Atkinson, J.:— The five accused together with 13 others were jointly indicated for unlawful assembly, riot, murder and dacoity with the intention of committing hurt and mischief to certain Rajputs on 10th September, 1915, 18 of the 23 have been acquitted by the Jury who tried this case before Mr. Rowland, Additional Sessions Judge, sitting in and for the District of Patna. The case was heard early in the present year, and after a trial extending over 42 days, on 20th March, 1916, the Jury brought in a verdict finding the 5 accused guilty of not under S. 147, I.P.C, and of unlawful assembly under S. 326 read in conjunction with S. 149. The trial, as I have said, was a very protracted one, mainly due to much unnecessary and immaterial cross-examination; and 1 think the Judge would have been perfectly within his rights had he limited and restricted the scope of the cross-examination which was indulged in on behalf of the defence; and in saying this I am fortified by the expression of opinion by the Jury. The Jury negatived the charge of murder and of dacoity with intent to commit hurt; and have merely found the five accused persons guilty of not and unlawful assembly with the common object of causing hurt to various Rajputs, but particularly towards Somar Rai, and of causing the death of one Ram Lal Rai. From that conviction an application is now made by way of petition on appeal under Section 419 of the Cr PC, seeking an order for retrial of this case on the ground of the misdirection in law of the learned Judge at the trial, and on the further ground that the learned Judge did not fairly put before the Jury matters and circumstances in support of the defence. It is unnecessary to do more than briefly refer to the facts of the case.

2. Eknath Sahay is a Mukhtear of this Court residing at Panwara, and it appears that he obtained judgment against Ram Lal Rai on foot of a mortgage-bond. Ram Lal Rai resided at Dhodhochak, and 10th, September 1915 was appointed as the day upon which execution on foot of the decree was to be levied, and under which Eknath Sahay had become the auction-purchaser of the property of Ram Lal Rai which was sold in pursuance of the decree. Two peons of the Court were commissioned to make the seizure, and deliver possession to Eknath Sahay as the purchaser, and to attach all available moveable property of the judgment-debtor to satisfy the judgment-debt. From the evidence, it appears in support of the case for the prosecution that Eknath Sahay, being a person of some legal qualifications and a man of about 51 years of age, organised on 10th September, 1915 at the village of Panwara a crowd of 400 persons from amongst his retainers there, and at the head of this force marched to the village of Dhodhachak one mile distant, and attacked the Rajputs who were living there, causing the death of Ram Lal Rai. The mob, headed by Eknath Sahay, assembled in the village of Dhodhochak between the hours of 2 and 3 o'clock, and then occurred the incidents which gave rise to this prosecution, and wherein Ram Lal Rai lost his life and Somar Rai received grave and serious injuries; and for the part which the five accused persons took in the incidents of that day, the Jury have found them guilty. The defence is that the entire charge is a false one, that there was no not or unlawful assembly, and that none of them were members of a riotous mob and are not responsible for the incidents that took place on 10th September.

3. The petition on appeal contains some 29 grounds, on which it is alleged that this conviction should be quashed and a new trial of the case directed; but of these 29 grounds only 15 were pressed in argument before us. This case was argued before us by Mr. Sinha and the Government Advocate with great ability, energy and determination and we have received much assistance from the arguments adduced to us. The first and perhaps the most important ground was the alleged misdirection of the learned Judge to the Jury in point of law. No doubt, under S. 367 a Judge is not required to write out in extenso the charge which he addresses to the Jury, but under the section that I have referred to the law requires that the Judge shall set forth in writing the headings of his charge to the Jury, and, such headings afterwards form part of the record of the proceedings in the trial before him. As the term “heads of charge” itself implies, it means that the Judge must faithfully record the lines upon which he addressed the Jury, both on the evidence and on the law, and the object of these heads of charge is to inform the High Court, should occasion arise, of what direction he gave in law to the Jury, and the nature of his summing up of the evidence not only for the prosecution but also for the defence. But the headings of charge do not purport nor are they intended by Statute, to be an exhaustive detail of every particular which the Judge may have addressed to the Jury. It is undoubted law that it is the sole function of the Judge to direct the Jury on all matters of law, and the Jury must take their direction in law from the Judge. It is equally certain that the Judge must present the main case for the prosecution and for the defence fairly for the consideration of the Jury. But this does not mean that he must in every particular and in every detail address himself to every suggestion put forward by the defence. His duty is fairly and candidly to point out the main and salient features of the case from the point of view of the prosecution and of the defence respectively and in doing so he is entitled to take into consideration the speeches made upon both sides by the Grown and by the prisoner's counsel, in considering his presentation of the evidence to the Jury. As I have said, the function of these heads of charge is for the guidance and information of the High Court and it is for the Judges on appeal, in applications similar to the present one, to construe the heads of charge as prepared by the Judge, and see if from such heads the Judge has fairly and properly directed the Jury in point of law, and whether he has fairly and properly reviewed the evidence in support of the prosecution and of the defence. I admit that these Headings of charge should record in an intelligible form and with sufficient fullness the points of law and the directions given by the Judge to the Jury: Panchu Das v. Emperor(1), and that the record should represent with accuracy the substance of the charge by the Judge: Fanindra Nath Banerji v. Emperor(2). I am clearly of opinion that the two cases' I have referred to lay down the general principle to be applied by Judges in preparing the heads of charge. But it 19 equally certain that one in considering the language used must not parse the headings of charge as if they were an indictment.

4. The method of expression and its form may be unsatisfactory, but if in substance one can see from the frame of the heads of charge what were the directions which the learned Judge gave to the Jury and that they were right and proper, then there can be no ground of complaint, even though the phraseology and form adopted might be open to question; Hooper v. Emperor(3) clearly lays this down. What one has to see and consider from the words used is the direction given, and that it was fair and right. Mere informality in expression or form would not be sufficient to invalidate the conviction. Thus it is for us to construe the heads of charge as best we can, and considering; the form adopted by the learned Judge in this case one must be guided by the sequence of legal considerations which affected his mind as set out in the heads of charge. We must bring our reason and common sense to bear upon the consideration of the document, and if we satisfy ourselves from a close inspection and examination of the record set forth by the learned Judge, that he properly directed the Jury in point of law, we must decline to interfere with the verdict of the Jury. Now in the headings of charge in the present case the Judge sets out the charges under which the prisoners were arraigned and the particular sections under which the prosecution was brought. He deals in sequence with every material section bearing upon the main charges coupled with the nature of the evidence given.

5. He keeps in sequence the section applicable to injury done to the immovable property distinct and separate from the other sections dealing with injury done to the person. He draws the attention of the Jury to how far intention and knowledge are essential ingredients in the commission of crime. He explains the nature of the joint act where more than five persons are involved in the commission of the joint wrong, and, taking the whole of his direction as embodied in the heads of charge we are satisfied that he directly brought to the Jury's mind every matter and legal consideration having regard to the evidence that was necessary for the Jury to know and to understand. While I fully admit that in the form in which he has prepared his heads of charge they are not as full and as satisfactory as they might be, nevertheless, reading them and considering them and giving them an intelligent and reasonable construction, I have no doubt that in substance he discharged his duty to the Jury and gave them a full and detailed direction in law and amply sufficient for them in considering the evidence for and against the prosecution. This disposes of the first and main ground in the argument addressed to us. The second objection that is taken is, that the Judge, in addressing the Jury as to the evidence or the value of the evidence of the two peons who were called as Court witnesses, was unfair, inasmuch as, it is alleged, he made a suggestion to the Jury in considering and weighing the evidence of these witnesses, that was not warranted by the evidence, and that thus he was unfair to the defence. The actual words used were as follows:

“Are you prepared to accept that story, or would you consider it as more likely that if the peons went to the village at all, they left it at least as early as midday?”

6. At first I was under the impression on Mr. Sinha's opening of this case, that was a mere suggestion by the Judge not warranted by the facts, but that impression which I formed, rapidly dissolved when, I came to consider and weigh the evidence of the two peons themselves. I think it is abundantly clear on the evidence of these two peons, that they were merely pawns in the hands of Eknath Sahay, who did his bidding and took instructions from him and in whose house they stayed. It was manifestly clear that this suggestion which the Judge did make was one which might be made with every show of reason and with justice. The story told by these peons is an incredible story, and in testing the truth of the evidence which they gave, one cannot leave out of consideration the fact that these witnesses are in no sense disinterested parties, but are pledged up to the hilt as witnesses for the defence. The suggestion made by the Judge was not in violation of the evidence but was consistent with it, and was obviously given to the Jury as a reasonable means of reconciling the conflicting cases of the prosecution and the defence. On this ground we likewise consider there is no reason for our intervention. Ground 3 alleged for challenging this conviction is that in reference to the alibi defence of prisoner No. 2, Bissessar Dayal. This gentleman is a law student, 27 years of age, and a School Master at Bahr. He produced evidence for his defence on the trial that he was in attendance in discharging his academical duties at the School on 10th September the day that the outrage was committed, and that, therefore, he did not take part in the unlawful assembly which was organised by his father. The Judge accurately and carefully set out the evidence in support of this prisoner's alibi, and the misdirection relied upon is, in telling the jury that there was no application by the prisoner for cancelling the last two days of his leave, he having been given leave from the 6th for 6 days, inasmuch as the Head Master stated that there was no register kept for recording rescinded leave. As I have said at the beginning of my judgment a Judge is not bound to discuss every little particular and detail of the defence. His duty is, and no more than this, to direct the jury's attention to the salient features of the case.

7. The omission of the Judge in not stating that the Head Master stated no register was kept for recording rescinded leave, was entirely immaterial to the main matter of defence which the prisoner wanted submitted to the jury, and I am satisfied that the Judge was not necessarily bound to so inform the jury, and that if he did not, his omission would not involve such irregularity as would amount to a failure of justice. Likewise on this heading we think there is no ground for our interference. I think the Judge, in his conduct towards this second prisoner, exercised a masterful forbearance, because had he so wished there was ample justification for saying and suggesting to the jury that the entry of his attendance in the register on 10th September was a fraudulent concoction. But without making any suggestion in disparagement of the alibi this prisoner gets, so far as the Judge is concerned, the most favourable consideration for his defence.

8. The 4th ground alleged of misdirection, is that the Judge kept back Ex. 15, a letter written by the Head Constable to a superior officer on the evening of 10th September, and did not contrast it with the contents of the first information made by the complainant and referred to as Ex. 3. It is solemnly suggested that because the constable, who had only come upon the scene about 6 o'clock, did not record in the letter that he wrote to his superior officer the incidents of looting, burning of property and plunder and injury to women, all matters referred to in the first information made by the complainant, that the Judge should have stated or told the Jury either that the constable did not see anything at all, or that the information contained matters that were not true. The constable only related what he saw, namely, a man lying dead, having been killed by a wound inflicted by a sword, and another man lying on the roadway gravely injured. In my view the learned Judge was quite right in not contrasting the letter of the constable with the evidence contained in the first information. It was not a document on oath, it was not a document for which the complainant was in any way responsible, it was nothing but the record of what the policeman himself saw, and it would be obviously improper to utilise that letter contrasted with the first information made, either as effecting the bona fides of the policeman or the justice of the complaint made by the complainant. Thus on this ground we see no cause for our intervention.

9. The 5th ground that has been alleged for challenging this virdict is, that the Judge did not state to the jury the substance of the medical evidence in so far as it showed that Ram Lal Rai's stomach was empty of human food, it having been proved by his son that he and his father had their breakfast about 11 o'clock, and that thus, having regard to the ordinary period of digestion, death must have been caused at an hour different to that alleged by the prosecution, coupled with the additional fact that when the constable arrived upon the scene at 6, blood was seen oozing from the wounds of the deceased. The Judge himself says that he directed the Jury's attention to the medical evidence. The doctor's deposition was put in evidence, the Jury had it or its substance before them, and even though the doctor was submitted for cross-examination by the defence he was not asked a single question or cross-examined by the defence as to this alleged ground for asking us to intervene. The entire argument is based upon speculation, and we see no ground whatsoever for impugning this verdict on any such frivolous pretext.

10. The 5th ground of misdirection that is alleged is, that the Judge should have pointed out the improbability of the case for the prosecution, that Eknath sent the letter to the Police on the morning of 10th September warning them that there was likely to be a disturbance and requiring their aid. It appears that the Government Prosecutor in stating the case to the Jury said that Eknath was the author of the letter alleged to have been written by the peon to the Police. At first I thought, that if that statement was made and was manifestly untrue, it might have affected the Jury's mind, but I am satisfied on reading the evidence of the peons that the Judge would not have been warranted in fact or law in making any such statement to the Jury as it is suggested he ought to have made. The bringing into existence of this letter was entirely the work of Eknath, and the peon was his willing implement to carry out his purpose and object, whatever they may have been. No doubt, he did not write the letter physically, but it was the creation of his brain, and thus there was no earthly reason why the Judge should tell the Jury that it was an improbable story that Eknath should have sent that letter to the Police on the evidence that was before the Court and Jury. Likewise we see no ground for our intervention in-respect of this alleged misdirection.

11. The 7th is the next ground of objection, and it is stated that the Judge should have drawn the attention of the Jury to the time when it was recorded that the Police received the peon's letter at 3 p.m on 10th September, when it is alleged that the letter was sent at 6 a.m, on that morning and delivered at the police barrack 7 miles away at 9 a.m; and that by reason thereof, the conduct of the police was so malicious and suspicious as to amount to evidence of collusion on the part of the police with the Rajputs coupled with the fact that the police Inspector when he came to Dhodhochak to investigate this outrage stayed at the kutchery of the accused's greatest enemy. I see no evidence of collusion or suspicion on the part of the police in carrying out their investigations in this case. If charges of this kind are to be made against public officials must they be made on evidence warranted to support them; and it is the merest pretence to suggest that the police were involved in collusion with the Rajputs as to the incidents connected with this outrage. There is not a shred of legal evidence to justify it, and in my opinion, it is wholly unwarranted; nothing but vain and unfounded suspicion. But probably the most effective answer to it is to be found in the petition for bail sworn by the accused Eknath himself, Ex. 4, Cl. (1) wherein, while suggesting collusion, no attempt is made to impeach the conduct of the police, and collusion is only alleged as against the arch enemy of Eknath, Ram Hari. In my opinion the Judge was perfectly right in not telling the jury that they should draw the inference of collusion on the part of the police for the reasons stated. Therefore on this ground we sea no cause for our interference.

12. The eighth ground of misdirection alleged is, that the Judge should have told the jury that it was unlikely that Eknath should injure his own property, he having become the purchaser of Ram Lal Rai's house and property under the decree in the bond suit which he had obtained against him, and that, therefore, it being his own property, in no sense could it be said that even if he did injure it he was guilty within the meaning of the term “mischief” as defined by S. 425, I.P.C However it is not necessary to labour this matter, because the jury have acquitted the accused of having unlawfully assembled to do mischief. But irrespective of that I can see no misdirection by the learned Judge whatsoever on this aspect of the case, because I think he fairly and fully put before the jury every matter that was necessary and proper in support of the defendants' case and I think it is quite impossible to support this contention as a ground of inter, ference by us. Now I come to ground No. 9, which deals with the important question of motive, and on this aspect of the case Mr. Sinha pressed us very strongly that the Judge has been guilty of great unfairness in his discussion with the jury on the question of motive. On p. 2 of the heads of charge the Judge commences to set forth the various contentions put forward as to the motive that was suggested in this case, namely, whether the motive was stronger on the part of the Rajputs to make a false case against Eknath and his party, or was stronger on the part of Eknath to commit the crime and whereas Mr. Sinha takes no objection to the first part, and indeed the major part, of the Judge's summary on the question of motive, but admits it is quite fair he objects to the concluding passage which runs as follows:

“Taking the litigation along with the examination of Eknath under Section 342 of the Cr PC, the jury will consider whether the feelings of the accused towards the Rajputs of Dhodhochak are friendly or hostile, if hostile, whether any argument as to what exact method would be likely to be taken by him in satisfying his grudge would have sufficient weight to enable them to reject the direct evidence.”

13. This is the only part of the Judge's charge on the question of motive to which Mr. Sinha takes objection. The phraseology of this clause is not what one would have desired, it is obscure; but when analysed it means no more than this that the Judge told the jury that speculation as to the method by which Eknath might give effect to his feelings to satisfy his grudge against the Rajputs, if he had any, would not be sufficient to justify them in the rejection of direct evidence. If that is the meaning of this phrase, and I think clearly it is, then surely there is no misdirection whatsoever, because the Judge was obviously right in telling the jury that speculation as to motives in a man's mind, and the method by which he intends to put those motives into action, cannot override the direct evidence of established facts.

14. In our view we are clearly of opinion that this clause of the Judge's charge, which I have read out in extenso and which has been objected to so strongly by Mr. Sinha, is not in law any misdirection whatsoever. We cannot say whether the motive was stronger to make a false case than that Eknath should commit this crime. However that was a matter entirely for the jury and there was undoubtedly evidence to support the finding at which they arrived as a question of fact, and thus on this ground there is no cause for our interference. Undoubtedly the jury were entitled to take into consideration the letter of Eknath to Somar for the purpose of showing the bent and tendency of his mind to drastic action. Ground 10 of misdirection that is alleged is that the Judge should have drawn the attention of the jury to the evidence of Chocha Rai Guru before the committing Magistrate, as to the evidence that he gave before him, when he omitted to state that he saw an assembled mob coming from Panwara on 10th September with Eknath at its head, and that he should have suggested to the jury that this omission on the part of this witness was sufficient to discredit the rest of his evidence. Why, one has to only analyse the facts to see the absurdity of this contention, because on the cross-examination of this witness when he is challenged upon this very matter, it appears he told the police two days after the commission of the crime the fact that he had seen the assembled mob coming to Dhodhochak on 10th September and ready for action, and that the reason that he did not mention it before the committing Magistrate was because he was not asked the question.

15. I think the Judge was not bound to refer to this alleged discrepancy in this witness's statement, because it is quite clear from his cross-examination that there was no ground whatsoever for impeaching his credit in this respect, and even if the Judge did not draw the attention of the jury to the evidence of this witness as given before the committing Magistrate and as given subsequently in the Sessions Court, it would not be an omission or error which would involve a failure of justice. Therefore we see no reason for our intervention on this ground. Ground 11, on which we are asked to set aside this verdict is, that the complaint was made so tardily after the commission of the crime, that it was evidence on which the jury might find that the complaint itself was not bona fide and it was suggested that the Judge was wrong in not telling the jury that the complainant took no step to make his complaint to the police till they arrived at the village of Dhodhochak at 6-15. I cannot see that there was any tardiness in the making of this complaint, taking all the circumstances into consideration, the hour, the surrounding conditions, the condition of not that must have existed during the occurrence and for some time after, and the fact that the police barrack was seven miles away, point conclusively to the result that there was no undue delay on the part of the complainant in giving information to the police as to the incidents that had taken place. The moment, the police arrived on the scene, there and then the complaint is made and at 6-15 on the day of the outrage the officers of the law are put in motion by the complainant. We cannot see that there was any delay or that the Judge would have been warranted in telling the jury there was such delay as would have impressed the complaint that was made with a false character.

16. The twelfth ground that is alleged is, that the absence of the female members of the complainant's family from their house on the day of the outrage showed a pre-meditated design on the part of the Rajputs to put up a fight. I do not agree with this a inference at all. I think Ram Lal knew execution and attachment of his property was to take place on that day, and that no doubt with a view of defeating an attachment the female members of his house left with such personal belongings and chattels as they were capable of taking with them from the wreck, but the absence of the females of this household does not at all warrant the assumption that their absence was indicative of the Rajputs as aggressors. We see no ground for our interference in thes respect. Ground 13 of misdirection is, that the Judge should have told the jury or directed their attention to the unlikelihood of Eknath retaining 4 of the cattle that were stolen while disposing, of all the rest of the booty and plunder. I do know from the evidence set out in the heads of the Judge's charge that he deals with the question of cattle, that he puts forward the case for the prosecution and the defence and he invites the jury to express their opinion as to whether they believe the evidence of the Police Inspector as to having found 4 heads of cattle in the house of Eknath, or whether they believed the evidence of the Tikkadar. I think that was quite a proper direction and the Judge sufficiently reviewed the case to enable the jury to come to a right conclusion. Ground 14 of misdirection that is alleged is, that the Judge should have directed the jury's attention to the evidence of the Court witness 3, as to the ownership of the cattle. I have no doubt that this witness's evidence was fully relied upon by the learned vakil on behalf of the defence, that all that could have been suggested in support of this witness's evidence was said, so far as it was calculated to support the defendants' case. But this witness appears to me wholly unworthy of credit. He is really a defence witness and in no sense a disinterested witness, and appears himself to have taken part as one of the mob in the incidents of that day.

17. However, I think the Judge was in no sense bound to have directed the jury's special attention to this witness's evidence, he having fully and carefully dealt with the salient and outstanding features of the general defence made for the prisoners in this aspect of the case. As to this and the previous ground the prisoners are in no way affected or prejudiced, because they have been acquitted of both charges in respect of which the facts alleged in this and the previous ground ire applicable. Therefore on this ground also we see no ground for our interference. The 15th and last ground that is suggested of misdirection is, that the Judge did not call the attention of the jury to the respective dates when the witnesses were examined by the police. Between midday on the 11th September and 17th September there were no less than 21 witnesses examined, who made statements to the police as to what they had seen taking place in reference to the outrage that occurred upon the 10th September, 19 of the 21 were eye-witnesses to the occurrence itself. I think, to say that there was any laxity or want of care or want of expedition in preparing the case for the prosecution is without any foundation, and the Judge would not have been warranted in stating any such fact to the jury as is suggested, because in every particular the police proceeded with the preparation of their case as rapidly as human affairs will admit under the circumstances. The grounds alleged in 11, 12, 13 and 24 of the grounds set forth in the notice to appeal have been abandoned. I desire to quote the following passage from Lord Alverstone's judgment in the King against Stodhart. Second Criminal Appeal, p. 256, where he says:

“mere non-direction is not necessarily misdirection. Those who allege misdirection must show that something wrong was said, or that something was said which would make wrong that which was left to be understood. Every summing up must be regarded in the light of the conduct of the trial and the questions which have been raised by the prosecution and defence respectively.”

18. Judging by the test there laid down and from the general principles established by the innumerable cases that have been referred to, more especially by the dictum of Lord Halsbury as reported in Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Empress(4) and Empress v. Nimchand Mookerjee(5), we are clearly of opinion that in this case there has been no misdirection by the learnad Judge on any of the grounds suggested in the petition of appeal, nor has the Judge refrained from putting fairly and honestly before the jury the salient and prominent features of the case for the defence. I think it would be more desirable, in cases involving such gravity as the present one, that they should be tried by the Senior Judge in the District and not delegated to some Junior Additional Judge, who may not have the same extensive experience of criminal law and criminal trials as the Senior Judge. But we desire to add that no reflection of any kind can be made upon the learned Judge who tried this case nor upon the jury.

19. It remains to consider the propriety of the sentences which the learned Judge has thought; fit to impose upon these five prisoners. In my judgment a man of the type of Eknath Sahay is a living and evil danger to any community. He has been sentenced to transportation for life and he has been fined a sum of Rs. 3,000 for causing grievous hurt to Ram Lal. Having regard to his age and also to the fact that it was not his hand that caused the death of Ram Lal we think the sentence is somewhat heavy. We shall, therefore, reduce in his case the punishment to one of transportation for 10 years and the fine of Rs. 3,000 will stand. As, to his son Bissesser, the 2nd prisoner, he has been awarded transportation for seven years and a fine of Rs. 1,000. In his case we shall moderate the sentence to one of five years' rigorous imprisonment and the fine will stand. Ram Lal Goala is the 3rd prisoner. His was the hand and by his dead Ram Lal's life was taken, because it is established that he was seen giving a blow which of itself was sufficient to cause death. He has been sentenced to transportation for life. There will be no change in the punishment awarded to him. Amrit Goala has been awarded transportation for life. He appears to have held down Ram Lal While the other man, the 3rd prisoner, struck him, a cowardly and shameful crime and, in my opinion, just as bad as the crime of the man who inflicted the blow which caused death. Therefore in his case there will be no change in the punishment awarded. Basudeo Goala, the 5th prisoner, appears only to have given one blow to Soma Rai. Fortunately his life was not taken, and he is still a living man. The crime was a dangerous one. We shall alter his sentence to one of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment.

20. Jwala Prasad, J.:— I concur with my learned brother that it has not been shown that there was any misdirection in point of law, or that the case for the defence was not fairly and properly put to the jury. A careful scrutiny of the heads of the charge recorded under Section 367 of the Cr PC, will hardly fail to impress one that the learned Sessions Judge has explained to the jury the law applicable to the facts of the case, and has drawn the attention of the jury to all the salient facts raised in the defence of the appellants. We have given our best consideration to the arguments so ably advanced on both sides in this case and also to the evidence that has been brought to our notice in the course of the arguments. It is needless for me to repeat the reasons given by my learned brother to dispose of, seriatim, the various objections raised by the learned counsel for the appellant.

21. It is sufficient to say that it has not been shown that the verdict of the jury was obtained on account of any misdirection by the Judge, or on account of their not having fully and sufficiently appreciated the law or the facts in this case. It is impossible to hold that the accused were in any way prejudiced, or that there has been a failure of justice in this case.

22. I also agree with my learned brother in the modification of the sentences passed upon some of the appellants.

V.S/R.K

23. Appeal dismissed.