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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act of 1870, Lord
  • Act. Therefore Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act
  • Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act (7 of 1913)
  • Companies Arrangement Act of 1870 or Section 153
  • Section 38 of the English Companies Act, 1907,
  • provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913.
  • Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act
  • Section 153 of the English Act of 1929
  • Section 2 of the Arrangement Act, 1870,
  • Companies Consolidation Act of 1908
  • SECTION 153 COMPANIES ACT
  • Companies Arrangement Act of 1870.
  • SECTION 271 COMPANIES ACT
  • SECTION 277 COMPANIES ACT
  • English Companies Act, 1862,
  • Indian) Companies, Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act of 1870, Lord
  • Act. Therefore Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act
  • Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act (7 of 1913)
  • Companies Arrangement Act of 1870 or Section 153
  • Section 38 of the English Companies Act, 1907,
  • provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913.
  • Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act
  • Section 153 of the English Act of 1929
  • Section 2 of the Arrangement Act, 1870,
  • Companies Consolidation Act of 1908
  • SECTION 153 COMPANIES ACT
  • Companies Arrangement Act of 1870.
  • SECTION 271 COMPANIES ACT
  • SECTION 277 COMPANIES ACT
  • English Companies Act, 1862,
  • Indian) Companies, Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application under Section 153 of the Companies Act by three creditors of the Travancore National and Quilon Bank Ltd., seeking to call a meeting of creditors to consider and approve a scheme of arrangement proposed between the bank and its members and creditors. The bank was formed in 1937 by amalgamating two banks incorporated in Travancore State, with its registered office in Quilon and central office in Madras. The bank had extensive operations across British India and beyond, with approximately 55,000 creditors and 4,000 shareholders.

Due to an unprecedented run on the bank, the bank temporarily suspended business on 21st June 1938, leading to winding up petitions filed in multiple jurisdictions including the District Court of Quilon and this Court. Provisional liquidators were appointed in July 1938. The Travancore Court passed a final winding up order, and similar proceedings were ongoing in Secunderabad and Ceylon. The present application seeks to avert winding up by proposing a scheme supported by creditors holding claims worth 87 lakhs of rupees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 153 of the Companies Act applies to a foreign company such as the Travancore National and Quilon Bank Ltd.
  2. Whether an application under Section 153 can be made before an order for winding up is passed.
  3. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application given the winding up order passed by the Travancore Court.
  4. Whether the scheme proposed is practicable, lawful, and in the interests of creditors to justify calling a meeting under Section 153.
  5. The scope and exercise of the Court's discretion under Section 153 in directing a meeting of creditors.
  6. The relationship between principal and ancillary winding up proceedings in different jurisdictions and the effect on the scheme's sanction.
  7. The propriety of the Court passing an order for winding up in this jurisdiction notwithstanding the winding up order in Travancore.

Arguments of the Parties

Opposing Creditors' Arguments

  • Section 153 does not apply to foreign companies, particularly before a winding up order is made.
  • After winding up, only the official liquidator can initiate an application under Section 153, not individual creditors.
  • The application under Section 153 must be initiated in the Court of incorporation (Travancore Court), not this Court.
  • The present application is not in respect of winding up and thus not maintainable.
  • The proposed scheme is impracticable, illusory, and detrimental to creditors' interests.
  • The scheme contains defects such as improper issuance of preference shares, inadequate shareholder liability, and potential director control.
  • The scheme is not based on accurate information and lacks bona fide support.
  • Public confidence in the bank is shaken, making reconstruction unfeasible.
  • The costs of liquidation are not as high as claimed to justify the scheme.
  • The Court lacks jurisdiction to direct a meeting of all creditors given multiple winding up proceedings.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Section 153 applies to foreign companies and to companies both going concerns and in liquidation.
  • Creditors and members have the right to initiate applications under Section 153, even after winding up orders.
  • This Court has jurisdiction since the central administrative control and principal place of business is in Madras.
  • The scheme aims to avert winding up and has the support of a large body of creditors.
  • Objections to the scheme can be addressed or modified at the creditors’ meeting.
  • The scheme is based on available information and a fuller report can be obtained to inform creditors.
  • It is in the creditors’ commercial interest to consider the scheme rather than proceed with winding up.
  • The Court should exercise its discretion to call a meeting and ascertain the wishes of the majority of creditors.
  • The scheme provides a practical alternative to costly and complex winding up proceedings in multiple jurisdictions.

Official Liquidator and Advocate-General

  • The Official Liquidator of Travancore has indicated willingness to cooperate with liquidation proceedings in this Court.
  • The Advocate-General represented the Official Liquidator and assisted the Court but did not take a position on the application’s merits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1893) 3 Ch 385 Principles on winding up of companies with branches in different jurisdictions; discretion to call meetings of creditors; majority rule in creditor meetings; Court’s discretion in sanctioning schemes. Used extensively to interpret Section 153, the concept of principal and ancillary liquidation, and the Court’s discretion in calling meetings and sanctioning schemes.
(1932) 2 Ch 196 Ancillary winding up and the independence of foreign Courts in liquidation proceedings. Supported the view that this Court is not subordinate to the Travancore Court and can independently control winding up of assets within its jurisdiction.
(1898) AC 349 Effect of foreign winding up orders and schemes on creditors in other jurisdictions. Confirmed that a winding up or scheme sanctioned in one jurisdiction does not bind creditors in another without sanction by that jurisdiction's Court.
(1936) AC 405 Distinction between winding up and dissolution of a company. Clarified that winding up does not dissolve the company and the Court can exercise discretion in winding up unregistered companies.
(1858) 44 ER 1028 Preference for compulsory winding up over voluntary winding up; weight of creditors’ majority opinion. Used to illustrate the Court’s role in considering creditors’ views on winding up or reconstruction schemes.
(1897) WN 48 Sanction of schemes in multiple jurisdictions and necessity of winding up order to bind creditors. Supported the practice of initiating schemes in one Court and seeking sanction in others.
Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 Procedure and jurisdiction for compromise or arrangement between company and creditors/members. Central statutory provision under consideration, interpreted to apply to foreign companies and to empower the Court to call meetings and sanction schemes.
Section 271 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 Conditions under which unregistered companies can be wound up and jurisdictional rules. Used to establish jurisdiction of this Court over winding up of foreign companies and to reject automatic deference to Travancore Court.
Section 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870 (English law) Scope of arrangement provisions including foreign creditors within jurisdiction. Interpreted to support inclusiveness of creditors in meetings under Section 153.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the applicability of Section 153 of the Companies Act to a foreign company, concluding that the definition of “company” includes foreign (unregistered) companies liable to be wound up under the Act. The Court interpreted the term “Court” in the context of a foreign company as the Court in which the company is liable to be wound up, which in this case includes the present Court by virtue of Section 271.

The Court rejected the argument that an application under Section 153 can only be made after a winding up order or only by the liquidator, holding that creditors and members retain the right to initiate such applications even after winding up orders.

Regarding jurisdiction, the Court analyzed principles of international and private international law, including English case law, to determine the “principal domicile” of the company for winding up purposes. It found that the place of central management and control (Madras) could be the principal domicile, but did not conclusively decide this, instead assuming Travancore as principal domicile for the present.

The Court emphasized that ancillary winding up proceedings are not subordinate to principal proceedings and that this Court has independent jurisdiction over assets and creditors within its territory. It rejected the contention that the scheme must be initiated in the Travancore Court, holding that it can be initiated and provisionally sanctioned here and subsequently adopted by other Courts.

On the merits of the scheme and the exercise of discretion under Section 153, the Court recognized that its discretion to call a meeting is limited and should not be exercised to reject schemes at the proposal stage unless they are illegal or incapable of modification. The Court examined the objections raised, including concerns about share issuance, shareholder liability, director control, accuracy of information, bona fides, and public confidence. It found none of these objections sufficient to refuse circulation of the scheme to creditors for their consideration, noting that many objections can be addressed or modified at the meeting.

The Court directed the provisional liquidators to procure accurate information on the bank's affairs and submit a report to enable creditors to make informed decisions. It acknowledged the complexity of simultaneous winding up proceedings in multiple jurisdictions and the necessity for cooperation among Courts.

Finally, the Court exercised its discretion to pass an order for winding up the bank in this jurisdiction to protect assets and creditors' interests, appointing official liquidators independent of foreign control.

The Court issued detailed directions for convening separate meetings of creditors and shareholders, including service of notices, advertisements in multiple newspapers, and arrangements for proxies and chairmanship, aiming to ascertain the wishes of the majority of creditors and shareholders regarding the scheme.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that Section 153 of the Companies Act applies to foreign companies and that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 153 even after a winding up order has been made by the Court of incorporation.

The Court further held that creditors and members have the right to initiate such applications, not only the official liquidator.

The Court exercised its discretion to order a meeting of the creditors and shareholders to consider the proposed scheme of arrangement, and also passed an order for winding up the bank in this jurisdiction to protect British Indian assets.

The Court’s order ensures that the creditors within its jurisdiction can participate in the decision-making process regarding the scheme and that the liquidation proceedings here are conducted independently and equitably. No new precedent was set beyond the application and interpretation of existing principles and statutes. The decision facilitates cooperation among multiple Courts conducting simultaneous winding up proceedings and recognizes the practical necessity of initiating schemes in the jurisdiction controlling the central administration and majority of creditors.

    Travancore National And Quilon Bank, Ltd., In Re

    1. This is an application under Section 153 of the Companies Act, by three creditors of the Travancore National and Quilon Bank Ltd., purporting to be on behalf of a large body of creditors of the said bank in the above O.P No. 158 of 1938 a petition for the winding up of the said company now pending. The application prays for an order that a meeting of the creditors should be called for the purpose of considering and-approving with or without modifications a scheme of arrangement proposed to be made between the said bank and its members and creditors. Several objections have been raised both as to the maintainability of the application and as to the propriety and desirability of calling a meeting of the creditors by this Court. Before dealing with them it is necessary to state a few facts. The Travancore National and Quilon Bank Ltd. was constituted by the amalgamation in 1937 of two separate banks, the Travancore National Bank Ltd. and the Qnilon Bank Ltd. The Travancore National Bank was incorporated in the State of Travancore in 1912 and Quilon Bank was also incorporated in the same State in the-year 1919. The name of the Travancore National Bank after its amalgamation with the Quilon Bank was changed into the Travancore National and Quilon Bank. The registered office of the bank after the amalgamation was situate in Quilon within the jurisdiction of the Travancore State and is still situate there, but the central office of the bank was established in Madras and the bank also complied with the-requirements of Section 277 of the Companies Act, by filing with the Eegistrar, Joint Stock Companies, Madras, the necessary documents required by the said Section. In the return the principal office of the company was-stated to be at Christian College Buildings, Esplanade, Madras. The company did extensive banking business and its assets are reputed to be over three crores of rupees. The company has 80 branches of which 19 are in the State of Travancore, 4 in the State of Cochin, 1 in the State of Pudukottah, 2 in the State of Mysore, 1 in the State of Hyderabad, 1 in Coorg, 4 in Ceylon, 3 in Bombay, 1 in Bengal, 1 in Delhi, 1 in Orissa, 2 in the Bangalore Cantonment, 1 in Secunderabad and 40 in the Presidency of Madras. The creditors of the bank number about, 55,000 and the shareholders are about 4000. The majority of the share, holders and creditors are in British India. It is stated in the affidavit that the bank was directed and managed from the central office in Madras by its Managing Director and Joint Managing Director. This has not been contradicted in any of the affidavits filed on behalf of the opposing creditors. The policy of the Bank was directed from the Central Office as aforesaid and from the affidavit filed by Mr. K.M Eapen the centre of administrative control was in Madras. All the branches including the branches in Travancore and other States, have to send their statements of account and other returns to the Central Office at Madras and they have to take orders from the Central Office for all matters connected with the business in their respective branches. All the information regarding the assets and liabilities of all the branches was available at Madras and only those books which were statutorily required to be kept under the Travancore Companies Regulation were kept at the Registerad Office at Quilon. Owing to an unprecedented run on the bank for some months before 21st June 1938, the Bank, it is stated, was obliged to make an announcement in the terms of fix. B, wherein it is stated that the Bank was obliged to adjourn its business temporarily and that all transactions of the Bank including receipts and payments would be adjourned until 1st July 1938. This announcement led to the making of applications for the winding up of the Bank both in Travancore and in Madras and steps being taken in various places for safeguarding the assets of the Bank. An application seems to have been presented in the District Court of Quilon on 23rd June 1938, by a creditor of the Bank for winding up the Bank. A similar application was made on 27th June 1938 by one Mr. Barkat Ali, a creditor in this Court. On the said application my learned brother Stodart J. appointed Mr. J.V Pirrie and Mr. G. Gill, provisional liquidators on 2nd July 1938 and the said provisional liquidators have been functioning from the said date. There was an appeal against the said order but the order has since been confirmed. On 29th July 1938 I gave directions for the advertisement of the petition for winding up and posted it for hearing on 19th August and the said directions have been complied with. This application was moved ex parte before me on 12th August and I directed it to be posted on 18th August. Meanwhile, proceedings for the winding up of the bank in Travancore went on and an order for winding up was made by the District Court of Quilon which has since been confirmed by the High Court of Travancore and the said order has become final so far as the State of Travancore is concerned. It also appears from the affidavit filed in support of the application that the creditors have also moved the Courts in Secunderabad and in Ceylon and proceedings for winding up are going on in the said places. This application has been made evidently with the object of averting the winding up and a scheme has been put forward. It is stated in the affidavit that it has got the support of a large body of creditors to the value of 87 lakhs of rupees.

    2. Under Sec. 153 on an application of this nature, if the English practice has to be followed, which is also the practice to be followed under R. 108 of the Original Side Rules, in the absence of any rules on the subject either in the Act or in the Original Side Rules, the requisite notice for calling a meeting of the members and creditors has to be issued with appropriate directions in regard to the place and time of meeting and such other matters which in the exercise of its discretion the Court may choose to direct. But as I have already stated, objections have been taken to the maintainability of the petition and also to the propriety of the exercise of my discretion in the particular case. Some creditors have supported the petition; others have opposed it. The Official Liquidator of Travancore is represented by the learned Advocate-General who represented to the Court that he was instructed to appear for the Official Liquidator and intimate to the Court that his client, the Official Liquidator of Travancore would co-operate in the matter of liquidation proceedings in this Court. He more than once emphasised that he was there simply to notify his presence in this Court on behalf of the Official Liquidator of Travancore and to intimate that fact to me. Beyond that the said Official Liquidator has not taken any part either in opposing or in supporting the petition and whatever was urged by the learned Advocate-General was partly to assist the Court and partly in his own capacity as a creditor of the Bank.

    3. Objections to the maintainability of the application may be formulated thus: (1) In the case of a foreign company, S. 153 is not applicable at all, at any rate, is not applicable before an order for winding up as made in this Court. (2) Even if an order for winding up is made, the application can only be maintained by the Official Liquidator. (3) The application under Section 153 in the case of a foreign company cannot be initiated in this Court but must only be initiated in the Court of the place where it was incorporated, at any rate, after an order for winding up has been made by that Court. (4) In the case of a foreign company there can be no application to avert a winding up and the application if at all must be with respect to the winding up and the present application is not one such and therefore must be rejected. In any event it was urged that the scheme proposed is impracticable, illusory and detrimental to the interests of the creditors and that the Court in the exercise of its discretion ought not to direct a notice of the meeting at all and the application should be summarily rejected.

    4. In support of the contention that S. 153 is not applicable to a foreign company, the argument advanced is that the expression ‘company’ in sub-ss. 1 and 2 means a company formed and registered under the Act or an existing company and a foreign company is neither, and the expression ‘Court’ in S. 153, Cls. 1 and 2 must be a Court having jurisdiction under the Act, which according to S. 3 shall be the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office is situate, which in the case of the Bank in question was at Quilon and therefore this High Court would not be the Court to which such an application could be presented by a foreign company. Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act (7 of 1913) was, before it was amended by Act 22 of 1936, word for word the same as Section 120 of the English Companies Act of 1908. Section 120 of the English Act was replaced by S. 153 of the Act of 1929 and S. 153 of our Act has been amended to bring it into line with Section 153 of the English Act of 1929 and on a comparison of both the Sections it will be seen that they are word for word the same. The plain language of the enactment is applicable both to a going company and to the case of a company in liquidation. The history of Section 153 of the English Act clearly bears this out. Under the English Companies Act, 1862, there was no provision corresponding to S. 153 of the Act of 1929, but the defect was in a measure supplied by the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act of 1870. As pointed out by Palmer:

    The Act was only to operate as part of the winding up machinery of the Court, and the assistance of the Court could not be invoked except in a winding up, whether compulsory, voluntary or under supervision which was a serious defect, because the very object of the arrangement or compromise was in many cases to avoid a winding up.

    5. By subsequent legislation all the defects were remedied so that a compromise or arrangement can be availed of both in the case of a company which is a going concern and also in the case of a company which is in the course of being wound up. Section 38 of the English Companies Act, 1907, enacted that the Act of 1870 should apply to a company which was not in the course of being wound up in like manner as it applied to a company which was in the course of being wound up. In the Act of 1870 a company was defined to include a company liable to be wound up under the Act which took in unregistered companies and therefore foreign companies. When the Companies Consolidation Act of 1908 was passed, S. 120 was enacted embodying all the legislation up to that date and was put under Part III of the Act and not under Part IV which provided for winding up, thus making it clear that S. 120 was, meant to apply to the case of a company which is a going concern and also to the case of a company in liquidation. Under the English Act it is clear therefore that the provision corresponding to Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act is applicable to the case of foreign companies because a foreign company is a company liable to be wound up under the Act. Therefore Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act when it was first enacted contained the provision that expression ‘company’ in Cl. 1 would mean a company liable to be wound up. There can be no doubt that the Travancore National Bank though incorporated outside British India and therefore a foreign company, would be an unregistered company within the meaning of Ss. 270 and 271 of the Act. An unregistered company is a company liable to be wound up under the Act. When the Legislature itself has defined the expression ‘company’ and has given it a wide signification, there is no reason for exeluding a foreign company from its purview. Of course, emphasis was not made so much upon the expression ‘company’ as upon the expression ‘Court’. Under the English Act, no difficulty arises because the definition of the expression ‘Court’ in S. 380 of the Act is “the Court having jurisdiction to wind up a company under the Act.” But if the expression ‘Court’ in Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act is interpreted in the light of sub-ss. 2 and 3 of the Act, this High Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the application. But when the Legislature has intended that S. 153 can be availed of even by a foreign company, we must so construe the expression ‘Court’ as to make the right conferred on a foreign company and its creditors and members available to them. Further the definition of the word ‘Court’ in Cls. 2 and 3 is to prevail only in the absence of anything repugnant to the subject or context. When the Legislature itself has sought to give the ‘company’ a wide signification, it must also have meant to give the ‘Court’ a wide signification. The expression ‘Court’ in my opinion, in the case of an unregistered company including a foreign company would mean “the Court in which the said Company is liable to be wound up” and that is fixed by reference to R. 271 and under S. 271 this High Court will be the Court in which a foreign company is liable to be wound up. It seems to me therefore that this High Court has juris, diction to entertain an application at the instance of a creditor or a member of a foreign company.

    6. The next argument that an application cannot be made before an order for winding up is made does not appear to be tenable. The Section, as already observed, is intended to apply both to the case of a going company not in liquidation and to the case of a company in liquidation and there is no reason why one should restrict it to the case of a winding up in the case of a foreign company. It was suggested that as any scheme must be with reference to the company as one concern, it would not have been the intention of the Legislature to confer jurisdiction on this Court to deal with a scheme which would affect the concern as a whole and no scheme can be operative unless it was approved by the Travancore Court. I may at once state that this argument has been reiterated with reference to all the objections and I will deal with this at length a little later. I will content myself now with stating that the Section confers jurisdiction to deal with a scheme, but how the scheme when sanctioned can be rendered effective and operative on the company as a whole does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with it. Whatever may he the force of the objection as to the applicability of the Section to a foreign company as a going concern, it cannot prevail after an application to the Court has been made for the winding up of the company. An application to wind up the company can be made to this Court because this is the Court indicated in S. 271. Once an application has been made to this Court and the jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked, there can be no doubt that the expression “Court” must mean the Court in which the company is being sought to be wound up. It is finally conceded by the learned advocates who appeared for most of the creditors that after an order for winding up is made, this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain this application, but the objection that was raised as to the maintainability of the petition was that the application after a winding up order could only be made by the liquidator and not by a creditor of a company, and this argument is based on the language of S. 153, namely “in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator.”

    7. There does not seem to be much sub-stance in this argument. The Section was intended to confer rights both on the company and on the creditors and members of the company. When it is a going concern the object will be to avert a winding up. Even after an order for winding up is made, an application can be made to cancel a winding up by the sanction of a scheme and allow the company to resume its normal business. The creditors and members are the persons vitally interested in the life of a company and are the best Judges of their interests. It could not have been therefore the intention of the Legislature to deprive the creditors of the right once an order for winding up is made and place them at the mercy of the liquidator who may or may not choose to move in the matter. All that is intended by the Section is that the liquidators should also have the right to make the application. At any rate, this is the view taken by Palmer on the corresponding Section of the English Act. In his book on winding up, he observes thus at page 899:

    A proposal for an arrangement or compromise is not confined to the company or its liquidator if any. It is open to any creditor or member to take the initiative. The Act expressly provides that the Court may on the application, in a summary way of the company, or of any creditor or member of the company, or in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting.

    8. I think the same view must be adopted in the interpretation of the Indian Act and I have therefore no hesitation in holding that even after an order for winding up, a creditor or member can move the Court under S. 153 of the Act. Mr. Bhashyam however stated that if on account of any technical objection or on any other ground I think it desirable to deal with the matter after an order for winding up is made, he had no objection to an order for winding up being passed.

    9. The next serious objection that has been made is that after an order for winding up has been passed by the Travancore Court, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under S. 153 unless a similar application was made first to the Travan core Court and a scheme was sanctioned by it. The argument in regard to this was mainly left to the learned Advocate-General. He outlines it thus: Quilon is the principal domicile of the Corporation and the Quilon Court must be the Court in which the principal liquidation must go on and liquidation in this Court or in any other Court must only be ancillary to it. Once an order for winding up is passed by the Quilon Court, this Court must pass an order for winding up as a matter of course. Both as a principle of international law and as a principle of convenience, any proposal for a scheme, suggesting an arrangement or compromise within the meaning of S. 153 must first be made to the Travancore Court fend if and when it has received that Court's sanction, this Court can adopt it. I shall now proceed to examine the soundness of this contention. The learned Advocate-General has not been able to cite any authority in support of the proposition that once an order for winding up has been passed by the Travancore Court, an order for winding up must automatically follow in other Courts. On the other hand, Section 271 of the Companies Act, would seem to negative any such proposition. The Section provides the conditions under which an unregistered company can be wound up, thereby indicating that it is left to the discretion of the Court whether it would, wind up the company in spite of a similar order having been passed in some other Court. It may be in the interests of the British Indian creditors that this Court may on practical considerations find it just and equitable to pass an order for winding up, but there is nothing to oblige the Court to pass the order.

    10. In the case of a company incorporated in one country and having branches in different countries the principle on which the winding up of such a company should be conducted is thus formulated by Vaughan Williams J. in (1893) 3 Ch 3851 at p. 394:

    One knows that where there is a liquidation of one concern the general principle is—ascertain what is the domicile of the company in liquidation; let the Court of the country of domicile act as the principal Court to govern the liquidation; and let the other Courts act as ancillary, as far as they can, to the principal liquidation. But although, that is so, it has always been held that the desire to assist in the main liquidation—the desire to act as ancillary to the Court where the main liquidation is going on—will not ever make the Court give up the forensic rules which govern the conduct of its own liquidation.

    11. In (1932) 2 Ch 1962 Lord Maugham observes thus:

    The view of the Court is that the principal winding up should be in the principal domicile of the corporation and that any other winding no order should be ancillary to the principal winding up.

    12. The expressions used are principal and ‘ancillary.’ There is no case in which I find any explanation of the expressions ‘principal domicile’ and how it is to be fixed in regard to the winding up of a company, nor has the learned Advocate-General been able to place before me any authority which would assist me on the point. A company can have more than one domicile. The expression ‘principal domicile’ implies it. The English cases above referred to or the other cases bearing on the matter do not decide that the place of incorporation is necessarily the domicile or the principal domicile of a company. Dicey enunciates the following rule for ascertaining the domicile of a corporation:

    The domicile of a corporation is the place considered by law to be the centre of its affairs, which (1) in the case of a trading corporation is its principal place of business, i.e the place where the administrative business of the corporation is carried on (2) in the case of any other corporation is the place where its functions are discharged.

    13. In his comment on the rule he observes that:

    The registration of the company is not for all purposes of itself decisive. The question in each case is, where is it that the real business of the company is carried on? According to the answer to that question, the company's domicile must in the main be determined.

    14. Later on he observes:

    The better opinion seems to be that a corporation has, following the analogy of an individual, one principal domicile, at the place where the centre of its affairs is to be found, and that the other places in which it may have subordinate offices correspond, as far as the analogy can be carried out at all, to the residences of an individual. Thus, an unregistered company in the United Kingdom must have more than one principal place of business from the point of view of jurisdiction in winding up, but its domicile in the strict sense of the term might well be held to be its head office in the foreign country of its incorporation.

    15. The view of Dicey seems to be that the place where the centre of the affairs of a company is to be found should be fixed as the principal domicile of the company with reference to the winding up of a company. Palmer in his book on Company Law, Edn. 15, at p. 254, observes: “The situation of the registered office fixes the domicile of the company.” But he does not state that it is necessarily the principal domicile. Cheshire in his book on Private Inters national Law (1938, Edn. 2) puts the question thus: “What is the test?” and answers it thus at page 198:

    The only solution therefore is to find some act which is so vital in the life of this juristic persona that we can justifiably fix its domicile in the place where the act is performed. The act which has been selected by the Courts for this purpose is the central management and control of the corporation. A trading company, for instance, has its domicile in that country where the centre of control is, where the directing power resides or, in the expressive language of Foots, where the brain which controls the operations of the company is situate.

    16. In every case in which the expressions “principal winding up” or “ancillary winding up” are used, it will be seen that in the place of incorporation was found the centre of adminstrative control and it is not possible to draw the inference that the place of incorporation must be taken to be the principal domicile of the corporation Foote in his book on Private International Law, Edn. 5, at p. 178 also observes thus:

    Further, just as a natural person must be pronounced for the purposes of domicile, to be resident in some one place more than in any other, however nicely balanced the evidence may be, so a corporation should be regarded as necessarily having its seat or centre of operations in some one spot to the exclusion of all others. It may be difficult to decide between two or more places whose claims appear conflicting, but it appears to be the duty of the law to pronounce between them and to declare that in fact as well as in law one establishment is the centre where the corporation resides while the other establishments are merely branch offices or agencies.

    The domicile of a corporation is in fact the place where ‘the brain which controls the operations of the company is situate’.

    17. No doubt some of the cases which he refers to are income-tax cases decided in England where the test of central control was applied, but if for the purposes of winding up the place where a foreign corporation carries on business confers jurisdiction on a Court, I do not see any impediment in fixing the place of central control as the principal domicile. All the process of winding up can go on there except perhaps the passing of an order for dissolution and if any steps have to be taken in the place of incorporation for perfecting the winding up, the Official Liquidator appointed by this Court can be directed to take such steps. Therefore if the centre of administrative control is taken to be the principal domicile of a corporation, Madras will be the principal domicile of the Bank and must be the place where the principal winding up should go on. It seems to me however that it is not necessary to decide this question for the present as this application can be disposed of without doing so. I will assume that Travancore State is the place where the principal winding up should go on. The question then arises as to the scope and power and jurisdiction of this Court in the matter of winding up. As already stated in such cases the jurisdiction is said to be ancillary. But what is the scope of it? In what way the jurisdiction is to be exercised is still unsettled. In (1932) 2 Ch 196 at p. 207 Maugham J. observed thus:

    The effect of one winding up being ancillary to the principal winding up has not, I think, been much considered in our Courts. This Court no doubt holds that in the winding up here all creditors, whether British or foreign, who can prove their debts have equal rights; but it would seem; that foreign Courts do not always take the same view.

    18. Lord North in (1888) 58 LT 8783 at p. 879 observed thus:

    The liquidation of the company is going on here. It is true that there is a liquidation of the company also going on in Queensland, where the head office of the company was situated. To a certain extent I treat the winding up here as ancillary to the winding up there, but not to such an extent as to make this Court an agent for the Courts in Queensland, and I must investigate the matter as far as I can here.

    19. Kay J. in (1889) 61 LT 7164 at p. 717 made the following observation:

    In the case of an Australian Company it would he confined to the property existing in this country, and would only be by way of assisting a winding up which either was going on or was contemplated in Australia. It would be only to protect the property in this country and the creditors in this country. That would be the only purpose of such an order.

    20. In (1884) 27 Ch D 2255 at p. 230 the same learned Judge however remarked thus:

    However ready this Court may be to shew courtesy to the Courts of New Zealand, it does seem proper to interfere, and that sufficient reason exists for taking proceedings in order to secure the English assets.

    21. Vaugham Williams J. in the passage already cited by me from (1893) 3 Ch 385 at p. 394 observed that the desire to assist in the main liquidation will not even make the Court give up the forensic rules which govern the conduct of its own liquidation.

    22. From these decisions one thing seems to be clear about the use of the word “ancillary.” It was not meant to make the Court where the ancillary winding up is going on subordinate to the Court where the main liquidation is going on and the former is not the agent of the latter and will have complete control over the conduct of its own liquidation according to its forensic rules, i.e the provisions of law relating to winding up governing the said liquidation. Thus, this Court would not be a mere agent of the Travancore Court. A separate order for winding up will be passed in this Court for the purpose of having control over the British Indian assets in the interests of the British Indian creditors and this Court will not permit a foreign Court in any way to interfere with the just rights of the British Indian creditors and the endeavour will be as far as possible to secure equal distribution for all creditors, British Indian or foreign. The underlying principle seems to be one of co-operation based on the essential principles of justice and equity. The reason is plain. An order for finding up passed by the Court of the place of incorporation in which the principal liquidation is going on does not bind a foreign creditor the special forum of whose debt was not the place of incorporation. In (1932) 2 Ch 196 at pp. 209 and 210 Lord Maugham observed thus:

    I can find however no reason to doubt that a person domiciled abroad can sue in his own Courts a company which, in carrying on business there, has incurred a debt or liability to him, whether or not that company is being wound up in this country, to which he owes no allegiance and with the laws of which he is not acquainted; though, as pointed out in Dicey, p. 877, if he desires to benefit under the English winding up he must generally speaking give up for the benefit of other creditors any advantage which he may have obtained for himself by the proceedings abroad.

    23. In (1898) AC 3496 Lord Davey at page 359 observed thus:

    If, as their Lordships hold, the Arrangement Act of 1870, does not extend to the colonies, the proceedings in the English Court are for this purpose proceedings in a foreign Court and cannot be pleaded in Victoria as a defence to an action by a Victorian creditor as was decided in England to a French winding up.

    24. In that case the company was incorporated in England under the English Companies Acts with its head office in England, but carried on business in New Zealand and the Australian Colonies including the Colony of Victoria. A creditor's petition for winding up was presented and an order for winding up was made in England. Subsequently a scheme of arrangement was sanctioned by the Court in England. In an action against the company by a creditor in Victoria the question arose whether the winding up order passed by and the scheme sanctioned by the English Court would be a valid defence and it was held that they could not be pleaded in bar of the claim, thus indicating that an arrangement between an English Company and its creditors under the Companies Act does not bind a creditor in a colonial Court. Thus, an arrangement sanctioned by the Travancore Court could not bind a creditor in British India; nor would an arrangement sanctioned by this Court bind a creditor in Travancore. This position only serves to reveal that where there are several liquidations of one concern going on in different countries, no scheme initiated in one Court will necessarily become effective and operative in regard to the concern as a whole, unless it was sanctioned by all the Courts in which the liquidations are going on. If this is the principle, there seems to be no force in the argument of the learned Advocate-General that the scheme must first be initiated in the Travancore State and then only can be considered by this Court. If, on the other hand, the principle upon which liquidation should be conducted be one of: co-operation, there is nothing to prevent a scheme being initiated in this Court and being provisionally sanctioned [there seems to be authority for such provisional sanction: vide (1893) 3 Ch 385 at p. 401] and this being adopted by the Travancore Court.

    25. No principle of international law has been shown to me that this cannot be done, whereas all the cases would seem to indicate that there is nothing in the international law against the adoption of this course. From the point of convenience it seems to me very desirable that the scheme should first be initiated in this Court. The centre of administration is in Madras; all the necessary and available information will be in Madras; the bulk of the creditors and share-holders are in British India and if a scheme is approved by a majority of such share-holders and creditors it is very likely that the Travancore creditors might adopt it and it is very likely also that the Travancore Court would sanction it and there is no reason to suggest that the Travancore Court would be unreasonable in declining to sanction a scheme sanctioned by this Court. The spirit of co-operation extended by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the Travancore Official Liquidator would certainly be always available. Therefore there is nothing to preclude me from considering this application under S. 153. In any event a scheme has to be approved by all the Courts in which simultaneous liquidations are going on. In the case of Australian Joint Stock Co., reported in (1897) WN 48,7 a scheme was sanctioned by the New South Wales Court where the head office was situate and the branch office was in London. An application was enade to have a scheme sanctioned in Eng land under the Joint Stock Companies Act. Vaughan Williams J. made an order for the winding up in order that he might approve of the scheme. This step was necessary for the purpose of binding the English creditors: vide Stiebel's Company Law, page 836.

    26. Another argument seriously advanced at the Bar is that as the Travancore Court is the Court competent to conduct the principal liquidation, it will be the Court which can summon a meeting where all the oredi tors can be heard and it will not be competent to a Court where the ancillary winding up is going on to direct such a meeting and therefore both on law and on principle the Court which ought to entertain an application of this nature is the Travancore Court, at any rate, it must be initiated in that Court. In support of this argument the decision of Yaughan Williams J., in (1893) WN 1288 was relied on, where the learned Judge is reported to have said thus:

    Vaughan Williams J. referring to (1893) 3 Ch 385 at p. 394 said there was only one liquidation in that case, which ms in England, and in such a case every creditor was entitled to be heard at the meeting wherever he resided. But where there were several liquidations in different countries, it might he that only the creditors in each country were entitled to be heard at a meeting held in that country.

    27. The same learned Judge in (1893) 3 Ch 385 at p. 394 expressed himself thus:

    According to my view, I have here to deal with a principal liquidation, and that being so, I am bound to make provision for creditors in all parts of the world doming in and being heard if they think fit.

    28. It will be seen that the learned Judge used very guarded language in both the cases. Even in the case of a principal liquidation he only says that he must make provision for foreign creditors being heard if they think fit. This is because any scheme sanctioned by him will not be binding upon a foreign creditor unless it is sanctioned by the foreign Court wherein the foreign creditor is domiciled. Again, in the later case the expression used by him is ‘might be’ and he is not definite. But looking at the generality of the language of S. 153 which provides for a meeting of the creditors, there is nothing to preclude this Court from directing a meeting of the creditors in all parts of British India or out-side it and eliciting expression of their views. In (1898) AC 349 in construing Section 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act of 1870, Lord Davey remarked thus:

    It is quite true that the provisions of the Arrangement Act are expressed to extend to all creditors, and so they do, to foreign as well as colonial creditors, but only when their rights are in question in the Courts of the United Kingdom.

    29. It will be useful to note that Lord Davey was dealing with a case of principal liquidation and yet he was careful to point out that all creditors, wherever they are found, may be summoned but only creditors within the jurisdiction of the English Court will be bound by the result. The language of Section 2 of the Arrangement Act, 1870, is “creditors of such company and any class of such creditors.” There can be no doubt there, fore that the similar expression in S. 153 ‘meeting of creditors or class of creditors’ should be interpreted as comprising all creditors whether situated in British India or outside British India. There is nothing to preclude the Court from directing a meeting of such creditors. It is open to them to express their views if they think fit. The question of principal liquidation or anciliary liquidation does not matter. The view expressed by Yaughan Williams J., that it is only in the case of a principal liquidation that all creditors are entitled to be heard at a meeting summoned at the instance of the Court where the principal liquidation is going on does not appear to me to be justified by the language of the Section. Of course if the view that I have expressed that Madras might be considered as the place where the principal liquidation should go on is correct, even according to Yaughan Williams J. there could be no objection to summoning a meeting of all the creditors. Assuming, as expressed by Yaughan Williams J., that where there are several liquidations in different countries only the creditors of each country were entitled to be heard at a meeting held in that country, there is nothing to preclude this Court from summoning a meeting of the British Indian creditors and getting the approval of the majority to such a scheme and this Court sanctioning it and the Courts in other countries adopting and sanctioning it because, in any event, if the scheme is to be operative on the concern as a whole it must be sanctioned by all the Courts in which liquidations are going on. Therefore the argument based on the difficulty of summoning a meeting of all the creditors standing in the way of this Court entertaining a scheme in the first instance does not appeal to me.

    30. Another argument was advanced which can be disposed of very briefly. It was urged that any scheme, which could be proposed in the case of a foreign company must be with respect to a winding up and an application of the nature in question is not with respect to a winding up and S. 153 could not be invoked for that purpose. I do not see much substance in this argument. Under S. 271, all the provisions of the Act with respect to winding up would apply to an unregistered company and a provision to avert a winding up will be a provision with respect to the winding up. A scheme under S. 153 provides an alternative mode of winding up and it cannot be doubted that S. 153 being a general law as to winding up is as much applicable to the winding up of a foreign company and the corresponding Section of the English Act has always been employed to give effect to a scheme of compromise already arranged in a simultaneous winding up abroad.

    31. I shall now proceed to the argument in regard to the exercise of my discretion under S. 153 for directing a meeting of the creditors as required by the said Section. I may at once state, as already observed by me, that if an application of this nature is made, the usual practice is to direct a notice and the application is always made ex parte. But this application comes to be made in peculiar circumstances, one of which being that a final order for winding up has been passed in the Travancore Court, and applications for winding up are pending in other foreign Courts. Mr. Bhashyam contended that the word ‘may’ in S. 153 meant ‘shall’, whereas some of the opposing creditors contended that the word ‘may’ meant ‘may’. It seems to me that the use of the word ‘may’ involves, that the Court has to exercise its discretion in making the order under S. 153. There is a distinction between making an order under S. 153(1) and an order under Sec. 153(2) when the scheme comes before the Court for sanction after the approval of the majority of the creditors. Under Sec. 153, Cl. 1 we are only concerned with the stage of proposals. What is urged is that the proposals are so unreasonable and illegal that to submit them to the general body of creditors and share-holders would be a mere waste of time as they are certain to be thrown out as not being in the interests of the general body of creditors and the defects in the proposed scheme are so inherent that the Court will be well justified in exercising gits discretion in declining to order a meeting for the consideration of such a scheme. The main defects urged are the following: (1) the issue of 3 lakhs, preference shares to the creditors who are giving up one anna a share. The argument advanced is that this amounts to a transfer, ence of shares to a new body of shareholders who cannot be registered in British India because the statutory registers, entry in which alone would recognize their title, are in a foreign State. If that cannot be done, the sanction of that provision by this Court would be an infringement of Section 153(a) of the Companies Act. It will be seen that there is nothing illegal in the issue of preference shares. All the shares have not been issued and it is open under the Memorandum and the Articles of Association to issue such preference shares with the consent of the general body of the majority of share-holders assembled at a meeting. An arrangement like this would come under S. 153. I do not see how it amounts to a transfer of assets to a new company within the meaning of S. 153(a). What is urged is that so long as the order of winding up stands, the shares could not be registered in the Travancore State. But the argument forgets that if a scheme is sanctioned by this Court and is also approved by the Travancore Court, the result would be an annulling of the winding up and the provision can be given effect to. The second objection put forward is that the scheme is more in the interests of the debtors and share-holders than those of the creditors. The main argument advanced in this connexion is that under the proposed scheme the share-holders need not pay or are relieved of the immediate necessity of paying their unpaid calls whereas they ought to be asked to pay immediately, and in support of this the observations of Vaughan Williams J. in (1893) 3 Ch 385 at pp. 394 and 406, were referred to me, i.e, the creditors ought to be paid 20 shillings in the pound. If it is there for them to have they ought to have it at the expense of the shareholders; there is no question at all about that.

    32. This was relied on for the purpose of showing that the share-holders should not be allowed to get any benefit to the detriment of creditors and reservation of liability to pay the uncalled capital is detrimental to the large body of creditors. Mr. Bhashyam says that if this is objectionable, it is open to the general body of creditors to modify it when the scheme goes, before them and he is even willing to alter it or to delete it or to modify it in any way even before submission to the? general body of creditors. Therefore the-objection raised does not seem to be such as to go against the general tenor of the scheme and such an intrinsic defect as to enable the Court to withhold the scheme from being placed before the general meeting of the share-holders and creditors. The third objection raised is that the directors-should not come into the management at all and though they ostensibly say that they would surrender their management they have indirectly provided for their reelection by reserving the election of the directorate to the share-holders, the majority of whom it is alleged are directors or their nominees or relatives. In Ex. R, filed along with the affidavit in support of the application, the directors have stated thus:

    Now that a scheme of reconstruction is proposed by creditors and depositors of the Bank, we feel that, with a view to enable the scheme to be considered with freedom and devoid of all personalities, every one connected with the Board of Directors or the management of the Bank should unconditionally and completely sever his connexion with the Bank forthwith, without at the same time any detraction in any manner of such, liability, accountability or other responsibility as is or may be attributable to them by reason of their connexion with the Bank's Directorate or Management or an account of their transactions with the bank or any acts of theirs in relation to the bank, or in any other manner whatsoever.

    We write this not only on behalf of ourselves but also on behalf of all the others connected with, the directorate and management of the bank that every one of them is ready and willing completely and unconditionally to resign his position in the-bank forthwith. We also desire to make it perfectly clear that such severance of connexion will, not detract in any manner or to any extent from any liability or responsibility as aforesaid. The resignations are tendered only with a view to provide for a perfectly clean state so far as the control, direction or management of the proposed, re-constituted bank is concerned.

    33. Mr. Bhashyam stated — and Mr. V.G Row supported him—that the directors are not only prepared to abide by the said undertaking but are prepared to give any undertaking in and by which it will be-made absolutely clear that they will not seek election. But it is urged that undertaking is illusory so long as power is given to the share-holders to elect and it may be possible that friends of the directors and nominees of the directors may get elected. It is open to the general body of creditors at the meeting to modify this provision in any manner they think fit and Mr. Bhashyam is prepared even here to consent to any modification which may be-suggested. The fourth objection is that the scheme has not been based on a correct information as to the affairs of the bank and has not had the intelligent support of the body of creditors who are supposed to have given assent to the scheme and there is no guarantee that 12 annas in the rupee will be realized. It is admitted in para. 16 of the affidavit that the scheme is based upon not quite accurate data. Para. 16 runs thus:

    As regards the present position, of the bank it is difficult to state with any degree of certainty its correct position with regard to its liabilities as the bank suspended its business on 21st June 1938, all the branches of the bank were on that date closed and sealed and provisional liquidators have been appointed since that date by various Courts including this Honourable Court to take charge of the assets of the bank. The books of account of the bank are not therefore available to these deponents or to any other creditor to ascertain with any degree of certainty the amount of liabilities and assets of the bank at the date of this affidavit. These deponents have therefore to rely on the directors' reports, the balance sheet and the profit and loss account of the bank for the year 1938.

    34. No doubt the creditors who put forward these proposals did what they could in the situation and in their anxiety to prevent the bank and consequently their interests being ruined. But it is very essential that any scheme which is put forward before the general body of creditors must as far as possible be based upon correct information. In this case the bank suspended its business on 21st June and the provisional liquidators were appointed on or about 5th July. The weekly reports on which the balance sheet was prepared and the present scheme was based was on report dated 17th June. Between 17th June and 5th July considerable payments must have been made and what was the exact state of affairs on 5th July it is not possible to know. As observed by Lindley L.J in (1893) 3 Ch 385 at p. 409:

    If the creditors are acting on sufficient information and with time to consider what they are about and are acting honestly, they are, I apprehend, much better judges of what is to their conmercial advantage than the Court can do.

    35. Therefore any scheme which is approved must, prima facie appear to be based on correct information and data; but that does not mean that the application should be rejected. If I can call for a report in as short a time as possible which will give a fair idea of the affairs of the bank at the present moment and on that state of information the scheme as adumbrated or with the necessary amendments can be circulated along with the report, I do not see any objection why it should not be done and why the application should be rejected in limine. Vaughan Williams J. observes in (1893) 3 Ch 385 that even after a scheme has been once approved by the general body of creditors, it is open to the Court to submit a scheme for re-consideration a second time in the light of a fresh and correct information. If this can be dona even with reference to a scheme which has been once approved by the majority of share-holders, there is nothing to preclude a Court from having correct information before submitting a scheme and submit the said scheme along with the correct data, so-that the creditors will be in a fair position to judge whether it be to their own commercial advantage that the scheme should be adopted or not. The fifth objection is that the proposals are not bona fide but are sponsored by the directors in their own interests. It is no doubt true as observed by Vaughan Williams J. in (1893) 3 Ch 385 at p. 396 that schemes are presented to the creditors in bankruptcy and in the liquidation of companies more often than not for the purpose of veiling some wrong that has been done or for the purpose, serving some interest which is wholly antagonistic to the interest of the creditors.

    36. But there is not sufficient evidence before me to say that the proposals have been wholly engineered by the directors. It may be that many of the creditors were led into their approval by the false hopes raised by the directors, but among the creditors to the value of 87 lakhs there are many creditors of status and holding or having held responsible positions in life and businessmen whose intelligence and understanding, and capacity to judge what is to their benefit, as appearing from the names mentioned in para. 10 of the affidavit and from a small list out of a large number of creditors who have supported the scheme handed to me by Mr. Bhashyam, cannot be doubted. It cannot be said that in giving support to this scheme they were actuated by any other motive than that of securing common, benefit for themselves and other creditors, and no Court ought to condemn the proposals to which a large body of creditors have accorded their approval for being put before the general body of creditors as mala fide and decline to put it before a meeting of all the creditors. The argument forgets that even if the scheme is approved by the majority of creditors the Court can decline to sanction it if it is made out that the object of the scheme is to veil the wrongs of the directors and burke investigation in the matter. It is again urged that there is a provision to write off bad debts and the discretion is given to the Board of Directors. That depends upon the personnel to be chosen and the choice depends on the creditors themselves. Then it was finally urged that the company, being a banking concern, public confidence has been so rudely shaken that no reasonable human being would put a pie into the bank.

    37. It is no doubt true that when a concern of an enormous magnitude like this suspends the business, the public confidence will be shaken; but I have not got any certain information as to what the suspension of the business is due to — whether it is on account of the unprecedented run or whether it is due to any bad management or fraudulent conduct of the directors. It is for the creditors to consider at the meeting, whether, if an entirely new inanagement is going to be had, it would not virtually amount to starting a new bank and the confidence in the bank would in a great measure depend upon the respectability and the capacity of the personnel chosen and it would be premature at this stage on my tart to attempt to pronounce any opinion on this matter and reject the scheme even: at the proposal stage. Mr. Yepa has brought to my attention certain observations of Turner L.J in (1858) 44 ER 1028.9 That was a case decided in the year 1858 and the question was whether the Court should prefer a compulsory winding up of the company to a voluntary winding up and it was in connexion with that question the learned Judge made certain observations to the effect that he would prefer a compulsory winding up, but he pointed out that there was no legislative provision which would dispose him to give any decided weight to the opinion of the majority of the creditors against the minority upon the question as to the choice of proceedings. If there had been an enactment like the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act of 1870 or Section 153 of the (English and the Indian) Companies, Act, the same learned Judge would not have disregarded the opinion of the majority of the creditors on any scheme that may be suggested by them. The considerations pointed out by him are all considerations which the Court can always take in sanctioning or refusing a scheme but they are not in my opinion considerations which are to be taken in throwing out a scheme at the stage of proposal. In this case anyhow I am making an order for winding up. Therefore before the Court gives effect to any scheme the result of which will be to cancel the winding up, it will have to be fully satisfied that the winding up should not go on.

    38. It is again urged by the opposing creditors that the main ground on which the proposed scheme is sought to be supported is that the costs of the liquidation would amount to an enormous sum as much as two annas in the rupee and it is not a tenable, one. But this is a point which cannot be lightly ignored especially with regard to this concern. The branches are situate in different jurisdictions and liquidation proceedings will have to simultaneously go on in different Courts and the costs of the liquidation must be very heavy indeed, and in my opinion, it would even amount to more than two annas in the rupee. There are other minor objections raised such as the differentiation between creditors, that is, those whose demands have to be immediately met and those whose demands can be deferred. But they are all matters of detail which the body of creditors can consider and suggest appropriate modifications. It is open to any of the creditors to dissent and the Court will not sanction or force a scheme upon a minority, if they are going to be seriously affected by such a provision being retained None of the objections therefore, if closely examined, is such as to enable a Court to decline to circulate the scheme because almost all the defects are such as can be remedied at a meeting of the creditors. It is open to the creditors to reject the scheme in toto or adopt it with or without modifications; a clause may even be inserted in the scheme as finally passed by the majority of creditors reserving power to the Court to modify it in the best interests of the creditors: vide (1893) 3 Ch 385. The object of S. 153(1) is to ascertain the wishes of the creditors or members and not go to get a verdict from the Court as to the feasibility or practicability of the proposed scheme. That is reserved for the Court under Cl. (2) of S. 153. The principle underlying S. 153(1) is plain. In (1893) 3 Ch 385 at p. 392 Yaughan Williams J. observed thus:

    I do not think that anyone who has followed the subsequent decisions — whether under the Companies Acts or the Bankruptcy Acts — will hesitate to say that the tendency of late has been rather to favour the power of the majority of creditors to impose their will upon the minority and to construe the legislation upon the subject with some freedom.

    39. In all concerns of the company whether in the matter of winding up or in the matter of a scheme, the policy of the Act seems to be to ascertain the wishes of the creditors as expressed by the majority of them subject to the rights of the minority being safeguarded. But no Court is entitled to say that it will not ascertain the wishes of the majority in regard to a proposed scheme. I quite perceive that under Cl. (1) of S. 153 a certain discretion is vested in Court, but the scope of that discretion is limited. A Court ought not to decline to order a meeting unless the proposals are illegal as being in contravention of the provisions of the Companies Act or incapable of modification in view of ascertained facts so that it would be a waste of time and expenditure to circulate them. I am not prepared to say that of this scheme because the scheme is open to modification. But the Court has always got a duty to see that before the scheme is approved such correct information as is available should, be placed before the creditors before they come to a decision. In this case it is possible to get correct information because the provisional liquidators, at any rate, so far as the Madras Presidency is concerned, are functioning from 5th July and provisional liquidators have been appointed in other places, so that information can now be easily had as regards the correct state of affairs of the bank and if a report as to the correct state of affairs can be had, and if it does not destroy the basis on which the proposals have been put forward, there would be no objection to circulating the scheme with the report; but if the report disclosed a state of affairs such as to suggest that it is impossible for this scheme being put through, it is quite possible that the petitioners may abandon the scheme or the petitioners themselves may suggest modifications in the light of the information had and the objectionable features in the proposed scheme can be removed and then the scheme can be circulated. As at present advised, I am not inclined to reject the application at this stage but would call upon the provisional liquidators whom I propose to appoint as Official Liquidators by a separate order, to submit a correct report of the affairs of the bank, its assets and liabilities, the nature of its good and bad debts and other information which they can possibly give with reference to the scheme which has now been put forward. I trust and believe that; they will receive the necessary co-operation from Courts beyond British India.

    40. So far as Travancore is concerned, the learned Advocate-General has in unambiguous terms represented to the Court that the Official Liquidators of Travancore would always be willing to co-operate and furnish any information that would be necessary, so that the Official Liquidators will find no difficulty in getting the requisite information from Travancore, where it is represented to me there are assets to the extent of over one crore of rupees. Even if the Official Liquidators will not be able to have correct information in places other than British India and Travancore, they are still required to furnish a report on such information as is available because the bulk of the assets and a greater portion of the liabilities are in British India and Travancore. I may at once state that Mr. Bhashyam for the petitioners was not unwilling for the course which I am now taking but all that he said was that this would involve delay and delay might defeat the scheme. I quite appreciate the argument based on delay, but having regard to the number of creditors living in different parts of British India and outside British India, it is impossible to expect every creditor to attend the meeting and he would not be in a position to give even intelligent directions to his proxy unless he had before him a correct state of affairs of the Bank. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I think that if a scheme should be successfully put through, it must be a scheme based on a correct data being put before the general body of creditors instead of a scheme based on in correct information. It is very unlikely that if a proper scheme based on correct information is, put before the creditors, every creditor, whether in British India or outside British India, may approve of it, and it would be possible for different Courts to sanction it because it would then have received the approval of the majority of creditors both within and outside British India. After all, if the report can be had early and if a meeting is to be called for, it can be called for within a very short time and the matter can be put through as expeditiously as possible. I therefore direct the said liquidators, on such information as is available to them, to submit a correct report of the affairs of the Bank, its assets and liabilities, the nature of good and bad debts and other information which they can possibly give with reference to the scheme proposed within three weeks from this date and adjourn the further hearing of this application to 29th September 1938.

    Winding up Order

    41. It is conceded on all hands that; the fact that the Travancore Court has passed an order for winding up does not preclude me from passing an order for winding up of the company in this country, though as I have observed in the order just delivered in Application No. 1610 of 1938, it is not obligatory on my part to do so. Several cases on the legal consequences of a dissolution of a company in the place of its incorporation were cited before me and particularly the case in (1936) AC 40510 was relied on for the purpose of showing that the winding up of the company in British India must follow as a matter of course by virtue of the order having been passed by the Travancore Court. In my opinion these cases have no bearing on the matter, for winding up is not the same thing as dissolution. As Viscount Cave points out in (1927) AC 9511 at page 102:

    A company which has been dissolved no longer exists as a separate entity capable of holding property or of being sued in any Court; but a company in liquidation, although the administration of its affairs has passed to the liquidator, retains its corporate existence. If the liquidation should be annulled, the company will resume its powers.

    42. Under S. 271 of the Act a discretion is vested in this Court to wind up an unregistered company under certain conditions specified in Cl. (iii) of the said Section. It is, therefore open to me to exercise my discretion whether I should pass an order for winding up or not. In the circumstances of this case, I have come to the conclusion that it is just and equitable that I should pass an order for winding up of the company for securing at least the property and) effects of the company so far as they exist and are available in British India. The-order for winding up has beconie final so far as the Travancore Court is concerned. Orders for winding up are awaited both, in Ceylon and in Secunderabad. It is therefore very essential in the interests of the British Indian creditors at least that I should pass the order. There can be no doubt that the order made by me will be effective so far, at any rate, as the British Indian assets are concerned, and for the? protection of the said assets this Court must have complete control of the liquidation proceedings. As already stated in the order just delivered by me, Mr. Bhashyam is not against my passing an order for winding up, if I consider it advisable to up so. Mr. V.G Bow on behalf of the Bank has also stated that the Bank has no objection to the order for winding up being, passed. No creditor has opposed it. I therefore do hereby order that the Travancore National and Quilon Bank Ltd., be wound up by this Court under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. It was-suggested by Mr. Parthasarathy that the Official Liquidators of Travancore may be appointed Official Liquidators here also. This was opposed on behalf of some of the creditors. In my opinion it is desirable that a liquidator appointed by this Court should not be amenable to any dual or foreign control and he should be completely under the control of this Court. I therefore appoint the provisional liquidators Mr. James Voce Pirrie and Mr. Cyril Gill as Official Liquidators. I think it unnecessary to give any special directions as they will be under the control of the Court in the conduct of the proceedings. Orders as to their remuneration are reserved.

    43. Order (2nd December 1938.) — In pay order dated 5th September 1938, I observed as follows:

    A Court ought not to decline to order a meeting unless the proposals are illegal as being in contravention of the provisions of the Companies Act or incapable of modification in view of ascertained facts, so that it would be a waste of time and expenditure to circulate them. I am not prepared to say that of this scheme because the scheme is open to modification. But the Court has always got a duty to see that before the scheme is approved, such correct information as is available should be placed before the creditors before they come to a decision and if a report as to the correct state of affairs can be had, and if it does not destroy the basis on which the proposals have been put forward, there would be no objection to circulating the scheme with the report, but if the report discloses a state of affairs such as to suggest that it is impossible for this scheme being put through, it is quite possible that the petitioners may abandon the scheme or the petitioners themselves may suggest modifications in the light of the information had and the objectionable features in the scheme can be removed and then the scheme can be circulated. As at present advised, I am not inclined to reject the application at this stage, but would call upon the provisional Liquidators whom I propose to appoint as Official Liquidators by a separate order, to submit a correct report of the affairs of the Bank, its assets and liabilities, the nature of its good and bad debts and other information which they can possibly give with reference to the scheme which has now been put forward.

    44. In pursuance of the said order, the Official Liquidators presented a report on 26th September 1938, but it was not a complete report because the Official Liquidators were not able to get accurate information in regard to the several branches including those in Travancore and Cochin. But so far as the 40 branches of the Bank within the Madras Presidency are concerned, the figures were correct within their knowledge. When the matter was taken up for hearing, it was represented to me on behalf of the Official Liquidators of Travancore that if a month's time was given, they would be able to furnish a correct statement of the affairs of the Bank under their control and the Official Liquidators of Madras repre sented to me that it might be possible to get information also from the branches other than Travancore. After some arguments, all the parties thought it desirable that I should adjourn the consideration of this matter for some time, so that correct information may be available for further action. Accordingly I adjourned this matter to the 7th November when a further adjournment was asked for and I adjourned the matter to 18th November. The Official Liquidators of Madras have now presented a complete report of all the 81 branches of the Bank on such accurate information as was possible to obtain. From the said report it will be seen that the book liabilities are shown as Rs. 2,42,57,824, together with a contingent liability for uncalled capital on shares held by the Bank to the value of Rs. 4,29,685. The net assets after excluding assets to the extent of Rupees 58,89,173-14-8 which the Official Liquidators consider as not realizable or the realizable value of which cannot now be estimated, are Rs. 2,02,95,800-12-2. Therefore the estimated deficiency according to the report subject to the realizability of doubtful debts and of fixed capital expenditure, to the contingent liability and to the costs of realization was put at Rupees 39,62,023-7-10. I directed them to prepare a consolidated statement of liabilities and assets and of the branches in each of the several jurisdictions and they have accordingly submitted the said statement. That statement discloses the following figures. The book liabilities are estimated at Rupees 2,42,57,824 and the book assets at Rs. 2,61,84,975. A deduction of Rupees 70,14,091 as assets, the realizable value of which cannot now be estimated was made and the net percentage of assets to liabilities was shown as 80 per cent, or to be more accurate 79-29 per cent. In this comparative statement, the Official Liquidators included among the assets the realizable value of which cannot be estimated the value of land and buildings which according to the book value is Rs. 11,24,918-7-0 whereas it was included among realizable assets in their report. In the realizable assets is not included, as pointed out in the report the call money of Rs. 30,91,966-5-8; Assuming only 50 per cent, of this sum could be realized, putting all liabilities (including contingent liabilities) at Rupees 2,46,87,509-4-4 and allowing for payment in full the security deposits and Provident Fund to the employees as per my order dated 18th November 1938, there is a net percentage of over 80 per cent, of assets to liabilities.

    45. The basis therefore on which the scheme was proposed by the creditors, i.e the probability of twelve annas in the rupee being realized, is established. It is conceded by all the opposing creditors that this is so. Mr. Parthasarathy who appeared for some of the creditors, was frank enough to concede at one stage of the case that in view of my order, having regard to the figures now furnished by the Official Liquidators, there is no other alternative than to submit the scheme to the creditors and ascertain their wishes. In the light of the information thus furnished by the Official Liquidators and in view of the objections raised on behalf of the creditors to the scheme as proposed, Mr. Bhashyam Iyangar has made certain alterations in the scheme particularly in regard to the following matters: (1) the provision empowering the directors to call for payment of the balance of share money which was not in the prior scheme (vide Cl. 4 of the present scheme); (2) the provision giving greater representation in the Board of Directors to preference share-holders and also preventing the present directors from standing for election; (3) the provision negativing the right of the directors to claim any costs, in respect of the winding up proceedings. The question therefore is whether I should not direct a meeting of the creditors under S. 153(1). Mr. Bhashyam Ayyangar submitted that in view of my prior order as the correct data is now available, a fair case is now made out for the scheme being pub before the general body of creditors and their wishes ascertained. The opposing creditors have now raised certain contentions with which I shall presently deal. The first contention is that it is not possible to put the scheme through without the co-operation of the other Courts, particularly the Travancore and Cochin Courts and if the Travancore and Cochin assets and liabilities are kept out of consideration the net per centage of assets to liabilities will not be more than 60 per cent, and the basis of the scheme therefore fails. This contention was in a way dealt with by me in my order of 5th September. I pointed out therein that:

    Where there are several liquidations of one concern going on in different countries, no scheme initiated in one Court will necessarily become effective and operative in regard to the concern as a whole unless it was sanctioned by all the Courts in which the liquidations are going on and if the principle upon which liquidation should be conducted be one of co-operation, there is nothing to prevent a scheme provisionally being initiated in this Court and being provisionally sanctioned and this being adopted by the Travancore Court, and no principle of international law has been shown to me that this cannot be done; whereas all the cases would seem to indicate that there is nothing in the international law against the adoption of this course and from the point of convenience it seems to me very desirable that the scheme should first be initiated in this Court.

    46. In almost every reported case it will be seen that the scheme was never initiated in all the Courts simultaneously but proceedings were taken in one Court in the first instance and after the scheme was sanctioned in that Court, proceedings were taken in other Courts for its sanction. If the contention that is now advanced is pushed to its logical conclusion, it would mean that where there is liquidation of one concern going on in different countries, it would not be possible to initiate a soheme for reconstruction and Section 153 of the Companies Act, would almost be a dead letter. The object of S. 153 is to enlarge the power of making compromises or arrangements which would be defeated, if this contention were to prevail. If at a meeting called for by this Court under Sec. 153(1) the majority of the creditors approve of a scheme and it is sanctioned under Sec. 153(2), it is expected that other Courts would sanction it. I cannot say that this expectation on the part of the petitioners is unreasonable; on the other hand, it would be wrong to assume otherwise.

    47. The next contention is that the scheme was based on the assumption that only assets of the value of 40 lakhs would not be realizable whereas it is now found to be nearly 70 lakhs. Mr. Yepa argues that in view of this it may not be possible for the creditors to get twelve annas in the rupee and they ought to be content with ten annas in the rupee and a modification in that respect is necessary in the scheme; This is a matter entirely for the creditors to consider when the matter goes before them. As it is, eliminating 70 lakhs, the net percentage is 80 per cent. It will be for the creditors to consider having regard to the narrow margin how much they would forgo and in what way they will modify the scheme in this behalf.

    48. The next contention urged by Mr. Yepa and also by Mr. Parthasarathy is that the object of a reconstruction scheme is to see that the Bank goes on and it cannot be disputed that for some time the Bank cannot go on because nobody would put any money in the Bank, the public confidence in it having been so rudely shaken. I have dealt with this aspect of the matter also and pointed out that it is a matter for the creditors to consider whether it is possible for the Bank to go on or not, if a fresh personnel for the guidance of the affairs of the Bank is constituted. Mr. Bhashyam Ayyangar has argued that whether the Bank should go on or not is not the only consideration, that the object of the scheme is also to provide a mode of liquidation otherwise than through Court and it is a matter for the creditors to come to a decision on the point. I would like in this connexion to refer to the following observations of Page C.J in 10 Rang 14312 at p. 159:

    Prima facie the creditors are in the best position to decide whether their interests in the company will be better served by the compulsory winding up of the Bank or by voluntary liquidation for the purpose of reconstruction. I go further and say that it would be extremely unwise for the Court on a petition filed on 22nd June, and before the wishes of the creditors as a whole has formally been ascertained, to determine that Dawsons Bank should be closed down by compulsory liquidation in the circumstances obtaining on that date.

    49. No doubt these observations were made by the learned Judge in considering whether an order for winding up should be made or not, but, as he indicates, that when an application is made for recon struction, before the Court should express its opinion for or against it, it is the bounden duty of the Court to ascertain the wishes of the creditors in the first instance. I need not emphasize this aspect of the case as I have already dealt with it in my order dated 5th September 1938. Under S. 153(2) the Court is the ultimate authority to decide whether the scheme even if approved by the creditors should be put through or not. It is always open to the Court to come to the conclusion in spite of the scheme having received the sanction of the creditors that winding up through Court would be more beneficial in the interests of the creditors than the scheme they have proposed. I therefore refrain from expressing any opinion on the matter at present. The next contention advanced is that working expenses to run the bank would cost an enormous sum and in view of the fact that no fresh deposits would be coming in, it would not be in the interests of the creditors to allow the scheme to go through. It is pointed out by Mr. Bhashyam Ayyangar in answer to this contention that the out standings carry higher rate of interest than the interest which the bank has to pay to its creditors, that the scheme only provides for 2 per cent, and 3 per cent, in certain cases to the creditors and that there would be quite a margin left for meeting the ordinary expenses of the Bank. It is open to the creditors to have this matter in their view. Mr. Yepa has further contended that owing to the winding up order being in force, interest has ceased to run on unsecured debts payable by the bank, whereas if the winding up order is annulled, interest would have to be paid and it may not be in the interests of the general body of creditors that the winding up orders should be annulled. Again, this is a matter which ought to be considered by the creditors, having regard to the financial position as now disclosed by the report. Mr. Yepa has suggested that out of the money now available in the hands of the Official Liquidators, the scheme may provide that a certain percentage in the rupee may be paid immediately to the creditors. It is open to the creditors to suggest that modification in the scheme if they think it necessary.

    50. I may state that after the receipt of the reports from the Official Liquidators there-has really been no serious opposition to the scheme going before the general body of creditors and their wishes being ascertained in the first instance. All the arguments that have been advanced were not such as to prevent the Court from putting the scheme before the general body of creditors. I have therefore decided to order a meeting of the general body of creditors and share holders and I consider the following materials to be absolutely necessary in order that each creditor and share-holder may arrive at an independent opinion as-to the feasibility or practicability of the scheme and I therefore direct that they should be printed and circulated to them: (1) The proposed scheme; (2) the report of the Official Liquidators dated 17th November 1938 and the further comparative statement filed by them; (3) extracts from my order dated 5th September 1938 dealing with the objections to the scheme; and (4) the present order. The next question relates to the directions that I should give in regard to the manner in which the meetings should be held and conducted and in regard to the service of the scheme and other material papers and notice of the meetings on the creditors and share-holders. I adjourn the consideration of this matter to Monday, 5th December, at 10-45 A.M

    51. Order (5th December 1938). — Having heard the learned counsel for the Official Liquidators, for the petitioning creditors, for the creditors who put forward the scheme, and for the opposing creditors, I give the following directions: I direct the Official Liquidators to convene at Madras at a place mentioned by them in the notice of the meeting sent to the creditors and share-holders and in the advertisement thereof separate meeting of: (i) Creditors mentioned in para. 9 of cls. (a) and (b) of the scheme; (ii) ordinary share-holders; and (iii) founder share-holders, for the purpose of considering, and if thought fit, of approving of considering with or without modification the scheme proposed herein. Such meetings shall be held at the said place as follows: (1) Meeting of the creditors on Saturday, 28th January 1939, at 11 A.M (2) Meeting of the share-holders on Sunday, 29th January 1939 at 11 A.M (3) Meeting of the founder share-holders on Sunday, 29th January 1939 at 3 P.M I direct the Official Liquidators to print the said scheme and also the other papers mentioned by me in my order dated 2nd December 1938 and send the notice of the meeting along with the said printed papers and the printed forms of proxy to be settled by me by ordinary post to the creditors and share-holders at the last known address so far as it is possible for the Official Liquidators to ascertain, within the three weeks before the date of the said meetings. I direct the Official Liquidators to notify in the said notice the time, the dates and places of the meetings intimating the purpose of the said meetings and that the creditors and share-holders may attend such separate meeting as aforesaid and vote in person or by proxy provided that all such proxies are deposited at the office of the Official Liquidators, Madras, one week before the dates of those meetings and that the proxies are affixed with two annas stamp and authenticated before the Presiding Officer of a Court, a Magistrate honorary or stipendiary, a Sub-Registrar, a Nazir of any Court, any of the Officers of the High Court, any of the Sub-Assistant Registrars or Managers of the Appellate Side, High Court, who shall subscribe in his own hand the fact of his being satisfied as to the identity of the person signing the proxy form. I direct the Official Liquidators to advertise the said notice in the following newspapers and in such other newspapers as they may consider advisable three or four weeks before the dates of the said meetings: (1) The Hindu, (2) The Madras Mail, (3) The Indian Express, (4) The Swadesa Mitran, (5) The Andhra Patrika, (6) The Malayala Rajyam, (7) The Mathrubhumi, (8) The Daily Post of Bangalore, (9) The Statesman of Calcutta (10) The Bombay Chronicle, (11) The Bulletin of Hyderabad, (12) The Ceylon Observer, (13) The Hindustan Times. The advertisement shall also make known that the print of the said scheme and the neces sary papers can be seen and the proxy forms obtained at the following places:

    (1) The Office of the Offl. Liquidators, Madras,

    (2) The Office of the Offl. Liquidators, Secunderabad,

    (3) The Office of the Offl. Liquidators, Colombo,

    (4) The Office of the Offl. Liquidators, Travancore,

    (5) The Office of the Offl. Liquidators, Coohin,

    (6) The Office of the Offl. Liquidators, Bangalore.

    52. I direct the Official Liquidators to submit for my approval a copy of the notice, of the advertisement, of the papers to be printed and the form of proxy. I appoint Mr. Pirrie or failing him Mr. Gill, to act as Chairman of the said meetings, as in my opinion they will be best fitted to act as such Chairman having regard to their business capacity and to their special knowledge of the affairs of the Bank, and they do report the result of the said meetings within Monday the 6th February. The Official Liquidators are also required to address the Official Liquidators who are functioning at the various places mentioned above representing them to convene meetings of the creditors and share-holders within their jurisdiction if possible within two weeks before the dates of the meetings and acquaint them with the nature of the scheme proposed in order that the creditors and share-holders may be in a position to vote for or against the scheme and give necessary directions to proxies. The Official Liquidators are empowered to employ such additional staff temporarily as they consider necessary for the purpose of carrying out my directions.

    C.R.K/N.S

    53. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Travancore National And Quilon Bank, Ltd., In Re
    (Sep 5, 1938)