S. R. No. 9636 of 1923 (In Appeal No. 186 of 1922).
This is a reference under Sect. 5 of the Court Fees Act, as regards the proper Court Fee to he paid on the Memorandum of Appeal fild by the 6th defendant.
This suit, out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the plaintiff, for a declaration that he is the Sajjadanashin of two durgas in the South Arcot District and for the possession of the Durgas and their properties. The plaintiff alleged that he was appointed by the last Sajjada as his successor and that he took possession of the Durgas and the properties on the last Sajjada's death, but that he was subsequently dispossessed by the 1st defendant, one of the female heirs of the original family of the founder. The Lower Court, holding that the plaintiff was not nominated by the last Sajjada and also that he was not the nearest male heir, dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiff, the High Court remanded the suit to the Lower Court to rehear the case, after bringing on record the descendants of the original founder and to appoint a trustee from amongst them, since the last Sajjada had failed to nominate his successor. After remand, the plaintiff compromised the suit with the 1st defendant and asked for permission to withdraw it, but the Court refusing such permission, transposed some of the defendant as plaintiffs, made the original plaintiff a defendant and proceeded with the suit. By his decree, dated 27th March, 1923, the Subordinate Judge appointed the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs, according to the revised cause title, as Muthavallis of the two Durgas, on probation for a period of three years and directed that they should take possession of the Durgas and their respective properties (see Cls, 1, 3, 4, and 6 of the decree). The decree also provided that the surplus income, after meeting the expenses of the Durgas, should be distributed amongst the members of the family. The 6th defendant, in his appeal against the decree, prays that he should be appointed trustee of both the Durgas, in the place of plaintiffs 1 and 2.
In the Lower Court and previously in this Court, on appeal, Court fees were paid ad valorem, on the value of the plaint properties. The appellant now seeks to value his appeal under Art 17, Cl. (b) 1, Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, on the ground that it is not possible to estimate, at a money value the subject matter in dispute; on the other hand, it is contended by Mr. Varadachariar, on behalf of the Government that the case is governed by Sect. 7, Cl. (5) of the Court Fees Act and that the appellant should pay ad valorem Court Fee, on the value of the suit properties.
The main argument of the learned Advocate-General, on behalf of the appellant, is this: If the suit had been against persons claiming adversely to the trust, ad valorem Court Fee might have to be paid; but in a case like the present, where all the parties to the suit claim the properties for and on behalf of the trust, the only point in dispute is as to who amongst them is entitled to manage the trust properties and as that, viz., the right of managements incapable of valuation, the proper article applicable is Art. 17, Cl. (b), Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. This argument appears to me to be untenable, because, though the defendants do not claim the properties adversely to the trust, they do claim the right to hold them adversely to the plaintiff and therefore plaintiff was necessarily bound to ask for relief, by way of possession, as against them. In Ramados v. Hanumantha Rao(1), relied upon for the appellant, the lands were in the possession of persons, who were willing to pay rent to the plaintiff, as soon as he recovered the office of Dharmakartha. In distinguishing the case before them from the decision in Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar, and the other case brought to their notice, the learned Judges indicate their opinion that, if the possession had been adverse to the plaintiff then it would have been necessary for him to sue for the relief of possession also; see page 356. In Sonachala v. Manika(2), where the plaintiff prayed for a decree, for the removal of the defendant from the management of the properties endowed for charity and for the appointment of himself as the manager thereof, it was held that the plaintiff was to sue for possession of the properties and that he should pay ad valorem Court Fee, under Sect. 7 of the Court Fees Act.
Reference has been made by Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar, the learned vakil for the appellant, in the connected S. R. No. 13423 of 1923, in which also the same question is raised, to the decisions in Thakuri v. Bramha Narain(3), Girdhari Lal v. Ram Lal(4) and Ramrup Das v. Mohunt Sitaram Das(5). These are cases, under Sect. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and do not really help him. Shortly stated, what was decided in these cases was that in suits coming under Sect. 92 (539 of the old Code) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the mere inclusion in the plaint of a prayer, either for account, or for the appointment of the plaintiffs themselves as trustees, does not render the plaintiffs liable to pay ad valorem Court Fee, on that part of their plaint. The suit, which has given rise to this appeal, is not one under Sect. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, nor does it possess the essential characteristics of such a suit. It cannot also be said that the nature of the suit has in any way been altered, subsequent to the remand by the High Court.
It has been further urged, on behalf of the appellant, that since the plaintiff sues for trusteeship only and has no beneficial or personal interest in the properties, in his capacity as trustee, no ad valorem Court Fee need be paid. This argument receives a certain amount of support from the observations of Spencer, J. in his order of reference to the Full Bench, in Ramamirutha Mudaliar v. Govinda Mudaliar. With all respect, I am unable to see how the question, as to whether the plaintiff has or has not any beneficial interest in the properties that he sues for, can make any difference, as regards the Court Fee payable by him. A guardian of a minor, for instance, suing on behalf of his ward, for recovery of possession of immoveable property, has no beneficial interest in the property; but I do not think that it can be argued that he need not pay ad valorem Court Fee, under Sect. 7, Cl. (5), when he sues for possession of properties of the ward.
It seems to me, that in determining the amount of Court Fee, payable in these cases, the sole question to be considered is “what is the subject-matter” of the suit. As already pointed out, in a case like the present one, the plaintiff is bound to ask for possession and the plaintiff here has, as a matter of fact, prayed for possession of the trust properties. So far as this relief is concerned, the suit, in my opinion, falls under Sect. 7, Cl. (5) of the Court Fees Act and the appellant should pay Court Fee under that section. As, in my view, the case comes under Sect. 7, Cl. (5), it follows that Art. 17 (b) is inapplicable. I give six weeks' time, for the appellant to pay the necessary Court Fee.
S. R. No. 13674 of 1923, S. R. No. 12052 of 1923, S. R. No. 13423 of 1923.
The same question arises in these Stamp References, which deal with the other Appeals, filed against the Lower Court's Judgment. The Order passed in S. R. No. 9636 of 1923 will apply to them also.
[These Court Fee references, having been set down to be spoken to, on Thursday the 6th Day of November 1924, in the presence of the Advocate-General and Mr. K. S. Desikan, Vakil for the appellant in S. R. No. 9636 of 1923 (Appeal No. 186 of 1923), Mr. A. Viswanatha Aiyar, Vakil for the appellant, in S. R. No. 13674 of 1923, Mr. C. R. Mahadeva Aiyar for Mr. C. V. Ananthakrishna Aiyar, for the appellant in S. R. No. 12052 of 1923 and Mr. L. A. Govindaraghava Aiyar, Vakil fop the appellant in S.R No. 13423 of 1923, and Mr. S. Varadachariar for the Government pleader, on behalf of the Government and haying stood over for consideration to this day, the Court made the following additional Order.]
These Stamp References were posted to be spoken to, at the instance of Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar, but after hearing the arguments of the learned vakils on both sides, I do not see any reason to modify or alter the order, which I have already made.
The only point, now urged by Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar, is that the decision of this Court, reported in Swaminatha Aiyar v. Ramier, is against the view, which I have taken in my prior order and that I should therefore reconsider my order, in the light of the said decision. I will assume that if the decision in Swaminatha Aiyar v. Ramier, has really taken a contrary view, it is open to me to reconsider the order. In that case, the plaintiffs sued for a declaration that they and the 1st defendant were the lawfully appointed trustees of a certain temple; and they prayed for a direction that the defendants 2 and 3 should be made to restore the office of trustee to them and for an injunction restraining them, from interfering with the exercise, by the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant, of their duties as trustees. The tenants, who were in possession of the properties; were willing to pay the rents to any one who was the proper trustee. It was held that the plaintiffs were not bound to sue for the possession of the temple properties and their omission to sue for such possession did not offend against the proviso to Sect. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The learned Judges had not to consider the question, as to what is the Court Fee payable, if the plaintiffs had, as a matter of fact, asked for possession and nowhere do they say that in such a case ad valorem Court Fee need not be paid. Even as regards the necessity of asking for possession) where the plaintiff alleges that some others had illegally taken possession of the temple lands, the learned Officiating Chief Justice states thus, when distinguishing the case in Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Pillai. “The maintainability of the suit must depend upon the allegations in the plaint” ****** In the plaint he [the plaintiff in the case in Rathanasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar], mentioned that the defendants 8 and 9 had illegally taken possession of the temple lands and leased out the fishery in the tank and collected rent. The plaintiff in that case having, for reasons best known to himself, combined two actions in one, namely, one action against the temple committee, for the restoration of his trustee's office and for damages, and a second action for the recovery of the trust properties against persons, who had wrongfully dispossessed him of such property, was bound to ask for the relief of possession of the temple properties, to which he asserted a present right of possession. On the allegations in the plaint in that suit, it may have been right to require the plaintiff to add a prayer for possession of the lands and if he refused to do so, his suit might have been dismissed. But he was not bound to sue for possession of the lands, before he was restored to office. If he had chosen to strike out from his plaint his statement, as to the part played by defendants 8 and 9, he might have waited till he was restored to his office of trustee, and he might then have brought a separate suit, on behalf of the trust to recover the trust properties, which had been wrongfully alienated. The plaintiff in the present case alleges in his plaint that he was dispossesed by the 1st defendant and asks for possession from him, and I do not think that the remand by the High Court and the subsequent re-arrangement of the parties can in way alter the nature of the case. It is not necessary for me to decide whether even in this case the plaintiff is bound to ask for possession. But as possession has been asked for and as the decree also directs that the Durga should be taken possession of, I think that Court Fee should be paid under Art. 7 (5) of the Court Fees Act. Time for the payment of the Court Fee is extended by six weeks from to-day, in all the references.
K. S. D.Reference answered.