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  • article in Sch. 1, Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Four suits were instituted by the plaintiffs for recovery of damages against the defendants for catching fish in a specified part of the public navigable river Meghna (a "jalkar"). The plaintiffs asserted that the exclusive fishery in that part of the river had been granted by the Crown to Nawab Sir Ashanulla of Dacca and that the plaintiffs were in possession as patnidars under a settlement from the grantee. The defendants denied that the Nawab had an exclusive Crown grant and denied the plaintiffs' title; they pleaded that they had acquired (a) easement rights (a profit a prendre/right in gross) to fish in the jalkar, and (b) a customary right to fish there, asserting widespread open fishing without payment by a large number of people.

The trial Court (Munsif, First Court, Narayanganj) decided in favour of the plaintiffs on the material issues and awarded damages. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, Dacca, substantially affirmed the trial Court's decision (the only variation being the measure of damages). The defendants appealed to the Court that issued the present opinion. The Court below and the present Court reviewed documentary and other materials (including Exs. 2 and 41) and concluded that there was direct and conclusive evidence of a Crown grant to the Nawab and a subsequent patni settlement to the plaintiffs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs (respondents) could claim a right to the jalkar in a public, navigable river as patnidars under a grantee from the Crown (i.e., whether there was a Crown grant of an exclusive fishery established).
  2. Whether the defendants had acquired an easement (a profit a prendre/right in gross) to fish in the jalkar.
  3. Whether the defendants enjoyed a customary right to fish in the plaintiffs' jalkar (and whether any such custom, if established, was reasonable and valid).
  4. What period of limitation applied to the plaintiffs' claims for damages: whether damages could be recovered for two years preceding suit or for three years preceding institution of the suits.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs claimed exclusive fishery rights in the described portion of the Meghna, based on a Crown grant to Nawab Sir Ashanulla and a subsequent patni settlement in their favour.
  • The plaintiffs asserted title and possession as patnidars under the grantee from the Crown, entitling them to damages for wrongful fishing by the defendants.

Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The defendants denied that Nawab Sir Ashanulla had received a Crown grant of an exclusive fishery and therefore denied the plaintiffs' derivation of title from such a grant.
  • The defendants pleaded that they had acquired easement rights (a right in gross/profit a prendre) to fish in the jalkar, supported by evidence of long practice by many fishermen.
  • The defendants also asserted a customary right to fish in the jalkar, relying on the practice of a large, fluctuating body of fishermen who fished without paying rent to anyone.
  • On the question of prescription and inheritance, it was contended (by or on behalf of the defendants) that tenants or successors could tack earlier possession (e.g., the father's possession) to establish prescriptive rights and that the right to fish as an easement could be inherited; this contention was raised against the lower Court's conclusions on possession and acquisition of easement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srinath Roy v. Dinabandhu Sen, AIR 1914 PC 48 Accepts that exclusive rights of fishery in public, tidal and navigable rivers may be granted by the Crown. Used to support the proposition that the Crown could grant an exclusive fishery and that such grants, when asserted, require clear and conclusive evidence.
Hori Das Mai v. Mahomed Jaki, 1885 11 Cal 434 Rule (laid down by this Court) concerning the quality of evidence required from a Government grantee of an exclusive fishery in navigable waters. Accepted as part of the rule that evidence of a Crown grantee should be conclusive and clear; applied in assessing documentary and other materials bearing on the Crown grant.
Wali Muhammad v. Muhammad Bakhsh, AIR 1930 PC 91 Where a question is one of fact and requires construing historical or documentary materials, it remains a question of fact; a second appeal does not lie merely because a court might have misconstrued documents. Supported the Court's view that concurrent factual findings by the lower Courts on the existence of a Crown grant are conclusive between the parties.
Chundee Churn Roy v. Shib Chunder Mundul, 1880 5 Cal 945 That a right in gross/profit a prendre may be established by the same kind of evidence used to establish profits appurtenant or ordinary easements. Referenced to explain the evidentiary standard for proving easement/profit a prendre which the defendants failed to meet on the record.
Fadu Jhala v. Gour Mohim Jhala, 1892 19 Cal 544 FB Similar principle regarding establishment of rights in gross/profit a prendre by ordinary easement evidence. Used with the other cases to frame the court's approach to the defendants' easement claims; the defendants were held not to have proved their easement.
Lokenath Bidyadhar v. Jahania Bibi, 1911 12 IC 305 Authority on evidence for rights in gross/profit a prendre and easements. Referred to in assessing whether the defendants proved a right of easement; court found evidence insufficient.
Lutchmeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo, 1882 9 Cal 698 Custom unreasonable if it confers rights on an unlimited number of persons, allowing appropriation of private property to the owner's detriment. Applied to reject the defendants' custom claim as inherently unreasonable (an indefinite fluctuating body appropriating private profits) and requiring strong evidence which was lacking.
Race v. Ward, 1855 4 E & B 702 English authority holding a profit a prendre cannot be acquired by custom where it would exhaust the subject-matter; supports the rule against custom in favour of an indefinite fluctuating class. Cited to support the proposition that a profit a prendre cannot be supported by a custom claimed for an unlimited/fluctuating body of persons.
Lord Rivers v. Adams, 1878 3 Ex. D 361 English authority supporting that a profit a prendre cannot be acquired by custom when it would destroy the subject-matter. Invoked to reinforce the reasoning that the defendants' asserted custom would destroy the subject-matter of the right and so is invalid.
Mangun Jha v. Dolhin Golab, 1898 25 Cal 692 Rule on limitation: analogy for damages for wrongful taking (relates to period for which damages can be claimed). Applied to hold that Article 49 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act is appropriate and that plaintiffs could claim damages for three years preceding the suits (not limited to two years).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the core issues in sequence:

  1. Crown grant and plaintiffs' title: The Court accepted the established principle (citing Srinath Roy and Hori Das Mai) that the Crown may grant exclusive fisheries in public, navigable rivers, and that evidence of such grants should be clear and conclusive. The Court examined the record, including Exs. 2 and 41 and other materials (including judgments of competent courts), and found a concurrent factual conclusion by the lower Courts that there was direct and conclusive evidence that Nawab Sir Ashanulla obtained a grant from the Crown and that the plaintiffs received a patni settlement of the jalkar from him. The Court applied Wali Muhammad to treat the concurrent factual findings as conclusive between the parties.
  2. Easement/profit a prendre pleaded by defendants: The Court recognised the legal position that a right in gross or profit a prendre may be proved by evidence akin to that used for appurtenant profits or ordinary easements (citing Chundee Churn Roy, Fadu Jhala, Lokenath Bidyadhar). It reviewed the evidence adduced by the defendants on the particular easement claimed and upheld the lower appellate Court's finding that the defendants who claimed such easements had failed to prove them.
  3. Tacking, prescription and inheritance contentions: The Court noted contentions that earlier possession (such as a father's possession) could be tacked to later possession to establish prescriptive rights, or that an easement right could be inherited. The Court declined to decide these points because the facts did not call for decision: there was no evidence that any deceased father of a defendant had acquired the easement claimed, and no specific evidence as to the periods of fishing or dates of death was led. Accordingly, acquisition by prescription or inheritance was not established.
  4. Customary right asserted by defendants: The Court examined the factual picture (a large fluctuating number of fishermen, estimates varying from 800–900 to 2,000–3,000, many escaping payment, plaintiffs recovering rents or damages from some fishermen, and fishing for sale). It applied the legal principle that customs must be reasonable and cannot confer rights on an indefinite and fluctuating body of persons where the result would be to exhaust or destroy the subject-matter of private property (citing Lutchmeput Singh, Race v. Ward, Lord Rivers v. Adams). The Court found the alleged custom both unestablished on the evidence and unreasonable in principle, and therefore rejected the customary-right defence.
  5. Limitation: The Court identified Article 49 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act as the applicable provision, reasoning by analogy to suits for compensation for cutting/carrying away crops or removal of trees. Relying on the rule in Mangun Jha v. Dolhin Golab, it held that plaintiffs could claim damages for three years preceding institution of the suits; accordingly no part of the claims was barred by limitation under the applicable article.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are dismissed with costs. The Court allowed one hearing-fee in these appeals, assessed at three gold mohurs. Two applications for revision filed in connection with two of these appeals were rejected. Finally, the opinion records: "Appeals dismissed."

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the lower Courts' concurrent factual findings—that there was a Crown grant to Nawab Sir Ashanulla and that the plaintiffs hold by patni settlement—stand and support the plaintiffs' title and their claims for damages (for three years preceding suit).
  • The defendants' pleas of easement and customary right were held not to be proved and were rejected; consequently defendants in these suits cannot defeat the plaintiffs' claims on those grounds.
  • The Court applied established authorities on Crown grants, easements, customs and limitation to the facts and treated the lower Courts' factual findings as conclusive between the parties. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond the application of those authorities to the facts before it.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer material beyond the text.

    Arjun Kaibarta And Others v. Manoranjan De Bhoumick And Others

    1. These appeals are directed against the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge, Third Court, Dacca, substantially affirming the decision of the Munsif, First Court, Narayanganj, in four suits instituted by the plaintiffs, for recovery of damages against the defendants, on the allegation that they caught fish in a part of the public navigable river Meghna, specifically described in the plaints, the exclusive fishery in which had been granted to Nawab Sir Ashanulla of Dacca, and of which the plaintiffs were in possession as patnidars. The case of the plaintiffs was that the Nawab had, by virtue of a grant from the Crown, an exclusive right of fishery in the part of the river in question. The defendants in the suits denied the plaintiffs' right to the fishery and asserted that Nawab Sir Ashanulla had not obtained a grant from the Crown, so far as the exclusive fishery was concerned, and the plaintiffs could not therefore derive any title to the same by a settlement in their favour. It was asserted by the defendants that they had acquired an easement right to fish in the jalkar in question, and that they had also a customary right to do so. The case of the defendants was-that a very large number of people of various districts openly catch fish without making any payment to anybody, as they had a right to catch fish in the jalkar in question as an easement as also by custom. The Court of first instance and the Court of appeal below agreed in deciding the cases, so far as the material questions in controversy were concerned, in favour of the plaintiffs: the variation made by the lower appellate Court in the decision of the trial Court related only to the measure of damages. The defendants have appealed to this Court. In these appeals it has to be considered, first, whether the plaintiffs-respondents, could claim a right to the jalkar in a public, navigable river as patnidars under the grantee under the Crown; whether there was a grant by the Crown of an exclusive fishery, which had been established by the plaintiffs, so as to enable them to assert their rights as patnidars under the grantee from the Crown. It must be taken to be established that an exclusive right of fishery in public, tidal and navigable rivers may be granted by the Crown to private individuals. As their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have laid down in the case of Srinath Roy v. Dinabandhu Sen . AIR 1914 PC 48, accepting the rule laid down by this Court in the case of Hori Das Mai v. Mahomed Jaki . 1885 11 Cal 434., the evidence of a Government grantee of an exclusive fishery in navigable waters ought to be conclusive and clear; but, in so far as such could be expected to be forthcoming as to particular grants, which were old, the evidence must be sufficient to show that the competent authority the Government of India—in right of the Crown did actually grant a jalkar right of several fishery. In the cases before us the Courts below have carefully reviewed the material placed before the Court and have come to the conclusion, on those materials, that there was direct and conclusive evidence of grant by the Crown; that Nawab Sir Asbanulla of Dacca obtained a grant from the Crown, and then leased the jalkar to the plaintiffs. Our attention was drawn to two of the documents bearing upon the question of a grant from the Crown—Exs. 2 and 41 in the cases. These two documents, taken together, indicate that the exclusive fishery in question was intended to be sold and was sold along with a zamindari mahal in the year 1863 to Nawab Sir Ashanulla, from whom the plaintiffs obtained a patni settlement of the jalkar.

    2. The documents, by themselves, may not be conclusive evidence of the grant from the Crown, but taking them into consideration, along with the other materials on the record, including judgments of competent Courts, directly bearing upon the questions in controversy, the Courts below have come to the decision that the case of a Crown grant, as asserted by the plaintiffs, was established. As was observed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Wali Muhammad v. Muhammad Bakhsh . AIR 1930 PC 91, where the question to be decided is one of fact, it does not involve an issue of law merely because the documents which were not instruments of title, or otherwise the direct foundations of rights, but were merely historical materials, have to be construed for the purpose of deciding that question; and a second appeal would not lie because some portion of the evidence might be contained in a document or documents and the first appellate Court had made a mistake as to its meaning. Considered in the light of these observations, the decision concurrently arrived at by the Courts below on the question of fact, whether there was the grant of an exclusive fishery by the Crown, must be taken to be conclusive as between the parties concerned. The question of the plaintiffs' title by virtue of a settlement from the grantee of an exclusive fishery from the Crown, must, accordingly, be taken to have been established.

    3. The right of easement was pleaded in the suit, as against the plaintiffs. It may be taken to be well settled now that a right in gross or profit a prendre as it is technically called, as claimed by the defendants in these cases, may be established by the same sort of evidence as is used to establish either a profit a prendre appurtenant or an easement in the ordinary sense of the word: see Chundee Churn Roy v. Shib Chunder Mundul . 1880 5 Cal 945, Fadu Jhala v. Gour Mohim Jhala . 1892 19 Cal 544 FB. and Lokenath Bidyadhar v. Jahania Bibi . 1911 12 IC 305.. Evidence was adduced by the defendants in proof of the particular nature of easement asserted by them, and on that evidence the Court of appeal below has held that all the defendants in the four suits, who had claimed right of easement, failed to prove it.

    4. The Court below has observed in this connexion that even if some fishermen on the banks of the river Meghna have fished in this jalkar without paying rent to anybody from generation to generation, they may have individually acquired rights of easement; but that does not amount to a complete ouster of the plaintiffs. There could not be any ouster of the plaintiffs, so far as the defendants in these suits were concerned, in view of the definite finding of fact referred to above, that all the defendants in these suits had failed to establish the right claimed by them. It was contended on this part of the case that the Court, below is wrong in holding that the tenants of the plaintiffs, in respect of other properties, could not acquire by prescription a right to fish as claimed by the defendants; that the father's previous possession, could not be tacked on to the subsequent possession by the son, and that, the right to fish, acquired as an easement, could not be inherited by the son, on the footing that such a right was not-heritable. It is necessary only to express the opinion that we do not feel justified to express agreement or dissent on any of the points mentioned above as they do not call for decision in the present cases in view of the findings arrived at by the Court below, that it has not been proved that the deceased father of any of the defendants acquired the easement as claimed. No evidence was led in these cases to prove the acquisition of easement by the deceased father of any of the defendants, and there was two specific evidence as to when the fathers of all the defendants died, or as to the period of their fishing. The acquisition of easement, as claimed by the defendants in the suits, must therefore be held not to have been established.

    5. The defendants in the suits asserted that they had a customary right to catch fish in the plaintiffs' jalkar. An issue was raised on the point, and the Courts below have given their decision against the defendants. The evidence bearing on this part of the case to which reference has been made by the Court of appeal below in its judgment, is this:

    “A large fluctuating number of fishermen—the estimate varying from 800 or 900 to 2,000 or 3,000—coming from Dacca, Tippera and Chittagong Districts, catch fish in the Meghna, acting either singly or in batches, using all kinds of nets, large and small. The plaintiffs have from time to time realized rent, from some few of them, and have occasionally sued some of them successfully for rents or damages; that owing to the vastness of the tract, most of them escape payment of rents or tolls. The right, which the defendants claim, is to catch fish not merely for consumption in their own families, but for the purposes of sale.”

    6. On these facts, it cannot possibly be held as a matter of law that the defendants had, or could have, a customary right to fish in the plaintiffs' jalkar. The relevant question on this part of the case was whether the right set up by the defendants can have for its basis a valid existing custom. Even on the assumption that the defendants had established a custom it cannot be treated as a valid custom on the ground of its unreasonableness. As has been pointed out in the decision of this Court in the case of Lutchmeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo . 1882 9 Cal 698, according to the custom set up, there would be no limitation to the number of persona entitled to enjoy it. The number of persons may increase to any number and an unlimited number of persons can appropriate the profits of a private property, leaving nothing to the owner. Every custom sanctioned and upheld by the Courts must be reasonable a custom is unreasonable when it throws an unjust burden on some individuals for the benefit of others a custom may also be held to be unreasonable on the ground that it would destroy the subject-matter of the right. On the last ground, it has been held by Courts in England that a profit a prendre cannot be acquired by custom. It has also been held that the chief reason, why a profit a prendre cannot be supported by custom in favour of an indefinite and fluctuating body of persons, is that, were such a right recognized, the result would be that the subject-matter of the right would soon become exhausted: see Race v. Ward . 1855 4 E & B 702 and Lord Rivers v. Adams . 1878 3 Ex. D 361.

    7. In the cases before us on the facts to which reference has been made already the custom set up was not only unrea sonable, but its very existence had not been established, the plaintiffs having succeeded in many instances in realizing rents or damages from some of the persons, on whose behalf, collectively, the custom to fish in the river Meghna was claimed by the defendants in these suits. It may also be mentioned in this connexion that although the question, whether or not a custom is reasonable, is a question of law, the Court of fact has to look into the nature of the alleged custom and, if it finds it greatly affecting the rights of private property, it may fairly expect and require that it should be supported by evidence strong and convincing. In the cases before us, the Courts below, after careful consideration of the materials placed before them, have concurrently held that the defendants have failed to prove that they had a customary right of catching fish in the plaintiffs' jalkar, and the conclusion thus arrived at by the Courts below cannot be ignored. The defendants in our judgment, could not be allowed to defeat the plaintiffs' claim in the suits on the ground of existence of any customary right in them as alleged by them in the suits.

    8. The question of limitation as raised in the cases by the defendants, related to the question whether the plaintiffs' claim for damages in the different suits were to be confined to the period of two years before the institution of the suits, or whether the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages for the wrongful appropriation of fish caught by the defendants for the period of three years before the suits were instituted. We are clearly of opinion that the article in Sch. 1, Limitation Act, appropriate to the cases before us, was Article 49. The period of limitation for claims to damages for wrongful taking of fish as made by the plaintiffs could in no way be different from that for a suit to recover compensation for damages for cutting and carrying away or misappropriating crops or a suit to recover compensation for wrongful removal of trees after they have been cut down and therefore according to the rule laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mangun Jha v. Dolhin Golab . 1898 25 Cal 692, no part of the claims in suit could be held to be barred by limitation, and not recoverable as such. The plaintiffs were entitled to claim damages for three years preceding the institution of the suits.

    9. In view of the conclusion we have arrived at on the questions submitted for our consideration in these appeals, as indicated above, the appeals are dismissed with costs. One hearing-fee is allowed in these appeals, which is assessed at three gold mohurs. There were two applications for revision, filed in connexion with two of these appeals. The applications are rejected.

    R.K

    10. Appeals dismissed.

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    Arjun Kaibarta And Others v. Manoranjan De Bhoumick And Others
    (Jul 18, 1933)