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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a final decree determining mesne profits following a decree for possession with mesne profits in favor of the plaintiff against numerous defendants categorized as landlord-defendants and tenant-defendants. The plaintiff has appealed the assessment of mesne profits, challenging the principle on which the amount was calculated. Some tenant-defendants are not parties to the appeal due to non-joinder or death with unsuccessful attempts at substitution of heirs. The lower courts' concurrent decisions on the amount of mesne profits are under challenge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal is maintainable given the defect of parties, specifically the absence of some tenant-defendants from the appeal.
  2. Whether the principle applied in the assessment of mesne profits was correct.
  3. Whether the doctrine of joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors applies strictly to mesne profits claims against co-trespassers or if apportionment and contribution among defendants is permissible.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that all defendants acted in concert and thus the principle in Merryweather v. Nixon should apply fully, precluding any question of contribution among defendants.
  • The appellant challenged the principle on which mesne profits were calculated, asserting it was erroneous.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pollock on the Law of Torts, 10th edn. Joint wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable; plaintiff may sue one or more but is bound by that choice. Used to establish the general principle of joint and several liability and limitation on suing multiple defendants separately.
Addison's Law of Torts, 8th edn. All who aid or join in a tort are joint tort-feasors and may be sued jointly or severally. Supported the principle that defendants cannot insist on others being joined when sued individually.
Thurman v. Waild [1840] 11 Ad. & E. 453 Accord and satisfaction by one wrongdoer discharges all; release of whole cause of action releases all wrongdoers. Clarified the indivisibility of cause of action among joint tortfeasors.
Duck v. Mayeu [1892] 2 Q.B. 511 Distinction between release and covenant not to sue among joint tortfeasors. Applied to interpret documents purporting to release one tortfeasor but reserving rights against others.
Price v. Barker [1855] 4 E. & B. 760 Interpretation of intention regarding release or preservation of rights against joint tortfeasors. Guided the court on construing agreements affecting joint tortfeasors.
King v. Hoare [1844] 13 M. & W. 760 Judgment for a debt or tort merges inferior remedies against other parties. Applied to hold that once judgment is obtained against one joint wrongdoer, others cannot be sued for the same cause.
Buckland v. Johnson [1854] 23 L.J.C.P. 204 Supports the principle of joint and several liability among wrongdoers. Referenced to affirm established tort principles.
Brinsmead v. Harrison [1872] 7 C.P. 547 After judgment against one wrongdoer, plaintiff cannot sue others for the same matter. Confirmed the rule limiting multiple suits for the same cause among joint tortfeasors.
Kendall v. Hamilton [1879] 4 A.C. 504 General principles on joint tortfeasors and liability. Used to support the court’s understanding of joint tort liability.
Mookerjee, J. in Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Butt [1910] 37 Cal. 559 Joint liability is not inflexible; apportionment may apply where tortfeasors are not truly joint or acting in concert. Applied to consider exceptions to strict joint and several liability in mesne profits cases.
Merryweather v. Nixon [1799] 8 T.R. 186 Strict application of joint and several liability among tortfeasors acting in concert. Discussed but distinguished as not fully applicable due to lack of findings on concerted action.
Palmer v. Wick Steam Shipping Co. [1894] A.C. 318 Qualified the extent of joint and several liability rule. Referenced to note limitations on extending strict joint liability rules.
Adamson v. Jarvis [1827] 4 Bing. 66 Related to the scope of joint liability and indemnity. Used to illustrate boundaries of joint tortfeasor liability.
Bishuu Charan Roy v. Bipin Chandra Roy [1914] 18 C.W.N. 622 Doctrine of contribution not applied where parties were not wilful tortfeasors. Supported the view that contribution among co-trespassers is not automatic in Indian context.
Nihal Singh v. Collector of Bulandshahr [1916] 38 All. 237 Doubt whether English joint tortfeasor contribution doctrine applies in India. Referenced to highlight uncertainty about applicability of English rules.
Sreeputty Roy v. Laharam Roy B.L.R. Sup. Vol 687; Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari [1880] 5 Cal. 720; Kishna Ram v. Rakmini Sewak Singh [1887] 9 All. 221; Mahabir Prasad v. Darbhangi Thakur [1919] 4 Pat. L.J. 486 Contribution allowed where wrongdoers acted under bona fide claim of right. Applied to justify apportionment in cases lacking wilful wrongdoing.
Makund Singh v. Saraswati Bibi [1919] 29 C.L.J. 245 Apportionment of mesne profits among co-trespassers where shares are determinable. Used to support apportionment principle in mesne profits claims.
Austin Friars Steamship Co. v. Spiller & Bakers Ltd. [1915] 3 K.B. 586; The Frankland [1901] 70 L.J.P. 42 Modification of joint liability rule in collision cases. Referenced to show exceptions to the general rule of joint and several liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by addressing the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal due to the absence of some tenant-defendants from the appeal proceedings. It emphasized the principle that an action for mesne profits is essentially an action for damages resulting from wrongful occupation (trespass), governed by settled tort law principles of joint and several liability. The court relied on authoritative tort law treatises and case law to affirm that a plaintiff may sue one or more joint tortfeasors but, once a decree is obtained against some defendants, the plaintiff cannot pursue others for the same cause.

The court further considered whether there existed a right of contribution among defendants which, if recognized, would render the appeal inconsistent and thus impermissible due to the absence of some parties. It acknowledged that while joint and several liability is the general rule, it is not absolute and may be relaxed where defendants are not truly joint tortfeasors acting in concert. The court cited Indian and English precedents permitting apportionment and contribution among co-trespassers in appropriate cases.

Regarding the appellant's contention that all defendants acted in concert and thus the strict joint liability rule applied, the court found no decisive findings on this issue in the record. It noted that the question of concerted action among defendants was not raised as an issue in the suit and therefore could not be treated as conclusively determined.

Consequently, the court held that the appeal was not maintainable because the plaintiff could not separately appeal against some defendants while others were not before the court. Since the decree against some defendants was final and operative, the plaintiff could not proceed further against others or vary the decree selectively on appeal.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff's attempt to challenge the assessment of mesne profits by selectively appealing against some defendants while others remain outside the appeal is impermissible. The decree as entered against the defendants before the court stands final and operative. The court did not set any new precedent but reaffirmed established principles regarding joint tortfeasor liability and the finality of decrees in such actions.

    Kamala Prosad Sukul v. Chandra Nath Pramanik

    1. This appeal arises out of a final decree determining mesne profits. The proceedings followed a decree for possession with mesne profits in favour of the plaintiff and against a very large number of defendants who belong to two classes, viz., the landlord-defendants and the tenant-defendants. The. plaintiff has appealed, but some of the defendants of the latter class are not before us, one of them not having been made a party to the appeal and three others having died and an application to substitute their heirs in their places not having been allowed as it was filed out of time. The decisions of the Courts below assessing the amount of mesne profits are concurrent.

    2. A preliminary objection has been taken as to the maintainability of the appeal in view of the defect of parties noticed above. This objection will have to be dealt with first.

    3. The claim for mesne profits is one to recover damages for the previous occupation of the land and under the present procedure it can be joined with the action for the recovery of the land. In the present case it was so joined and a decree entitling the plaintiff to mesne profits was passed against all the defendants in the suit. In the proceedings relating to the ascertainment of mesne profits, a certain sum was assessed by the trial Court and the decree passed on the basis cf the said assessment has been upheld by the lower appellate Court. The object of the plaintiff in preferring this appeal is to vary the amount so assessed. His ground is that the assessment has been made on a wrong principle.

    4. An action for mesne profits is in origin an action of trespass. It is, therefore, regulated by these broad principles which apply to and are now well settled as being applicable to actions for damages against wrong doers. In such actions joint wrong doers may be sued jointly or severally.

    5. In Pollock on the Law of Torts, 10th edn. p, 206 the principles are stated thus:

    Where more than one person is concerned in the commission of a wrong, the person wronged has his remedy against all or any one or more of them at his choice. Every wrongdoer is liable for the whole damage, and it does not matter, whether they acted, as between themselves, as equals, or one of them as agent or servant of another. There are no degrees of responsibility, nothing answering to the distinction in criminal law between principals sand accessories. But when the plaintiff in such a case has made his choice, he is concluded by it. After recovering judgment against some or one of the joint authors of a wrong, he cannot sue the other or others for the same matter, even if the judgment in the first action remains unsatisfied. By that judgment the cause of action transit in rem judicatium and is no forger available. The reason of the rule is Stated to be that otherwise a vexations multiplicity of actions would be encouraged.

    7. As regards joint torts it is said in Addison's Law of Torts, 8th edn. p. 44:

    All who aid or counsel, direct or join in the commission of a tort are joint tort-feasors. 'If divers do a trespass it is joint and several at the will of him to whom the wrong is done', that is to say, he can sue any one or more of them at his election, and those who are sued cannot Insist on haying the others joined as defendants.

    8. In Thurman v. Waild [1840] 11 Ad. & E. 453 and other cases it was settled that an accord and satisfaction by one wrongdoer for the whole injury done discharges all the wrongdoers. A release, therefore, given of the whole cause of action to one discharges the others, the reason being that the cause of action being one and indivisible having been released, all persons otherwise liable thereto are consequently released : Cocke v. Jennor [1724] Hob. 66. But a covenant or agreement not to sue one of them is no defence to an action against the others : Hutton v. Eyre[1815] Hob. 66. If therefore while purporting to release one tort-feasor it reserves rights against another, it will be construed as a covenant not to sue and not a release : Duck v. Mayeu [1892] 2 Q.B. 511, Rice v. Reed [1900] 1 Q.B. 54. The rule for construing such a document was laid down in the case of Price v. Barker [1855] 4 E. & B. 760 and is to the effect that the meaning would turn upon the intention to be gathered as to whether the right against a joint debtor was intended to be preserved or not. In King v. Hoare [1844] 13 M. & W. 760 Parke, B, authoritatively laid down:

    These considerations lead us, quite satisfactorily to our minds, to the conclusion that where judgment has been obtained for a debt, as well as a tort, the right given by the record merges the inferior remedy for the same debt or tort against another party.

    9. See also Buckland v. Johnson [1854] 23 L.J.C.P. 204, Brinsmead v. Harrison [1872] 7 C.P. 547, Kendall v. Hamilton [1879] 4 A.C. 504. Brinsmead v. Harrison [1872] 7 C.P. 547 settled the point that after recovering judgment against one wrongdoer, a plaintiff cannot sue the other for the same matter, even if the first action remains unsatisfied a proposition which was doubted before them. Though Section 43, Contract Act, is not perhaps quite clear whether a complete adaptation of the English rule is intended, yet King v. Hoare [1844] 13 M. & W. 491 has been held to apply in this country both in respect of joint debtors and of joint wrongdoers.

    10. If these principles are applied to an action for mesne profits against co-trespassers the position is clear that while it is open to the plaintiff to proceed against one or some or all of several co-trespassers at his own choice, once a decree has been obtained it is the decree in its entirety that may be challenged on appeal and not otherwise; for so long as the decree against some remains a final and operative decree and not subject to an appeal, even though it is not satisfied but is capable of execution, the plaintiff cannot proceed with the suit further and take an appeal as against the others.

    11. The question of the maintainability or otherwise of the appeal may be considered from another point of view, namely, as being dependent upon the question whether there is a right of contribution amongst the defendants inter se because if there is such a right, the decree, on the appeal if it varies that from which the appeal has been preferred will affect the rights and liabilities of those parties who are not before the Court and will produce an inconsistency on the record which is not permitted, ay law.

    12. No doubt, as a general rule the liability of joint wrongdoers in tort is joint and several, but it is not an inflexible rule which needs no relaxation according to the view that is taken of jointness of the act or acts which constitute the wrong. Mookerjee, J., in an elaborate judgment in the case of Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Butt [1910] 37 Cal. 559, in which he has exhaustively dealt with the question, has observed thus:

    It cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule that in every case of tort, the Court is bound to pass a joint decree against the wrongdoers making each jointly and severally liable for the whole amount decreed.... In cases, therefore, in which the controlling general principle, namely, that where acts of several persons by design, or by conduct tantamount to conspiracy, contribute to the commission of a wrong, they are jointly liable, is not applicable, the rule of joint liability also ceases to be applicable.

    13. In that case it was held that in respect of mesne profits which accrue during the pendency of a suit for possession, the liability of different tenure-holders of the same degree, and1 of separate trader-tenure-holders of different degrees, should1 b& apportioned according to the share of the profits intercepted by each. Thisdecision has been dissented from by Page, J., in the case of Promode Nath Roy v. Secy. of State . With great respect, however, I venture to think that the judgment of Mookerjee, J., carefully ready appears to except from the general rule1 cases in which the tort-feassors are not really joint and are, therefore, persons-to whom the rule does not apply and, in my opinion, therefore, the judgment is unexceptionable. Merryweather v. Nixon [1901] 70 L.J.P. 42 was a case in which one S brought an action against two persons for an injury done by them to his reversionary estate in a mill, in which was included a count in trover for the machinery belonging to the mill and having recovered £840, he levied the whole upon one of the said two persons, and one of them then sued the other for a contribution of the moiety, as for so much money paid to his use. The plaintiff was nonsuited. Lord Kenyon, C.J., said that he had never before heard of such an action having been brought, where the former recovery was for a tort; that the distinction, was dear between this case and that of a joint1 judgment against several defendants in an action of assumpsit; and that this decision, would not affect cases of indemnity where one nun employed another to do acts, not unlawful in themselves, for the purpose of asserting a right.

    14. The rule has been modified in collision cases : The Frankland [1901] 70 L.J.P. 42, Austin Friars Steamship Co. v. Spiller & Bakers Ltd. [1915] 3 K.B. 586. Relying upon Palmer v. Wick Steam Shipping Co. [1894] A.C. 318 it has been said in more decisions than one that the rule will not be extended. The rule has been said by very high authority as having, been too widely laid down and it has been said that it is to be taken with the qualification that it will hold1 if the nature of the case is such that the plaintiff must be presumed to have known that, he was doing an unlawful act : See Pollock on the Law of Torts, 10th edn., p. 207, referring to the dicta of Lord Herschell in Palmer v. Wick Steam Shipping Co. [1894] A.C. 318; Per Bruce, J., in The Englishman and The Australia [1895] P. 212 and Burrows v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q.B. 816 : see also Adamson v. Jarvis [1827] 4 Bing. 66.

    15. In this country the doctrine has not been applied in cases of contribution regarding mesne profits where the parties were not wilful tortfeasors, Bishuu Charan Roy v. Bipin Chandra Roy [1914] 18 C.W.N. 622, and doubt has been entertained whether it applies to this country at all Nihal Singh v. Collector of Bulandshahr [1916] 38 All. 237. When wrongdoers have acted under a bona fide claim of right and had reason to suppose that they had a right to do what they did, contribution inter se may be allowed : Sreeputty Roy v. Laharam Roy B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 687; Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari [1880] 5 Cal. 720; Kishna Ram v. Rakmini Sewak Singh [1887] 9 All. 221; Mahabir Prasad v. Darbhangi Thakur [1919] 4 Pat. L.J. 486. There has been cases in which the liablity of co-trespassers for mesne profits has been apportioned where their shares are capable of being determined, e.g., Makund Singh v. Saraswati Bibi [1919] 29 C.L.J. 245.

    16. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that in the present case it has already been found that all the defendants acted in concert and consequently Merryweather v. Nixon [1799] 8 T.R. 186 should be applied in all its integrity and no question of contribution can possibly arise. In support of this contention reliance has been placed upon certain findings in the judgments declaring the plaintiff's right to khas possession and mesne profits I have carefully examined these findings, but I am unable to hold that they were ever intended to be treated as findings decisive of the question. The question never arose for determination in the suit as lit is obviously a question between the defendants inter se and there was no issue raised for its effective determination.

    17. The result then is that the appeal is no longer maintainable. In that view the appellant's contention as to the propriety of the principle on which mesne profits have been calculated need not be considered.

    18. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

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    Kamala Prosad Sukul v. Chandra Nath Pramanik
    (Aug 3, 1927)