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Case Summary — Beevor, J. (with concurrence of Bennett, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs obtained a decree in a suit founded on a handnote against Phalli Singh, his sons and grandsons. In execution of that decree on 3 January 1942 they brought to sale and purchased an eight-anna share in a property as representing the share of Phalli, his sons and grandsons. The decree was dated 23 April 1940 and the eight-anna share had been attached before judgment on 22 April 1939. The defendant-appellant is of the same family as Phalli Singh; the plaintiffs thereafter sued for partition of the eight-anna share against the defendant-appellant.

The defendant-appellant contested the suit on various grounds. The lower courts found against the appellant on a key question of fact (the appellant's allegation of a prior partition allotting him 16 annas), and that factual finding could not be challenged in the second appeal. The present proceeding is an appeal by the defendant against the judgment upholding the plaintiffs' partition suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs' partition suit was maintainable when they had not prayed for possession (invoking the proviso to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act).
  2. Whether the plaintiffs' suit for partition was maintainable when they did not include all properties of the joint family in which the appellant and Phalli were coparceners.
  3. Whether Phalli, his sons and grandsons were necessary parties to the plaintiffs' partition suit.
  4. Whether, in execution of the decree, the plaintiffs could purchase and thereby determine the share as eight annas themselves, or whether they could only purchase the right, title and interest of Phalli (with or without that of his sons and grandsons) and must have the share determined in a separate suit against the family.
  5. Whether the existence of a sudbharnadar (usufructuary mortgagee) in possession barred the partition suit or required that the sudbharnadar be made a party.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The suit was not maintainable because the plaintiffs omitted to pray for possession (invoking the proviso to section 42, Specific Relief Act).
  • The partition suit was defective because the plaintiffs did not include the entire joint family properties in the suit.
  • Phalli, his sons and grandsons were necessary parties to the partition suit and should have been included.
  • The plaintiffs, in execution, could only purchase the right, title and interest of Phalli (with or without his sons and grandsons), and could not themselves determine the share as eight annas; the share must be determined in a suit brought against the family (i.e., the execution sale could not pre-empt suit for partition to fix shares).
  • The property was in possession of sudbharnadars (usufructuary mortgagees), and that possession renders the plaintiffs' partition suit not maintainable or requires the mortgagee to be a party.

Plaintiffs' Position (as evident from the opinion)

  • The plaintiffs had purchased an eight-anna share at execution sale in respect of the judgment-debtor's interest (that purchase was of the share or right, title and interest of Phalli and, it appears, of his sons and grandsons as they had been parties to the decree and execution proceedings).
  • The plaintiffs sought partition (not mere possession) of the share they had purchased.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Din Dayal's case In Mitakshara law (as administered in the province) the right, title and interest (share) of a joint-family member may be sold in execution, and a purchaser's rights are limited to those which the judgment-debtor could have compelled by partition before alienation. Applied to hold that the plaintiffs' auction purchase conferred on them the same rights they would have had if they had purchased "the share or right, title and interest of Phalli, his sons and grandsons"—i.e., the purchaser steps into the judgment-debtor's position as to partition rights but cannot claim more than the debtor could have obtained.
Hurdey Narain Sahu's case (Judicial Committee) Even where a purchaser has obtained possession, the joint family can recover possession of the entire property subject to the purchaser's right to work out his entitlement by partition. Used to support the proposition that a purchaser at such an auction cannot sue for possession other than by means of partition; plaintiffs' remedy is partition, not a simple possession claim.
Nandkishore Kumar v. Achambit Kumari (James, J.) The court must ensure plaintiffs do not avoid liability to pay proper ad valorem court-fee by omitting a prayer for possession in a suit that is essentially a title suit framed as a partition suit. The appellate court's requirement that plaintiffs pay ad valorem court-fee (because they were out of possession) was aligned with this principle; the present decision does not overturn that fee-related conclusion.
Rewati Raman Basak v. Haris Chandra Basak Courts refused to allow a plaint in a partition suit to be amended by adding a prayer for possession (in the facts of that case the plaintiff could have sued for joint possession). Distinguished on facts (there the plaintiff could have sued for joint possession); not treated as controlling here but cited in fee/possession discussion.
Tarini Charan Chakrabati v. Debendra Lal De Held that the purchaser of a small portion of joint family property can obtain partition only of the land purchased; a suit for partial partition will lie. Relied upon to support the view that a purchaser may bring suit confined to the particular land purchased rather than being required always to include entire joint family properties.
Sris Chandra Dutta Chaudhuri v. Mahima Chandra Datta Choudhuri (Calcutta High Court) Complementary rule: a suit for partition cannot include properties in which the parties do not claim an interest; a plaintiff may confine his application to particular parts of the property he desires divided, subject to other parties showing division requires consideration of the rest. Quoted to justify that plaintiffs may confine suit to the property in which they purchased a share, while leaving open to others the argument that broader partition is necessary.
Ram Mohan Lall v. Mul Chand (Allahabad High Court) Held that purchaser of a share in two joint-family properties could bring suit for partition of one of those properties without including the other. Cited as an authority (noting it goes further than present plaintiffs' claim) supporting partial partition suits; court treated it as consistent with allowing the present suit limited to the property purchased.
Ram Charan v. Ajudhia Prasad (Allahabad High Court) Where one brother sold his interest in a portion of joint family property, the other brother could sue for partition of his share in that specific property without asking for partition of other joint family properties. Held to be complementary and supportive of the proposition that suit may be confined to the property affected by the alienation.
Srimati Padmamani Dasi v. Srimati Jagadamba Dasi (Phear, J., Calcutta High Court) Principle that plaintiff may confine his application to the part he wants divided, but other parties may show that part cannot fairly be divided without considering the rest. Adopted as the true principle to be applied; used to conclude plaintiffs' suit limited to the purchased property is maintainable subject to objections from other parties as to necessity of broader partition.
Koer Hasmat Rai v. Sunder Das Held that the objection that the whole of the joint family property is not included is not merely a technical objection (though facts were special in that case). Cited by appellant; court treated the case as consistent with permitting a suit confined to the purchased property while recognizing the defendant could seek broader partition—no such objection was raised in the written statement here.
Mahanth Harnandan Das v. Syed Md. Kalim Dealt with equity of redemption of a usufructuary mortgage covering an undivided share and whether mortgagee's claim entitled him to a simple suit for partition; held possession of co-owners was not the mortgagee's possession to found a simple partition suit. Distinguished: the judge (Beevor, J.) regarded that decision as having no bearing on the facts here and did not accept it as a bar to the present partition suit involving a sudbharnadar.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded to analyze each contention in turn, beginning with the fourth (concerning what a purchaser at execution acquires):

  1. Fourth contention (execution purchase and extent of purchaser's rights):

    The court applied the principle from Din Dayal's case: under Mitakshara law the interest of a coparcener may be sold in execution and a purchaser's rights are limited to what the judgment-debtor could have compelled by partition prior to alienation. On the facts (and after the lower courts' finding that there had been no prior partition), the share in issue was at no time other than eight annas. The court rejected the suggestion that plaintiffs purchased only Phalli's interest excluding his sons and grandsons; the court noted that the interest of the sons and grandsons could be sold in execution (unless the debt were immoral, a defence available to them). It was also noted that Phalli's sons and grandsons had been parties to the suit and to the execution proceedings. The court thus held that by their auction purchase the plaintiffs acquired the same rights as if they had purchased “the share or right, title and interest of Phalli, his sons and grandsons,” even though the exact quantum was not specified at the time of sale.

  2. First contention (omission of prayer for possession under proviso to section 42, Specific Relief Act):

    The court referenced the proviso to section 42 and authorities (including Hurdey Narain Sahu) to conclude that a purchaser of such an interest cannot seek simple possession other than by means of partition; the purchaser's remedy is partition. The plaintiffs had claimed partition; therefore their omission of a separate prayer for possession did not render the suit non-maintainable in light of these decisions. The court acknowledged the appellate court's approach to require ad valorem court-fee (because the plaintiffs were out of possession) pursuant to the concern expressed in Nandkishore Kumar v. Achambit Kumari, but treated that fee issue as distinct from maintainability.

  3. Second contention (necessity to include entire joint-family properties):

    The appellant relied on authorities (including Mayne and Koer Hasmat Rai) to argue that an alienee must include the entire joint-family properties in a partition suit. The court surveyed contrary decisions (Tarini Charan Chakrabati, Calcutta and Allahabad decisions, Srimati Padmamani Dasi) and adopted the principle expressed by Phear, J.: a plaintiff may confine his suit to the particular part he wishes divided, though other parties may show that the part cannot fairly be divided without consideration of the rest. The court concluded that plaintiffs' suit confined to the property in which they had purchased a share was maintainable, subject to the defendant's right to contend that broader partition is necessary. The court also observed that no such objection was taken in the defendant's written statement.

  4. Third contention (necessity of parties):

    The court held that so long as the suit is restricted to the property in which the plaintiffs' purchased share has passed to them, Phalli, his sons and grandsons were not necessary parties to that suit.

  5. Fifth contention (effect of sudbharnadar/usufructuary mortgage in possession):

    The court stated that a partition cannot be effective in possession until the sudbharnadar's rights are redeemed and any shares allotted remain subject to the sudbharnadar. However, because the present suit did not propose to evict the sudbharnadar or to substitute other security for the mortgage dues, the existence of the sudbharnadar did not bar the partition suit nor render the mortgagee a necessary party. The court distinguished Mahanth Harnandan Das v. Syed Md. Kalim and found that decision inapplicable to the facts before it.

  6. Result of analysis:

    Having addressed each contention and applied the relevant authorities to the facts, the court concluded that all of the appellant's contentions failed.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED — The court dismissed the defendant-appellant's appeal with costs.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The plaintiffs' partition suit, confined to the property in which they purchased the eight-anna share in execution, is maintainable.
  • The auction purchase is treated as conferring on the plaintiffs the rights equivalent to purchasing "the share or right, title and interest of Phalli, his sons and grandsons" and their remedy is to pursue partition (not a simple claim for possession).
  • The defendant's objections — including non-joinder of all joint-family properties, non-joinder of certain persons, and the existence of a sudbharnadar in possession — were rejected on the facts and legal principles applied; the sudbharnadar's rights remain subject to the partition allotment and are not a bar to the suit as framed.

Broader legal implications:

The court applied and reconciled existing authorities (as cited) to the facts and did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law; the decision affirms established principles on what rights a purchaser at execution acquires in a Mitakshara joint-family context, the appropriate remedy (partition rather than possession), and the circumstances in which a suit may be confined to the property affected by alienation. No new precedent beyond the application of these authorities to the facts was declared in the opinion.

Opinion delivered by Beevor, J.; Bennett, J. concurred. Appeal dismissed.

    Delosingh v. Jagdip Singh

    Beevor, J.:— This is an appeal by the defendant in a suit for partition. The plaintiffs brought a suit against Phalli Singh, his sons and grandsons on the basis of a handnote and obtained a decree, and on 3rd January 1942, in execution of; that decree, they brought to sale and purchased an eight-anna share in one property as representing the share of Phalli, his sons and grandsons. The decree in the suit was dated 23rd April 1940 and the eight annas share had been attached before judgment on 22nd April 1939. The defendant-appellant was of the same family as Phalli Singh, and the plaintiffs sued for partition of the eight-anna share purchased by them as against the defendant-appellant.

    The defendant-appellant contested the suit on various grounds, the main allegation of fact on his behalf being the allegation that there had been a prior partition in the family of himself and Phalli Singh whereby the 16 annas of the property in suit had been allotted to him. On this question of fact, however, the decision of the lower courts was against the appellant and that decision could not be challenged in second appeal.

    Five contentions have been raised on behalf of the appellant: first, that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiffs had made no prayer for possession; secondly, that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiffs had not included in their partition suit the entire properties which belonged to the joint family of the appellant and Phalli, his sons and grandsons; thirdly, it was contended that Phalli, his sons and grandsons were necessary parties to the suit; fourthly, it was contended that the plaintiffs in execution of their decree could only purchase the right, title and interest of Phalli with or without the interest of his sons and grandsons, and that they could not themselves in their execution proceedings determine the share at eight annas, and that the share must be determined in a suit brought against the family of Phalli and the appellant; and, fifthly, it was contended that as the property is in possession of sudbharnadars the plaintiffs' suit is not maintainable.

    It will be convenient to deal first with the fourth of these contentions. From the time of Din Dayal's case it has been settled that in the Mitakshara as administered in this province the right, title and interest or share of a member of a Mitakshara joint family may be sold in execution of a decree against him even though he may not dispose of his share in the joint estate by voluntary conveyance without the concurrence of his co-parceners. It was also stated in that case that the right of the purchaser at the execution sale must be limited to that of compelling the partition which his debtor might have compelled had he been so minded before the alienation of his share took place. It is thus obvious that the decree holder cannot by specifying a share in his execution proceedings as being that to which his judgment-debtor is entitled give himself or any other auction-purchaser a right to obtain by partition any greater share from that which his judgment-debtor could have obtained by partition as stated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In the present case, however, it could not be urged after the finding of the lower courts that there had been no previous partition that the share in the joint family property or in the village, in which the plaintiffs made their purchase, was at any material time either greater or less than eight annas. It was suggested that the plaintiffs might have purchased merely the right, title and interest of Phalli excluding that of his sons and grandsons, and such a share would certainly be less than eight annas. But the interest of the sons and grandsons can be sold in execution of a decree against the father unless the debt is an immoral one. This is a defence which can be raised by the sons and grandsons, and it appears that Phalli's sons and grandsons were parties to the suit against Phalli as well as the execution proceedings. I, therefore, hold that by their auction purchase the plaintiffs acquired exactly the same rights as they would have done had they in their execution proceedings put up for sale and purchased “the share or right, title and interest of Phalli, his sons and grandsons” in the village without at that time specifying exactly what that share was.

    I now turn to the first of the appellant's contentions. This is based on the proviso to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act which runs as follows:—

    “Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to peek further relief the a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.”

    Now in the above cited case of Din Dayal and the later decision of the Judicial Committee in Hurdey Narain Sahu's case even though the purchaser of the right, title and interest of one member of the joint family had obtained possession, the Judicial Committee held that the joint family was entitled to recover possession of the entire property purchased subject to the rights of the purchaser to work out his rights by means of a partition. It seems to me quite impossible in the face of these decisions to suggest that the purchaser at such an auction sale can in a subsequent suit sue for possession otherwise than by means of partition. The plaintiffs have claimed partition and in the circumstances I do not think they could claim any further relief. It may well be that, the lower appellate Court was right in requiring the plaintiffs to pay ad valorem court-fee instead of the fixed court-fee for partition on the ground that they were out of possession, but that does not affect the question with which we are now concerned.

    It was certainly held by James, J. in Nandkishore Kumar v. Achambit Kumari that the Court should be astute to see that the plaintiff should not avoid the liability to pay court-fee under section 7(iv)(c) or 7(v) of the Court-Fees Act merely try omitting to assert a prayer for possession in what was essentially a title suit in the guise of a partition suit. The lower appellate Court has really applied this principle in requiring the plaintiffs to pay ad valorem court-fee. We were referred to the case of Rewati Raman Basak v. Haris Chandra Basak, a case in which the courts refused to allow a plaint in a partition suit to be amended by adding a prayer for possession, but that was clearly a case in which the plaintiff could have sued for joint possession.

    I now come to the second point. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that, as the plaintiffs' right to partition would at most be the right which was possessed by his judgment-debtor to obtain partition, the plaintiffs in their suit must include all the joint family properties, because had Phalli himself sued for partition he would certainly have had to do so. The appellant has referred to paragraph 388 of Mayne's Hindu Law, 10th edition, page 500 where it is stated that

    “the alienee's suit for partition must be one for the partition of the entire property and not for partition of any specific interest for he acquires no interest therein and the coparcener who alienated had himself no such interest. He cannot sue for partition and allotment to him of his share of the property so alienated, nor is he entitled to any mesne profits in respect of his share between the date of his purchase and the date of his suit for partition”.

    The corresponding remarks in the 9th edition, paragraph 594 at page 716 were, however, not followed by, Nasim Ali, J. in Tarini Charan Chakrabati v. Debendra Lal De. The learned Judge in that case held that the purchaser of a small portion of the joint family property is entitled under the law to get a partition only of the land purchased by him, and that in such cases a suit for a partial partition will lie, for to give effect to the contrary view would be to affirm the principle that a plaintiff can institute a suit for partition in respect of property in which he has no interest at all. He also pointed out that although the ordinary rule is that a suit for parution must embrace all properties owned by the parties thereto, there is also the complementary rule that the suit for partition cannot include properties in which each of the parties does not claim an interest. The latter proposition was set out in an earlier case of the Calcutta High Court—Sris Chandra Dutta Chaudhuri v. Mahima Chandra Datta Choudhuri—decided by Sir Asutosh Mukherji, later Chief Justice of Calcutta, and Roe, J. who subsequently became one of the original Judges of this Court. Applying that principle they held that, where two properties A and B were jointly owned by X and Y and by mutual agreement X held possession of A while Y of B but no final and definite partition was effected between the parties, and Y, though in possession of B, transferred to Z his one-half share in A, Z was entitled to claim partition as against X. There are two earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Mohan Lall v. Mul Chand and Ram Charan v. Ajudhia Prasad which have a bearing on this question. In the first of those cases it was held that it was competent to the purchaser of a share in two joint family in property to bring a suit for partition of one of those properties without including the other in his suit. This goes much farther than the claim of the plaintiffs in the present instance. In the second of those Allahabad decisions, where two brothers formed a joint Hindu family and one of them sold his interest in a portion of the joint family property, it was held that it was competent to the other brother to sue for partition of his share in the property so dealt with without asking also for partition of the remainder of the joint family properties. The facts of that case are really complementary to those now before us. The first of those Allahabad decisions relied on the earlier decision of Phear, J. of the Calcutta High Court in Srimati Padmamani Dasi v. Srimati Jagadamba Dasi. It seems to me that he has laid down the true principle to be applied in his judgment in that case in the following words: “I think that the plaintiff may confine his application to the Court to that particular part of the property which he is desirous of having divided; but then it follows from the view which I have already endeavoured to express that in a suit so brought, it will always be open to the other parties to show that part of the property ought not to be divided, or could not fairly be divided without taking into consideration the rest of the property and dividing it also.” The appellant relied on the decision in Koer Hasmat Rai v. Sunder Das for the proposition that in a suit for partition the objection that the whole of the joint family property is not included in it is by no means a technical one. The facts of that case involved special questions, but even if the proposition is treated as of general application, it seems to me to be quite consistent with the view that the present plaintiffs might bring their suit in respect of the one property in which they had purchased a share though it would have been open to the defendant to object that partition should not be allowed unless other properties were also brought into partition. No such objection was taken in the written statement in the present suit. It was urged also on behalf of the appellant that the transferee of a share in only one of the joint family properties cannot as against the members of the joint family compel a partition of that property alone. Again I think that this proposition is quite consistent with the view that the plaintiffs may bring their suit in respect of the one property subject to the possibility that the defendant may claim that other properties also be brought into the partition. The result of the principle expressed by Phear, J. and quoted above will also have the reasonable result that the choice whether the plaintiff shall be restricted to the particular property in which he has purchased a share or whether a general partition should be demanded, will be with the members of the joint family and not with the plaintiff who is a stranger purchaser, in my opinion, therefore, the present suit for partition is maintainable though all the properties of the joint family have not been included.

    Turning now to the third point, I think it is quite clear that so long as the suit is restricted to the property in which the share of Phalli, his sons and grandsons has passed to the plaintiffs, those persons are not necessary parties to the suit.

    As regards the fifth point, the partition cannot be effective in possession until the sudbharna is redeemed and the shares allotted on partition must clearly remain subject to the sudbharna. But as it is not proposed to evict the sudbharnadar or to do anything in the present partition suit which would have the effect of requiring any substitution of property as security for his mortgage dues, I do not think that the existence of this sudbharna or usufructuary mortgage is either a bar to the partition suit or requires that the sudbharnadar should be made a party to the suit. A reference was made on behalf of the appellant in this connection to the decision in Mahanth Harnandan Das v. Syed Md. Kalim, a decision to which I was a party. That was a case in which the holder of an equity of redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, which mortgage covered an undivided share in zamindari property, brought a partition suit against his co-owners. It was found that although he claimed possession through his mortgagees, the mortgagees were not in possession, and it was held that the possession of the co-owners was not his possession so as to entitle him to bring a simple suit for partition. That decision has, to my mind, no bearing on the facts of the case now before us.

    In my view, therefore, all the contentions of the appellant fail, and I would dismiss this appeal with costs.

    Bennett, J.:— I agree.

    K.D
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Delosingh v. Jagdip Singh
    (Apr 17, 1947)