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond applying the settled principle (as cited) that compromises cannot be forced on infants against the opinion of their guardian. No broader or novel principle was announced in this judgment beyond the application of established practice to the facts of the case.

Source: The judgment text provided to the Analyst. All statements in this summary are drawn exclusively from that text.

    Hemangini Dasi And Ors. v. Bhagwati Sundari Dasi And Ors.

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    The facts which have given rise to this appeal and to the connected rules, shortly stated, are as follows:—One Monmohan Das, who was possessed of considerable, properties, both moveable and immoveable, died on the 2nd March 1908 leaving him surviving his two widows Hemangini Dasi and Bhagwati Sundari Dasi and a son, alleged to be of unsound mind, named Gubind Chand Das by the said Srimati Bhagwati Sundari Dasi, a deceased daughter's son and two unmarried daughters named Nanibala and Khudibala by the said Bhagwati Sundari and Hemangini respectively. The said Khudibala died unmarried some time in 1320 B.S Gobind Chand Das died on the 10th April 1908 without any issue leaving him surviving his widow Srimati Budheswari Dasi. Monmohan Das left a Will by which he appointed six executors and the Will directed that in the event of there being difference of opinion between the executors in respect of any matter relating to the estate of the testator, the opinion of the majority should prevail. Application having been made by the said six executors for probate of the said Will, the said two widows intervened and applied to be appointed as executrices' on the ground that they had been appointed impliedly so under the said Will. On the 18th January 1909, probate of the said Will was granted by the District Judge of Rajshahi to the said six executors and to the said two widows. Some time in 1912-1913 two out of the said six executors died and thereafter the estate was administered by the surviving executors and by the two widows. In 1319 Nanibala was married to one Lalitmohan Poddar and a dispute subsequently arose between the two widows regarding the adoption of a boy named Shyamapada Das as a son to the testator. This dispute was composed some time in Asar 132-5 when it was settled between the parties that the accumulations of the income of the estate amounting to Rs. 77,000 should be divided between the, two widows, Nanibala and the grandson (Sachindra) of the testator in certain proportions and that Heraangini Dasi should execute an ekrar in favour of her co-widow acknowledging the validity of the adoption by her of the said Shyamapada Das. In Kartick 1325 the adopted son Shyamapada Das died. In 1919 Heman gini Dasi who had not been paid her portion of the said accumulations instituted a suit, being suit No. 361 of 1919, for construction of the said Will and for administration of the estate of the said testator. The Defendants in that suit were no less than 14 in number, i.e, the four surviving original executors and certain other parties, the relationship between whom appears from the following genealogical table:—

    On the 16th September 1920, the Plaintiff Hemangini filed a petition praying that the suit may be disposed of in accordance with certain terms of compromise arrived at between her of the one part and three of the executors, namely, Defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5 of the other part. One of the terms of the said compromise was that a sum of Rs. 24,500 should be paid out of the estate of the said testator to Hemangini in accordance with terms of settlement of Asar 1325. Along with this petition of compromise, an affidavit by one Rakhal Chandra Das was filed in which it was pointed out that although the proposed compromise was beneficial to the infant Defendant No. 14, the Defendant No. 1 as the guardian ad litem of the said infant had refused to give her consent to the said settlement and that in the circumstances it was necessary that Defendant No. 1 should be removed and another person, namely, one Girish Jhunder Das, the natural father of the infant, should be appointed guardian ad litem in place of the Defendant No. 1 Sreemati Bhagwati Dasi. The Defendant No. 14, it may be noted here, was adopted as a son by Sreemati Bhagwati after the death of Shyamapada Das who has been referred to above. On the 18th September 1920, the said Girish Chunder Das filed a petition praying that be may be appointed guardian ad litem of the minor Defendant No. 14 in place of Sreemati Bhagwati. By the terms of the proposed compromise the junior widow, i.e, the Plaintiff relinquished all claims to the estate of the said testator and admitted the validity of the second adoption recognising the minor adopted son of the senior widow, namely, the Defendant No. 14, as the sole heir to the said estate; but these admissions and the withdrawal were made conditional on the payment to the Plaintiff of the said sum of Rs. 24,500. The applications referred to above were vigorously contested by the other widow Sreemati Bhagwati and the dissenting executor Madanmohan Das before the Sub-Judge before whom the administration suit was pending; but meanwhile a separate application had been brought on by the Plaintiff before the District Judge for permission to compromise the said suit, in terms of the draft petition of the compromise filed before the Sub-Judge and for sanction to the payment of Rs. 24,500 out of the said estate to the Plaintiff. The District Judge called for a report from the Sub-Judge. The latter reported on the 7th October 1920 that, the petition of compromise should be approved of by the Court; but in disposing of the application filed by the Plaintiff he recorded the following order on the 7th October 1920 in the order-sheet, of the said suit No. 361 of 1919:— “An application has been made before the District Judge for permission to compromise this suit according to the draft solenama filed before me and for sanction for the payment of Rs. 24,500 to the Plaintiff. The District Judge has called for my report which will be submitted tomorrow. It is not desirable and proper that, final orders should be passed by this Court in the matter until the application pending before the District Judge is disposed of. It is necessary that the matter should be reconsidered in the light of the order passed by the District. Judge. Plaintiff is directed to file a certified copy of the District Judge's order. Put up on the 29th November 1920 for further hearing.”

    It appears that the learned District Judge after perusing the report of the learned Sub-Judge expressed himself in the following manner on the 8th October 1920 against the acceptance of the compromise:—“Circumspection is very necessary owing to the charges of mal-administration urged by the junior widow herself as Plaintiff. I also do not feel safe in expressing approval of the terms, the payment of Rs. 24,500 for which a somewhat dictatorial demand is made is such that it looks as if this were the raison d'etre of the solenama. The questionably advisable payment of Rs. 24,500 will not save the estate from litigation and the safest course is to seek for a surer basis in the determination of the administration suit in regular course.” Thereafter a fresh application to compromise the suit on the terms which had already been mentioned to the Court was filed before the learned Sub-Judge on the 4th December 1920, on behalf of the Plaintiff and Defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5 containing, among others, the following prayer: “That an order may be passed that the Defendant No. 1 may be removed from the guardianship of the minor Defendant. No. 14 in connection with this suit for the reason of his offering opposition to the amicable settlement against the interest of the said minor Defendant. No. 14 and that the aforenamed Girish Chunder Das, the natural father of the minor Defendant No. 14 may be appointed his guardian ad litem.”

    On the 15th December 1920, the Sub-Judge by his order of that date held that there were not sufficient grounds for the removal of Defendant No. 1 and for the appointment, of Girish Chunder Das as guardian ad litem of Defendant No. 14 in place of Defendant No. 1. He further held that inasmuch as a second suit for administration of the said estate had already been commenced by the Defendant No. 1 on behalf of herself and as next friend of her adopted son and by the dissenting executor, the proposed compromise, even if given effect to, would not end the litigation relating to the estate and he accordingly dismissed the Plaintiff's application. Against this last mentioned order, the present appeal from original order has been preferred by the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5. The Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921 is directed against the order of the District Judge, dated the 9th October 1920, refusing permission to make over War Bonds of the value of Rs. 15,000 to the Plaintiff in part satisfaction of her claim for Rs. 24,000. The Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921 which was obtained by the Defendant. No. 10, who is the husband of the said Nanibala, is directed against Order No. 178 in the order-sheet, dated the 15th December 1920 by which the names of the Defendants Nos. 10 and 12 were expunged from the record of suit No. 361 of 1919. Lastly, the Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922 was obtained by the Defendant No. 1 Sreemati Bhagwati Dasi calling upon the Plaintiff and the said Defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5 to show cause why a Receiver should not be appointed of the estate of the said testator pending the hearing of the said appeal from Original Order No. 9 of 1921.

    On behalf of the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5 who are the Appellants before us, it has been contended in the first place that the findings of the Court below are inconsistent with its own findings contained in the report submitted to the District Judge on the 7th October 1920, and in the second place the Court below ought to have held on the facts on the record that the Defendant No. 1 was acting fraudulently in opposing the said compromise and accordingly the Court below should have removed the Defendant No. 1 from the guardianship of the infant Defendant and should have appointed Girish Chunder Das or some other person as guardian ad litem of the infant Defendant in place of the Defendant No. 1.

    As regards the first contention we do not think that the learned Sub-Judge was precluded from reconsidering the matter by reason of what he had said in his report to the learned District Judge on the 7th October 1920. There may perhaps be room for criticism as regards the terms of the order made by the District Judge on the 8th October 1920; but it must he remembered that order was invited by the applicants themselves on their application made to the District Judge. There may also perhaps be room for criticism of the terms in which the order of the 7th October 1920 was expressed by the learned Sub-Judge; but after all said and done, what was there on the record which tied down the learned Sub-Judge to the opinion which he had expressed in his report to the learned District Judge? It was no doubt irritating to the Appellants when they found that in his final order, dated the 15th December 1920, the learned Sub-Judge had expressed an opinion contrary to that contained in his report to the learned District Judge; but, in law and on the facts of this case, the learned Sub-Judge was free to change his opinion as often as he liked until he had definitely made a final order, which, as will be seen from the above, was not made till the 15th December 1920. There is therefore no substance in the Appellants' first contention and it accordingly fails.

    As regards the second contention, it is settled law that although the Court can and must approve of a compromise on behalf of infants, it cannot and will not force one upon them against the opinion of their next friend or guardian ad litem in the action. In the case of Re: Birchall: Wilson v. Birchall (where Jessel, M.R, stated the practice adopted by himself and his predecessor Lord Romilly, M.R) it was definitely ruled that no compromise can be enforced upon infants against the opinion of their guardian or next friend. No doubt if the Court found that a guardian or next friend was acting improperly and against the infant's interests in refusing to assent to an arrangement which appeared clearly beneficial to them, steps might be taken to remove him and substitute some other person. These being the principles to be borne in mind, can it be said in this case that the action of the learned Sub-Judge in refusing to remove the Defendant No. 1 and in refusing to appoint Girish Chunder Das in place of the Defendant No. 1 is unsustainable? We have anxiously considered the whole of the record and we have come to the conclusion that it is impossible for us to say at this stage of the litigation that the terms of the proposed compromise are so entirely for the benefit of the minor that no further enquiry should be made into the validity of the Plaintiff's claim for Rs. 24,500 and that she should straightway get a decree for Rs. 24,500 to be paid out of the estate of the testator. Further, as has been pointed out by the lower Court, this compromise, even if given effect to, will not end the litigation relating to the estate of the said testator, for important questions of construction of the Will of the said testator have been raised and whether in this suit or in the suit started by the Defendant No. 1 they will have to be determined by the Court. It is said, however, that the second suit, for administration at the instance of the Defendant No. 1 is a malâ fide suit and has been instituted only with a view to prevent the compromise referred to above being sanctioned by the Court. It is sufficient for us to observe that allegation is not proof and that on the materials on the record at this stage it is difficult to express an opinion on the merits of this accusation. We have not seen the Will of the testator nor have we heard any argument before us as regards the rights of the various parties in this case in and to the estate of the said testator: the matters alleged by the Plaintiff in paras. 9 to 13 of her plaint clearly call for investigation: we have no materials before us which enable us to say that an enquiry into these matters should be burked and the disputes adjusted in the manner proposed by the Plaintiff. For these reasons in our opinion the second contention is equally untenable. The Appeal from Original Order No. 9 must therefore be dismissed. With it must also fail Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921. As regards Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922, no orders are now necessary. As regards Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921 the order complained of was one under Or. 1, r. 10, C.P.C and in our opinion it does not come within the purview of sec. 115, C.P.C The result therefore is that Appeal from Original Order is dismissed with costs which we assess at 5 gold mohurs. There will be no order for costs as regards Civil Rule No. 49 of 1921 and Civil Rule No. 593M of 1922. The Civil Rule No. 140 of 1921 is discharged with costs which we assess at 2 gold mohurs.

    S.C.C

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    Hemangini Dasi And Ors. v. Bhagwati Sundari Dasi And Ors.
    (Feb 8, 1923)