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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs-appellants brought a suit to recover bhaoli rent for the years 1343 and 1344 Fasli. The claim for 1343 Fasli was not pressed, leaving only the question whether the appellants could recover bhaoli rent for 1344 Fasli. The appellants relied on a sadhaua-pataua deed executed in their favour by Mt. Sona Dei on 11 December 1933 in respect of her proprietary share in the estate containing the respondent's holding. Both Courts below treated the deed as creating a usufructuary mortgage and held that because the appellants were not registered in Register D they could not recover rent from the respondent. The appellants produced in this Court a copy of Register D (marked Ex. A) showing that they were recorded as usufructuary mortgagees after the institution of the present appeal, and based on that entry they sought a decree for the rent of 1344 Fasli.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants are entitled to recover bhaoli rent from the defendant for the year 1344 Fasli.
  2. Whether a mortgagee whose suit for rent was rightly dismissed because of the operation of Section 78 of the Land Registration Act, 1876, can obtain a decree in a second appeal if he becomes registered under the Act during the pendency of that appeal (as framed in the reference to 7 Pat 690).
  3. Whether rent is barred by limitation if the mortgagee's registration in the Collector's register is made after the expiry of the period of limitation for bringing a suit for rent.
  4. Whether, having regard to Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court of second appeal can reverse the decree passed by the Courts below on the ground that the plaintiff obtained registration after institution of the appeal.
  5. Whether the document relied on by the plaintiffs is properly characterized as a usufructuary mortgage or as a lease (this point was raised but the Court did not decide it because the plaintiffs had been registered as usufructuary mortgagees).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs-Appellants' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs relied on the sadhaua-pataua deed (dated 11 December 1933) as the basis for their claim to the rent for 1344 Fasli.
  • They tendered a copy of Register D (Ex. A) in this Court showing that they were recorded as usufructuary mortgagees after the institution of the appeal and sought a decree on that basis.

Defendant-Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended that under Section 78 of the Land Registration Act, 1876, the tenant's liability to pay rent does not arise until the landlord (or mortgagee) claiming the rent is registered, and therefore the appellants had no cause of action when they instituted the suit.
  • The respondent suggested that the decision in Mullick J.'s case (7 Pat 690) had not been followed in subsequent cases and relied on later authorities (12 PLT 693; 18 PLT 925; 17 PLT 423) to support the contention that non-registration is a bar to suing (or at least to successful suit) unless registration existed at the relevant times.
  • The respondent argued, in effect, that the timing of registration (after accrual of the right or after the period of limitation) could bar recovery by the plaintiffs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
7 Pat 690 Answered questions about whether a mortgagee, whose suit was dismissed because of Section 78, could secure a decree if registered during pendency of second appeal; whether registration after limitation affected rent; and whether a second appeal Court could reverse decree when registration occurred after institution. The Court followed the decision in 7 Pat 690 (Mullick J. agreeing with Kulwant Sahay J.) and held that those questions were to be answered in favour of the plaintiff; the decision governed the present case and left little room for argument against allowing the plaintiffs' claim after their registration.
23 Cal 872 (Full Bench, Calcutta High Court) Held that Section 78 does not take away the proprietor's right to sue for rent; it only prevents realization until registration is effected. The Court accepted this view as correct and used it to support the conclusion that Section 78 does not extinguish the right to sue where rent is due; it merely imposes an impediment to enforcement prior to registration.
12 PLT 693 Observations by Jwala Prasad and Wort JJ.: they did not accept Mullick J.'s characterization of a conditional decree in favour of an unregistered plaintiff and distinguished cases on the basis of whether registration had occurred before the second appeal was heard. The Court reviewed these decisions, noting they did not displace the view in 7 Pat 690 as to the essential principles; their observations were read as not contradicting the holding that registration affects enforceability rather than the right to sue.
18 PLT 925 Wort J. observed that plaintiffs were "precluded from suing by reason of Section 78" (language relied on by respondent). The Court interpreted such remarks to mean "suing successfully" and harmonized this authority with the established view that non-registration bars recovery but not the right to institute suit.
17 PLT 423 James J. incidentally observed that under Section 78 no person whose name is not entered in the register can maintain a suit for recovery of rent; the reference was to the register entry being evidence of possession. The Court treated the observation as incidental and not addressing the core question; it held that the case did not challenge the proposition that Section 78 bars enforcement rather than the right to sue.
4 PLJ 312 Supports the proposition that an appellate Court (including a Court of second appeal) may take notice of facts material to the decision which have arisen subsequent to the decision of the suit. The Court relied on this authority (and AIR 1935 Lah 32) to hold that O.41, R.33 together with established practice permits the Court of second appeal to consider the registration entry made during the pendency of the appeal and to pass a decree on that basis.
AIR 1935 Lah 32 Similar support for the proposition that appellate courts can consider post-decision facts material to the case. Used in conjunction with 4 PLJ 312 to justify that the Court could take into account the plaintiffs' registration in Register D made after institution of the appeal and hence could pass a decree accordingly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the narrow issue: entitlement to recover bhaoli rent for 1344 Fasli. It noted that the trial and appellate courts below treated the deed as creating a usufructuary mortgage and declined recovery because the plaintiffs were not in Register D at those earlier stages.

The Court analyzed the effect of Section 78 of the Land Registration Act, 1876, which provides that no person is bound to pay rent to a person claiming as proprietor or mortgagee unless the claimant's name is registered. The respondent argued that Section 78 prevents the accrual of a cause of action until registration. The Court rejected that construction, following the consistent line of authority (notably the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in 23 Cal 872 and the decision in 7 Pat 690) that Section 78 does not extinguish the landowner's or mortgagee's right to sue; rather it places an impediment on realizing/enforcing that right until registration occurs.

The Court examined later decisions cited by the respondent (12 PLT 693, 18 PLT 925, 17 PLT 423) and interpreted remarks there as meaning that an unregistered plaintiff cannot "sue successfully" or recover rent prior to registration, rather than meaning that no cause of action arose at all. The Court emphasized that none of those later cases squarely raised the question whether a plaintiff had a cause of action at the time of suit where registration was effected subsequently; in each, registration had not occurred by the time the second appeal was heard, so dismissal was required on that ground.

On the limitation point, the Court found that the plaintiffs instituted the suit on 22 September 1937, within a year of accrual of their right to rent, and thus the fact that registration occurred more than a year after accrual did not bar recovery — Section 78 does not prevent a right to sue where rent was due; it merely prevents enforcement until registration.

Regarding the power of the Court of second appeal to take notice of registration made during the pendency of the appeal, the Court relied on the reasoning in 7 Pat 690 and the procedural powers conferred by Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The Court explained that Order 41, Rule 33 gives appellate courts broad power to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed, and that this power extends to considering facts arising subsequent to the decision of the suit; the Court cited authorities (4 PLJ 312 and AIR 1935 Lah 32) in support.

The Court therefore concluded it was competent to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs on the basis of the entry in Register D, which removed the bar imposed by Section 78. The Court declined to determine whether the deed was truly a usufructuary mortgage or a lease because the plaintiffs themselves had obtained registration in Register D on the footing that they were usufructuary mortgagees.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Holding (core ruling):

  • The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below, and directed that a decree be made in favour of the plaintiffs for the produce rent of the year 1344 Fasli.
  • The Court held that Section 78 of the Land Registration Act, 1876, does not extinguish the right to sue for rent where rent is due; it only bars enforcement until registration is effected. Registration of the plaintiffs in Register D during the pendency of the appeal removed that bar and entitled them to a decree.

Specific directions and consequences:

  • The produce of the holding is to be calculated at the rate of ten kachcha maunds of paddy per bigha.
  • The price of the produce should be calculated on the basis of the rates published in the Gazette; if such rates are not available or are less than the rate admitted by the defendant, then the price is to be calculated at the rate of ten kachcha pasuris per rupee as admitted by the defendant in his written statement.
  • The plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages.
  • The parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout.

Broader implications:

  • The decision reaffirmed the view (as in 7 Pat 690 and the Full Bench in 23 Cal 872) that non-registration under Section 78 bars enforcement but not the right to institute suit for rent where rent is due. The Court applied established authorities rather than announcing a new precedent.
  • No broader new precedent beyond the application of the cited authorities to the facts of this case was announced; the direct legal effect is the grant of the decree for 1344 Fasli in accordance with the factual findings (including the Munsif's unchallenged determination of quantity).

    Doman Sahu v. Gangu Nayek

    Fazl Ali, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-appellants to recover bhaoli rent for the years 1343 and 1344 Fasli. As the claim for the year 1843 Fasli is not pressed, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether the appellants are entitled to recover bhaoli rent from the defendant for the year 1344 Fasli. The appellants base their claim upon a sadhaua-pataua deed executed in their favour by one Mt. Sona Dei on 11th December 1933, in respect of her proprietary share in the estate in which the respondent's holding is situated. Both the Courts below have held that this deed is a usufructuary mortgage and the appellant not having been registered in Register D are not entitled to recover rent from the respondent. The appellants however have tendered in evidence in this Court a copy of Register D which has been marked as Ex. A without objection. This document shows that the appellants were recorded as usufructuary mortgagees after the institution of the present appeal and on the basis of it they now claim a decree for the rent of the year 1344 Fasli.

    2. Now the points which arise in this appeal are precisely those which arose in 7 Pat 690.1 In that case there being a difference of opinion between Kulwant Sahay and Macpherson JJ., the following questions were referred to Mullick J.: (1) Whether a mortgagee, whose suit for rent had been rightly dismissed in appeal by reason of the provisions of Section 78 of the Land Registration Act, 1876, could secure a decree for rent sued for from the Court of second appeal, if he has during the pendency of the second appeal been registered under that Act, and (2) if he could do so, whether the rent was barred by limitation if his name was registered in the Collector's register after the expiry of the period of limitation for bringing a suit for rent and (3) whether having regard to the provisions of S. 100, the Court of second appeal could reverse the decree passed by the Courts below on the ground that the plaintiff had after the institution of the appeal got himself registered. Mullick J. agreeing with Kulwant Sahay, J. answered all these questions in favour of the plaintiff and it seems to me that in view of the decision in that case, there is hardly any room for argument in this appeal.

    3. It being suggested, however, that the decision of Mullick J. has not been followed in its entirety in two subsequent cases, I wish to examine briefly the arguments advanced by the respondent on this point. Dealing with the question of limitation, the first point to be considered is what is the effect of Section 78 of the Land Registration Act, 1876. That Section runs as follows:

    No person shall be bound to pay rant to any person claiming such rent as proprietor, or manager of an estate or revenue free property in respect of Which he is required by this Act to cause his name to be registered, or as mortgagee, unless the name of such claimant shall have been registered under this Act.

    4. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that by reason of this Section, the liability of the tenant to pay rent does not arise until the landlord claiming to be entitled to the rent is registered as such and consequently the appellants had no cause of action when they brought the suit. The argument is a plausible one, but it appears that the view which has been consistently taken in a number of cases which cannot now be dissented from is that under this Section the right to the rent of an estate being in the proprietor, although not registered, his right to sue for the rent is not taken away; but this Section merely puts an impediment in the way of his realizing the rent until he had complied with the law by obtaining registration of his name as proprietor. This view was set out very clearly in the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in 23 Cal 872 and was accepted as the correct view by Kulwant Sahay J. and Mullick J. in 7 Pat 690. It is suggested on behalf of the respondents that a contrary view has been expressed in at least three subsequent cases of this Court. The first case is that in 12 PLT 693,3 which was decided by Jwala Prasad and Wort JJ. It appears that both the learned Judges did not agree in that case with the view of Mullick J. (which they characterised as obiter dictum) that even where the plaintiff landlord has not got his name registered in Register D, a conditional decree can be passed in his favour imposing a condition that he will be able to execute it upon his name being registered. The learned Judges however have nowhere suggested in their judgment that the case was not correctly decided on its own facts, which it is conceded were quite similar to those of the present case. On the other hand, the distinction which they drew between that case and the case before them was that whereas in the first case the proprietor had been registered before the second appeal was heard, in the case before them no such registration had taken place. It was pointed out to us that one of the observations made by Wort J. in his judgment was that where a proprietor was not registered under the Bengal Registration Act, such non-registration “would be a bar to the plaintiff's cause of action;” and, it was contended that this observation supports the view propounded on the respondent's behalf that the plaintiffs had no cause of action until their names were registered. Now, the actual observations made by Wort J. are these:

    Consequently no action by a person not registered under the Act can succeed; in other words, it is a bar to the plaintiff's cause of action.

    5. If we bear in mind the first part of the observation, it is quite clear that what his Lordship really meant was that the plaintiffs could not sue successfully if their names were not registered under the Bengal Registration Act. The next case which was relied on by the respondent was that in 18 PLT 925.4 In that case also the name of the plaintiffs who sued as proprietors of a village for recovery of rent had not been recorded as such and Wort J. observed at the end of his judgment:

    I should have mentioned that they were precluded from suing by reason of Section 78 of the Hand Registration Act.

    6. In my opinion if these remarks are construed in the light of the remarks made by Wort J. in the previous case, the expression “suing” must be interpreted in the above sentence also to mean “suing successfully,” this view being consistent with the view expressed in a number of cases of the Calcutta High Court which have never been dissented from by this Court. It must be observed that in none of the two cases referred to above, the question as to whether the plaintiff had a cause of action at the time of the suit properly arose, because the plaintiff not being registered even at the time when the second appeal was heard, his suit had to be dismissed in any event; and in the first case Jwala Prasad J. who was of the same opinion as Wort J. made the following remarks:

    Neither Section 78 of the Land Registration Act, nor Section 60 of the Ben. Ten. Act, prohibits a suit being instituted for rant by a plaintiff without having his name registered under the Land Registration Act. These Sections prohibit recovery of rent unless the plaintiff has his name registered. Therefore although the plaintiff is entitled to bring a suit without his name having been registered, he is not entitled to recover rant unless he gets his name registered.

    7. The last case cited on behalf of the respondent was that in 17 PLT 4235 in which James J. while dealing with the effect of Section 78 of the Bengal Registration Act, incidentally observed that under that Section no person whose name is not entered in the register can maintain a suit for recovery of rent. This Section was referred to by the learned Judge only to show that the entry in the Register D was evidence of the fact that the person whose name appears in the register is the person who is in possession of the property and in the case before him the question as to whether S. 78 bars a suit or merely bars the right to recover rent was not raised at all. Thus, the view expressed by this Court in 7 Pat 690 still stands good and I am unable to hold that the appellant's suit is barred by limitation. This suit was instituted on 22nd September 1937, within a year of the date when the plaintiffs' right to rent accrued and the mere fact that the plaintiff was registered more than a year after the accrual of that right will not affect the position. S. 78 does not bar the right to sue if the rent was due; its only effect is that the liability for rent cannot be enforced.

    8. The second point raised on behalf of the respondent is also concluded by the decision of this Court in 7 Pat 690. In that case the question as to whether the Court of second appeal was entitled to take into consideration the effect of the registration of the plaintiff's name during the pendency of the second appeal was expressly referred to Mullick J., and he substantially agreed with the view taken by Kulwant Sahay J. The point was not dealt with fully by Mullick J., but as was pointed out by Kul want Sahay J. the provisions of O. 41, R. 33, are wide enough to enable the Court to take into consideration the entry in the Land Registration Record made since the institution of the second appeal. It has been held in a number of cases that in special circumstances the Court of second appeal can take notice of facts material to the decision of a case which have arisen subsequent to the decision of the suit: see 4 PLJ 3126 and AIR 1935 Lah 32.7 It is true that it is stated in Section 100 of the CPC, that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to it on certain specified grounds only and S. 101 provides that no second appeal shall lie except on grounds mentioned in S. 100. This Section however must be read with O. 41, R. 33, which provides that the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. The only limitation, which has been put upon the powers of the Court in this Section is that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under S. 35-A in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.

    9. This provision applies not only to appeals from original decrees but also to appeals from appellate decrees, and so, in my opinion, this Court is quite competent to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs on the basis of the entry in Register D which shows that the bar imposed by S. 78 has now been removed. The only other point which was put forward before us on behalf of the appellant was that the document upon the basis of which the plaintiffs have instituted the suit is in essence not a usufructuary mortgage but a lease. In my opinion, it is unnecessary to discuss this question in view of the fact that the plaintiffs themselves have obtained an entry in Register D on the footing that they are the usufructuary mortgagees of the property. I would therefore allow this appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and direct that a decree be made in favour of the plaintiffs for the produce rent of the year 1344 Fasli in accordance with the decision of the Munsif as to the quantity of produce which is not challenged by either party. The produce of the holding is to be calculated at the rate of ten kachcha maunds of paddy per bigha and the price of the produce should be calculated on the basis of the rates published in the Gazette and if such rates are not available or are less than the rate admitted by the defendant, then at the rate of ten kachcha pasuris per rupee as admitted by the defendant in his written statement. The plaintiffs will not be entitled to any damage and the parties will bear their costs throughout.

    Chatterji, J.:— I agree.

    G.N/R.K

    10. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Doman Sahu v. Gangu Nayek
    (Oct 11, 1939)