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Structured Summary of the Opinion: Assessment of Mesne Profits on Estate Sold for Arrears of Revenue

Factual and Procedural Background

This dispute concerns assessment of mesne profits in respect of an estate purchased by the respondents at a sale for arrears of revenue on 25 September 1894. The purchasers (respondents) first sued for recovery of possession of some lands comprised in the estate; that suit was decreed on 2 March 1900 and the decree was affirmed on appeal on 24 March 1905. On 12 April 1905 the purchasers commenced a second action for recovery of possession of additional lands, alleging that intermediate tenures relied upon by persons in possession were either fictitious or created after the Permanent Settlement and therefore inoperative against purchasers at a revenue sale. The second suit was decreed on 19 December 1905; it was found that the tenures, though genuine, were not proved to have existed at the date of the Permanent Settlement. Delivery of possession to the decree-holders occurred on 14 March 1906. On 30 July 1906 the decree-holders sought assessment of mesne profits. The trial (District) Court, after investigation, awarded mesne profits jointly against all defendants on the basis of rent payable by the actual cultivators. The defendants (judgment-debtors) appealed, advancing four principal grounds of challenge to the mesne-profits assessment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether mesne profits up to the date of the decree for possession should be calculated on the basis of the rent payable by the tenure-holders of the first degree (those holding immediately under the defaulting proprietors), rather than on the rent payable by the actual cultivators.
  2. Whether mesne profits accrued during the pendency of the ejectment suit (from institution of the suit to delivery of possession) should be assessed separately for different under-tenures (including distinct under-tenures of the same degree and for subordinate tenures of different degrees), and whether the decree should specify the separate liability of each under-tenure-holder.
  3. Whether the release by the decree-holders of some judgment-debtors (under-tenure-holders) operates as a release of all judgment-debtors (i.e., whether release of one joint tort-feasor/discharge of one joint-debtor discharges the others).
  4. Whether, where some judgment-debtors have been released on payment of specified sums, the remaining judgment-debtors can be made jointly and severally liable for the balance of the entire debt.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants / Judgment-Debtors) Arguments

  • As to the first ground: A sale for arrears of revenue does not automatically (ipso facto) avoid all encumbrances and under-tenures; instead, under-tenures are only voidable at the purchaser's option until a suit for annulment and recovery of lands is instituted. Consequently, the possession of under-tenure-holders is not wrongful prior to institution of such a suit, and mesne profits for that antecedent period should be limited to the rent that would be payable by the immediate under-tenure-holders (first-degree holders), not by the actual cultivators.
  • As to the second ground: Mesne profits accruing during the pendency of the suit (from institution to delivery of possession) should be separately assessed in respect of different under-tenures — separately both for different holders of the same degree and for subordinate tenures of different degrees — and the decree should specify each under-tenure-holder's separate liability.
  • As to the third ground: The release by the plaintiffs of some joint tort-feasors/judgment-debtors operates as a release of every judgment-debtor, relying on authority (Cocke v. Jennor) that an absolute release to one joint wrong-doer discharges the others because the cause of action is indivisible.
  • As to the fourth ground: Because plaintiffs released some wrongdoers (on payment of sums), their own conduct has split the claim and a joint decree should not be entered against all defendants; the plaintiffs cannot thereafter demand joint and several liability for the entire balance.

Respondents' (Plaintiffs / Decree-Holders) Arguments

  • In relation to joint liability (raised in defence of the District Judge's decree), respondents contended that the liability of wrong-doers (those keeping the purchaser out of possession) is joint and several; therefore, it was urged that a joint decree against all defendants making each jointly and severally liable was appropriate.
  • More generally, respondents relied upon earlier authorities supporting the proposition of joint and several liability for tortfeasors in many circumstances (as cited in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Titu Bibi v. Mohesh Chunder Bagchi (1883) I.L.R. 9 Calc. 683 Demonstrates that a sale for arrears of revenue does not ipso facto avoid encumbrances/under-tenures; such interests are avoidable only at purchaser's option. The Court relied on this authority to reject the appellants' contention that all under-tenures are automatically annulled by the revenue sale, and to hold that an under-tenure is annulled only when the purchaser exercises the option by instituting suit.
Kamal Kumari Chowdhurani v. Kiran Chandra Boy (1898) 2 C.W.N. 229 Supports that purchaser's option to avoid under-tenures may be exercised by suit; no notice is a necessary preliminary. Used to support the proposition that institution of suit (within legal time) can annul an under-tenure; no prior notice was required in this case.
Mafizuddin v. Korbad Ali Chowdhuri (1903) I.L.R. 31 Calc. 393 Same theme: sale does not automatically annul under-tenures; purchaser may sue within time to avoid them. Confirmed the Court's view that the relevant date for annulment is the date of suit institution, not the date of sale.
Mir Waziruddin v. Lala Deoki Nandan (1907) 6 C.L.J. 472 Supports position on purchaser's option to avoid under-tenures by suit (no prior notice necessary). Reinforced the Court's conclusion that the tenure was annulled from the date of institution of the suit.
Fuzul Mahomed Mundul v. Raj Coomaree Debee (1866) 6 W.R. 113 Cited by appellants in support of separate assessment principles for mesne profits. The Court noted the authority among several cited by appellants but did not treat any single case as directly decisive; it accepted the general proposition that apportionment principles apply.
Collector of Bograh v. Shama Shankur Mojoomdar (1866) 6 W.R. 230 Cited in support of appellants' argument about separate assessments. Referenced as part of the group of authorities supporting separate assessment; the Court adopted the practical apportionment principle instead of upholding a joint decree.
Sreeputty Roy v. Loharam Boy (1867) 7 W.R. 384 Cited in relation to apportionment and also discussed elsewhere regarding joint liability; used in comparison. Noted among precedents; the Court observed distinctions between cases involving combination and those involving good faith assertion of imperfect title.
Krishna Mohun Basak v. Kunjo Behari Basak (1881) 9 C.L.R. 1 Illustrates that where injury was caused in good faith or by assertion of an imperfect title, strict joint-and-several liability is not just. The Court relied on this reasoning to limit application of joint liability where defendants acted in good faith without combination.
Krishna Ram v. Rakmini Sewak Singh (1887) I.L.R. 9 All. 221 Cited by appellants among authorities for separate assessment principles. Listed among cases supporting appellants; used to support the view that separate liabilities may be appropriate.
Hari Saran Maitra v. Jotindra Mohan Lahiri (1900) 5 C.W.N. 393 Discussed in relation to apportionment and limitation of joint-liability principle. The Court noted its earlier view in this case and its acceptance by the Judicial Committee, supporting restricted application of joint liability.
Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja (1869) 3 B.L.R. P.C. 44; 12 W.R. 38 Example of a case where rioters acting in combination were held jointly and severally liable. Used to illustrate the category of cases (combination/conspiracy) where joint liability is just; distinguished from the facts of the present case.
Ajoodhya Doss v. Lalljee Paurey (1873) 19 W.R. 218 Example where joint action excluded a co-owner (tenant-in-common) — used as an instance of just joint liability. Referred to as an authority supporting joint liability where there is collusion or combined wrongful exclusion.
Shama Sunkur Chowdhry v. Sreenath Banerjee (1869) 12 W.R. 354 Case of colluding trespassers; supports joint and several liability in combination cases. Used to show that when defendants act in concert, joint liability is appropriate; distinguished from the present facts.
Ram Chunder Surmah v. Ram Chunder Pal (1875) 23 W.R. 226 Another authority cited for joint liability where intermediate tenure-holders combined to keep purchaser out. Again used to illustrate when joint liability is justified; contrasted with the present case where no combination was found.
Mudun Mohun Singh v. Ram Dass Chuckerbutty (1880) 6 C.L.R. 357 Discussed to show limits to joint-liability rule when acts are done in good faith. Supported the Court's distinction between wrongful concerted action and independent acts done in good faith.
Place v. Minister (1875) 65 N.Y. 89 Quoted for principle condemning designed or concerted wrongs and the need to hold conspirators jointly liable. The Court quoted an extract to emphasize that concerted wrongful design justifies joint liability; used illustratively.
Bodreugam v. Arcedekne (1302) Y.B. 30 Edw. I. 106 (referred in Harihar Pershad v. Bholi Pershad) Historic source for the rule of joint liability adopted in England — early origin of the principle. The Court traced the rule's historic origins and then explained its limited modern application in equity and justice.
Harihar Pershad v. Bholi Pershad (1907) 3 C.L.J. 383 Reference point for the application of the joint-liability rule in prior Court decisions. Referred to in support of historical background to the rule; Court emphasized limitations to its application.
Palmer v. Wick [1894] A.C. 318 Warning (by Lord Herschell) that rigid application of joint-liability ceases to be equitable or just. Relied upon to support the proposition that joint liability must be applied with limitations.
Adamson v. Jarvis (1827) 4 Bing. 66 Early authority cited to show judicial caution in applying joint-liability as an inflexible rule. Used to illustrate historical judicial comments limiting blanket application of joint liability.
Jotindra Mohun Lahiri v. Guru Prosunno Lahiri (1904) I.L.R. 31 Calc. 597; L.R. 31 I.A. 94 Judicial Committee reference to the principles discussed in Hari Saran Maitra; confirms limited approach. Referred to as confirmation of restricted application of joint liability in similar contexts.
Cocke v. Jennor (1615) Hob. 66; 102 E.R. 214 Authority supporting that a release to one joint tort-feasor operates to discharge the others (traditional common-law rule). Cited by appellants; the Court examined it but declined to adopt its absolute operation without limitation, preferring a pro tanto approach where appropriate.
Brinsmead v. Harrison (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 547 Rule that judgment against one of several joint tort-feasors can be a bar to action against others (English rule). Discussed as part of historical doctrine; the Court noted contrasting modern authorities and limited the doctrine's automatic operation.
Lovejoy v. Murray (1865) 3 Wallace 1 U.S. Supreme Court authority holding that a judgment against one joint tort-feasor does not by itself bar recovery against others unless satisfied. Relied on to support the Court's reluctance to accept the absolute common-law rule that release of one releases all.
In re Atlas (1876) 93 U.S. 302 Also cited for the principle limiting effect of judgment/release against one joint tort-feasor on actions against others. Supported the view that satisfaction of judgment (not mere judgment) is what bars further recovery against others.
Duck v. Mayeu [1892] 2 Q.B. 511 Establishes that a covenant not to sue one of two joint tort-feasors does not release the other. Used to show English tendency to restrict the operation of release/covenant rules; Court adopted similar caution.
Snow v. Chandler (1839) 10 N.H. 92; 34 Am. Dec. 140 Authority for the proposition that a release of one joint wrong-doer, if not intended as full satisfaction, discharges others only pro tanto. Relied upon to support the Court's conclusion that releases given by plaintiffs discharged others only pro tanto where not intended to be full satisfaction.
Seither v. Philadelphia (1880) 125 Pa. 397; 11 Am. St. Rep. 905 Another American authority supporting pro tanto effect of a partial release. Adopted as supportive precedent for limiting the operation of releases to partial discharge unless express or implied full satisfaction is shown.
Juggarnath Singh v. Ahmedoolla (1867) 8 W.R. 132 Decision supporting the limited operation of a release — used in support of the Court's position. Viewed as authority consistent with the Court's rejection of an absolute release rule in the present circumstances.
Bissonath Tewarry v. Koylashbany Narain Singh (1863) 2 Hay 297 Cited supporting the contention that plaintiffs' release of some wrongdoers splits the claim and affects imposition of joint decrees. The Court acknowledged this authority as supporting the fourth ground but observed that the second ground's remedy (specifying separate liabilities) made further treatment unnecessary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing, in sequence, the four principal grounds of appeal raised by the judgment-debtors and applied legal principles and authorities to the facts.

  1. On whether sale ipso facto annulled under-tenures (first ground):

    The Court accepted the established principle (illustrated by Titu Bibi and other authorities) that a sale for arrears of revenue does not automatically avoid encumbrances and under-tenures. Rather, an under-tenure is avoidable at the purchaser's option, which may be exercised by institution of a suit within the time allowed by law. Because the purchasers in the present case did not give notice prior to suing, the Court held the tenure was not annulled until the date of institution of the ejectment suit (12 April 1905). The Court rejected the appellants' alternative contention that the tenure was not annulled until the decree; it found no authority for that view and emphasized that a cause of action must exist at the date of institution for a decree to be possible. Consequently, for the period antecedent to institution of the suit, the plaintiffs were entitled only to recover sums representing the rent payable by the first-degree tenure-holders — and any decree for that antecedent period could be entered only against defendants who held directly under the defaulting proprietors (not against all defendants jointly and severally).

  2. On separate assessment and apportionment of mesne profits during the suit (second ground):

    The Court examined competing authorities concerning joint and several liability of tort-feasors and concluded that the strict rule of joint-and-several liability does not apply universally. It distinguished cases of deliberate combination or conspiracy (where joint liability is just) from cases where interference resulted from good-faith assertion of an imperfect title or independent acts. Finding no evidence of combination or conspiracy among the defendants in this case, the Court held that they could not justly be made jointly and severally liable for mesne profits. Instead, mesne profits must be apportioned according to the share of profits intercepted by each defendant (i.e., the net amount retained by each out of the rent payable by occupancy raiyats). The Court illustrated this principle by a detailed hypothetical showing how interception at successive tenancy levels should be apportioned among holders of different degrees. Practically, the Court directed the need to identify under-tenures of the second degree under the proprietary interest and then successive under-tenures under each second-degree tenure, and to compute the net profits intercepted by each such holder for payment to the purchasers.

  3. On effect of release of some judgment-debtors (third ground):

    The appellants invoked the ancient common-law rule (Cocke v. Jennor) that release of one joint tort-feasor discharges the others. The Court surveyed authorities (including English and U.S. decisions) and declined to adopt an absolute rule of discharge without limitation. The Court preferred the more moderate rule that where a release is not intended to be full satisfaction of the wrong, it discharges the others only pro tanto (to the extent of the amount received), citing American authorities (Lovejoy v. Murray, In re Atlas) and other cases (Snow v. Chandler, Seither v. Philadelphia). Because the Court had already held that liability in the present case was not joint and several (see the second ground), the classical doctrine of release of one joint wrong-doer was inapplicable in any event; thus the third ground failed.

  4. On splitting of claims by plaintiffs' release of some wrongdoers (fourth ground):

    The appellants argued that by releasing some wrongdoers on payment, the plaintiffs had split their claim and so could not obtain a joint decree. The Court observed that this contention had merit and cited Bissonath Tewarry v. Koylashbany Narain Singh in support. However, the Court noted that because it had already held (on ground two) that the decree should specify separately the liability of each under-tenure-holder, further elaboration on the fourth ground was unnecessary.

On balance, the Court concluded that the District Judge's approach (awarding mesne profits jointly against all defendants based on rent payable by actual cultivators) was unsound in key respects and required the matter to be re-opened and re-assessed according to the principles stated above. The Court authorized the trial Court to receive such further evidence as may be necessary to determine under-tenures of the second degree and successive under-tenures and to calculate net profits intercepted by each holder.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; ORDERS OF THE COURTS BELOW SET ASIDE; CASES REMANDED TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE FOR REASSESSMENT.

Direct consequences and instructions resulting from the ruling:

  • For the period antecedent to the institution of the ejectment suit (i.e., before 12 April 1905), the plaintiffs (purchasers at the revenue sale) are entitled only to the sum representing the rent payable by the tenure-holders of the first degree (those holding immediately under the defaulting proprietors). Any decree for that antecedent period may be entered only against those directly liable, not against all defendants jointly and severally.
  • For mesne profits accrued during the pendency of the ejectment suit (from institution to delivery of possession), liability should be apportioned among under-tenure-holders according to the net amount of profits intercepted by each (i.e., the share each intercepted out of the rent payable by occupancy raiyats). The decree must specify separately the extent of each under-tenure-holder's liability.
  • The Court rejected the absolute common-law rule that the release of one joint tort-feasor automatically discharges all others without qualification; where a release is not intended as full satisfaction it operates only pro tanto. Because the Court found no joint-and-several liability on these facts, the classical doctrine of release of one as discharging all did not apply here.
  • The trial Court is to be at liberty to take further evidence necessary to identify the relevant under-tenures and to compute apportionments of intercepted profits. There was to be no order as to costs.

Note: The opinion directs re-assessment and specific apportionment methodology rather than affirming the District Judge's joint-and-several mesne-profits decree; it does not purport, in the language of the judgment, to declare a broader rule beyond the principles applied to the facts before the Court.

    Ram Ratan Kapali And Ors. v. Aswini Kumar Dutta And Ors.

    1. The substantial question of law which calls for decision in these appeals relates to the assessment of mesne profits of property sold for arrears of 'revenue, and is of a somewhat novel character. The circumstances under which the claim for mesne profits is made by the decree-holders are not the subject of controversy between the parties. On the 25th of September 1894, the respondents purchased an estate at a sale for arrears of revenue. They at first commenced an action for recovery of possession of some of the lands comprised in the estate, on the allegation that the intermediate tenure set up by the persons in possession was not binding upon them as purchasers at a sale for arrears of revenue. This suit was decreed on the 2nd March 1900, and on appeal to this Court, the decree of the Court of first instance was affirmed on the 24th March 1905. On the 12th April 1905 the purchasers commenced the present action for recovery of possession of lands not comprised in the previous suit, upon the allegation that the intermediate tenures set up by the defendants were either fictitious, or had been created after the date of the Permanent Settlement, and were consequently inoperative against them as purchasers of the entire estate at a revenue sale. The suit was decreed on the 19th December 1905, and it was found that the tenures, though genuine, were not proved to have been in existence at the date of the Permanent Settlement. On the 14th March 1906, the decree-holders obtained delivery of possession, and subsequently, on the 30th July 1906, asked for assessment of mesne profits. The Court below has made a full investigation into the claim, and has made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs, by which mesne profits have been awarded, jointly against all the defendants, on the basis of the rent payable by the actual cultivators, The defendants judgment-debtors have now appealed to this Court, and on their behalf the decision of the District Judge has been assailed substantially on four grounds: namely, first, that the mesne profits up to the date of the decree for possession should have been calculated on the basis of the rent payable by the tenure-holders of the first degree, who held immediately under the defaulting proprietors; secondly, that the mesne profits, both for the period antecedent and subsequent to the decree for possession, should have been assessed separately in respect of different under-tenures of the same degree, as also in respect of subordinate tenures of different degrees, and that the decree should have specified the separate liability of each under-tenure-holder; thirdly, that as some of, the judgment-debtors have been released from liability, the effect is to release all the judgment-debtors; and fourthly, that in any event, as some of the judgment-debtors have been released from liability on receipt of specified sums from them, the remaining judgment-debtors cannot be made liable jointly and severally for the balance of the entire debt.

    2. In support of the first of these contentions, it has been argued by the learned vakil for the appellants that the effect of a sale for arrears of revenue is not if so facto to avoid all incumbrances and under-tenures, but only to make them voidable till a decree has been made in a suit for annulment of the under-tenures" and for recovery of the lands; the possession of the under-tenure-holders is not wrongful, and the purchaser at the revenue sale is consequently not entitled to claim, by way of damages for use and occupation, any sum in excess of what represents the rent payable by the under-tenure-holders. In our opinion this contention is partially sound. The case of Titu Bibi v. Mohesh Chunder Bagchi (1883) I.L.R. 9 Calc. 683, shows conclusively the fallacy of the assumption that the effect of a sale for arrears of revenue is if so facto to avoid all incumbrances and under-tenures. An incumbrance or under-tenure is not if so facto avoided by the sale of an estate for arrears of revenue, and is only liable to be avoided at the option of the purchaser at such sale. As pointed out in the cases of Kamal Kumari Chowdhurani v. Kiran Chandra Boy (1898) 2 C.W.N. 229, Mafizuddin v. Korbad Ali Chowdhuri (1903) I.L.R. 31 Calc. 393 and Mir Waziruddin v. Lala Deoki Nandan (1907) 6 C.L.J. 472, 484, the law does not require any notice as a necessary preliminary to a suit to avoid an under-tenure but the option of the purchaser may be exercised by the institution of a suit within the time allowed by law. In the case before us, where no notice was given by the purchaser before the commencement of the suit for ejectment, we must hold that the tenure was not annulled till the date of the institution of the suit, that is, the 12th April 1905. We are unable to accept as well-founded the contention of the appellants that the tenure Was not annulled till the date of the decree made in the suit for ejectment. There is no authority in support of this view, which is clearly opposed to principle, because, unless it is assumed that there Was a cause of action at the date of the institution of the suit, no decree for ejectment could be made therein. We must hold, therefore, that the tenure was annulled with effect from the date of the commencement of the suit, and that, for the period antecedent thereto, the plaintiffs as purchasers at a revenue sale are entitled only to such sum as represents the rent payable by the tenure-holder of the first degree; obviously, a decree for this sum can be made only against such of the defendants as hold the tenures directly under the defaulting proprietors, and not against all of them jointly and severally. The first ground taken on behalf of the appellants must, consequently, succeed in part.

    3. In support of the second contention of the appellants, it is argued that in respect of the mesne profits which have accrued during the pendency of the suit for possession, from the date of its institution to the date of delivery of possession, the liability of different tenure-holders of the same degree, and of separate under-tenure-holders of different degrees, should have been separately assessed. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Fuzul Mahomed Mundul v. Raj Coomaree Debee (1866) 6 W.R. 113, Collector of Bograh v. Shama Shankur Mojoomdar (1866) 6 W.R. 230, Sreeputty Roy v. Loharam Boy (1867) 7 W.R. 384, Krishna Mohun Basak v. Kunjo Behari Basak (1881) 9 C.L.R. 1, Krishna Ram v. Rakmini Sewak Singh (1887) I.L.R. 9 All. 221 and Hari Saran Maitra v. Jotindra Mohan Lahiri (1900) 5 C.W.N. 393. It has been argued, on the other hand, on behalf of the respondents decree-holders, that the liability of the wrong-doers is joint and several, and in support of this proposition, reliance has been placed upon' the cases of Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja (1869) 3 B.L.R. P.C. 44. 12 W.R. 38, P.C. Ajoodhya Doss v. Lalljee Paurey (1873) 19 W.R. 218, Shama Sunkur Chowdhry v. Sreenath Banerjee (1869) 12 W.R. 354, Ram Chunder Surmah v. Ram Chunder Pal (1875) 23 W.R. 226 and Mudun Mohun Singh v. Ram Dass Chuckerbutty (1880) 6 C.L.R. 357. No useful purpose would be served by an analysis and examination of each of these decisions, because not one of them is directly in point. No doubt the liability of wrong-doers in tort is, as a general rule, joint and several; but it cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule, that in every case of tort the Court is bound to pass a joint decree against the wrong-doers, making each jointly and severally liable for the whole amount decreed. In cases of combination like that of Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja (1869) 3 B.L.R. P.C. 44. 12 W.R. 38 P.C. where rioters as members of a common assembly, plundered a house, or Shama Sunkur Chowdhry v. Sreenath Banerjee (1869) 12 W.R. 354, where trespassers had colluded to keep the true owner out of possession of his property, or Ajoodhya Doss v. Lalljee Paurey (1873) 19 W.R. 218, where a tenant-in-common had been excluded by the joint action of the defendants from his property which had been divided as a spoil amongst them, or Ram Chunder Surmah v. Ram Chander Pal (1875) 23 W.R. 226, where intermediate tenure-holders had combined wrongfully to keep an auction purchaser out of possession, it is just and reasonable that the tort-feasors should be held jointly and severally liable for the damage sustained by the injured party. In cases, however, where there is no combination, and where, as in Krishna Mohun Basak v. Kunjo Behari Basak (1881) 9 C.L.R. 1. and Mudun Mohun Singh v. Ram Dass Chuckerbutty (1880) 6 C.L.R. 357, the injury to the plaintiff, though wrongful in the sense that it is an infraction of his legal rights, has been caused in good faith, or in assertion of an imperfect title, the strict rule of joint and several liabilities cannot justly be enforced. The principle of law which holds all persons concerned in the commission of a tort liable therefor, without regard to the part taken therein by them so long as their acts are not separate and independent, is far-reaching and efficacious: that principle is that persons who act in concert or combination to commit the wrong Which actually results in damage to person or property, must each be held liable for the entire damage, no matter what part one may take, so long as there is concerted action. As has been well said in Place v. Minister (1875) 65 N.Y. 89,

    "designing men cannot be allowed to put forth a supple tool to do their bidding, knowingly take the profits of concocted wrong, remain silent, and go unwhipped of justice."
    In cases, therefore, in which the controlling general principle, namely, that where acts of several persons by design, or by conduct, tantamount to conspiracy, contribute to the commission of a wrong, they are jointly liable, is not applicable, the rule of joint liability also ceases to be applicable. The rule of joint liability, therefore, which, as appears from the case of Bodreugam v. Arcedekne (1302) Y.B. 30 Edw. I. 106, referred to in the judgment of this Court in Harihar Pershad v. Bholi Pershad ( 1907) 3 C.L.J. 383, 390, was adopted in England as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century, and may be regarded as based on sound principle when applied to cases of combinations or conspiracies, must be applied with some limitations; otherwise, as pointed out by Lord Herschell in Palmer v. Wick [ 1894] A.C. 318, it ceases to be a principle of justice or equity, or even of public policy. The same view was indicated by Best C.J. in Adamson v. Jarvis ( 1827) 4 Bing.66; 29 R.R. 503, and by Peacock C.J. in Sreeputty Boy v. Loharam Roy ( 1867) 7 W.R. 384. A similar view was taken by this Court in Hari Saran Maitra v. Jotindra Mohan Lahiri (1900) 5 C.W.N. 393, which was not questioned when the case was taken, before the Judicial Committee: Jotindra Mohun Lahiri v. Guru Prosunno Lahiri (1904) I.L.R. 31 Calc. 597; L.R. 31 I.A. 94. If now we apply these principles to the case before us, what is the position? The plaintiffs are the purchasers of an estate at a sale for arrears of revenue; the defendants are tenure holders of different grades who held possession of the property under the defaulting proprietors; till the plaintiffs had made their election and indicated to the defendants that they did not want any portion of the rents payable by the actual cultivators to be intercepted by the under-tenure-holders, the defendants were entitled to remain in occupation and to exercise their rights over the property. When the suit for ejectment was commenced, the defendants set up in good faith an intermediate tenure which, however, was found to be inoperative against the plaintiffs purchasers at a sale for arrears of revenue, as it was not established to have been created before the time of the Permanent Settlement. A decree for ejectment was consequently made against them, but there is no foundation for any suggestion that the defendants had combined or conspired to keep the plaintiffs out of possession. Consequently they cannot, in justice, be made jointly and severally liable for the mesne profits, which must be apportioned according to the liability of the various defendants. The question, therefore, arises, what is the principle upon which such apportionment should be made? The obvious answer is that the liability should be apportioned according to the share of the profits intercepted by each defendant. An application of this principle may be illustrated by a concrete example. Assume that before the revenue sale, X, the proprietor of the estate had under him successive tenure-holders 6f different degrees, A, B, C, the last of whom was the immediate landlord of an occupancy raiyat who paid rent at the rate of Rs. 100 per annum. Suppose that C paid rent to B at the rate of Rs. 60 per annum, B paid rent to A at the rate of Rs. 35 per annum, and A paid rent to X at the rate of Rs. 20 per annum. It is obvious that if all the intermediate tenures were annulled, X would be entitled to receive direct from the occupancy raiyat Rs. 100 per annum, out of which sum Rs. 40 was intercepted by C, Rs. 25 by B, and the remainder Rs. 35 constituted the sum received by A, out of which he retained a profit of Rs. 15. If, however, X recovers possession by ejectment of A, B, and C, he should in justice receive as mesne profits Rs. 35 from A, Rs. 25 from B, and Rs. 40 from C. To put the matter in another way: each tenure-holder of different degree should be made liable to the purchaser of the estate for the amount of profits retained by him, which is equivalent to the net amount intercepted by him out of the sum payable by the occupancy raiyat. We have made no allowance in the illustration for any reasonable deduction that may have to be made on account of collection or other similar charges. In order to apply this principle to the case before us, we have first to determine under-tenures of the second degree, under the tenure immediately subordinate to the proprietary interest, and we have next to determine the under-tenures of successive degrees, under each under-tenure of the second degree. The holders of each of these under-tenures must pay to the plaintiffs respondents the net amount of profits made by them out of rents payable by the occupancy raiyats. The result, therefore, is that the second ground upon which the decision of the District Judge is assailed must prevail.

    4. The third ground raises the question of the judgment-debtors other than those that have been released from the claim of the decree-holders. It appears that before the suit was commenced, the plaintiffs entered into a compromise with some of the tenure-holders, and subsequent to the commencement of the action, on the 11th February and 12th March 1906, they gave up their claims against some other under-tenure-holders upon payment by them of certain sums as damages. Under these circumstances, it has been argued by the learned vakil for the appellants that the release of some of the tort-feasors from the claim of the plaintiffs operates in law as a release of every judgment debtor. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed upon the case of Cocke v. Jennor (1615) Hob. 66; 102 E.R. 214, where it was ruled that a release granted to one joint tort-feasor, or to one joint-debtor, operates as a discharge of the other joint tort-feasor or other joint-debtor, because the cause of action which is one indivisible having been released, all persons otherwise liable thereto are consequently released. From this principle there has been deduced the rule adopted in Brinsmead v. Harrison (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 547 that a judgment in an action against one of several joint tort-feasors is a bar to an action against the others for the same cause, although such judgment remains unsatisfied. This result, however, has been attacked on the ground that it is based upon technical rules of English jurisprudence, and is not consistent with principles of justice, equity, and good conscience; and in Lovejoy v. Murray (1865) 3 Wallace 1 and In re Atlas (1876) 93 U.S. 302, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held, upon an elaborate review of all the authorities, that a judgment against one joint tort-feasor does not, by itself, bar a recovery against the others, but satisfaction of such a judgment is a bar. In England, also, the tendency has been to restrict the operation of the rule by a refined distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue. Thus in Duck v. Mayeu [1892] 2 Q.B. 511, it was ruled that a covenant not to sue one of two joint tort-feasors does not operate as a release of the other from liability. We are, therefore, not prepared to adopt without any limitation the principle of the Common law that the release of one joint wrong-doer operates as a release of all. On the other hand, we are of opinion that the more reasonable and logical rule is that a release of one without any intention to release the other joint tort-feasors, but only as a partial satisfaction, discharges the others only pro tanlo: Snow v. Chandler (1839) 10 N.H. 92; 34 Am. Dec. 140, Seither v. Philadelphia (6) (1880) 125 Pa. 397; 11 Am. St. Rep. 905. No doubt it may be contended, with some show of reason, that the act of the injured party should be taken most strongly against himself, and that, if he releases one joint wrong-doer, it furnishes strong, if not conclusive, evidence that he has been satisfied for the wrong; this theory, indeed, is the foundation of the rule, which is of ancient origin, that an absolute release of one joint tort-feasor operates as a discharge of all. If, however, the release cannot be considered to be of such import as to be in full satisfaction, the rule ought not to be held applicable. The view we take is supported by the decision in Juggarnath Singh v. Ahmedoolla (1867) 8 W.R. 132. The third ground taken on behalf of the appellants cannot consequently be supported. We may add that, as we have held on the second ground that the liability in the present case is not joint and several, it would in this view be unnecessary to consider whether the release of one joint tort-feasor operates as a release of all, because admittedly that doctrine can apply, if anywhere, only in cases of joint liability.

    5. The fourth ground taken on behalf of the appellants is to the effect that as the plaintiffs have released some of the wrongdoers from liability, their claim against the others have been split up by their own conduct, and that consequently a joint decree ought not to be passed against all the defendants. This contention is obviously well-founded, and is supported by the case of Bissonath Tewarry v. Koylashbany Narain Singh (1863) 2 Hay 297. It is not necessary, however, to deal with this point further, as we have already held upon the second ground that the decree ought to specify separately the extent of liability of each under-tenure-holder.

    6. The result, therefore, is that these appeals must be allowed, the orders of the Courts below set aside, and the cases remanded to the Court of first instance, to be dealt with on the lines indicated in this judgment. The Court will be at liberty to take such further evidence as may be needed to elucidate any of the questions which require investigation. There will be no order as to costs.

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